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Abstract 
The present research aimed to develop the implicit relational assessment 
procedure (IRAP) as a means of quantifying tobacco addiction in terms of implicit (i.e. 
automatic) evaluative processes. Chapter 1 begins by highlighting the fundamental 
importance of such processes to the losses of personal autonomy which characterise 
tobacco addiction. Accordingly, thereafter, Chapters 1-3 involve critically reviewing all 
major measures of addiction-related implicit processes in terms of their respective 
abilities to distinguish between implicit evaluating of one topic as distinct from another. 
The review culminates by recommending the IRAP, and its behaviour analytic rationale, 
as a tool for both functional and cognitive theorizing about tobacco addiction. Chapter 4 
reports a study showing that the IRAP compares favourably with the most popular 
implicit measurement tool, the implicit association test (IAT), in terms of its ability to 
validate against multiple defining features of tobacco addiction. Indeed, this was despite 
the fact that both implicit measures were focused on evaluative topics specifically 
designed to favour the IAT rather than the IRAP; and also despite the fact that as a 
result the relevant IAT convincingly outperformed all of its predecessors in the 
literature. In response, Chapter 5 describes research that explored the potential of the 
IRAP to target complex, mood-conditional aspects of smokers’ implicit reasons for 
smoking that were unavailable to the IAT, or any other implicit measure. Crucially, by 
revealing motivational distinctions that were simply not available using other existing 
measures of implicit cognition, the IRAP’s experimental precision allowed us to 
identify aspects of implicit evaluating with unprecedented levels of criterion validity in 
relation to tobacco addiction. For example, these findings suggested a preliminary 
functional model wherein tobacco addiction is motivated by complex, coordinated and 
mood-dependent networks of implicit evaluative processes which collectively insist that 
one should regulate one’s ongoing emotional experiences – particularly negative 
craving-related affect – by smoking. Extending this model, the three experimental 
studies reported in Chapters 6 and 7 confirmed that smokers’ most popular, and also 
least successful, method of managing their (implicit) tobacco cravings is ultimately self-
defeating insofar as it involves experientially avoidant tactics like thought suppression. 
Accordingly, Chapter 8 concludes by recommending the IRAP, with certain important 
qualifications, as a useful means of quantifying tobacco addiction in such a way as to 
begin clarifying the motivational problem(s) that smoking-cessation treatments must 
ultimately tackle.  
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CHAPTER 1: A Review of Foundational Rationales and Early Approaches for Examining 
Tobacco Addiction in terms of Implicit Cognition 
 
1.1. Defining the Problem of Tobacco Addiction 
Tobacco smoking is one of the single most self-destructive and yet persistently 
popular pastimes of our era. As a testament to this troubling contradiction, most regular 
smokers not only recognize that smoking undermines the length and quality of their lives, 
but many also recognize that it harms even non-smokers (i.e. CDC, 2002, 2008; 
Eurobarometer, 2006, p. 53, 2012, p.101; Koh, Alpert, Judge, Caughey, Elqura, Connolly, 
& Warren, 2011; Stuber, Galea, & Link, 2008; Wilson, Creswell, Sayette, & Fiez, 2013; 
World Health Organization, 2011). Of the roughly one quarter to one third of regular 
smokers that populate developed countries most report that they would like to quit smoking 
(i.e. if they felt able to; see CDC, 2002, 2008; Eurobarometer, 2006, p. 52, 2012, p. 99; 
Fong, Hammond, Laux, Zanna, Cummings, Borland, & Ross, 2004; Peterson, Vander, & 
Jaén, 2011, p. 4; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012; West, 2004; 
Wilson et al., 2013; World Health Organization, 2011; Zatoński, Przewoźniak, Sulkowska, 
West, & Wojtyła, 2012); and yet, those one in three or four people continue to smoke.1  
Irrespective of the many longstanding theoretical controversies concerning the 
minutiae of what defines tobacco addiction, this is in essence the core puzzle at its heart: 
that so many smokers appear unable to stop themselves from regularly smoking even 
though they are very clearly often desperate to do so (see Chassin, Presson, Rose & 
Sherman, 2007; Conklin, Clayton, Tiffany & Shiffman, 2004; DiFranza, 2010; DiFranza, 
Savageau, Fletcher, Ockene, Rigotti, McNeill, Coleman, & Wood, 2002; DiFranza, 
Ursprung, Lauzon, Bancej, Wellman, Ziedonis et al., 2010; DiFranza, Wellman, 
Mermelstein, Pbert, Klein, Sargent, 2011; Donovan & Marlatt, 2005, pp. 1-49; Edwards, 
2012; Heyman, 2009, 2011, 2013; Hughes, Keely, & Naud, 2004; Köpetz, Lejuez, Wiers, 
& Kruglanski, 2013; Piasecki, Piper, & Baker, 2010; Scragg, Wellman, Laugesen, & 
DiFranza, 2008; Ursprung & DiFranza, 2010; Wellman, DiFranza, Pbert, Fletcher, Flint, 
Young, & Draker, 2006, p. 494; West, 2001, 2006). For example, among the most popular 
ways of defining tobacco addiction is in terms either of nicotine providing irresistible 
                                                 
1 For brevity any mention of smoking or smokers shall henceforth refer exclusively to tobacco smoking unless 
otherwise specified. 
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emotional relief (e.g. Baker, Piper, McCarthy, Majeskie, & Fiore, 2004; McCallion & 
Zvolensky, 2015; Tiffany, Conklin, Shiffman, & Clayton, 2004), providing irresistible 
reward (e.g. Everitt & Robins, 2005), or indeed in terms of hijacking motivational brain 
systems that make its use irresistible regardless of hedonia (e.g. Robinson & Berridge, 
1993, 2003). Thus, it could be argued that when the term tobacco addiction is stripped back 
to its raison d’etre it is fundamentally conveying a problem of diminished personal 
autonomy; and one which ultimately constitutes the single greatest premature cause of 
death among humans to date (see CDC, 2002, 2008; U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2012; World Health Organization, 2011). Exploring sources for this pivotal loss 
of personal autonomy is the focus of the current thesis. 
The general approach will involve developing and testing measures of automatic 
cognitive biases, usually termed implicit evaluations or cognitions, that relate to smoking 
(De Houwer, 2006, 2011; De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes & Moors, 2013; De Houwer & 
Moors, 2012; Gawronski & Creighton, 2013). In particular, we2 will consider how a 
relatively new measure of implicit cognition, the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
(IRAP; Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Power, Hayden, Milne & Stewart, 2006) may be 
used to build upon the capabilities of its predecessors in terms of measuring smoking-
related implicit cognition. By experimenting with smoking-related IRAP scores the 
following research thus seeks to clarify two major issues about tobacco addiction: why 
smokers continue to smoke even when they dislike doing so; and also to explore how 
smoking-related implicit cognition relates to classic formulations of self-control involving 
deliberate suppression of tobacco cravings. In so doing, we hope to provide some 
theoretical clarification as to what extent tobacco addiction manifests in implicit evaluating 
in terms of emotional relief versus reward. 
1.2. Why Research on Implicit Cognition is required to solve the Problem of Diminished 
Autonomy at the Heart of Tobacco Addiction 
In keeping with western peoples’ strong tendency to embrace the age-old libertarian 
idea of ‘free-will’ (see Acton, 1922/2007; Augustinos, Walker, & Donaghue, 2006; Baer, 
Kaufman, & Baumeister, 2008; Balaguer, 2012; Dunning, 2013; Nichols, 2011; Malle, 
2004; Nichols & Knobe, 2007; Sarkissian, Chetterjee, De Brigard, Knobe, Nichols, & 
                                                 
2 For purely stylistic reasons the collective pronoun “we” will henceforth be used instead of the personal 
pronoun “I” even though the work presented herein was conducted solely by the present doctoral candidate.  
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Schlinger, 2005; Schwartz, 2004; Shariff, Greene, Karremans, Luguri, Clark, Schooler, 
Baumeister, & Vohs, 2014; Viney, 1969), psychological theories of (tobacco) addiction are 
traditionally built upon the assumption that humans make choices using only rational and 
introspectively accessible mental processes (see Abrams, Niaura, Brown, Emmons, 
Goldstein, & Monti, 2003; Ajzen, 1988; Ajzen & Fishbein, 2000; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; 
Becker, 1974; Brandon, Herzog, Irvin, & Gwaltney, 2004; Conklin et al., 2004; DiFranza, 
2010; DiFranza et al., 2010; Donovan & Marlatt, 2005; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Heyman, 
2009, 2011, 2013; Köpetz et al., 2013; Peterson et al., 2011; Rogers, 1983; Rooke, Hine, & 
Thorsteinsson, 2008; Shadel, Shiffman, Niaura, Nichter, & Abrams, 2000; Tiffany, 
Conklin, Shiffman, & Clayton, 2004; West, 2001, 2006; Wiers & de Jong, 2007; Wiers et 
al., 2010). From this rationalistic point of view human behaviour is assumed, a priori, to be 
mediated exclusively by mental calculations that involve deliberately and systematically 
“working out” whether the benefits of some behaviour or action are likely to outweigh its 
costs. 
At first glance this mainstream, rationalistic way of understanding human thinking 
may seem very plausible in that it certainly comports well with the ongoing personal 
experience of observing oneself thinking things through to come to (seemingly) reasonable 
judgements and decisions about the things that matter to us. Indeed, it is an empirical fact 
that humans with the ability to notice and describe their thinking normally strive to resolve 
any inconsistencies that they happen to notice within that thinking and/or their behaviour 
more broadly (see Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, & Dymond, 2001; Bem, 1967, 1972; Bordieri, 
Kellum, & Wilson, 2013; Cooper & Carlsmith, 2001; Crisp & Turner, 2010, pp. 114; Fazio, 
Zanna, & Cooper, 1977; Festinger, 1957; Gawronski, 2012; Harmon-Jones, 2012; 
Heintzelman, Trent, & King, 2013; Nickerson, 1998; Skinner, 1989; Wray, 2011; Wray, 
Dougher, Hamilton, & Guinther, 2012). Crucially, however, it is also a well-established 
empirical fact that human behaviour is frequently influenced in ways that are not 
exclusively governed by rational and/or introspectively accessible processes (e.g. Chiesa, 
1994; Greenspoon, 1955; James, 1890, 1892; Kahneman, 2011; Kihlstrom, 2008; Moore, 
2003, 2010, 2011; Proctor & Capaldi, 2012; Skinner, 1945; 1953; 1974; Stacy & Wiers, 
2010, pp.554-555; Verplanck, 1955). Specifically, psychologists have long noted that what 
people claim to know about their own psychology can vary in its accuracy in many 
contradictory ways depending upon context. 
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Firstly, people often fail to correctly self-report the source of contrasting 
experimental effects upon their behaviour (see Dunning, 2013; Jones & Harris, 1967; Jones 
& Nisbett, 1971; Kahneman, 2011; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Roediger, 2003; Schiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977; Uziel, 2010; Wilson, 2009). Secondly, self-reports are themselves 
susceptible to many common confounding contextual effects (e.g. demand characteristics, 
and/or more broadly, to the context-specific cuing of irrelevant but highly rehearsed ways 
of thinking and acting; see Bilalić, McLeod & Gobet, 2008; Cronbach, 1990; Dane, 2011; 
Dougherty & Johnston, 1996; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Haas & Hayes, 2006; Hayes, 1989; 
James, 1890, 1892; Kahneman, 2011; Kendrick & Olson, 2012; Lally & Gardner, 2013; 
Lelkes, Krosnick, Marx, Judd, & Park, 2012; Nichols & Maner, 2008; Nickerson, 1998; 
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Roediger, 2003; Rugg & D’Agnese, 2013; Schiffrin & Schneider, 
1977; Schwarz, 2008; Verplanck, 1955; Tiffany, 1990; Wilson & Schooler, 1991; Wilson 
2009; Wood & Neal, 2007; Wulfert, Greenway, Farkas, Hayes, & Dougher, 1994). Thirdly, 
self-reports are prone to a large variety of trait-like cognitive biases that mislead human 
reasoning in general (i.e. philosophers call these biases logical fallacies; for popular 
reviews see Ariely, 2008; Kahneman, 2011).3 Fourthly, even if we assume that people can 
sometimes manage to introspect accurately, the relevant self-reports would still be prone to 
distortions of social desirability wherein people seek to conform what they say with what 
they perceive to be the prevailing social norms of the relevant audience (e.g. Bem, 1967, 
1972; Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1977; Festinger, 1957; Gawronski, 2012; Holtgraves, 2004; 
Paulhus, 1989; Uziel, 2010).4 The cumulative upshot of these various distortions to which 
self-reports are prone is that many aspects of behaviour do not operate in full accordance 
with the subjective rationality of self-reports. Rationalistic theories, derived as they are 
from questionnaire-based self-report methodologies, have therefore been largely 
unsuccessful at predicting irrational behaviours even cross-sectionally (e.g. Abraham, 
Connor, Jones, & O’Conner, 2008, pp.148-155; Ajzen & Fishbein, 2000, pp. 16-26; 
Armitage & Connor, 2001; Connor & Sparks, 2002; Dunning, 2013; Orbell & Sheeran, 
                                                 
3 In fact, some of these popular logical fallacies specifically hide inconsistencies from introspection thus 
directly bolstering rationalistic illusions even further (e.g. confirmation, einstellung and attribution biases; see 
Crisp & Turner, 2010, pp. 42-120; Dane, 2011; Jones & Harris, 1967; Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Malle, 2004, 
2006, 2011; Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007; Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; Nickerson, 1998; 
Proctor & Capaldi, 2012; Rugg & D’Agnese, 2013; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2013). 
4 To complicate matters even further peoples’ self-reports sometimes polarize against social norms that they 
find threatening or otherwise unpalatable (see Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996; Legault, 
Gutsell, & Inzlicht, 2011; Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012; Nestler & Egloff, 2010; 
Rhodes, Roskos-Ewoldsen, Edison, & Bradford, 2008; Wood, 2000).  
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1998; Schwarz, 1999, 2008; Schwarz & Oyserman, 2001; Sheeran, 2002; Stacy, Bentler, & 
Flay, 1994; Topa & Moriano, 2010; Verplanken & Aarts, 1999; Webb & Sheeran, 2006; 
Wiers et al., 2010, pp. 464-465).  
Crucially, the tobacco addict’s thinking about smoking is a classic microcosm of the 
foregoing duality between rationality versus irrationality. On the one hand, even the most 
addicted smokers retain some degree of rationalistic insight and discretion about their 
smoking: whether they postpone their cigarette for a short time in the service of waiting for 
their coffee to brew, or whether they postpone it much longer in the service of taking a 
plane journey to somewhere they would like to visit (see DiFranza et al., 2007; DiFranza et 
al., 2012; Wilson et al., 2013). And yet at other times, the addicted smoker’s thinking is 
characteristically conflicted, fluctuating irrationally between wanting to smoke and wanting 
to quit smoking, and such that even those smokers who report disliking smoking do not 
know how to stop themselves from continuing to do so (e.g. Chassin et al., 2007; DiFranza, 
Ursprung, & Biller, 2012; DiFranza, Ursprung & Carson, 2010; Lipkus, Green, Feaganes, 
& Sedikides, 2001; Sayette, Loewenstein, Griffin, & Black, 2008; Shadel et al., 2000; 
Webb & Sheeran, 2006, p. 254; Wilson et al., 2013). Thus, despite the ability of all tobacco 
addicts to at least temporarily maintain rational consistency in their thinking about 
smoking, when considered in its defining contexts tobacco addiction is a psychological 
condition that appears to be inherently irrational5 and also elusive to introspection. 
Bearing out the mismatch between smoking-related explicit self-reports and the 
irrational often stigmatized nature of tobacco addiction, changes in self-reported beliefs, 
smoking-related attitudes and/or intentions are generally poor predictors of changes in 
smoking behaviour. If anything, changes in self-reported attitudes and intentions about 
smoking tend to follow changes in smoking-related behaviour, and even then the resulting 
post hoc self-reports are usually only weakly related to smoking behaviours (see Baldwin, 
Rothman, Hertel, Linde, Jeffrey, Finch & Lando, 2006; Brandon, Juliano, & Copeland, 
1999; de Leeuw, Engels, Vermulst, & Scholte, 2008; Hendricks, Prochaska, Humfleet, & 
Hall, 2008; DiFranza, 2010; Donny & Dierker, 2007; Gifford & Humphreys, 2007; 
Gwaltney, Metrik, Kahler & Shiffman, 2009; Hertel, Finch, Kelly, King, Lando, Linde et 
al., 2008; Hughes, 2007a; Lipkus et al., 2001; Palfai, 2002, p. 318; Piper, McCarthy, & 
                                                 
5 That is, irrational in the sense of the cognitive (in)consistency of its constituent processes, rather than 
irrational in any moral sense, or indeed in any sense that it cannot in principle be scientifically understood in 
terms of experimental variables. 
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Baker, 2006; Stacy et al., 1994; Tiffany et al., 2004; Topa & Moriano, 2010; Webb & 
Sheeran, 2006, p. 254).6   
Nonetheless, without viable alternatives, psychological treatments of smoking-
cessation traditionally resort to self-reports for empirical guidance. This has contributed to 
a largely hit-or-miss approach to treatment discovery wherein even the best smoking-
cessation interventions stagnate at disappointingly low 10-30% six-month smoking-
abstinence rates. In particular, one of the most frequently cited reasons for this clinical 
stagnation is the lack of treatment-specific psychological measurement effects to target for 
systematic development (see Abrams et al., 2003, pp. 21-23; Borland, Partos & Cummings, 
2012, 2013; Chapman & McKenzie, 2010, 2013; Dawkins, 2013; Fiore, Jaén, Baker, 
Bailey, Benowitz, Curry et al., 2008; Kapson, Leddy, & Haaga, 2012; Kazdin, 2007; 
Gifford & Humphreys, 2007; Hughes, 2008; Hughes, Rennard, Fingar, et al., 2011; 
Lancaster & Stead, 2005; Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 2011; Messer & Pierce, 
2013; Murphy, Cooper, Hollon, & Fairburn, 2009; Peterson et al., 2011, pp. 49-57; Piasecki 
et al., 2010; Roefs, Huijding, Smulders, MacLeod, de Jong, Wiers, & Jansen, 2011; Rooke 
et al., 2008, p. 1324; Rosen & Davison, 2003; Tønnesen, 2009; Walsh, 2008; Webb & 
Sheeran, 2006, p. 254).  
At this point, therefore, we can safely conclude that a sole reliance on traditional 
questionnaire-based self-report measures is not sufficient to provide a complete picture of 
the psychological causes of tobacco addiction, and worse still, such practices thus limit 
smoking-cessation treatments (see Abrams et al., 2003, pp. xiii-xiv; Croyle & Backinger, 
2008; DiFranza, 2010; Donovan & Marlatt, 2005, pp. 114-115; Gifford & Humphreys, 
2007, pp. 356-358; Tiffany, 2008; Tiffany, et al., 2004; Tønnesen, 2009, p. S22; West, 
2001, 2004, 2006; Wiers & de Jong, 2007; Wiers et al., 2010; Wray et al., 2013). The lost 
autonomy which defines tobacco addiction is instead an inherently irrational process that 
defies self-report; and so the only effective way of understanding tobacco addiction is to 
employ measures that capture irrational cognitive processes per se. In principle, measures 
of implicit cognition are uniquely suited to the task because by definition irrational 
                                                 
6 Although self-reported tobacco cravings sometimes co-occur with the onset of heavier patterns of smoking 
and/or moderately predict relapse during abstinence, they are generally poor predictors of changes in future 
patterns of smoking (DiFranza, 2009, 2010; DiFranza et al., 2012; DiFranza et al., 2011; Erblich & 
Montgomery, 2012; Hughes, 2007a, 2007b; MacKillop, Brown, Stojek, Murphy, Sweet, & Niaura, 2012; 
Piasecki et al., 2010; Sayette et al., 2008; Shiffman, West, & Gilbert, 2004; Tiffany et al., 2004; Tiffany, 
2008; Wray, Gass, & Tiffany, 2013).  
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cognition involves inadvertent, and thus automatic, contradictory changes in cognition (see 
De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009a, 2009b; Roefs et al., 2011; Wiers 
& de Jong, 2007; Wiers et al., 2010). For example, implicit measures might be used to 
quantify the propensity of pro-smoking evaluating to automatically interrupt and thus 
contradict corresponding anti-smoking evaluating (or vice versa). Therefore, what follows 
in the next section, and over the course of the following two chapters are a series of 
systematic reviews critiquing each of the most popular measures of implicit cognition 
relative to our intended task of improving experimental understanding of tobacco addiction 
processes. In providing this review, we ultimately hope to make it clear why the IRAP is 
uniquely equipped to solve a range of critical impasses in the literature on smoking-related 
implicit cognition. 
1.3. The First Wave of Research on Smoking-related Implicit Cognition: A Comprehensive 
Review of Attention- and Cue-based Measures 
At first, and for the longest time, people could only detect irrational processes in 
terms of the inadvertent occurrence of contradictions among self-reports. Among the 
earliest measures of addiction to specifically target implicit styles of evaluation per se (i.e. 
tasks that orchestrate fast, efficient, introspectively-inaccessible and/or unintentional 
evaluative responses; see De Houwer & Moors, 2012; De Houwer et al., 2009a, 2009b), 
were those that attempted to capture automatic attention and/or distraction processes (see 
Bruce & Jones, 2006; Payne & Gawronski, 2010; Tiffany, 1990, pp. 159-161). 
Parsing Tobacco Addiction in Terms of Implicit Evaluating: A Systematic Review of 
Attention-based Measures 
There are many different varieties of attention measure, but in broad methodological 
terms they all measure cued cognitive consumption by gauging the extent to which an 
individual does or does not attend to particular addiction-related versus control stimuli (for 
comprehensive reviews and meta-analyses of addiction-related attention research see Bruce 
& Jones, 2006; Field, 2010; Field & Cox, 2008; Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006; Field, 
Munafó, & Franken, 2009; Rooke et al., 2008). Attention-based measures have perhaps 
been most useful in highlighting how addiction-related stimuli and contexts can 
automatically monopolise cognition to varying degrees depending upon various 
background motivational factors (e.g. such as how self-reported goals, emotions or 
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expectations can moderate which aspects of the ongoing context capture cognition; see 
Becker, Folk, & Remington, 2013; Drew, Võ, & & Wolfe, 2013; Eitam, Yeshurun, & 
Hassan, 2013; Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Price, 2013; Huntsinger, 2013; Rensink, O’Regan, 
& Clark, 1997; Vogt, De Houwer, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2013; Zhao, Al-Aidroos, & 
Turk-Browne, 2013).  
Nevertheless, attention measures are severely limited in one important way; 
although they can indicate that a stimulus is (or is not) attended to, they are silent with 
respect to whether that stimulus was evaluated positively, negatively, or indeed 
ambivalently (see Bruce & Jones, 2006; Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Field & 
Cox, 2008; Field, Munafó, & Franken, 2009; Shomstein & Johnson, 2013). Thus, a 
researcher using attention-based measures could conclude that a smoker attends to a picture 
of a lit cigarette to a greater extent than a non-smoker, but the reason behind the difference 
in attention would remain unclear. Intuitively, one might assume that smokers will attend 
more to such pictures because they like smoking, but attention-based measures provide 
nothing to support or contradict this assumption – they simply reveal greater or lesser levels 
of attention (see Field & Cox, 2008; Field et al., 2009). 
To illustrate, consider the addiction Stroop which is by far the most frequently used 
measure of addiction-related attentional bias. It is a modified version of the classic Stroop 
paradigm (Stroop, 1935) that requires participants to name the varying colours of neutral 
versus addiction-related words as quickly and as accurately as possible (see Cox, Fadardi, 
& Pothos, 2006). The basic rationale here is that when addiction-related words capture a 
participant’s attention it will selectively interfere with, and thus delay, the colour naming of 
addiction-related words relative to words that are assumed to be motivationally neutral. 
Thus, the longer it takes a participant to name the colour of the addiction-related words 
relative to the neutral words (i.e. the addiction Stroop effect) the more it indicates 
attentional bias towards the addiction-related stimuli (see Cox, Fadardi, & Pothos, 2006; 
Field & Cox, 2008; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). However, in and of itself, an 
addiction Stroop effect tells us nothing about any positive and/or negative evaluations that 
might have been involved in attending to those addiction-related stimuli (see Algom, 
Chajut & Lev, 2004; Bradley, Field, Healy & Mogg, 2008; Bruce & Jones, 2006; De 
Houwer, 2003a; Fox et al., 2001; Frings, Englert, Wentura, & Bermeitinger, 2010, p. 47). 
As noted above, if smokers showed a Stroop effect for smoking-related words, one might 
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intuitively assume that they did so because they like smoking; and yet, smokers may 
equally have shown this same attentional bias because they temporarily evaluated smoking 
negatively in the relevant context (e.g., many addicted smokers sometimes think of 
smoking as being a life-threatening habit that they cannot control; Baldwin et al., 2006; 
Bradley et al., 2008; Heyman, 2013; Lipkus et al., 2001).  
Another related problem is that measures of smoking-related attention have rather 
poor internal reliability (i.e. visual probe tasks and modified-Stroops related to substance 
abuse, respectively, exhibited N-weighted average Cronbach’s αs of just .14 and .46; see 
Ataya, Adams, Mullings, Cooper, Attwood, & Munafó, 2012a, 2012b; Spiegelhalder, 
Jähne, Kyle, Beil, Doll, Feige & Riemann, 2011; for even worse findings in other domains 
see also Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009; LeBel & Paunonen, 2011, p. 572; Schmukle, 
2005). Furthermore, they also tend to correlate weakly and/or inconsistently with core 
tobacco addiction criteria (i.e. subjective craving, experimental levels of deprivation, 
addiction-status, or rates of overt addictive behaviour). For example, examining the 
relationship of attention to addiction criteria in general Cox et al. (2006) found an r = .21 
for the addiction-Stroop; Rooke et al. (2008) found an r = .28 for visual probe tasks; and 
Spiegelhalder et al. (2011), found rs = .14 and .07, respectively, for visual probe tasks and 
addiction-Stroops (for more intricate but concordant reviews of attention effects in tobacco 
addiction see Bradley et al., 2008; Field & Cox, 2008; Littel & Franken, 2011; Waters & 
Sayette, 2006, pp. 312-324).7 
Subjective cravings is the variable most often theoretically related to addiction-
related attention in the literature (see Bradley et al., 2004, 2008; Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 
2005, 2006; Field & Cox, 2008; Franken, 2003; Larsen, Kong, Becker, Cousijn, 
Boendermaker, Cavello, Krishnan-Sarin, & Wiers, 2014; Mogg, Bradley, Field, & De 
Houwer, 2003; Mogg, Field, & Bradley, 2005), and yet a recent meta-analysis examining 
the correlation between measures of addiction-related attention and subjective cravings 
found the relationship to be very weak (i.e. across all addictions r = .19, and for tobacco 
addiction specifically r = .16; Field et al., 2009, p. 600). Moreover, Field et al.’s (2009) 
meta-analysis found evidence that addiction-related attention effects are commonly 
                                                 
7 Indeed, it is worth noting that the poor internal reliability of attention measures may be largely a result of 
their aforementioned lack of precision with regard to motivational processes (i.e. in principle, attention 
measures could result haphazardly on each occasion from any of a variety of different confounded cognitive 
processes depending on context; see Ataya et al., 2012a, 2012b; Cox et al., 2006; Field & Cox, 2008; Field et 
al., 2009; De Houwer, 2011; Spiegelhalder, et al., 2011).  
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confounded by many different cognitive processes. Overall, therefore, attention measures 
clearly do not marshal enough precision to disentangle whatever irrational evaluative 
processes govern tobacco addiction from situation to situation (see Ataya et al., 2012a, 
2012b; Bruce & Jones, 2006; Cisler et al., 2009; Field, 2010; Field & Cox, 2008; Field et 
al., 2009; Littel & Franken, 2011; Rooke et al., 2008; Spiegelhalder et al., 2011; Stacy & 
Wiers, 2010; Waters & Sayette, 2006). 
Parsing Tobacco Addiction in Terms of Implicit Evaluating: A Systematic Review of Cue-
based Measures 
The first techniques that were designed to target implicit evaluative processes per 
se, did so by examining the extent to which smoking-related versus control cues could 
automatically moderate the performance of subsequent evaluative responses (see Barrett, 
2006a, 2006b; Carter & Tiffany, 1999a, 1999b; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 
1986; Feldman-Barrett, Lindquist, Bliss-Moreau, Duncan, Gendron, Mize, & Brennan, 
2007; Ito & Cacioppo, 2007; Roediger, 2003; Roediger, Guynn, & Jones, 1994; Wentura & 
Degner, 2010; Wray et al., 2013). There are two main versions of this broad, cue-based 
approach: the cue-reactivity paradigm and the evaluative priming paradigm. As the 
simplest and earliest cue-based measure of tobacco addiction we deal with the cue-
reactivity paradigm first (Carter & Tiffany, 1999; Drummond, 2000; Drummond, Tiffany, 
Glautier, & Remington, 1995; Rosenberg, 2009). 
The Cue-reactivity Paradigm as a Means of Parsing of Tobacco Addiction 
This approach involves presenting individuals with addiction-related versus control 
stimuli to measure how much doing so moderates self-reported cravings, physiological 
symptoms of arousal, and/or much less commonly, the intensity of whatever overt 
behaviours are subject to the relevant addiction (for reviews see Erlblich & Montgomery, 
2012; Carter & Tiffany, 1999a, 1999b; Rose, Field, Franken, & Munafo, 2013; Wray et al., 
2013). Such work was important primarily because it provided the first evidence that 
addictive responses are controlled by contextual cues (i.e. including temporary goals or 
expectations; see Becker et al., 2013; Carter & Tiffany, 1999a, 1999b; Drew et al., 2013; 
Eitam et al., 2013; Erblich & Montgomery, 2012; Field & Duka, 2001; Harmon-Jones et 
al., 2013; Hayes & Brownstein, 1986; Huntsinger, 2013; Mucha, Pauli, & Weyers, 2006, 
pp. 204-209; Rose et al., 2013; Vogt et al., 2013; Wray et al., 2013; Zhao et al., 2013). In 
particular, cue-reactivity research revealed that addiction-related stimuli tend to provoke 
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many of the classic, intrusive symptoms of addiction whenever they are encountered 
(Carter & Tiffany, 1999a; Drummond, 2000). For example, Carter and Tiffany’s (1999a) 
meta-analysis found that smoking-related stimuli produced very large experimental cue 
effects with smokers’ self-reported cravings ( ̅ = 1.18; i.e.  ̅ ≈ .51)8, and small to medium 
experimental cue effects even on smokers’ physiological measures like heart rate and 
sweat-gland reactivity (respectively  ̅s = .21, .44; i.e.  ̅s ≈ .10, .22), even if no such effects 
were found for smokers’ skin temperature ( ̅ = - .07; i.e.  ̅ ≈ .03; see also Mucha et al., 
2006). In addition, although not a meta-analysis of the cue-reactivity paradigm per se, 
Heckman, Kovacs, Marquinez, Meltzer, Tsambarlis, Drobes, and Brandon (2013) found 
that negative mood induction moderately increased tobacco cravings ( ̅ = .47,  ̅ ≈ .23), 
even if positive mood inductions had inconsistent effects in this regard ( ̅ = .05,  ̅ ≈ .02). 
And yet, contemporary cue-reactivity measures are severely limited for our 
purposes. The central problem is that cue-reactions are measured in an unrestrained fashion. 
For example, self-reports are the most common evaluative responses examined for 
addiction-related cue effects: we have already reviewed how such reports are prone to 
various distortions, and so the same point must apply to addiction-related cue-reactivity 
research (Carter & Tiffany, 1999a; Drummond, 2000; Drummond et al., 1995; Perkins, 
2009; Rosenberg, 2009; Wray et al., 2013). Indeed, this has been confirmed by the finding 
that cue-reactions based upon self-reported cravings are prone to many extraneous 
influences (e.g. fleeting goals or expectations, and/or by asymmetric, construal-based order 
effects that are not resolved by counterbalancing; Dols, van den Hout, Kindt, & Willems, 
2002; Erblich & Montgomery, 2012; Sayette et al., 2010).  
One might be tempted, at this stage, to conclude that the cue-reactivity paradigm 
might provide a clear advantage over attention-based measures if psycho-physiological 
metrics (rather than self-reports) were employed. However, without procedures to ensure 
that each neural or autonomic response is driven by a particular evaluative process, such 
cue-reactivity effects are also open to a large variety of different motivational 
interpretations (see Barrett, 2006a, 2006b; Carter & Tiffany, 1999a, 1999b; Feldman-
Barrett et al., 2007; Feldman-Barrett, Lindquist, & Gendron, 2007; Feldman-Barrett, 
                                                 
8 Throughout the current thesis we used Rosnow, Rosenthal and Rubin’s (2000) and Rosenthal and 
DiMatteo’s (2001, p. 71) formulae to convert relevant statistical effects (e.g. d, t and F values coupled with 
their corresponding degrees of freedom) to r values in order to facilitate comparisons among different types of 
statistical effect sizes where appropriate. 
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Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011; Field & Duka, 2001; Kelly, Barrett, Pihl & Dagher, 2004; 
Havermans, Mulkens, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 2007; Hendricks et al., 2008; Heyman, 2011, 
2013; Ito & Cacioppo, 2007, pp. 149-151; Kassam & Mendes, 2013; Miller, 2010; Mucha 
et al., 2006; Perkins, 2009; Poldrack, 2006; Rose et al., 2013; Rosenberg, 2009; Sayette et 
al., 2010; Wang & Minor, 2008). For example, if a given addiction-related cue like a 
cigarette box is observed to heighten a smoker’s autonomic arousal in terms of increased 
heart rate, it could mean that the smoker became more excited about the prospect of 
smoking, or it could mean that they were begrudgingly experiencing increased urges to 
smoke, or indeed, it could perhaps otherwise mean that they were anxious about a 
government sponsored warning about smoking that they noticed on that cigarette box. 
Thus, cued psycho-physiological measures are unable to make even broad distinctions 
between positive versus negative evaluating per se (e.g. Ajzen & Fishbein, 2000; Bandura, 
1977; Biglan & Hayes, 1996; Eagley & Chaiken, 1993; Hermans, Spruyt, De Houwer & 
Eelen, 2003, p. 97; Herring, White, Jabeen, Hinojos, Terrazas, Reyes, Taylor, & Crites, 
2013, pp. 1-2; James, 1890a; Robinson & Berridge, 2008; Schwarz, 2008). 
The key point, therefore, is that the cue-reactivity literature, based as it is upon self-
reported cravings and indeterminate psycho-physiological responses, is unable to clearly 
distinguish how much its cue effects involve positive versus negative evaluating. 
Accordingly, neither cue-reactivity effects based upon self-reported tobacco cravings nor 
those based upon psycho-physiological measures have reliably related either to each other, 
or to any clinically relevant aspects of smoking (e.g. such as number of cigarettes smoked 
per day, or the risk of relapse during smoking abstinence; see Carter & Tiffany, 1999a, 
1999b; Drummond, 2000; Erblich & Montgomery, 2012; Havermans et al., 2007; Perkins, 
2009; Rose et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 2013; Wray et al., 2013).9  
For these reasons, successive reviews of the cue-reactivity literature have 
emphasized the need to research cue-reactivity effects based directly upon overt and 
relatively extended aspects of addictive behaviour (e.g. latency to smoke, smoking 
                                                 
9 For example, Havermans et al. (2007) found an average r = .04 between cue-reactivity measures in terms of 
subjective tobacco cravings versus various aspects of physiological arousal. Likewise, Payne, Smith, Sturges, 
and Holleran (1996, pp. 147-148) found that of the four non-craving tobacco addiction criteria they assessed 
none significantly correlated with cue-reactivity based upon subjective tobacco cravings. Likewise, although 
Payne et al. did observe a correlation between these cue-reactivity measures about subjective cravings and 
changes in heart rate (r = .20), these cue-reactivity measures only correlated modestly with self-reported 
changes in negative affect (r = .21) and positive affect (r = .16), and not at all with changes in systolic blood 
pressure or self-reported physical symptoms.  
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frequency, etc.; Carter & Tiffany, 1999a; Drummond, 2000; Perkins, 2009; Rose et al., 
2013; Rosenberg, 2009; Sayette, Shiffman, Tiffany, Niaura, & Shadel, 2000; Wray et al., 
2013). However, such research has been unforthcoming, with just two relevant studies 
listed in a recent review of the smoking-related cue-reactivity literature (Perkins, 2009, p. 
1614; but for a few additional examples of such effects not reviewed, some of which are 
null, see Greenberg & Altman, 1976; Lochbuehler, Kleinjan, & Engels, 2013; O’Connell, 
Shiffman, & DeCarlo, 2010; Niaura, Abrams, Pedraza, Monti, & Rohsenow, 1992; Payne, 
Schare, Levis & Colletti, 1991; Van Gucht, Van Den Bergh, Beckers, & Vansteenwegen, 
2010). And in any case, even if such research were more common, it would still suffer from 
much the same core problem as the psycho-physiological measures described above. That 
is, to measure only relatively extended addictive behaviours is to ignore the many different 
positive versus negative varieties of evaluating that may have motivated those behaviours 
from occasion to occasion (see Barrett, 2006a, 2006b; Chassin et al., 2007; Droungas, 
Ehrman, Childress, & O’Brien, 1995; Feldman-Barrett et al., 2007; Feldman-Barrett, 
Lindquist, & Gendron, 2007; Feldman-Barrett et al., 2011; Lochbuehler et al., 2013; Mucha 
et al., 2006; Niaura et al., 1992; O’Connell et al., 2010; Payne et al., 1991, pp. 477-478; 
Moore, 2013; Payne, McClernon, & Dobbins, 2007; Perkins, Epstein, Grobe, & Fonte, 
1994; Perkins et al, 1997; Rose et al., 2013; Rosenberg, 2009, pp. 526-528; Van Gucht et 
al., 2010; Wray et al., 2013).  
In summary, although cue-reactivity measures are not designed like attention 
measures to be agnostic about evaluative processes, they are prone to confound such 
processes.  Moreover, even ignoring the indeterminacy of cue-reactivity measures with 
respect to evaluating, much like the literature on attention there is little in the cue-reactivity 
literature to verify the implicitness of its measures apart from arguments based upon face 
validity (see Bruce & Jones, 2006; Carter & Tiffany, 1999a, 1999b; Erblich & 
Montgomery, 2012; Field, 2010; Field & Cox, 2008; Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006; Field, 
Munafó, & Franken, 2009; Rooke et al., 2008; Rose, Field, Franken, & Munafo, 2013; 
Wiers & Stacy, 2006a, 2006b; Wray et al., 2013).  
The Evaluative Priming Paradigm as a Means of Parsing Tobacco Addiction 
One approach that appears, at least at first blush, to address the lack of precision 
associated with attention and cue-reactivity based measures is evaluative priming (for 
reviews see Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Payne, 2012; De Houwer et al., 2009a; Fazio & 
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Olson, 2003; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes, 1986; Herring et al., 2013, pp. 
1064-1065; Klauer & Musch, 2003; Payne & Gawronski, 2010, pp. 8-9; Payne et al., 2007; 
Wentura & Degner, 2010; Wittenbrink, 2007). Like cue-reactivity methods, evaluative 
priming is a cue-based approach that presents addiction-related versus control cues in order 
to measure implicit evaluating. However, unlike the cue-reactivity paradigm, evaluative 
priming does not involve measuring evaluative responses to its cues per se. Rather, the 
focus is upon how its cues, usually called primes, moderate the fluency (i.e. speed, 
accuracy, or frequency) of positive versus negative evaluating in general.  
There are a large variety of different ways to implement evaluative priming 
measurements (for reviews see De Houwer et al., 2009a; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Herring et 
al., 2013, pp. 2-3; Klauer & Musch, 2003; Payne & Gawronski, 2010, pp. 8-9; Wentura & 
Degner, 2010, pp. 96-97; Wittenbrink, 2007). Nevertheless, in broad methodological terms 
they all compare how fluently participants perform the task of positively versus negatively 
evaluating target stimuli that are respectively designed to be normatively positive versus 
negative and irrelevant to the researcher’s topic of interest. For example, during a priming 
task a participant might be asked to press one button if a pleasant word is presented and a 
second button if an unpleasant word is presented. On some trials an addiction-related prime 
(e.g., a picture containing a packet of cigarettes) is presented briefly before the target word 
and on other trials a non-addiction-related prime may be presented (e.g., the same picture 
but without the cigarette packet). Critically, participants are not asked to evaluate the prime 
in any way. The basic rationale is that if addiction-related stimuli are evaluated positively 
(at an implicit level) participants should be “primed” to respond more fluently to the 
pleasant target words when these are preceded by addiction-related stimuli than when they 
are not. Conversely, if addiction-related stimuli are evaluated negatively (at an implicit 
level) then the opposite should be the case (e.g., a negative target word should be evaluated 
as negative more fluently when it is preceded by the addiction-related prime).10  
                                                 
10 The foregoing example describes the most popular variant of evaluative priming, Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, 
Powell, and Karde’s (1986) affective priming methodology. Methods like this which task participants with 
evaluating target stimuli as being positive versus negative contribute approximately 61% of all evaluative 
priming effects currently in the literature (see Herring et al., 2013; see also the Affect Misattribution 
Procedure, AMP; Payne, Chang, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). The remaining evaluative priming variants do 
not task participants with evaluating target stimuli but instead focus upon measuring how the normative 
evaluative congruity between primes and target stimuli moderates the fluency of participants’ performances 
on non-evaluative categorizing tasks (e.g. such as naming/pronunciation, lexical verification, or non-
evaluative semantic categorization tasks which respectively comprise approximately 30%, 5%, and 5% of 
extant evaluative priming research; see Herring et al., 2013). These so-called semantic variants of evaluative 
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The important point here is that evaluative priming effects should reflect implicit 
aspects of evaluation because they generally do not require participants to evaluate the 
prime stimuli, in a conscious or deliberative manner. In addition, all evaluative priming 
methods present each trial’s prime in close succession with its target stimulus, such that 
there is very little time for a participant to think about the prime, in a deliberative or highly 
controlled manner, before evaluating the target.11 As such, any priming effect that emerges 
is likely to be due to the automatic or implicit evaluation of the prime, rather than through 
some slow, deliberative or controlled cognitive processing. Indeed, the evaluative priming 
literature has gone a long way towards systematically corroborating the implicit character 
of its measurement scores.  
Firstly, evaluative priming effects tend to occur with greater magnitude the shorter 
the time from prime to target presentation and the shorter the duration of the target 
presentation (i.e. indicating that the cognitive processes involved were rapid; see De 
Houwer, 2009; De Houwer & Moors, 2007; Hermans, De Houwer & Eelen, 2001; Moors, 
Spruyt & De Houwer, 2010; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005; Payne & 
Gawronski, 2010; Wentura & Degner, 2010; Wittenbrink, 2007). Secondly, even when 
primes are presented subliminally (i.e., primes are presented so rapidly that participants 
cannot report accurately what prime was presented), most12 evaluative priming effects still 
occur in line with known-groups behavioural preferences (i.e. suggesting that the cognitive 
processes involved may occur without awareness; see Cameron et al., 2012, pp. 336, 343-
344; De Houwer et al., 2009a; Klauer & Musch, 2003; Herring et al., 2013, pp. 20-21; 
Hermans et al., 2003; Payne & Gawronski, 2010, p. 9; Van den Bussche, Van den 
Noortgate, & Reynvoet, 2009; Wentura & Degner, 2010). Thirdly, a recent meta-analysis 
                                                                                                                                                     
priming were specifically designed to settle theoretical controversies about how much Fazio et al.’s (1986) 
affective priming effects derived from high- versus low-level mental processes (i.e. semantic evaluative 
memory processes versus evaluative response processes per se; cf. Cameron et al., 2012; Herring et al., 2013; 
Moors, Spruyt, & De Houwer, 2010; Schmitz & Wentura, 2012; Wentura & Degner, 2010; Werner & 
Rothermund, 2013). 
11 Usually each priming trial presents a target stimulus within a few hundred milliseconds after the onset of its 
prime; and yet, for the purposes of examining how various theoretically relevant cognitive effects emerge 
during the time course of evaluative priming trials, a very small minority of studies have presented individual 
primes and targets at the same time as each other or even in slightly reversed but overlapping sequences (see 
Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001; Hermans et al., 2003; Herring et al., 2013, pp. 5-7; Klauer, Rossnagel, 
& Musch, 1997; Schmitz & Wentuura, 2012; Spruyt, Hermans, De Houwer, Vandromme, & Eelen, 2007; 
Wentura & Degner, 2010, pp. 107-108). 
12 Whereas subliminal evaluative priming does consistently yield evaluative priming effects in line with 
known-groups preferences when derived from evaluative tasks (i.e. with the exception of one variant, the 
AMP; see Rohr, Degner & Wentura, 2014), those derived from non-evaluative tasks do not (see Wentura & 
Degner, 2010, pp. 99-100). 
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found that evaluative priming effects correlated strongly with various behavioural criteria 
when those criteria were likely to have been governed mainly by implicit cognition, 
average r = .45, p < .00001, Q = 25.62. That is priming occurred in situations where there 
was likely to be lower motivation and/or ability to engage in deliberative, strategic styles of 
thinking; see Cameron et al., 2012, pp. 332, 338-339, 344), but significantly less, Z = 3.45, 
p = .001, and indeed not at all when those behavioural criteria were likely to have been 
governed by deliberative (explicit) cognitive processes, average r = .06, p = .46, Q = 15.68 
(pp. 338-339, 344).13 
And yet, despite being significantly correlated with various criteria for irrational 
behaviours, regrettably, it can also be argued that evaluative priming measures suffer from 
much the same core problem as attention and cue-reactivity measures. Before exploring 
these arguments, it is important to understand that the relevant issues are very much 
obscured by the existence of many different varieties of evaluative priming in the relevant 
literature as compared to attention or cue-reactivity procedures (see Carter & Tiffany, 
1999a; Rose et al., 2013; Wentura & Degner, 2010; Wittenbrkink, 2007). With so many 
variants of evaluative priming attempting to improve upon their respective predecessors 
each in different ways, the surrounding literature is dense with disjointed controversies 
about the peculiarities of each variant. This results in an equivocal literature about which it 
is difficult to establish generalities without the considerable distraction of having to address 
multiple disjointed and collateral issues along the way. Thus, in general we will refer any 
such collateral issues to be addressed in Appendix 1 in order to preserve the clarity of each 
criticism that we wish to make about evaluative priming.  
The basic argument is as follows. During evaluative priming tasks, participants must 
respond to each target stimulus as being either ‘good’ versus ‘bad’, ‘pleasant’ versus 
‘unpleasant’, or as more versus less pleasant than average, etc. (i.e. depending on the 
version of priming being employed). Thus participants are typically permitted to deliberate 
for as long as they like, and in many evaluatively different but unrecorded ways, before 
providing the required response on each priming trial (for a discussion of collateral issues 
                                                 
13 Indeed, even defining the enabling conditions for implicit versus deliberative cognition idiosyncratically 
according to domain-specific predictions, Cameron et al. still found that evaluative priming effects correlated 
more with various behavioural criteria under those idiosyncratic conditions predicted to foster implicit styles 
of cognition, but significantly less, Z = 7.05, p < .00001, and indeed not at all under contrasting conditions 
predicted to foster deliberative styles of thinking (i.e. respectively, average r = .40, p < .00001, Q = 30.10, 
versus, average r = -.004, p = .99, Q = 24.63).  
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surrounding this topic see Note 1, Appendix 1; otherwise see Hermans et al., 2001, p. 145; 
Wentura & Degner, 2010). Therefore, regardless of how heavily each trial’s recording is 
influenced by the prime’s activation of implicit cognitive processes, such recordings are 
delivered in a binary fashion that obscures the various different topics of evaluating 
involved. 
To  illustrate, consider how many ways a smoker might construe the task of 
evaluating a target stimulus word ‘fabulous’ as positive versus negative following a prime 
word ‘cigarette.’ A positive response could mean that the smoker interpreted ‘cigarette’ and 
‘fabulous’ in terms of how smoking a cigarette would make them feel fabulous; or 
alternatively, it could mean that the relevant smoker was thinking about how fabulous it 
would be to quit smoking if only they felt able to. As such, a positive response following a 
smoking-related prime could mean any of a vast range of things not just about how the 
smoker interpreted their task on the relevant trial, but also about how they interpreted that 
trial within its wider measurement context. Worse still, there are likewise many different 
ways a smoker could construe a positive versus negative categorisation task for each 
combination of smoking versus control primes with positive versus negative target 
stimuli.14 Indeed, regardless of instructions to the contrary, there is nothing about 
evaluative priming procedures that prevents smokers from secretly ignoring target and/or 
prime stimuli on at least some trials (for a discussion of collateral issues surrounding this 
topic see Note 2, Appendix 1). 
Confirming such possibilities, multiple streams of experimental research have 
recently emerged showing that evaluative priming effects do not result from the tasks set by 
evaluative priming procedures per se, but rather, from whatever evaluating is unwittingly 
induced on those tasks by each participant’s wider measurement context (for a meta-
analysis of relevant methodological effects see Herring et al., 2013; also see Alexopoulos, 
Fiedler & Freitag, 2012; Blair, 2002; Cameron et al., 2012, p. 336; Cesario, 2014; Chan, 
Ybarra, & Schwarz, 2006; De Houwer, 2009, pp. 378-386; De Houwer et al., 2009a, pp.  
358-360; Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009; Fiedler, 2003; Gawronski, Cunningham, LeBel & 
Deutsch, 2010; Gawronski, Deutsch, LeBel & Peters, 2008; Klauer, Rossnagel, & Musch, 
                                                 
14 Control primes seem particularly likely to prompt a large variety of unrecorded target interpretations when, 
as is often the case, they are specifically chosen to have neutral, and thus tenuous evaluative connotations 
with the topic of interest (i.e. otherwise, some researchers choose control primes to fit a conceptual category 
they speculatively believe will have opposing functions relative to the topic of interest for most people; see 
Wentura & Degner, 2010, pp. 98, 103, 106-107; Wittenbrink, 2007). 
18 
 
1997; Hermans et al., 2003, pp. 108-110; Loersch & Payne, 2011; Moors, Spruyt & De 
Houwer, 2010, pp. 26-33; Schmitz & Wentura, 2012; Werner & Rothermund, 2013; 
Wittenbrink, 2007, pp. 39-45).15 For example, when participants are suitably motivated 
and/or instructed they can normally distort evaluative priming effects in a secret and 
strategic manner (i.e. increasing, reducing, obliterating or even reversing priming effects; 
for a discussion of collateral issues surrounding this topic see Note 3, Appendix 1; 
otherwise see Bar-Anan, 2010; Cameron et al., 2012, p. 336; Degner, 2009; De Houwer et 
al., 2009, pp. 360-362; Klauer & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007; Moors et al., 2010, pp. 30-32; 
Teige-Mocigemba & Klauer, 2008; Wentura & Degner, 2010, pp. 97-98). Thus, although it 
is possible to systematically influence evaluative priming effects by experimentally 
inducing particular types of evaluating, it is important to remember that such influences are 
extraneous to evaluative priming procedures per se. In other words, even when particular 
types of evaluating do systematically influence priming effects based on some unknown 
aspect of the wider measurement context, such effects are not equipped to identify the 
specific types of evaluating involved. 
Worse still, this issue of identifying which particular evaluative processes 
systematically influence evaluative priming effects is largely moot given that evaluative 
priming effects are for the most part not very systematic; a fact borne out by their generally 
very low internal reliability (e.g. average α ≤ .20 for affective priming; LeBel & Paunonen, 
2011, p. 572; see also De Houwer, 2009, pp. 379-384; Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014; 
Roefs et al., 2011, p. 153; Wentura & Degner, 2010). The key problem here is that 
participants tend to evaluate each priming trial idiosyncratically in terms of its wider 
measurement context (i.e. as distinct from other trials and also from the particular topic it 
was intended to exemplify; see De Houwer, 2009, pp. 374-384; see also Blaison, Imhoff, 
Huhnel, Hess & Banse, 2012; Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009; Gawronski et al., 2008; Spruyt, 
Klauer, Gast, Schryver, & De Houwer, 2014; Rydell & Gawronski, 2009). Thus because 
                                                 
15 Note that variants of evaluative priming which set non-evaluative tasks should, in principle, be even more 
prone to multiple evaluative interpretations than versions using evaluative tasks. Whereas standard evaluative 
priming at least instructs participants to evaluate in broad positive versus negative terms, evaluative priming 
with non-evaluative tasks does nothing to directly encourage participants to evaluate trial stimuli consistently 
in any particular way across trials. In fact, this is a leading explanation for the dual findings that (a) evaluative 
priming effects from naming/pronunciation tasks are substantially weaker and less replicable (particularly 
under subliminal conditions) than priming effects involving evaluative tasks and likewise that (b) more 
elaborate non-evaluative semantic tasks generally fail even to produce evaluative priming effects (see De 
Houwer, 2009, pp. 378-386; Herring et al., 2013; Moors, Spruyt & De Houwer, 2010, pp. 28-32; Wentura & 
Degner, 2010, pp. 98-99; Werner & Rothermund, 2013). 
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evaluative priming does not succeed in measuring people’s evaluative responses to any 
given topic in some consistent and determined sense, its scores are likely to be severely 
limited in their ability to correlate with criterion behaviours (for a discussion of relevant 
collateral issues involving the Affective Misattribution Procedure see Note 4, Appendix 1). 
Indeed, throughout the 30 or so years since its inception evaluative priming has consistently 
produced very small priming effects regardless of the extent of known-groups behavioural 
preferences upon which they were based (weighted average mixed effects model d = .37, 
i.e. r ≈ .18, Herring et al., 2013, pp. 1061-1064; see also Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014). And 
likewise, Rooke et al.’s (2008) meta-analysis of addiction-related evaluative priming effects 
yielded poor correlations with behavioural criteria related to addiction (i.e. across 8 
individual studies average r = .23, p < .01). In particular, with the modest exception of 
research involving two recent variants of evaluative priming, smoking-related evaluative 
priming scores do not generally correlate with tobacco addiction criteria at all. 
The first study to use evaluative priming to measure smoking-related implicit 
processes (Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson and Chassin, 2003) yielded a small-to-moderate 
interaction between heaviness of smoking and nicotine deprivation (i.e. r = .17; converted 
from F to r using conversion formulae from Rosnow et al., 2000). However, those scores 
did not distinguish smokers from non-smokers, and despite claims to the contrary, nor did 
they even produce pro-smoking priming effects for smokers (although Study 1 reported a 
pro-smoking priming effect of just 27.01 ms for smokers, Study 2 reported an average anti-
smoking priming effect of 33.62 ms for smokers using the same stimuli).16 Likewise, when 
using traditional evaluative priming methods a number of studies have failed to produce 
pro-smoking priming effects for smokers or to distinguish smokers from non-smokers 
(Glock, Unz & Kovacs, 2012; Glock, Kovacs & Unz, 2014; O’Connor, Fite, Nowlin, & 
Colder, 2007; Leventhal, 2008).17  
                                                 
16 Indeed, given that smoking-related evaluative priming effects are based upon interaction effects between 
smoking-related versus contrast primes and positive versus negative target stimuli, it is therefore not valid to 
claim that such effects are pro- versus anti-smoking just because they are significantly different from zero. 
For example, positive scores might arise not because smoking-related primes facilitated correct responses to 
positive targets but because the contrasting primes interfered with correct responses to negative targets (see 
Wentura & Degner, 2010, pp. 100-105).  
17 Although Glock et al. (2012) and O’Connor et al. (2007) both claimed to have found evidence for pro-
smoking evaluative priming, in fact neither obtained a significant prime by target interaction in favour of 
smoking. Instead, they mistakenly interpreted simple effects between target stimuli as indicating evidence of 
evaluative priming even though such effects do not compare the influence of different types of primes at all 
(for a detailed explanation of the inherently flawed logic behind this common approach see Wentura & 
Degner, 2010, p. 105).  
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On balance, Leventhal (2008) did find some evidence for the validity of an 
improvised evaluative priming method called the subliminal repetition priming task. 
Specifically, Leventhal found that deprived smokers produced priming effects that were 
significantly more pro-smoking (and/or less anti-smoking) than those obtained by non-
deprived smokers or non-smokers, F(2, 166) = 4.99, p = .01, η 2p  = .03 (i.e. r ≈ .17). 
However, these modest findings in favour of smoking-related subliminal repetition priming 
are not just unprecedented, they appear to participate in publication bias. Namely, 
Leventhal, Waters, Breitmeyer, Tapia, Miller and Li (2008) published the positive 
repetition priming effects from Leventhal’s (2008) Ph.D. thesis, but they did not mention 
how these priming effects generally failed to correlate with core aspects of tobacco 
addiction, and nor did they report Leventhal’s (2008) null findings for the equivalent 
unmodified evaluative priming procedure (see above).   
The only remaining evidence in favour of the ability of evaluative priming to 
measure smoking-related implicit processes comes from just two research publications on 
the AMP. Payne et al. (2007) were the first to report that AMP scores correlated with core 
tobacco dependence criteria. In summary, Payne et al. found that AMP scores correlated 
non-significantly with the number of cigarettes smoked per day, r = .28, p = .11, correlated 
significantly with the Shiffman/Jarvik Withdrawal Questionnaire of current nicotine 
withdrawal, r = .49, p < .01, and correlated non-significantly with the Wisconsin Inventory 
of Smoking Dependence Motives (WISDM) a popular 68-item measure of nicotine 
dependence, r = .31, p < .01. In addition, Payne et al. found that smokers differed 
significantly from non-smokers in terms of their AMP scores, F(1, 58) = 27.01, p < .001, η2 
= .32 (i.e. r ≈ .57). Lastly, Payne et al. claimed that smokers with relatively high versus low 
nicotine withdrawal and/or dependence scores invariably produced pro- versus anti-
smoking AMP scores, respectively. However, Payne et al. never tested this assertion 
directly but instead, rather puzzlingly, based it mainly upon a scatterplot which included 
many cases to the contrary. Furthermore, even if we put aside the fact that it is not valid to 
interpret an AMP score of zero as indicating the absence of an evaluative bias (see Wentura 
& Degner, 2010, p. 105), Payne et al.’s smoking-related AMP scores were clustered about 
both sides of zero for most of the range of nicotine withdrawal scores observed. 
Indeed, in an effort to clarify why Payne et al. (2007) obtained so-called ambivalent 
AMP scores among smokers (i.e. AMP scores distributed about zero, F(1, 34) = 1.82, p = 
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.19, η2 = .05), Haight, Dickter and Forestell (2012) distinguished between the occasional 
versus daily types of smokers that were mixed together in Payne et al.’s analyses. Haight et 
al. found that daily smokers produced AMP scores that were moderately more pro-smoking 
(and/or less anti-smoking) than occasional smokers, F(1, 50) = 5.45, p < .03, η2 = .10 (i.e. r 
≈ .32). Putting aside the fact that AMP scores do not necessarily reflect ambivalence just 
because they are distributed around zero, this finding does provide evidence that the 
relevant AMP scores are correlated with tobacco addiction. In addition, Haight et al. found 
a very similar correlation as Payne et al. (2007) between smokers’ AMP scores and their 
smoking frequency, r = .26, p = .06.  
However, Haight et al. did not corroborate Payne et al.’s (2007) speculations with 
regard to there being a relationship between smokers’ AMP scores versus their current 
levels of nicotine deprivation or nicotine withdrawal. Namely, Haight et al. found no 
significant correlation between smokers’ AMP scores versus the length of time since they 
had last smoked, p > .05, r = - .20, nor between smokers’ AMP scores versus their WISDM 
scores, p > .05, r = .05. In addition, it is worth noting that Haight et al. only obtained 
positive findings when they were considering a particular subset of smoking-related 
pictures that depicted people interacting with smoking-related stimuli. When Haight et al. 
(2012) computed AMP scores in terms of smoking-related pictures that did not depict 
people interacting with the relevant smoking-related stimuli none of the foregoing analyses 
yielded statistically significant findings. Likewise, in a preceding version of Haight et al.’s 
(2012) research which they do not mention, Haight’s (2011) unpublished thesis, which 
incorporated a 12-hour experimental manipulation of nicotine deprivation, there was no 
significant effect upon smokers’ AMP scores, F(1, 50) = 1.24, p = .271. Moreover, Haight 
(2011) found smaller corresponding known-groups effects than Haight et al. (2012), and an 
even smaller correlation than Haight et al. between smokers’ AMP scores and smoking 
frequency, r = .21.  
In summary, apart from some encouraging known-groups effects involving AMP 
scores from two studies and a small correlation between AMP scores and smoking 
frequency that has been replicated just once, there is very little evidence that smoking-
related evaluative priming scores bear any reliable relationship with tobacco addiction. 
Granted, we did mention earlier how Cameron et al.’s (2012) meta-analysis found 
encouraging evidence that evaluative priming effects (i.e. including the AMP) generally 
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correlate highly with behavioural criteria that specifically encourage implicit cognition. 
However, even disregarding the fact that these correlations were relatively weak across 
domains related to addiction (i.e. r = .24 for ‘impulsive behaviours’), the behavioural 
criteria involved in that meta-analysis were predominantly comprised of self-reported 
behavioural intentions and judgements measured during the same session as the relevant 
evaluative priming effects (i.e. only 23% of the behavioural criteria involved were not self-
reported; see Cameron et al., 2012, pp. 333, 342). Thus, although such findings do support 
the implicit nature of evaluative priming effects in general, they provide only equivocal 
support for criterion validity because self-reported behavioural intentions and judgements 
are renowned for their lack of adherence to criterion behaviours (i.e. particularly in 
domains such as addiction where personal autonomy is compromised; Armitage & Connor, 
2001; Sheeran, 2002; Topa & Moriano, 2010; Webb & Sheeran, 2006, p. 254; Webb, 
Sheeran, & Luszczynska, 2009). What is more, there is clear evidence in Herring et al.’s 
(2013, p. 1082) meta-analysis that such estimates are likely inflated in general by 
publication biases favouring statistically significant findings. Overall, therefore, existing 
evaluative priming techniques clearly fail to produce scores that consistently measure 
whatever implicit evaluative processes might be involved in tobacco addiction.  
A Future for Cue-based Measures of Smoking-related Implicit Evaluating? 
Existing cue-reactivity and evaluative priming techniques all suffer from the same 
key problem as each other: they lack the ability to determine what particular topics of 
implicit evaluating are involved in the scores they produce. Indeed, as illustrated above, 
these techniques cannot ensure even such broad distinctions as between (implicit) 
evaluating in positive versus negative terms. And yet, unlike attention measures which 
must ignore any distinctions between particular topics of evaluating by design, there is 
nothing definitive preventing future evolutions of priming and/or cue-reactivity techniques 
from employing response measures that do distinguish particular topics of implicit 
evaluating from each other. Specifically, if cue-based techniques incorporated controlled 
experimental comparisons of how cues moderate precise measures of implicit evaluating, 
then by experimental first principles it would be clear what particular topics of implicit 
evaluating were involved in the relevant comparison scores (for a sidebar on the wider 
importance of this point to research about the neurobiology and psychopharmacology of 
addiction and/or to research even more broadly on the context dependent nature of 
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behaviour see Note 5, Appendix 1). Critically, therefore, if we are to determine how 
contextual cues moderate any particular evaluating involved in tobacco addiction then we 
must first identify measures that can distinguish implicit evaluating per se. Indeed, as we 
attempt to review in the following two chapters, this issue is an important recurring 
problem throughout the various remaining literatures on addiction-related implicit 
evaluating. 
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CHAPTER 2: The Second Wave of Research on Smoking-related Implicit Cognition: A 
Comprehensive Review of the IAT Literature 
 
The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998) is by 
far the most commonly used measure of implicit attitudes to date (Payne & Gawronski, 
2010). At half the age of evaluative priming methods, the IAT and its variants command 
almost twice as many citations (Nosek et al., 2011). In fact, Nosek et al. (2011) estimated 
that across the literature on implicit evaluating the IAT and its variants account for almost 
all method-specific citations not already accounted for by attention and cue-based methods 
(i.e. all but approximately 7% of such citations).18 
From the outset, one of the primary reasons why the IAT (in the interests of brevity, 
henceforth we will refer to the full range of IATs simply as the IAT) was so popular was its 
general ability to produce measurement effects that were much more internally reliable than 
other measures of implicit attitudes (see Payne & Gawronski, 2010, p. 5; Teige-Mocigemba 
et al., 2010, p. 118). For example, when the IAT was first introduced, evaluative priming 
effects had internal reliabilities that were typically less than .20, but in contrast IAT effects 
regularly achieved internal reliabilities in the range .70-.90 (see Nosek, Greenwald & 
Banaji, 2007; LeBel & Paunonen, 2011, p. 572; see also De Houwer, 2009, pp. 379-384; 
Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014; Roefs et al., 2011, p. 153; Wentura & Degner, 2010). 
Many therefore reasoned that if internal reliability is an absolute prerequisite for measuring 
individual differences, and if no other measure of implicit evaluating could satisfy this 
prerequisite, then this implies that the IAT is best equipped to measure individual 
differences in implicit evaluating (Dasgupta, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2003; Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998; Lane, Banaji, Nosek & Greenwald, 2007, p. 61). 
However, whether we take Greenwald et al.’s (2009) estimate of r = .22 or Rooke et 
al.’s estimate of r = .18 as the criterion validity of IATs focused on addiction, the IAT’s 
contribution to this research area appears limited. Indeed, on balance, it is safe to say that 
the IAT does not outperform the addiction-related criterion validity of evaluative priming, 
which currently stands at r = .23 (Rooke et al., 2008, p. 1323). As such, it appears that high 
                                                 
18 Although Nosek et al. (2011) do not directly account for attention or cue-reactivity based methods, they 
estimated that in the remaining literatures about implicit cognition evaluative priming methods contributed 
approximately 35% and IAT-based methods approximately 58%, of all method-specific citations. Therefore, 
by implication, only approximately 7% of all method-specific citations of implicit measures are due to 
methods other than those based on attention, cues, or the IAT. 
25 
 
internal reliability is certainly not tantamount to high criterion validity when it comes to 
IATs focused upon addiction. Nonetheless, it may still be useful to ask whether the IAT is 
capable of being further developed for greater precision with respect to the implicit 
evaluating involved in tobacco addiction. As we shall see subsequently, however, there is 
good reason to doubt that such a research agenda is feasible.  
2.1. Why it is Not Feasible to Improve the IAT’s Modest Criterion Validity for 
Addictions 
Assuming that the criterion validity of an IAT is reliant upon how precisely it can 
distinguish among the different topics of implicit evaluating involved in a given addiction 
criterion, then enhancing the precision of that IAT with respect to those component 
processes should in principle enhance its ability to achieve the relevant form of criterion 
validity. Regrettably, however, the IAT is bound by design to overlook key aspects of 
evaluating that are commonly involved in behavioural criteria, and so the IAT is 
fundamentally limited in its ability to develop criterion validity in many domains. To 
understand why, we will consider the IAT method in detail. 
The IAT is a computerized task that involves asking participants to repeatedly 
perform two different types of binary classification as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
The first classification task involves assigning various individual stimuli as belonging to 
one of two contrasting target categories (e.g. flowers versus insects), and the other type 
involves assigning various individual stimuli as belonging to one of two contrasting 
attribute categories (e.g. pleasant versus unpleasant). During the critical part of an IAT, 
participants must complete randomly alternating sequences of these two types of 
classification tasks using just two response keys. As such, each response key is shared 
between one target category and one attribute category during critical sequences of IAT 
trials. In addition, participants must alternate between using two different key assignment 
schemes depending on the particular sequence of IAT trials involved.  
Crucially, the IAT effect is a comparison of how quickly participants can correctly 
complete both types of binary classification task using one key assignment scheme versus 
the other. The core assumption underpinning this design is that the maximum speed with 
which participants correctly classify stimuli on IAT trials should be proportional to how 
much each response key designates a target concept and an attribute concept that are 
associated in the relevant participant’s memory (see Greenwald et al., 1998). For example, 
26 
 
most participants should find it easier to categorize flowers with pleasant and insects with 
unpleasant than vice versa (i.e., flowers-unpleasant & insects-pleasant) because most 
people associate flowers with pleasant things and insects with unpleasant things. However, 
there is a long recognised limitation at the heart of this design: the IAT cannot measure 
implicit evaluating about one target category as distinct from another, and nor can it 
measure in terms of one attribute category as distinct from another (see Blanton & Jaccard, 
2006; Fiedler, Messner, & Bleumke, 2006; Teige-Mocigemba et al., 2010, p. 133).  
To illustrate, consider the earlier scenario of a participant categorizing flowers with 
pleasant and insects with unpleasant more quickly than vice versa. Critically, such a finding 
could indicate that (a) flowers are liked and insects are disliked; (b) both flowers and 
insects are liked, but the former are liked more than the latter; or (c) both flowers and 
insects are disliked, but the former are disliked less than the latter. In fact, the finding could 
also indicate that flowers are liked and insects are neither liked nor disliked (a neutral 
preference), or that insects are disliked and flowers evoke no preference (see Blanton & 
Jaccard, 2006). The key problem here is that the IAT cannot determine how much flowers 
are implicitly associated with pleasantness as distinct from relative comparisons with 
insects or unpleasantness. The IAT is therefore widely termed a relative measure because it 
might reflect the strength of an implicit association between a given target attitude object 
and a target attribute category, but only relative to (a) a contrasting attitude object and/or 
(b) a contrasting attribute category.  
When it comes to designing questionnaire-based self-report measures of (explicit) 
evaluating researchers are not constrained as they are with the IAT to examining their 
preferences in relatively-phrased terms. Rather, using self-reports usually grants researchers 
the option of asking participants how much they like a given attitude object such as flowers 
(e.g. on a scale of 0-10) (a) without ever asking how much they dislike flowers and (b) 
without ever drawing comparisons with contrasting attitude objects such as insects. 
Therefore, the problematic nature of the IAT’s relativity is perhaps best appreciated in 
terms of the behavioural difference it makes when self-reported evaluations are framed in 
relative versus non-relative terms.  Much research shows, for example, that people often 
behave differently about an attitude object when it is being evaluated on its own versus in 
comparison to a contrasting attitude object (see anchoring heuristic, social comparions, 
conceptual correspondence, structural fit and transfer-appropriate processing; Bem, 1967, 
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1973; De Houwer, 2009, p. 367; Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Furnham & Boo, 2011; 
Festinger, 1957; Gschwender, Hofmann & Schmitt, 2008; Hofman, Gawronski, 
Gschwender, Le, & Schmidt, 2005; Payne, Buckley & Stokes, 2008; Payne & Gawronski, 
2010, pp. 5-6; Suls & Wheeler, 2013). Likewise, other streams of research have long-
established that people behave differently in response to a topic when they are evaluating it 
in (a) positive terms, (b) negative terms, or (c) positive versus negative terms (see Field, 
2010, pp. 637-638; Sweeney, Pilliteri, & Kozlowski, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; 
Kahneman, 2011). 
Thus, the relative nature of the IAT may be particularly problematic when it comes 
to dealing with topics like addiction about which people are likely to be ambivalent. For 
example, it is characteristic for smokers to evaluate smoking in terms of positive attributes 
in one instance (e.g., when socializing with other smokers) but in terms of negative 
attributes in another context (e.g. when thinking about the costs of smoking; see Brandon, 
Wetter, & Baker, 1996; Cano, Lam, Adams, Correa-Fernández, Stewart, McClure, 
Cinciripini, & Wetter, 2014; Copeland et al., 1995; de Jonge & Gormley, 2005; Harrell & 
Juliano, 2012; Hine, Marks, & O’Neill, 2009; McKee, Wall, Hinson, Goldstein, & 
Bissonnette, 2003; Palfai, 2002; Sweeney, Pilliteri, & Kozlowski, 1996). Another important 
example of ambivalence is the fact that smokers typically behave differently with respect to 
self-reported evaluating that is framed in terms of (a) smoking (b) not smoking or (c) 
smoking versus not smoking (e.g. Brandon et al., 1996; Cano et al., 2014; Chassin et al., 
2007; DiFranza et al., 2011; Kirchner & Sayette, 2007; Hine et al., 2009; Robinson et al., 
2005; Rosenberg, 2009; Toll, Salovey, O’Malley, Mazure, Latimer, & McKee, 2008). 
Thus, without the ability to measure smoking-related evaluating non-relatively, the IAT 
seems particularly ill-equipped to understand what factors occasion a person to pursue 
versus resist addictive behaviours like smoking on different occasions (see Conner & 
Sparks, 2013; DiFranza, Ursprung & Carson, 2010; Lipkus, Green, Feaganes, & Sedikides, 
2001; Piasecki et al., 2010; Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson and Chassin, 2003, pp. 16-18, 
31-33; Smith & Nosek, 2012; Sweeney, Pilliteri, & Kozlowski, 1996).  
Granted, some researchers have attempted to adapt the IAT into a non-relative 
measure of implicit attitudes. However, none of these attempts have succeeded in 
disambiguating one attitude object from another while also disambiguating one attribute 
from another. For example, the first IAT variants, the Go/no-go Association Task (GNAT; 
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Nosek & Banaji, 2001) and the Single-Target IAT (ST-IAT; Wigboldus, Holland, & van 
Knippenberg, 2004; also known as the Single-Category IAT; SC-IAT; see Bluemke & 
Friese, 2008; Karpinski & Steinman, 2006), were both designed to measure implicit 
evaluating about one attitude object category at a time in positive versus negative terms. 
Thus, neither variant measures one attitude object relative to another, but both continue to 
measure one attribute category relative to another. To illustrate the core problem in 
practical terms, consider what it would mean if a participant categorized flowers with 
pleasant stimuli more quickly than with unpleasant stimuli. In principle, this type of 
comparison indicates that a participant associates flowers more strongly with “pleasant” 
than “unpleasant.” However, a participant might strongly associate flowers with pleasant 
things when in comparison to unpleasant things, but nevertheless not associate flowers with 
pleasant things outside of such polarized comparisons (e.g. as when the relevant participant 
suffers from hay fever and normally avoids flowers but still prefer flowers relative to a 
negative attribute word like cancer which was used by Greenwald et al., 1998). In principle, 
therefore, the GNAT and the ST-IAT lack the ability to predict any behaviour that does not 
specifically involve a polarized comparison between positive versus negative attributes. In 
light of what we have already explained about the ambivalent nature of tobacco addiction, 
and about the fact that people behave differently when evaluating in (a) positive, (b) 
negative or (c) positive versus negative terms, the ST-IAT and GNAT are not likely to 
provide wholly adequate measures.  
Other researchers have attempted to adapt two IAT variants to measure positive 
evaluating separately from negative evaluating. In broad terms, these IAT variants called 
the unipolar IAT (e.g. Jajodia & Earleywine, 2003) and the Brief IAT (Sririam & 
Greenwald, 2009), are both essentially the same as the original IAT format except that they 
are designed so that participants respond to one attribute category as being neutral.19 Thus, 
for example, these modified tasks might involve associating flowers with pleasant versus 
neutral exemplars (thus avoiding the polar opposite attribute). The critical point here, is that 
if a unipolar or brief IAT was used to target smoking it might provide an indication of how 
positively (i.e. relative to some neutral category) a smoker implicitly evaluated smoking 
                                                 
19 The unipolar IAT attempts to render the contrasting attribute category in the original IAT format as neutral 
by replacing it with a category of stimuli chosen as being neutral to the topic of interest, but the Brief IAT 
does so by instead instructing participants to respond to the contrast category stimuli as not belonging to 
either the target attitude object or the target attribute (i.e. as being neutral by virtue of irrelevance to the topic 
of interest; see Sririam & Greenwald, 2009; Teige-Mocigemba et al., 2010, p. 134). 
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relative to any other non-smoking activity, but it could not determine how much that 
smoker liked (a) smoking, or (b) the other activity, per se (see Friese & Fiedler, 2010; 
Rothermund & Wentura, 2010). Such distinctions are important, because it is possible for a 
smoker to implicitly like smoking more than a non-smoking activity but nevertheless not 
implicitly like smoking on other occasions outside of such comparisons (e.g. as when an 
addicted smoker wants to quit smoking but feels ill-equipped to face doing so; e.g. 
DiFranza et al., 2012). Once again, therefore, the unipolar and Brief IATs do not 
adequately address this subtle but practically important issue of relativity.  
Finally, there are two rarely used IAT variants, called the unipolar ST-IAT (Thush 
& Wiers, 2007) and the Function Acquisition Speed Test (FAST; O’Reilly, Roche, Ruiz, 
Tyndall, & Gavin, 2012), that were created to provide fully non-relative measures of 
implicit evaluating.20 Unfortunately, however, both measures inadvertently incorporate 
relative comparisons that are even more ambiguous with respect to evaluating than the 
relative comparisons employed by the original IAT format. Given the severe lack of 
research about either of these rare IAT variants we feel it would be an undue distraction to 
fully engage such issues here within the main text, and so instead we deal with them in 
Note 6, Appendix 1, along with additional collateral criticism of the unipolar IAT and Brief 
IAT.  
In summary, therefore, all versions of the IAT either measure (a) one attitude object 
relative to another, (b) one attribute relative to another, or (c) both. Thus, at best, the IAT is 
limited by design to investigating “polarized” evaluative comparisons. Given that tobacco 
addiction is likely to involve many non-polarized forms of implicit evaluating, this means 
that the IAT is fundamentally limited in its ability to achieve criterion validity in relation to 
tobacco addiction. Indeed, bearing this point out, the research literature on smoking-related 
IATs is characterised by haphazard findings and disjointed theoretical controversies, 
instead of by research that systematically develops criterion validity with respect to tobacco 
addiction (e.g. see Roefs et al., 2011, pp. 178-181; Tibboel et al., 2011; Waters & Sayette, 
2006). To illustrate these points further, we now review three intractable theoretical 
controversies that have dominated smoking-related IAT research to date, before then 
                                                 
20 Other variants of the IAT do exist, such as the Recoding Free IAT (IAT-RF; Rothermund et al., 2009), or 
the Single Block IAT (Teige-Mocigemba et al., 2008), or the sorting-paired features task (SPF; Bar-Anan, 
Nosek, & Vianello, 2009; Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014b). However, none of these remaining variants even 
attempt to resolve the relativistic nature of the original format IAT (see Teige-Mocigemba et al., 2010, pp. 
131-134). 
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retrospectively synopsizing the central albeit tacit role played by the IAT’s relativity in the 
escalation of these controversies. Thereafter, most crucially, we systematically review how 
such theoretical controversy has resulted in haphazard and heavily obfuscated findings 
about the criterion validity of smoking-related IATs. 
2.2. Parsing Tobacco Addiction in Terms of Implicit Evaluating: A Systematic Review of 
the Evolution of Smoking-related IAT Research 
How Theoretical Controversy involving the IAT’s Relativity Drove Disjointed Research on 
Smoking-related IATs 
 One of the most robust and yet unexpected findings in the literature on smoking-
related IATs is that smokers typically fail to respond more quickly to smoking/positive and 
contrast/negative key assignment schemes than to contrast/positive and smoking/negative 
key assignment schemes (for reviews see Roefs et al., 2011, pp. 178-181; Waters & 
Sayette, 2006, pp. 324-327). In other words, when using a standard format IAT researchers 
have found no evidence for a so-called implicit pro-smoking bias among regular tobacco 
users. Indeed, many researchers obtained significantly negative IAT effects from smokers 
and interpreted these as being implicitly anti-smoking (experiment 2, Andrews et al., 2010; 
Chassin, Presson, Rose, Sherman, & Prost, 2002, p. 492; experiments 1 & 2, Huijding, de 
Jong, Wiers, & Verkooijen, 2005; Perugini, 2005, p. 35; experiment 1, Rudman et al., 
2008, p. 1704; experiments 1 & 2, Swanson, Rudman & Greenwald, 2001; Waters, Carter, 
Robinson, Wetter, Lam, & Cinciripini, 2007; Waters, Miller & Li, 2010), while most of the 
remainder obtained near zero IAT effects and interpreted these as indicating that smokers 
were implicitly ambivalent about smoking (experiment 1, De Houwer et al., 2006; 
experiment 1, Robinson et al., 2005; Macy, Chassin, Presson, & Sherman, 2015; 
experiments 1 & 2, Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson, & Chassin, 2003; experiment 3, 
Swanson et al., 2001).  
Although it is unclear why exactly smokers variously produced negative or near-
zero IAT effects on the standard IAT, either way, it raised serious questions about whether 
implicit attitudes could play a causal role in tobacco addiction.21 Moreover, the only time 
                                                 
21 Anecdotally, the only consistent methodological difference between the negative versus near-zero findings 
was that the former used IATs which exemplified their concept categories in terms of word stimuli, but the 
latter used only IATs that exemplified their concept categories in terms of pictures. Critically, however, even 
if that were the reason why the literature obtained divergent findings, this fact would still not clarify how 
specifically participants evaluated smoking in either case.  
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that smokers have ever produced an apparently pro-smoking bias on a standard IAT was 
when the attitude object contrasted with smoking was more stigmatized (e.g. stealing; 
experiment 2, Robinson et al., 2005; Swanson et al., 2001). In response, the literature 
generally concluded that the IAT was consistently indicating that smokers lack pro-
smoking implicit evaluating except in comparison to negative extremes. Thus, controversy 
ensued within the literature on smoking-related IATs about whether implicit attitudes are 
collateral versus integral to tobacco addiction.  
The IAT’s original proponents responded to the above findings by arguing that 
smoking-related implicit evaluating is not normally involved in tobacco addiction (e.g. 
Rudman, Phelan, & Heppen, 2008; Swanson et al., 2001). According to such accounts, the 
default is for smokers to implicitly dislike smoking as a function of negative childhood 
experiences with smoking and/or repeated experiences of society stigmatizing this addition. 
However, there is very little evidence to support this assertion, and the two research 
programmes that claim to provide evidence in this regard may be questioned. Swanson et 
al. (2001) used the data from various IATs to argue that smokers’ implicit dislike of 
smoking is cognitively inconsistent with the fact that they implicitly identify with smoking, 
and in turn that this means smokers’ implicit attitudes about smoking were likely to be 
inconsistent with and thus irrelevant to tobacco smoking itself. However, this empirical 
argument has no bearing upon the extent to which smokers might implicitly like smoking in 
other circumstances. Instead, Swanson et al. provide only post hoc, anecdotal evidence that 
smokers might implicitly dislike smoking by default.  
In contrast, Rudman et al. (2008) did report an exclusive relationship between a 
smoking-related IAT and negative childhood experiences with smoking. Specifically, they 
found that their smoking-related IAT correlated significantly with the number of negative 
smoking-related childhood experiences smokers recalled by self-report, r = .33, while also 
not correlating with the number of recent positive smoking-related experiences those 
smokers’ recalled by self-report, r = .06. However, even taking Rudman et al.’s correlation 
with retrospective self-reports at face value, this solitary finding does not address the 
possibility that smokers might often engage in pro-smoking implicit evaluating that is non-
relative and therefore not detectable by the IAT.  
Accordingly, some researchers refused to accept negative and/or near-zero IAT 
effects as conclusive evidence pro-smoking implicit evaluating is not involved in  tobacco 
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addiction. Instead, they speculated that the IAT might detect pro-smoking implicit 
evaluating among smokers if only its measurement effects were not so obscured by one 
evaluative confound or another. Thus, smoking-related IAT research diversified into three 
offshoots each seeking to demonstrate pro-smoking implicit evaluating among smokers 
using a different IAT variant. One of the first offshoots was inspired by an attempt to 
explain smokers’ apparent lack of pro-smoking IAT effects in terms of Robinson and 
Berridge’s (1993, 2003) well known incentive-sensitisation theory. In brief, incentive 
sensitisation theory marshals extensive neurobiological evidence to assert that addicts 
normally experience less pleasure (i.e. less liking) from addictive substances as they 
become more addicted to (i.e. motivated to consume) those substances. Crucially, Robinson 
and Berridge draw a clear evaluative distinction here between liking something versus 
wanting something. From this point of view, wanting (i.e. incentive) processes are thought 
to be central to addiction, but constructs based upon liking, such as implicit attitudes, are 
thought to be largely irrelevant except when addictions are first becoming established.  
De Houwer et al. (2006, experiment 1) first tested these ideas with respect to 
smoking by juxtaposing a standard smoking-related IAT with a modified smoking-related 
IAT designed to target implicit wanting rather than implicit liking. Specifically, both IATs 
were exactly the same except that the wanting IAT replaced positive versus negative 
attribute exemplars with synonyms for approach versus avoid, respectively. De Houwer et 
al. found that smokers produced near-zero effects on the standard attitude IAT, but were 
significantly faster at responding to ‘Smoking/Approach + Nonsmoking/Avoid’ trials than 
to ‘Nonsmoking/Approach + Smoking/Avoid’ trials on the wanting IAT. Thus, confirming 
their expectations, De Houwer et al. interpreted these findings as indicating that smokers 
implicitly associated smoking more with approach than avoidance, but not more with liking 
than disliking or vice versa. However, in the only other study on the topic, Tibboel et al. 
(2011) modified a standard smoking-related IAT to use the labels ‘I want’ versus ‘I do not 
want’ instead of the attribute labels ‘Positive’ versus ‘Negative’ but did not find that 
smokers’ resulting IAT effects differed from zero. Moreover, when Tibboel et al. compared 
smokers’ wanting-IAT effects when satiated versus deprived of nicotine for 12 hours, 
contrary to incentive-sensitisation theory and/or the tenets of tobacco addiction, they found 
no significant difference. And yet, also contrary to incentive-sensitisation theory, they 
found that a corresponding IAT designed to measure implicit liking was nevertheless 
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sensitive to the same nicotine deprivation manipulation. 
Another important contradiction of incentive-sensitization theory was Tibboel et 
al.’s finding that their wanting-IAT correlated extremely highly with the corresponding 
liking-IAT (i.e. rs = .77-.78, depending upon nicotine satiation versus deprivation). In fact, 
Tibboel et al. found no significant main effects when comparing the liking- versus wanting-
IATs in nicotine deprivation versus satiation conditions (Fs < 1.91). Rather, both IATs 
displayed poor discriminant validity with respect to core variables, like nicotine 
deprivation, that are supposed to distinguish between smoking-related liking versus 
wanting (see Tibboel et al., 2011, p. 288-289). Similarly, even when De Houwer et al.’s 
wanting-IAT used different attribute exemplars to a corresponding smoking-related attitude 
IAT they still correlated significantly with each other, r = .39. In the end, such findings 
have raised serious questions about whether it is realistic to assume that verbally 
sophisticated humans customarily distinguish between liking versus wanting, at least in the 
same way as proposed by Robinson and Berridge. Namely, it is important to note that 
Robinson and Berridge formulated the distinction based on non-human animal research, 
which precludes a role for sophisticated verbal or cognitive processes (see Havermans, 
2011; Tibboel et al., 2011, pp. 290-291; Tibboel, De Houwer, & Van Bockstaele, 2015). 
Therefore, however inconclusive the research is about standard smoking-related IATs, the 
research about smoking-related wanting IATs is even more inconclusive. 
The second offshoot in smoking-related IAT research was inspired by findings that 
IATs are prone to measuring perceptions of societal mores as opposed to personal 
preferences when dealing with stigmatized topics (see Han et al., 2006; Olson & Fazio, 
2003, 2004, 2006; Payne & Gawronski, 2010, pp. 3-4, 11; Tegie-Mocigemba et al., 2010, 
pp. 131-132). In an attempt to control for this possible confound, Olson and Fazio (2003; 
2004) created the first ‘personalized’ IATs by removing error feedback from IAT trials, and 
by replacing the standard IAT’s positive versus negative attribute category labels with the 
terms “I like” versus “I don’t like”. Given that smoking is frequently stigmatized, De 
Houwer et al. (2006, experiment 2) therefore hypothesised that an IAT variant capable of 
measuring personal implicit preferences to the exclusion of others’ preferences might 
reveal pro-smoking IAT effects among smokers where the original IAT format had failed. 
And indeed, De Houwer et al. did find that regular smokers were significantly faster at 
completing the ‘Smoking/I-like + Nonsmoking/I-dislike’ key assignment scheme than its 
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alternative.  
Thus, whereas De Houwer et al.’s (2006) first experiment indicated that smokers 
were pro-smoking on a wanting-IAT, their second experiment indicated that smokers were 
also pro-smoking on a personalized-IAT. Importantly, De Houwer et al. took this as 
evidence that implicit liking was potentially as relevant to tobacco addiction as implicit 
wanting. However, when Tibboel et al. (2011) used a very similar smoking-related 
personalized IAT a few years later they did not replicate these findings. Instead, Tibboel et 
al. found that when regular smokers were satiated for smoking they produced near-zero 
effects on personalised IATs. Moreover, these researchers also found that when deprived of 
nicotine for at least 12 hours regular smokers responded faster to trials pairing smoking 
exemplars with the term ‘I dislike’ than to trials pairing smoking exemplars with the term ‘I 
like’. Indeed, somewhat ironically, one personalized IAT that was designed to measure 
smokers’ perceptions of the social consequences of smoking ended up reflecting smokers’ 
perceptions of smoking-related stigmatization rather than their personal preferences about 
smoking (see Kahler, Daughters, Leventhal, Gwaltney, & Palfai, 2007). As such, much like 
the research on smoking-related wanting-IATs, the research on personalized smoking-
related IATs is highly inconclusive about whether implicit evaluating is involved in tobacco 
addiction. 
The third and final offshoot of the smoking-related IAT literature sought to uncover 
non-relative pro-smoking IAT effects among smokers by using the ST-IAT. Initially, 
Huijding and de Jong (2006) did find pro-smoking implicit attitudes among smokers with 
this measure (i.e. significantly faster responding on “Smoking/Positive versus Negative” 
key assignments than on “Smoking/Negative versus Positive” key assignments). However, 
using a similar ST-IAT, Glock, Müller, and Krolak-Schwerdt (2013) found near-zero 
effects among smokers. It is also worth noting that Bassett and Dabbs (2005) had also 
previously found near zero effects for smokers using the GNAT. 
Overall, therefore, the literature on smoking-related IATs is characterised by three 
research offshoots that have each yielded confusing and inconclusive findings about what 
particular aspects of implicit evaluating are involved in tobacco addiction (see also Roefs et 
al., 2011, pp. 178-181; Waters & Sayette, 2006, pp. 324-327). From our privileged position 
of hindsight, this disappointing state of affairs could be seen as an inevitable consequence 
of the IAT’s relativity. Indeed, it could be argued that the literature on smoking-related 
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IATs is confused, in large part, because its research is predicated upon the idea that the size 
and direction of smoking-related IAT effects reflect whether a person is implicitly pro-
smoking versus anti-smoking or perhaps ambivalent about smoking. As explained above, 
however, the relativity of the IAT effect undermines the assumption that the polarity of 
such an effect captures how a smoker evaluates smoking in absolute terms (see Blanton & 
Jaccard, 2006). On balance, one could argue that IAT effects could still be useful if they are 
shown at least incidentally to have criterion validity with respect to tobacco addition. 
Unfortunately, however, the smoking-related IAT has demonstrated haphazard criterion 
validity across its research literature, and this is also in keeping with the idea that tobacco 
addiction involves many non-relative forms of evalauting which the IAT cannot. 
On the Haphazard Criterion Validity of Smoking-related IATs. 
The most popular method of testing the criterion validity of smoking-related IATs is 
in terms of known-group comparisons between smokers’ versus non-smokers’ IAT effects. 
Swanson et al. (2001) were the first to make such comparisons wherein they found that 
smokers implicitly identified with smoking significantly more than non-smokers (i.e. using 
a smoking-identity22 IAT in experiment 2), and they also found that smokers implicitly 
liked smoking significantly more than non-smokers (i.e. with an attitude IAT in experiment 
3). However, even if we disregard the relative nature of such findings for a moment, the 
key point here is that often they have not replicated in subsequent research, and even where 
they have there has been no systematic improvement in the magnitude of the known-groups 
effects achieved by smoking-related IATs since then.  
For example, in cases where an IAT contrasts smoking with exercise, sweets or 
stealing the resulting measurement effects do not significantly distinguish smokers from 
non-smokers, and moreover it is unknown why this is the case (r = .10, study 1, r = .18, 
study 2, Swanson et al., 2001; r = .20, study 1, Robinson et al., 2005). Similarly, when 
Glock et al. (2013) used an ST-IAT to measure how much smokers versus non-smokers 
associated smoking with healthy versus unhealthy behaviours they found no significant 
difference (r = .06). Indeed, Larsen et al. (2014) used two different smoking-related Brief 
                                                 
22 I will henceforth prefix the IAT with the term ‘smoking-attitudes’ versus other prefixes (e.g. ‘smoking-
identity’), as necessary, in order to distinguish smoking-related IATs that are designed to measure implicit 
attitudes (i.e. liking) about smoking versus those designed to measure other aspects of smoking-related 
implicit cognition (e.g. how much a person implicitly wants or identifies with smoking). As such, whenever 
the following text mentions an IAT it should be interpreted by default as referring to a ‘smoking-attitudes’ 
IAT unless otherwise specified. 
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IATs and both failed to significantly distinguish adolescent smokers from non-smokers (ps 
> .59, rs < .05). In another study, about child-related smoking, Chassin et al. (2002) 
unexpectedly found little or no relationship between either mothers’ or fathers’ smoking-
related IAT effects and their respective smoking-status’ (i.e. .01 < η2 < .02, i.e. .0001 < rs < 
.0004, p. 491). Indeed, more generally, smoking-related IAT effects can vary as an 
extraneous function of the order in which key assignment schemes are presented to them 
(e.g.  Kahler et al. 2007, p. 2017, t(65) = 4.0 p < .001; Sherman et al., 2003, p. 28, r > .32). 
Furthermore, Waters et al. (2010) found that non-smokers’ smoking-related IAT effects 
gradually diminished upon repeated administrations so that they eventually became 
indistinguishable from those of smokers’ (i.e. diminishing a once significant known-groups 
effect to non-significance).  
Granted, smoking-related IAT effects have yielded significant known-groups effects 
about twice as often as not, but crucially, even among such statistically significant cases 
there is no evidence of a systematic improvement in the magnitude of the criterion effects 
achieved. Namely, Swanson et al. reported significant known-groups effect sizes between 
smokers versus non-smokers of r = .34 (i.e. using a smoking-identity IAT) and r = .30 (i.e. 
using a smoking-attitudes IAT) that are broadly of the same magnitude as the other 
significant differences obtained in subsequent smoking-related IAT research (i.e. .10 < rs < 
.52; a very small significant difference between children who had a family member that 
smoked versus those that did not, r = .10, but no significant difference between children 
who had tried smoking versus not, Andrews et al., 2010, p. 2399; smokers versus non-
smokers, r = .33, Basset & Dabbs, 2005; smokers versus non-smokers, r = .46, Dal Cin et 
al., 2007; smokers versus non-smokers, r =  .39, Huijding & de Jong 2006; smokers versus 
non-smokers, r = .52, Huijding et al., 2005, study 1, p. 952; smokers versus non-smokers, r 
= .38, Perugini et al., 2005; smokers versus non-smokers, r = .52, study 1, r = .32, study 2, 
Robinson et al., 2005; smokers versus non-smokers, r = .27, light versus heavy smokers, r 
= .16, non-smokers versus light/heavy and deprived/satiated smokers, .13 < rs < .28, 
Sherman et al., 2003, study 2, pp. 28-30). Thus, if anything, even the significant known-
groups effects achieved with smoking-related IATs vary quite widely in their magnitude 
(i.e. .10 < rs < .52). Moreover, even after more than 13 years of research about the subject, 
the literature remains uncertain about what might be causing such variety in the magnitude 
of the known-groups effects as has so far been obtained (see Roefs et al., 2011, pp. 178-
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181; Tibboel et al., 2011; Waters & Sayette, 2006). 
Likewise, when it comes to considering the incremental known-groups validity of 
smoking-related IATs over analogous self-reported attitudes, the evidence is less than 
encouraging. In the only study of this kind, Perugini used logistical regression to 
demonstrate that a standard smoking-related IAT did not significantly distinguish smokers 
versus non-smokers (p = .31) beyond the significant level of prediction achieved by 
analogous self-reported attitudes (p = .001; combined R2 = .55). Granted, when the 
interaction between the IAT and the relevant self-reports was entered as the second step in 
Perugini’s logistical regression it did yield a marginally significant R2-change = .05 (p = 
.06). However, even if we embrace this finding as encouraging evidence in favour of 
smoking-related IATs,23 the fact remains that it is disjointed from other research in the area.  
Moreover, when it comes to cross-sectional correlations between smoking-related 
IATs and tobacco addiction criteria only seven journal articles are relevant, and collectively 
they are less than conclusive in their findings. First, we consider those cross-sectional 
correlations that lend support to the criterion validity of smoking-related IATs, before then 
qualifying this supportive evidence with some other less favourable findings that are 
commonly overlooked by the extant literature. As detailed in Table 2.1, all seven articles in 
the area reported at least some significant cross-sectional correlations between smoking-
related IATs and various criteria related to tobacco addiction. In summary, there are four 
cases of a smoking-related IAT correlating with self-reported tobacco consumption 
somewhere in the range, .14 < rs < .42, ps < .05; six cases of a smoking-related IAT 
correlating with clinical measures of nicotine dependence, .24 < rs < .37, ps < .05; and 
finally, four cases of a smoking-related IAT correlating with self-reported measures of 
tobacco craving, .32 < rs < .45, ps < .05.  
In addition, Huijding and de Jong (2006, p. 185) also found that the IAT they 
employed significantly correlated with self-reported craving and nicotine dependence even 
where corresponding self-reported attitudes failed to do so. Similarly, McCarthy and 
Thompsen (2006, p. 439) showed via latent variable analyses that their positively-focused 
unipolar IAT significantly correlated with the Fagerström Test for Nicotine Dependence 
                                                 
23 Self-reported attitudes about smoking are normally capable of distinguishing a very high percentage of 
smokers versus non-smokers (i.e. as evidenced in the first step of Perugini’s logistical regression), and 
therefore it is perhaps impressive that Perugini’s IAT managed at all to predict smoking status in addition to 
analogous self-reports. 
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(FTND; Heatherton, Kozlowski, Frecker, & Fagerström, 1991) and various aspects of 
tobacco consumption even controlling for the Smoking Consequences Questionnaire (SCQ; 
Copeland, Brandon & Quinn, 1995; Myers, McCarthy, MacPherson, & Brown, 2003), path 
coefficient = .15, p < .01, N = 264. Lastly, Chassin, Presson, Sherman, Seo, and Macy 
(2010, p. 674) found a small first-order correlation between smokers’ self-reported plans to 
quit smoking in the following 18-months and their scores on a standard smoking-attitudes 
IAT, r(447) = - .11, p < .05. Though not strictly a criterion for tobacco addiction, self-
reported intentions to quit smoking are reflective of tobacco addiction insofar as they 
indicate how much smokers still believe they retain at least some autonomy over their 
tobacco consumption. 
Critically, however, Table 2.1 does not mention the many non-significant criterion 
correlations that also resulted from the articles it includes. Namely, five of the seven 
articles listed in Table 2.1 involved, but downplayed, non-significant cross-sectional 
correlations between smoking-related IATs and tobacco addiction criteria. In fact, in each 
case there were a comparable number of significant versus non-significant criterion 
correlations, but only the former findings were emphasized in the relevant articles. For 
example, Tibbeol et al. (2011) only reported significant correlations between their wanting-
IAT, their liking-IAT and various self-reported urges to smoke, without ever reporting the 
details of a similar number of criterion correlations involving the same variables that did 
not achieve statistical significance (see p. 288). In addition, Kahler et al. (2007, p. 2072) 
found no significant correlation between their smoking-related social consequences IAT 
and the social subscale of the Smoking Motivation Questionnaire, nor with the FTND, and 
nor with CPD (| |′s < .10, ps > .10). Similarly, Waters et al.’s (2007, p. 183) generalized 
estimating equation (GEE) analyses found no significant relationship between the smoking-
attitudes IAT they used and the number of years a person had been smoking, and nor with 
CPD (ps > .05). Indeed, in one other study that failed to provide any positive finding to 
Table 2.1, Larsen et al. (2014) found smoking-related Brief IAT scores did not correlate 
with either CPD or mFTQ scores in a sample of adolescent smokers. Indeed, even Huijding 
and de Jong’s (2006) headline finding that their smoking-attitudes IAT correlated 
significantly with self-reported cravings is questionable upon closer scrutiny. As Huijding 
and de Jong themselves admit in a footnote (p. 185), the correlation they found between 
their smoking-attitudes ST-IAT and self-reported craving only held when self-reported 
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craving was measured just after that ST-IAT was implemented and not before. In their 
footnote, Huijding and de Jong interpreted this finding as indicating that the smoking-
related pictures incorporated into their ST-IAT induced self-reported cravings at follow-up. 
Thus, at best, Huijding and de Jong’s research (even if not their findings) suggests that the 
ST-IAT did not measure implicit evaluating related to pre-existing cigarette cravings, but 
instead merely induced artificial changes in self-reported cigarette craving that were 
correlated with the measurement effects it produced.  
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Table 2.1 
Cross-sectional correlations for, but not against the criterion validity of smoking-related IATs (i.e. excluding non-significant cases). 
Tobacco Addiction Criterion Variable Type of Smoking-
related IAT 
Statistics Originating Study 
Questionnaire Measures of Tobacco Consumption, 
Relapose & Abstinence 
   
 Cigarettes smoked per day (CPD) Standard r(447) = .14, p < .05 
Chassin, Presson, Sherman, Seo, & Macy, 
2010, p. 674 
 CPD Standard r(32) = .29, p < .05 Swanson et al., 2001, p. 225 (experiment 3) 
 CPD Smoking-identity r(32) = .42, p < .005 Swanson et al., 2001, p. 225 (experiment 3) 
 Cigarettes smoked per week 
Positively-focused 
unipolar IAT 
.29 < r(262)s < .37,   
ps < .01a 
McCarthy & Thompsen, 2006, p. 439 
 
Time to relapse during unaided 
smoking-cessation 
Approach/avoidance 
IAT measuring trait 
experiential 
avoidance 
r(30) = -57,              
p < .001 
Cameron, Reed, & Ninnemann, 2013, p. 
2909 
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Tobacco Addiction Criterion Variable Type of Smoking-
related IAT 
Statistics Originating Study 
Clinical Measures of Nicotine Dependence    
 
The modified Fagerström Tolerance 
Questionnaire (mFTQ) 
Single-target IAT r(31) = .26, p < .05 Huijding & de Jong, 2006 
 
The Fagerström Test for Nicotine 
Dependence (FTND) 
Positively-focused 
unipolar IAT 
.29 < r(262)s < .37, 
ps < .01a 
McCarthy & Thompsen, 2006, p. 439 
 FTND Standard p < .05 Waters et al., 2007 
 
Social motivations subscale of the 
Wisconsin Inventory of Smoking 
Dependence Motives (WISDM) 
Personalized  IAT   
| (65)| = .24,b  p < 
.05 
Kahler et al., 2007, p. 2072 
 
The Smoking Consequences 
Questionnaire (SCQ) 
Standard 
GEE analyses, p < 
.05 
Waters et al., 2007 
  The short-SCQ 
Positively-focused 
unipolar IAT 
.29 < r(262)’s < .37, 
ps < .01a 
McCarthy & Thompsen, 2006, p. 439 
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a McCarthy and Thompsen (2006) did not identify individual correlations between their positively-focused unipolar IAT versus CPD, the FTND or the 
short-SCQ. b Kahler et al. (2007, p. 2072) reported a negative correlation, r(65) = -.24, p < .05, between a reverse scored smoking-related social 
consequences IAT and a nicotine dependence subscale designed to measure social motivations for smoking (i.e. smokers who found it easier to pair 
smoking with negative, rather than positive, social consequences tended to report less social motivations for smoking). 
 
  
     
Tobacco Addiction Criterion Variable Type of Smoking-
related IAT 
Statistics Originating Study 
Measures of Tobacco Craving    
 Self-reported cravings after IAT Single-target IAT r(31) =  .39, p < .05 Huijding & de Jong, 2006 
 Questionnaire of Smoking Urges (QSU) Standard 
GEE analyses,                    
p < .05 
Waters et al., 2007 
 
Various measures of nicotine craving 
including the QSU in nicotine-deprived 
and/or satiated conditions. 
Wanting-IAT rs = .32-.45, ps < .05 Tibboel et al., 2011 
 
Various measures of nicotine craving 
including the QSU in nicotine-deprived 
and/or satiated conditions. 
Liking-IAT rs = .32-.42, ps < .05 Tibboel et al., 2011 
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When McCarthy and Thompsen (2006, p. 441) estimated how much their 
smoking-related IAT correlated with measures of tobacco consumption after controlling 
for the SCQ it resulted in a significant but very small path coefficient of just .15. In 
addition, they also found that unlike the positively-focused unipolar smoking-related 
IAT they used, their corresponding negatively-focused unipolar IAT failed to correlate 
with the SCQ, the FTND or with measures of weekly tobacco consumption. Granted, 
this might be interpreted as discriminant validity for the positively-focused unipolar 
IAT McCarthy and Thompsen used, in that it confirms that positively-framed evaluating 
is more relevant to addiction than negatively-framed evaluating, as had been suggested 
in earlier research on alcohol dependence (p. 441). However, even accepting this 
argument (i.e. by ignoring the relativity of unipolar IATs), it then becomes puzzling that 
there has been no research published on smoking-related unipolar IATs during the eight 
years since McCarthy and Thompsen (2006). 
As inconclusive as the aforementioned literature involving cross-sectional 
correlations is, the research examining prospective correlations between smoking-
related IATs and tobacco addiction criteria is even less conclusive. Namely, that 
literature only includes three cases of a smoking-related IAT prospectively predicting a 
tobacco addiction criterion (and never vice versa). Firstly, Kahler et al. (2007) found 
that their smoking-related social consequences IAT prospectively predicted the success 
of a standard smoking cessation treatment at two- and eight-week follow-ups (r(65) = 
.35, p < .01, and r(65) = .35, p < .10, respectively).  
Secondly, Chassin et al. (2010) conducted an internet-based survey of smokers 
from the general population and found that their smoking-attitudes IAT scores at 
baseline prospectively predicted how likely they were to be abstinent from smoking 18 
months later (i.e. the more ostensibly ‘pro-smoking’ a smoker’s IAT effects the less 
likely they were to be abstinent 18 months later, r(447) = - .17, p < .001, p. 674). 
Putting aside the very small magnitude of their finding for a moment, admittedly, 
Chassin et al. did make some attempt to systematically analyse the prospective 
correlation they obtained. Namely, they used complex logistical regression to model 
how baseline variables might be moderating the relationship between their smoking-
attitudes IAT and abstinence at 18 months follow-up. The supplementary analyses 
suggested that those with more anti-smoking implicit attitudes are more likely to be 
abstinent from smoking in the long-term when they had many previous failed attempts 
but still planned to quit smoking regardless, or when they started out with no plan to 
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quit and had little experience of failing to quit.24 However, this systematic analysis is of 
course not the same thing as conducting systematic research on the matter. Rather, 
despite numerous competing explanations for Chassin et al.’s findings, neither they, nor 
anyone else subsequently, has attempted to tease apart these possibilities via systematic 
research. 
Thirdly, using structural equation modelling Sherman et al. (2009, p. 316) found 
that children’s smoking-attitudes IAT effects at baseline significantly predicted whether 
they were one of the 15% who initiated smoking 18 months later (with path coefficients 
≈ .16-.22). In addition, Sherman et al. used a significant path coefficient ≈ .18-23 
between children’s versus mothers’ or fathers’ smoking-attitude IAT effects to suggest 
that they had demonstrated the ‘intergenerational transmission of implicit attitudes’ 
from mother/father to child, and that this increased a child’s likelihood of initiating 
smoking. However, this secondary assertion is nothing more than a post-hoc speculation 
given that it is (a) founded upon a cross-sectional correlation instead of upon a 
prospective correlation or experimental methods, and (b) given that it is an 
unprecedented finding. A related point is that Chassin et al. (2002) made similarly 
unfounded claims as Sherman et al. (2009) about the potential for a prospective 
relationship between mothers’ smoking-related implicit attitudes and their children’s 
likelihood of smoking. Namely, using a cross-sectional χ2 correlation, Chassin et al. 
claimed that children were significantly more likely to smoke when their mothers 
produced smoking-attitudes IAT effects that were more pro-smoking; and in turn, they 
used this finding to claim that mothers’ implicit attitudes influenced their children’s 
smoking (p. 493). However, even putting aside the relativity of the IAT they used (and 
thus its zero point), and also the fact that the correlation Chassin et al. observed was 
small and cross-sectional (odds ratio = 1.41, p < .03, p. 493), their claim still ignores 
multiple null relationships that bear directly upon it. For example, they observed a near 
zero cross-sectional correlation between children’s versus mother’s smoking-related 
IAT effects, r(444) = .15, p < .05; null cross-sectional relationships between children’s 
IAT effects with their father’s IAT effects, r(444) = .06, p > .10, and also with both 
mother’s and father’s smoking-status (p. 491); a null relationship between fathers’ IAT 
effects and children’s smoking; and indeed a null correlation between children’s 
smoking and their own smoking-related IAT effects (p. 493). 
                                                 
24 Specifically, Chassin et al. found that their IAT only predicted 18-month abstinence among those high 
in past experiences of quitting failures but who nevertheless had a plan to quit smoking at baseline, B = - 
1.20, p = .004, odds ratio = .30, and among those who had no plan to quit smoking at baseline but who 
had little previous experience of failing to quit smoking, B = - .41, p = .10, odds ratio = .67. 
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Likewise, Dal Cin et al.’s (2007) study examining implicit smoking-identity was 
another study that mistakenly used cross-sectional correlations to make causal 
arguments about smoking-related IATs. Their basic claim was to have found evidence 
that the extent to which undergraduate smokers implicitly identified with smoking at the 
start of a college semester (on a smoking-identity IAT) determined the extent to which 
those undergraduates’ intentions to smoke increased across the relevant semester. Dal 
Cin et al. solely based this assertion upon their regression finding that smokers’ 
smoking-identity IAT effects served as a large and unique predictor of the relevant 
changes in smokers’ smoking intentions, t(20) = 3.30 (r ≈ .59). Critically, however, the 
researchers did not deliver their smoking-identity IAT until after the relevant changes in 
smoking-related intentions had already occurred. Thus, as per the longstanding 
scientific convention that causes must precede their effects, Dal Cin et al.’s central 
claim was ill-founded (e.g. Hempel, 1970; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & Van 
Der Maas, 2011).  
Moreover, even if we were to assume for a moment that smokers’ implicit 
smoking-identity remained unchanged across the relevant college semester, various 
methodological ambiguities would still prevent us from making unequivocal claims 
about stronger implicit smoking-identity leading to greater increases in smoking 
intentions. Most notably, the researchers’  regression did not take into account that the 
changes they recorded in self-reported smoking intentions were obtained across an 
unspecified time within a college semester that ended with one of two different types of 
film clip (i.e. glamorising smoking versus not). This oversight is particularly perplexing 
when one considers that Dal Cin et al.’s preceding statistical analyses indicated that the 
type of film clip used significantly moderated implicit smoking-identity in the relevant 
sample (p. 561; but see Moore, 2003; Skinner, 1981).  
Granted, Cameron, Reed, and Ninnemann (2013) did find a large prospective 
relationship between smokers’ implicit evaluating on their approach/avoidance IAT and 
how long in hours those smokers managed to sustain an unaided attempt at smoking-
cessation (see Table 2.1). Crucially, however, the relevant IAT did not measure 
smokers’ implicit evaluating of smoking, or quitting smoking, but instead their implicit 
evaluating of experiential avoidance in general (i.e. without reference to smoking). And 
as such, they did not establish a prospective relationship between smoking-related 
implicit evaluating and tobacco addiction. 
Furthermore, a general issue that is of concern in this area is that smoking-
related IATs are relatively poor at prospectively predicting even their own effects. 
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Namely, on the two occasions where test-retest reliability for smoking-related IATs has 
so far been recorded it ranged lowly between r = .20-.56 (i.e. test-retest r = .20, .29 over 
one week for a standard smoking-IAT , Andrews et al., 2010; test-retest r = .56, .53 
over one month respectively for a positively-focused versus negatively-focused unipolar 
IAT, McCarthy & Thompsen, 2006). Thus, even if smoking-related IATs did happen to 
correlate with tobacco addiction criteria on any given occasion, researchers would be 
highly unlikely to replicate any such findings on any given attempt (see LeBel & 
Paunonen, 2011). On balance, the test-retest reliability of a smoking-related IAT might 
fluctuate due to any of a range of background variables that once identified, would in 
principle allow researchers to achieve higher levels of test-retest reliability with 
smoking-related IATs (i.e. by experimentally controlling the relevant background 
variables). Critically, however, there is very little research examining how contextual 
variables moderate smoking-related IATs, and moreover as we will now review, what 
little research does exist on the matter is inconclusive in its findings. 
The final, and perhaps most concerning, aspect of extant research findings about 
smoking-related IATs is the fact that they exhibit poor sensitivity to the experimental 
manipulation of variables that are integral to tobacco addiction. For example, Huijding 
et al. (2005, experiment 2) found that smokers’ smoking-related IAT effects did not 
vary between typical smoking versus non-smoking contexts, F(1, 38) < 1 (i.e. r < .16). 
Similarly, both of Lochbuehler et al.’s (2013) studies indicated that children’s smoking-
attitudes IAT effects were not affected by whether they had just watched and/or enjoyed 
film clips where the lead characters were depicted smoking, Fs < .05 (i.e. rs < .02). 
Granted, Dal Cin et al. (2007) found that the extent to which people self-reported that 
they identified with a tobacco-smoking hero in a film clip significantly moderated the 
smoking-identity IAT effects, t(47) = 2.05 (i.e. r = .29 without any significant 
interaction with smoking-status). However, this finding is not only unprecedented and 
unrepeated but moreover it was obtained without assessing smokers’ implicit attitudes 
toward smoking (i.e. the IAT assessed implicit identity), and with a male-only 
undergraduate sample that had an average age of just 19.7 years. As such, we must 
regard Dal Cin et al.’s finding that a smoking-identity IAT is moderately sensitive to 
smoking-related social contexts as being both preliminary and of questionable scope 
(e.g. it may not necessarily generalise to smokers’ implicit attitudes about smoking nor 
to more established or female smokers). As such, smoking-related IATs must be 
regarded as being relatively insensitive to smoking-related contextually cuing. 
On the matter of whether smoking-related IATs are sensitive to nicotine 
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deprivation, the findings are again mixed. Waters et al. (2007) found that smokers 
produced moderately more pro-smoking IAT effects having smoked a cigarette 40 
minutes beforehand as compared to when they had not, F(1, 52) = 4.48, p < .05 (i.e. r ≈ 
.28). And indeed, this comports well with the significant main effect that Rydell, 
Sherman, Boucher and Macy (2012) obtained on their smoking-attitudes IAT between 
participants who were allowed to smoke just beforehand versus not, F(1, 40) = 4.22, p = 
.05,   
  = .09 (i.e. r ≈ .30).25 Somewhat puzzlingly, however, Waters et al. also found 
that the impact of having smokers abstain from smoking for 12 hours had much the 
same impact on their smoking-attitudes IAT effects, F(1, 52) = 4.61, p < .05 (i.e. r ≈ 
.29). And moreover, Waters et al. found no interaction on their smoking-attitudes IAT 
between their 12-hour abstinence manipulation and whether smoking was permitted 40 
minutes before the experimental session, p > .20. In fact, post hoc contrasts revealed 
that the only experimental condition that produced IAT effects that were significantly 
different from any of the other three conditions was when smokers smoked 40 minutes 
beforehand having not abstained from nicotine, ps < .05 (i.e. rs > .36). In other words, 
Waters et al.’s IAT reported no impact of smoking 40 minutes beforehand among 12-
hour abstainers, nor any impact of 12-hour abstaining among those who did not smoke 
beforehand, ps > .10. However, it is important to note that Waters et al. may have 
mistaken ruled out at least one moderate-sized effect in these latter cases. Namely, the 
relevant p values coupled with their appropriate degrees of freedom imply rs < .31, and 
this comports well with the similarly sized significant main effects Waters et al. had 
earlier ascribed to both experimental variables (see above). 
On balance, therefore, Waters et al.’s findings provide only equivocal evidence 
that smoking-related IATs are sensitive to smokers’ nicotine deprivation. Likewise, 
Tibboel et al. (2011) revealed that abstaining from smoking for 12 hours had almost no 
impact upon smokers’ IAT effects whether measured in terms of liking, t(43) = 2.10 
(i.e. r ≈ .22), or in terms of wanting, t(47) < 1 (i.e. r ≈ .14). And finally, worse still, 
Sherman et al. (2003, p. 28) found that abstaining from smoking for four hours had no 
discernible impact upon a smoking-attitudes IAT effect produced by smokers (note that 
none of the relevant inferential statistics were reported). Thus, at best, smoking-related 
IATs are rather hit and miss when it comes to detecting different levels of nicotine 
deprivation.  
                                                 
25 Note that Rydell et al. described this experimental manipulation as a form of nicotine deprivation but 
that this is a highly questionable assertion given that their participants in both conditions were free to 
smoke up until shortly before completing the relevant smoking-related IAT. 
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Finally, as further evidence that researchers have yet to identify clear controlling 
variables for smoking-related IAT effects, existing attempts to bring about lasting 
changes in these effects have mostly failed. In the first such attempt, Czyzewska and 
Ginsburg (2007, p. 120) found that it made no difference to smokers’ smoking-related 
IAT effects when they had just watched a 15 minute video of public service 
announcements against tobacco versus marijuana. Later, Andrews et al. (2010, 
experiment 2) found that some anti-smoking games produced marginal changes in 
children’s smoking-related IAT effects, Fs < 3.24 (i.e. rs < .23), one-tailed ps < .10, but 
that many more did not, one-tailed ps > .10 (i.e. from pre- to post-intervention and in 
comparison with a control game). Indeed, these disappointing findings are all the more 
remarkable when one considers the fact that the sample involved did not even have a 
history of smoking to bolster their smoking-related IAT effects against the relevant 
games (i.e. a sample of children with an average age of 12 years with only 4% of whom 
had previously tried smoking).  
After that, Rydell et al. (2012) claimed to have found evidence that when 
smokers watched a brief but strongly worded anti-smoking video clip it made their 
smoking-related IAT effects more anti-smoking in comparison to a weakly executed 
anti-smoking video clip, but only when they had just smoked a cigarette, t(41) = 2.54, p 
= .02 (i.e. r ≈ .37). However, this causal finding was ill-founded given that, much like 
Dal Cin et al., Rydell et al. did not deliver their smoking-related IAT to smokers until 
after the relevant changes were supposed to have taken place. In other words, Rydell et 
al. did not determine whether the relevant differences they obtained reflected changes in 
smoking-related implicit attitudes induced by the strongly worded video clip, or merely 
initial differences in sampling. Moreover, even if we put aside this issue, it is important 
to recognise that Rydell et al.’s significant finding here was merely a post hoc contrast 
plucked from within a non-significant main effect of message-strength, p > .05 (other 
statistics not reported), and from within a non-significant interaction between message-
strength and whether or not the relevant smokers smoked just before receiving their 
anti-smoking message, F(1, 40) = 1.20,   
  = .03 (i.e. r ≈ .17). As such, Rydell et al.’s 
key claim is not only ill-founded but it is also based upon data that might very well be a 
cherry-picked artefact of statistical familywise error.  
Taking a slightly different approach, Glock et al. (2013) computed a regression 
of smokers’ smoking-related IAT effects onto the number of cigarettes they smoked per 
day (CPD) to determine if anti-smoking warnings would diminish this relationship. The 
researchers found that smokers’ IAT effects did not regress upon CPD when they had 
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just been confronted with a succession of anti-smoking warnings, β = -.24, p > .05, but 
that they did when smokers had not been confronted with such warnings, β = .31, p < 
.05. However, Glock et al. did not statistically test their core assertion as to whether 
those two correlations were significantly different from each other. Indeed, it was not 
even possible to compare the relative magnitude of those relationships because Glock et 
al. bundled them as part of a multiple regression with three other predictors measuring 
the self-reported extent to which those smokers engaged in compensatory health 
behaviours to justify their continued smoking (i.e. doing exercise, eating healthily and 
reducing how much they smoked without quitting entirely). 
Furthermore, as in all but one of the aforementioned studies (i.e. Andrews et al., 
2010), Glock et al. only measured smokers’ IAT effects just after the relevant anti-
smoking warnings. Consequently, their findings cannot rule out initial sampling 
differences as the source of the reduced beta weights. Worse still, Glock et al. did not 
use a control condition but instead merely refrained from delivering the relevant anti-
smoking warning messages to one group of smokers. As such, these researchers made 
no experimental distinction between whether the relationship they observed between 
smoking-related IAT effects and CPD was diminished by the anti-smoking content of 
the relevant warnings or perhaps merely as a function of receiving any information 
about smoking (i.e. regardless of whether it was pro- versus anti-smoking versus 
relatively neutral).  
In one other study, Macy et al. (2015) did ensure the delivery of a smoking-
related IAT to smokers both before and after they had received either an anti-smoking 
treatment versus a suitable control treatment. They found that a web-based approach-
avoidance task designed to train avoidance of smoking-related stimuli brought about a 
moderate-to-small reduction in smokers smoking-related IAT effects, F(1, 267) = 14.70, 
p < .001,   
  = .05 (i.e. r ≈ .22). However, that main effect was qualified by two 
significant interactions that unexpectedly limited the success of the relevant approach-
avoidance task to just two smoker sub-groups. Namely, the smoking-avoidance 
treatment only brought about anti-smoking changes in IAT effects for smokers who at 
three months previously, had planned to quit smoking or were without an educational 
attainment greater than high school; and even then the smoking-avoidance treatment 
effect was relatively borderline in both cases (i.e.   
 s = .04, .05, respectively). 
Moreover, an accompanying anti-smoking treatment based upon public service 
announcements had no impact whatsoever on smokers’ smoking-related IAT effects 
(the relevant statistics were not reported).  
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Thus, in summary, smoking-related IATs might exhibit a moderate degree of 
known-groups validity (i.e. even if somewhat haphazardly), but when it comes to 
evidence that they correlate with other tobacco addiction criteria, whether in cross-
section or prospectively, the extant literature is highly inconclusive. At best, smoking-
related IATs achieve medium-sized correlations with tobacco addiction criteria, and 
often these relationships are not replicated. And more to the point, what little research 
does exist on the subject is certainly not systematic. This is perhaps most evident in the 
small research literature attempting to bring about lasting changes in smoking-related 
IAT effects. Despite nine years of research on the topic, so far only two studies have 
experimentally demonstrated an intervention changing smoking-related IAT effects (i.e. 
Andrews et al., 2010, experiment 2; Macy et al., 2015). And moreover, in both cases the 
treatment effects on the relevant IATs were small, and exceptions among a larger 
collection of unexpected null treatment effects. It is thus possible that the only existing 
evidence that smoking-related IAT effects can be modified by researcher intervention 
are merely statistical outliers around zero rather than bone fide treatment effects.  
Furthermore, a major issue that is outstanding even within the wider IAT 
literature is that researchers generally fail to check how long the relevant intervention-
induced changes persist on smoking-related IATs. Crucially, without such follow-up 
research the IAT literature simply cannot distinguish between experimental effects that 
reflect genuine psychological change (e.g. learning) versus experimental effects that 
merely reflect contextual cueing of pre-existing psychological processes (see De 
Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Moors, 2013; Han et al., 2010; Lochbuehler et al., 2013; 
Webb, Sheeran, & Pepper, 2012; Wiers, Gladwin, Hofmann, Salemink, & 
Ridderinkhof, 2013; Wiers & Stacy, 2010, pp. 566-567). And lastly, further research 
would still be needed to determine how well the relevant treatment effects generalised 
beyond laboratory settings to tobacco addiction per se.26 
 
                                                 
26 In particular, this last point challenges the scope of findings wherein anti-smoking treatments are 
designed to train smokers how to respond in an anti-smoking manner on computerized classification tasks 
like those employed by IATs, but without ever providing evidence that such context-specific training 
generalises to reduce tobacco addiction in non-laboratory settings. To illustrate, Macy et al. obtained 
some treatment effects on their smoking-related IAT with a smoking-avoidance intervention that they 
specifically designed to employ stimuli that were similar to those used in the relevant smoking-related 
IAT, but importantly, when it came to more naturalistic aspects of smoking behaviour the same treatment 
did not even manage to increase smokers’ willingness to receive links to websites with tips to help them 
quit smoking. Indeed, even putting aside reference to smoking-related IATs, preliminary evidence has 
only just begun to emerge showing that smoking-avoidance techniques might be effective on smoking, at 
least minimally (see Wittekind, Feist, Viertel, Moritz, & Fritzsche, 2015). 
51 
 
2.3. A Recap of the IAT’s Shortcomings in Relation to Tobacco Addiction 
The IAT is incapable of measuring implicit evaluating in a non-relative fashion 
and as a result it cannot distinguish among the many non-polarized forms of evaluating 
commonly involved in behavioural criteria. In particular, tobacco addiction is a 
condition that is characterised by the ambivalent interplay of contrasting forms of non-
polarized evaluating from situation to situation (e.g. a smoker might vary between 
engaging in positively-framed pro-smoking evaluating when socializing with smokers 
but engage in negatively-framed anti-smoking evaluating during sporting activities that 
highlight the ongoing physical costs of smoking). Thus, the IAT is fundamentally 
incapable of parsing up tobacco addiction in terms of implicit evaluating because it does 
not distinguish among different types of implicit evaluating (i.e. in the sense of 
addressing different topics) that seem likely to be involved in tobacco addiction. 
Bearing this out, the literature on smoking-related IATs is dominated by disjointed and 
intractable controversies about whether implicit evaluating is even involved in tobacco 
addiction or not. Moreover, researchers have only ever demonstrated criterion validity 
for smoking-related IATs as an incidental by-product of these assorted controversies. 
Having initially happened upon modest and often unstable levels of criterion validity, 
without ever determining what specific topics the relevant implicit evaluating addressed 
in achieving that criterion validity, researchers have thus been unable to demonstrate 
any further progress in this regard. In fact, on balance, with respect to achieving 
critierion validity in relation to tobacco addiction, or with respect to distinguishing 
between competing theories about implicit evaluating in this domain, the IAT appears 
no better equipped than evaluative priming. 
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CHAPTER 3: Undercurrents in the Research on Smoking-related Implicit Cognition: A 
Comprehensive Review of Miscellaneous Alternatives to the IAT 
 
Collectively, the IAT and cue-based measures are the most established and 
popular measures of addiction-related implicit cognition. However, it appears that both 
approaches are severely limited in their ability to hone theory or to systematically 
develop criterion validity on addiction. Therefore, we now consider the only two 
remaining alternatives that were routinely promoted within the literature prior to the 
emergence of the IRAP (see Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014; Nosek et al., 2011; Roefs 
et al., 2011, pp. 151-155; Rooke et al., 2008; Stacy & Wiers, 2010, pp. 558-562; Waters 
& Sayette, 2006, p. 324). The first of these alteratives is an assortment of various 
movement-based tasks that we term approach/avoidance tasks (AATs), and which were 
designed to measure a persons’ implicit tendency to approach versus avoid addiction-
related cues (Watson, de Wit, Hommel, & Wiers, 2012; Watson, de Wit, Cousijn, 
Hommel, & Wiers, 2013). The second remaing alternative, is an assortment of various 
questionnaire-based tasks that we term expectancy accessibilty tasks (EATs) which 
were designed to measure complex forms of implicit evaluating about addiction-related 
cues using indirect self-reports (i.e. based on questions that do not ask participants 
directly about the topic of interest; McKee et al., 2003; Read, Wood, Leiuez, Palfai, & 
Slack, 2004). Then lastly, having reviewed how the foregoing alternatives suffer from 
many of the same experimental ambiguities as the IAT and its predecessors, we offer 
the IRAP as a third, more promising alternative. In particular, we will provide a brief 
summary of the main theoretical rationales underpinning the IRAP, explaining why it is 
relatively uniquely equipped as a means of systematically refining our experimental 
understanding of tobacco addiction (and thus of how best to treat it). 
3.1. Measuring Automatic Approach versus Avoidance to Tobacco Smoking Cues as a 
Means of Parsing Tobacco Addiction 
Despite having a relatively small research base, AATs are usually granted 
prominence in contemporary reviews of addiction-related implicit evaluating (e.g. Roefs 
et al., 2011; Rooke et al., 2008; Stacy & Wiers, 2010; Watson et al., 2013). Thus, for 
present purposes it is worth at least considering: (a) what level of criterion validity 
AATs have so far exhibited in relation to tobacco addiction; and (b) what potential there 
is to further improve any such criterion validity. In practice, AATs have primarily been 
used to measure automatic motivational processes as criteria that could be used to 
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validate various measures (and/or theories) of addiction-related attention (e.g. Larsen et 
al., 2014; Mogg et al., 2003; Watson et al., 2013). Indeed, addiction researchers have 
not only used AATs to measure motivational processes as distinct from attention 
processes, but sometimes as distinct entirely from mental processes (e.g. Bradley et al., 
2008; Thewissen, Havermans, Geschwind, van den Hout, & Jansen, 2007; see 
Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010; Mogg et al., 2005; Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast & 
Smith, 2015; Van Dessel, De Houwer, Roets, & Gast, 2015; Watson et al., 2012). 
Bearing this point out, AATs are most commonly referred to as measuring action 
tendencies rather than implicit cognition (Stacy & Wiers, 2010, pp. 557-558).  
Crucially, however, few had even questioned the criterion validity of AATs until 
very recently, much less conducted research dedicated to testing that validity (see 
Watson et al., 2012). Instead, what little data do exist on the subject were usually 
gathered inadvertently as part of wider research agendas seeking to resolve theoretical 
controversies about various attention and/or other cognitive processes (i.e. without 
considering the bearing of these findings on the validity of the relevant AATs; see 
Larsen et al., 2014; Mogg et al., 2005; Watson et al., 2012; Watson et al., 2013). 
Moreover, such data certainly do not suggest that AATs might possess any greater 
criterion validity for tobacco addiction than corresponding IATs or cue-based measures. 
A Systematic Review of the Criterion Validity of Approach/avoidance tasks (AATs) in 
relation to Tobacco Addiction 
There are currently five studies demonstrating that AATs are capable of 
distinguishing between groups with different smoking histories. Four of these studies 
employed an AAT known as the Manikin or Stimulus Response Compatibility task 
(SRC; De Houwer, Crombez, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2001; i.e. smokers versus never-
smokers, F(1, 36) = 14.70, p < .01, r ≈ .54, Bradley et al., 2004; smokers versus never-
smokers, F(1, 41) = 5.82, p < .01, r ≈ .35, Bradley et al., 2008; smokers versus never-
smokers, F(1, 37) = 6.90, p < .01, r = .40, Mogg et al., 2003; low versus moderately 
dependent smokers, F(1, 37) = 7.01, p < .05, r ≈ .40, Mogg et al., 2005), and one 
remaining study employed a relatively novel task variously known as the zooming 
joystick approach/avoidance task or the zooming joystick AAT (we introduce the 
acronym zAAT to include all AATs with zooming functionality; Krieglmeyer & 
Deutsch, 2010; Rinck & Becker, 2007; Watson et al., 2013; i.e. smokers versus never-
smokers, t(42) = 1.74, p = .04, r ≈ .26, smokers versus ex-smokers, t(42) = 1.72, p = .05, 
r ≈ .26, Wiers, Kuhn, Jovadi, Korucuoglu, Wiers, Walter, Gallinat, & Bermpohl, 2013). 
Thus, according to these findings AATs appear to provide a moderate to large degree of 
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known-groups validity with respect to tobacco addiction.  
 Upon closer inspection, however, the matter is far from clear cut. Though not 
acknowledged as such, elements of the foregoing studies suggest that AATs are prone 
to obtaining null, and indeed sometimes reversed smoking-related known-groups 
effects. For example, Bradley et al. (2008) may have obtained a significant known-
groups effect between smokers versus never-smokers with their SRC, but only when 
they scored it in terms of an ad hoc sub-set of the smoking-related cues it involved. 
Namely, when they scored the SRC in terms of cues that non-smokers had rated 
negatively (and that smokers had rated neutrally) they obtained statistical significance 
for the relevant known-groups effect, F(1, 41) = 5.82, p < .01, r ≈ .35. However, this 
was not the case when they scored the SRC in terms of the remaining smoking-related 
cues which the non-smokers had rated neutrally (and the smokers had rated positively), 
F(1, 41) = 1.24, p = .27, r ≈ .17, nor when they pooled both subsets of smoking-related 
cues together, F(1, 41) = 3.23, p = .08, r ≈ .27.27  
And although Bradley et al.’s (2008) findings arguably tally (indirectly) with the 
fact that both Bradley et al. (2004) and Mogg et al. (2003) had earlier obtained 
significant SRC differences between smokers versus non-smokers when non-smokers 
rated the relevant smoking-related cues negatively, neither of these preceeding studies 
compared how that SRC performed with smoking-related cues that non-smokers had 
rated otherwise. Moreover, Mogg et al. (2005) obtained a significant known-groups 
effect on a smoking-related SRC even though the groups they contrasted both rated its 
constituent smoking-related cues in a similarly positive fashion. Thus, it appears that 
participants’ ratings of an SRC’s smoking-related cues do not necessarily determine 
whether that SRC will distinguish between relevant known-groups.  
Adding further to uncertainty in this area, Mogg et al.’s (2005) claim to have 
demonstrated known-groups validity for the SRC was not only relatively unprecedented 
and counter-intuitive, but in the opposite direction to what the wider literature would 
normally predict. Namely, they found that low dependent smokers showed greater 
approach to smoking cues on an SRC than moderately dependent smokers. Thus, on 
balance, it is currently unclear why SRCs have sometimes yielded genuine smoking-
                                                 
27 This qualitative interpretation of the relevant smoking-related cues is derived from Bradley et al.’s 
(2008, p. 742) results section wherein they reported that on average (a) the smokers rated one set of 
smoking-related cues as positive and the other as neutral, and (b) the non-smokers rated the same sets of 
cues as neutral and negative, respectively. Note, however, that when justifying their findings Bradley et 
al. did not refer to the relevant cues accordingly. Instead, rather inexplicably, they maintained that one of 
the sets of cues was universally interpreted as ‘pleasant’ and the other set as ‘unpleasant’ for both 
smokers and never-smokers alike. 
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related known-groups effects (i.e. thrice), and at other times have failed in this regard 
(i.e. twice). Likewise, in relation to zAATs, Wiers et al. (2013) may have obtained two 
findings in favour of their sensitivity to smoking-related known-groups, but both 
Watson et al. (2013) and Larsen et al. (2014) failed to explain why they found that 
smokers versus never-smokers did not differ on another version of the zAAT, p > .14 
and p > .90, respectively (i.e. other relevant statistics not reported).28  
Overall, therefore, some aspect(s) of smoking-related cues might be important in 
determining whether AATs can consistently distinguish among smoking-related known-
groups, but it is unclear whether this is necessarily so, much less whether other 
extraneous variables are involved. One thing that is clear however is that AATs have 
succeeded in demonstrating smoking-related known-groups validity only about as many 
times as they have failed to do so. And as such, AATs certainly are prone to 
confounding variable(s) even if we do not yet know what those variables are. 
Furthermore, although AATs sometimes exhibit very good internal reliability with 
respect to threat-related cues (e.g. for a non-zooming joystick AAT, Experiment 1, rsb = 
.76, Experiment 2, rsb = .80, Experiment 3, rsb = .71, Rinck & Becker, 2007, p. 114; but 
see Experiment 2, .21 < rsb < .53, Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010, p. 819; for SRC, 
Experiment 1, rsb = .84-.95, Experiment 3, rsb = .72-.81, Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010; 
but again see Experiment 2, -.65 < rsb < - .03, for SRC used by Krieglmeyer & Deutsch 
and also α = .26-.45 for the zAAT used by Klein, Becker & Rinck, 2011; for a broad 
review of the area see Watson et al., 2012, p. 5), this does not appear to be the case 
when addiction-related cues are involved (e.g. using smoking-related cues with a zAAT, 
α = .41; Watson et al., 2013; using alcohol-related cues with an SRC, rsb = .46, Field, 
Caren, Fernie, & De Houwer, 2011, p. 700). Such low internal reliability further 
suggests that addiction-related AATs are being confounded by extraneous variables (i.e. 
to the extent that we assume action tendencies are reliably involved in criterion 
behaviour in any given context; e.g. Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010; Watson et al., 
2012). Indeed, even putting aside the fact that a measure’s internal reliability limits the 
extent to which it can correlate with other variables (see Field, 2013; LeBel & 
Paunonen, 2011; Osborne, 2013), as we will now illustrate AATs tend to correlate 
rather haphazardly with tobacco addiction criteria from study to study.  
In line with Mogg et al.’s (2005) anomalous SRC finding from earlier that low 
                                                 
28 Note that the current literature commonly omits the statistical details and/or even mention of null 
correlations, and so wherever we discuss such null findings without providing statistical details it is for 
this reason. 
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dependent smokers are more inclined to automatically approach smoking-related cues 
than moderately dependent smokers, they also found that the relevant SRC correlated 
negatively with CPD, r = - .33, p < .05, and with nicotine dependence as measured by 
the mFTQ, r = - .39, p < .05. And yet, rather inconsistently that same SRC did not 
correlate with years smoking. Likewise, Mogg et al. (2005) found that the SRC 
correlated positively with time since last cigarette, r = .31, p = .06, but in contrast not 
with urge to smoke as measured by the QSU. Most problematic of all is the fact that 
smoking-related SRCs have consistently failed to correlate with tobacco addiction 
criteria on every other occasion where such comparisons were possible (null 
correlations with CPD, FTND, QSU, self-reported urge to smoke, years smoking, and 
time since last cigarette, Bradley et al., 2004; null correlations with CPD, FTND, QSU-
brief, years smoking, and time since last cigarette, Bradley et al., 2008; null baseline 
correlations with CPD, the mFTQ, the QSU-brief, and time since last cigarette Field et 
al., 2005; null correlations with CPD, QSU, FTND, years smoking, time since last 
cigarette, and number of previous quit attempts, Mogg et al., 2003; null baseline 
correlations with CPD, FTND, and self-reported urge to smoke, Thewissen et al., 2007).  
Other smoking-related AATs are also hit and miss when it comes to correlating 
with tobacco addiction criteria. Watson et al. (2013) found that self-reported craving 
and the FTND both regressed significantly onto smokers’ zAAT scores, R2-change = 
.14, F-change(2, 45) = 4.5, p = .02. However, when analyzed separately the relationship 
between smokers’ zAAT scores and self-reported craving was modestly positive, 
whereas rather inconsistently, the relationship between smokers’ zAAT scores and their 
FTND scores was modestly negative. Granted, the latter finding does lend some support 
to Mogg et al.’s (2005) anomalous known-groups SRC finding described above. 
However, at the same time, Watson et al. also failed to find correlations between 
smokers’ zAAT scores and CPD, years smoking, or time since last cigarette. Then, in 
contrast, Wiers et al. (2013) found that ex-smokers’ smoking-related zAAT scores 
correlated strongly with years smoking, r = .55, p = .01, with pack years (i.e. number of 
packets of cigarettes smoked per day by years smoked), r = .55, p = .01, with CPD 
while smoking, r = .44, p = .05, and indeed, that the zAAT scores of 2-hour nicotine 
deprived smokers correlated strongly with QSU, r = .56, p = .001. However, for no 
apparent reason, Wiers et al. also found that smokers’ zAAT scores did not correlate 
with CPD, FTND (p > .16), years smoking, or pack years. Moreover, Larsen et al. 
(2014) found no correlation between adolescent smokers’ zAAT scores and CPD, r = 
.04, or mFTQ, r = .05; and Earp, Dill, Harris, Ackerman, and Bargh (2013) found no 
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correlation between smokers’ non-zooming joystick AAT scores and their FTND 
scores. Thus, overall, AAT’s appear to correlate haphazardly with tobacco addiction 
criteria in cross-section. Moreover, the literature has yet to demonstrate a prospective 
correlation between such variables in either direction, and what little data exists on the 
test-retest reliability of AATs is discouraging (i.e. with respect to threat-related cues, the 
only domain for which such data exists; r ≈ .35, Reinecke, Becker, & Rinck, 2010).   
Another relevant issue is the fact that there is very limited evidence for the 
sensitivity of AATs to experimental manipulations of contexts related to tobacco 
addiction. Earp et al. (2013) claimed that smokers’ smoking-related AAT scores were 
subliminally primed to exhibit a moderately greater approach bias for smoking-related 
cues when ‘No-smoking’ signs were placed within the background of a picture rating 
task that those smokers had to complete before the AAT, F(1, 28) = 4.02, p = .06,   
  = 
.13, r ≈ .36 (i.e. as compared to when the same pictures did not contain the relevant 
‘No-smoking’ signs). From this point of view, it would appear that the AAT is 
relatively sensitive to smoking-related context. However, the relevant experimental 
effect was ironic insofar as the ‘No-smoking’ prime appeared to promote a greater, not 
lesser, approach bias toward smoking on the AAT. Thus, despite being an interesting 
finding it is subject to many different competing explanations.  
For example, Earp et al. claimed that the relevant priming effect was automatic 
and thus, with the additional assumption that the negation component of the ‘No-
smoking’ sign cannot be processed automatically, they concluded that it functioned as a 
“Smoking” rather than “No-smoking” sign. However, given that half of the smokers in 
the experimental condition reported noticing the inclusion of the ‘No-smoking’ sign, it 
is also possible that the relevant priming effect emerged from (non-automatic) 
deliberative reactance to that sign. Indeed, given that Earp et al. did not measure 
smokers’ AAT scores before their priming manipulation it is even possible that the 
relevant experimental effect emerged as an inadvertent consequence of sampling. As 
such, Earp et al.’s finding is more akin to an anomaly than a criterion effect.  
Similarly, Watson et al. (2013) reported the unusual finding that when smokers 
smoked after an average of 13 hours of abstinence it strongly increased, rather than 
alleviated, their bias toward approaching smoking-related cues on the relevant zAAT, 
F(1, 44) = 8.90, p = .01 (i.e. r ≈ .41); and this occurred regardless of the relevant 
smokers’ FTND scores (p > .14). Although incentive sensitization theory could 
potentially accommodate this finding in terms of behavioural sensitisation processes 
(see Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2003, 2008), the fact remains that it is an entirely 
58 
 
unprecedented finding within the AAT literature that directly contradicts most tobacco 
addiction theory (Watson et al., 2013). Indeed, there is even a finding in the evaluative 
priming literature (Sherman et al. (2003, p. 29) that appears to contradict what Watson 
et al found. Specifically, an evaluative priming measure indicated that satiation 
significantly reduced, rather than increased, light smokers’ implicit bias in favour of 
smoking (i.e. as compared to smokers abstaining from smoking).29 Thus, much like 
Earp et al.’s equivocal finding, Watson et al.’s zAAT-based experimental effect does 
not qualify as a validity criterion.  
In the only other finding in this area Field et al. (2005) found no effect of 
drinking alcohol (as compared to drinking a soft drink) on smokers’ smoking-related 
SRC scores. Granted, their null finding based on a sample of just 19 light smokers may 
have been overly conservative given that the relevant interaction effect was substantial 
even if not significant, F(1, 16) = 2.98 (i.e. r ≈ .40; see Figure 3 in Field et al., 2005, p. 
69). However, even admitting this finding would not change the fact that there is only 
preliminary, and rather contradictory evidence that smoking-related AATs are 
differentially sensitive to contexts related to tobacco addiction (indeed, for similar 
patterns of inconsistent AAT findings in other behavioural domains see Watson et al., 
2012, pp. 6-9). 
Lastly, as further evidence that researchers have yet to identify clear controlling 
variables for smoking-related AAT effects, only one study has attempted to modify such 
effects within a given context; and the resulting findings are certainly less than 
conclusive. In the relevant study, Thewissen et al.’s (2007) main assertion was that 
smokers who had agreed to abstain from smoking for at least 2 hours showed more of 
an approach bias for smoking-related pictures on an SRC in the presence of a 
background colour that had been evaluatively conditioned to signal an opportunity to 
smoke in a tempting situation (i.e. as compared to a background colour that had been 
evaluatively conditioned to signal an inability to smoke in that same tempting situation). 
Crucially, however, Thewissen et al. did not emphasize that the statistical effect they 
quoted in support of this finding, F(1, 19) = 8.15, p < .01 (i.e. r ≈ .54), was based on two 
sets of SRC scores: one for SRC trials involving smoking-related pictures and another 
                                                 
29 Watson et al.’s smokers smoked an average of 10.8 CPD and thus were comparable to Sherman et al.’s 
‘light’ smokers who were defined as smoking 15 CPD or less. This distinction is important because, 
unlike Sherman et al.’s (2003, p. 29) ‘light’ smokers, their ‘heavy’ smokers (i.e. those who smoked more 
than 15 CPD) did display an increased bias in favour of smoking in response to satiation (as compared to 
abstinence) much like Watson et al.’s (light) smokers did. Thus, with such highly contradictory and 
preliminary findings it is questionable whether smoking-related AATs are sensitive to tobacco satiation 
versus deprivation in any consistent manner.  
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for SRC trials involving pictures designed to be neutral with respect to smoking. Thus, 
the relevant statistical effect might have arisen not from SRC scores based upon 
smoking-related pictures but from SRC scores based upon pictures that were designed 
to be irrelevant to smoking. And indeed, according to a side-bar restricted to Thewissen 
et al.’s results section (p. 37) this is just what happened, F(1, 37) = 4.17, p < .05 (i.e. r ≈ 
.32).30 Overall, therefore, smoking-related AATs appear to be even more equivocal than 
smoking-related IATs in relation to tobacco addiction criteria (indeed for collateral 
discussion about the lack of evidence that AAT-based training modifies criterion 
behaviours by modifying aspects of implicit evaluating see Note 7, Appendix 1).  
What is wrong with the Design of AATs in Relation to Tobacco Addiction Research? 
The primary reason why AATs are not amenable to systematic development 
with respect to tobacco addiction is because, much like the other measures of implicit 
evaluating reviewed so far, they are not capable of experimentally distguishing implicit 
evaluating of one particular topic as distinct from implicit evaluating of other (perhaps 
related) topics. We begin our analysis of the matter by explaining how this problem 
manifests in terms of the SRC because it is arguably the most established measure of 
automatic approach/avoidance tendencies (i.e. particularly in relation to addiction; 
Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010; Watson et al., 2012, pp. 5-6). Then, we will describe 
how subsequent attempts to improve remaining AATs, namely joystick AATs, have 
also failed to distinguish precisely among different types of implicit evaluating. 
In broad terms, the SRC requires participants to alternate between moving a 
computerized manikin towards target stimuli (and away from co-occurring control 
stimuli) in one block of trials, versus away from those same target stimuli (and toward 
the co-occurring control stimuli) in another block trials. The core idea here is that the 
response time difference between the former versus the latter SRC blocks of trials will 
provide a measure of automatic approach versus avoidance in relation to the relevant 
                                                 
30 Granted, this latter finding does not account for the fact that Thewissen et al.’s evaluative conditioning 
manipulation impacted smokers’ SRC scores differently depending upon whether those smokers were 
explicitly instructed as to what contingency they were supposed to learn during conditioning, F(1, 37) = 
11.42, p < .01 (i.e. r = .49). Specifically, there was a larger conditioning effect on smokers’ SRC scores 
when they obtained explicit conditioning instructions, F(1, 19) = 8.15, p < .01 (i.e. the original finding 
upon which Thewissen et al. mistakenly based their claim; r ≈ .54), than when they did not, F(1, 18) = 
3.50, p > .05 (i.e. r ≈ .40). Crucially, however, this finding did not significantly interact with whether 
smokers’ SRC scores were based on smoking-related versus smoking-neutral pictures, and so the matter 
is not relevant to Thewissen et al.’s core claim (i.e. despite the fact that they reported it this way). And 
indeed, even if it were relevant, a similar study found that such evaluative conditioning instructions had 
no impact whatsoever on an alcohol-related AAT (see Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 
2011; moreover, for further evidence that such instructions are ineffective with pre-experimentally 
established implicit biases see Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast et al., 2015; Van Dessel, De Houwer, Roets, 
et al., 2015). 
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target stimuli (e.g. cues for smoking). A central, though unacknowledged, problem with 
this measurement approach is that much like the IAT it is doubly relative: it measures 
the fluency of approach towards target stimuli such as smoking cues relative to (a) 
avoidance of those same target stimuli, and (b) at the same time relative to approach 
versus avoidance of control stimuli. Thus, much like the IAT, the SRC is limited by 
design to investigating “polarized” evaluative comparisons. And given that tobacco 
addiction is likely to involve many non-polarized forms of implicit evaluating, this 
means that the SRC is fundamentally limited in its ability to achieve criterion validity in 
relation to tobacco addiction. Indeed, if anything, the SRC is arguably even more 
indeterminate than the IAT, insofar as responding in terms of an ill-defined manikin 
actively encourages participants to shift their existing perspective in unpredictable ways 
(e.g. rather than interpreting the manikin in terms of the self as intended, participants 
might interpret it as any type of person or even non-person with little or no relevance to 
their own self). As such, smoking-related SRCs are necessitated by design to bear only 
haphazard relationships with whatever implicit evaluating might be involved in tobacco 
addiction.  
Unlike the SRC, there are a rather large variety of different joystick-AATs. The 
primary concern driving the emergence of different types of joystick-AATs was that 
researchers could not determine what specific types of approach/avoidance were 
involved from trial to trial. To illustrate, the earliest joystick-AATs involved measuring 
how quickly participants could respond to target stimuli presentations by moving a 
joystick (or lever) towards their body during one block of trials, as compared to how 
quickly they could move the joystick away from their bodies during another block of 
trials involving those same target stimuli (Chen & Bargh, 1999). The core assumption 
here was that particular motor actions are invariably synonymous with approach versus 
avoidance, respectively. However, researchers have since demonstrated that participants 
can re-interpret any given motor movement as either approaching versus avoiding a 
given target stimulus. Specifically, these researchers were able to repeatedly reverse 
joystick-AAT effects according to whether participants were instructed to interpret 
movements towards their body as approaching versus avoiding a given target stimulus 
(see Watson et al., 2012, p. 5). Therefore, participants are prone to interpreting 
movements towards their body on a joystick-AAT not just as an approach towards the 
relevant target object as originally intended, but also as an approach towards their body 
and away from the relevant target object onscreen. And crucially, the original joystick-
AAT does not allow researchers to determine whether it involved movement 
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interpretations of one kind and/or the other. 
In an effort to control how participants interpreted their movements on joystick-
AATs, some researchers added zooming functionality such that joystick movements 
towards the body consistently increased the size of target stimuli and movements away 
consistently decreased the size of target stimuli (or vice versa). However, even if this 
succeeded in disambiguating whether participants made particular zAAT movements in 
terms of approach versus avoidance, it would not clarify what particular type(s) of 
approach versus avoidance were involved. For example, a smoker might evaluate their 
approach to smoking cues on a zAAT in terms of obtaining desirable experiences like 
stimulation, or contrastingly, in terms of reducing aversive experiences like cravings.  
Indeed, making matters worse, some researchers have adapted zAATs so that 
participants are instructed to respond to irrelevant features of target stimuli (and control 
stimuli) such as orientation or position on the screen rather than content. The main 
reason for the introduction of these so-called irrelevant feature zAATs is to provide a 
more implicit measure of approach/avoidance processes. The core assumption here is 
that participants will tend to process target stimuli implicitly (rather than explicitly) 
during irrelevant feature zAATs because zAATs do not task participants with 
deliberately processing the relevant content of target stimuli. However, just because a 
participant is not required to deliberately respond to the relevant content of target 
stimuli on an irrelevant feature zAAT it does not in any way prevent participants from 
doing so. In fact, irrelevant feature zAATs not only allow participants to deliberately 
respond in many different but unrecorded ways to the content of target stimuli, but 
ironically, by virtue of their irrelevant feature instructions, they specifically encourage 
participants to respond to target stimuli in ways that are irrelevant to the topic being 
investigated (see Klein et al., 2011, p. 230; Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010; 
Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011; Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast et al., 2015; Van 
Dessel, De Houwer, Roets, et al., 2015). Indeed, somewhat concordantly, Krieglmeyer 
and Deutsch (2010, Experiment 2) have provided initial evidence that irrelevant feature 
zAATs are rather less reliable than other zAATs (see also Watson et al., 2012, pp. 5-6; 
but for indirect evidence to the contrary see Cousijn, Goudriaan, & Wiers, 2011, p. 
1670; Watson et al., 2013, p. 255). 
Ultimately, even if we put aside the fact that joystick-AATs are indeterminate 
with respect to implicit evaluating on any given trial, their measures would still remain 
highly problematic in that they are relativistic much like the SRC or the IAT. Take for 
example, Chen and Bargh’s (1999) original joystick-AAT. It compared how quickly 
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participants ‘approached’ target stimuli on some trials and ‘avoided’ control stimuli on 
other trials, versus how quickly they respectively ‘avoided’ target stimuli and 
‘approached’ control stimuli across another block of trials. Thus, Chen and Bargh’s 
joystick-AAT is doubly relative in that it notionally measures how much participants 
are inclined to approach target stimuli relative to avoiding control stimuli, and also 
relative to avoiding target stimuli and approaching control stimuli (i.e. putting aside the 
issue of whether ‘approach’ versus ‘avoidance’ was operationalised as such within each 
trial; see also Krieglmeyer & Deutsch, 2010; Watson et al. 2013). 
Granted, some researchers have recently started to score participants’ AAT 
responses to smoking versus control stimuli separately in an effort to measure smokers’ 
automatic approach tendencies toward smoking cues as distinct from control stimuli 
(e.g. for an SRC example see Thewissen et al., 2007; for zAAT examples see Earp et 
al., 2013; Larsen et al., 2014; Wiers et al., 2013).31 However, even putting aside the fact 
that participants must respond to smoking-related AATs smoking cues in the context of 
opposing responses to control cues, the resulting zAAT scores would still remain 
relative in the sense that they compare approach versus avoidance of smoking cues in a 
polarized fashion that does not allow for situations in which people are indifferent to the 
relevant smoking cues. As a result, for example, smoking-related zAATs are not likely 
to be consistently related to varying levels of smoking-related satiation/deprivation 
given that smokers should, by definition, be indifferent to smoking cues whenever they 
are satiated with respect to smoking. 
Indeed, in a broader sense, zAATs that are scored only in terms of responses to 
smoking cues (i.e. ignoring responses to control stimuli) arguably suffer much the same 
wide range of limitations as we described earlier for smoking-related ST-IATs (i.e. 
being unable to distinguish between smoking-related implicit evaluating that is framed 
in positive/approach versus negative/avoidance terms). Overall, therefore, it is not 
feasible to improve upon the relatively hit and miss criterion validity of existing 
smoking-related AATs because even if these methods could be refined to consistently 
measure particular topics of approach/avoidance from trial to trial, they would still be 
measuring it relativistically against approach/avoidance of other topics – thus ignoring 
important motivational distinctions within tobacco addiction. In fact, from this point of 
                                                 
31 The relevant authors did not justify this novel scoring procedure. Instead, they wrongly interpreted the 
resulting scores as if they reflected participants’ responses to smoking cues as distinct from control cues. 
In fact, along similar lines, these researchers also (wrongly) interpreted the polarity of AAT scores as if 
they indicated something absolute about whether participants were more inclined to approach versus 
avoid smoking cues in general (e.g. Earp et al., 2013; Larsen et al., 2014; Thewissen et al., 2007; Wiers et 
al., 2013). 
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view, it seems possible that the haphazard criterion validity exhibited by smoking-
related AATs to date merely reflects behavioural responses that are haphazardly 
secondary to tobacco addiction (i.e. rather than responses that are causally involved 
therein). 
3.2. Measuring Complex Implicit Evaluating using Expectancy Accessibility Tasks 
(EATs)  
A Conceptual Overview of EAT research 
The most characteristic feature of EAT research is its focus upon measuring 
complex forms of implicit evaluating in terms of so called networks of hypothetical 
cognitive associations. In broad terms, all EATs involve asking participants to report 
their introspections under distraction and/or high time pressure using questionnaire-
based measures. The core conceptual basis of the EAT methodology is the idea that 
networks of cognitive associations may provide a mechanism by which humans can 
automatically anticipate which combinations of cues and behaviours will lead to 
specific consequences (see Goldman et al., 2006; Kahler et al., 2007; Grenard, Ames, 
Wiers, Thush, Sussman, & Stacy, 2008; McKee et al., 2003; Palfai, 2002; Palfai & 
Wood, 2001; Stacy, 1997; Stacy & Wiers, 2006, pp. 502-504; Stacy & Wiers, 2010, pp. 
557-566; Waters & Sayette, 2006; Watson et al., 2012). Indeed, reflecting this 
sentiment, many EAT proponents refer to networks of cognitive associations as implicit 
expectancies (e.g. see Goldman et al., 2006; Leigh & Stacy, 1991, 1998; Leung & 
McCusker, 1999; McKee et al., 2003; Palfai & Wood, 2001; Stacy, 1997, pp. 62, 70; 
Stacy & Wiers, 2010, p. 559; Watson et al., 2012).  
Crucially, in targetting implicit expectancies, all EATs are specifically designed 
to capture a range of rule-based cognitive processes (i.e. incorporating conditionality) 
such as memory templates, schemas, implementation intentions, or even 
placebo/nocebo effects (see Cesario, 2014; Dijksterhuis & Aarts 2010; Goldman et al., 
2006; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; Harell & Juliano, 2012; Hendricks & Brandon, 
2008; Hughes et al., 2011, pp. 478-483; Kelly et al., 2006; Koole, Webb, & Sheeran, 
2015; Krank, Wall, Stewart, Wiers, & Goldman, 2005; Lovibond, 2006; McKee et al., 
2003; Stacy, 1994, 1995; Stacy, Leigh, & Weingardt, 1994; Stacy & Wiers, 2010, p. 
565; Vogt et al., 2013; Webb, Sheeran, & Pepper, 2012; Wiers et al., 2010, pp. 465-468, 
479-480). This is important because in principle it grants EAT users the ability to 
explain a much greater range of routinized criterion behaviours than they would be able 
to with any of the other implicit measures we have considered so far. And indeed, 
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Rooke et al.’s (2008) recent meta-analysis comparing various implicit measures of 
addiction does provide some support for this assertion, insofar as it found that EATs 
measuring addiction-related implicit expectancies were among the best at achieving 
criterion effects ( ̅s = .29-.40; Rooke et al., 2008).32 
With regard to the specifics of implementation, there is quite a large variety of 
EAT variants throughout the literature. As noted above, all EATs are based upon the 
same core strategy of asking participants to self-report in ways that are designed to limit 
introspection and/or deliberation about each cognitive process of interest. The core idea 
behind attempting to limit deliberation is to minimise any basis for participants to 
confound an EAT’s intended measurement process by responding strategically to it (e.g. 
whether in terms of attempting to conform to the researcher’s expectations, or in terms 
of satisfying personal concerns for social desirabilty; see Gawronski & De Houwer, 
2014; Payne & Gawronski, 2010). And as such, many view (smoking-related) EATs as 
measuring implicit cognition insofar as these methods were specifically designed to 
indirectly measure inadvertent aspects of participants’ explicit self-reporting (see Palfai, 
2002; Stacy & Wiers, 2010, pp. 555-561; Rooke et al., 2008, pp. 1316-1317; but see De 
Houwer, 2006, p. 20). 
Traditionally, the main way in which EATs were designed to curtail deliberation 
about a topic of interest was by (a) employing open-ended questions that had only 
indirect and equivocal connections to the relevant topic, by (b) encouraging participants 
to respond quickly, and/or by (c) analysing only the earliest self-reports to each question 
(see Krank et al., 2005; Rooke et al., 2008, pp. 1316-1323; Stacy, 1997; Stacy et al., 
2006; Stacy & Wiers, 2010, pp. 558-561; Watson et al., 2012; Wiers & Stacy, 2006). 
However, the approach of asking indirect, ambiguous and open-ended questions meant 
that researchers were prevented, by definition, from targeting particular implicit 
expectancies for measurement on an a priori basis. In an effort to remedy this limitation, 
some researchers relented and designed variant EATs that do involve asking 
participants directly about the relevant topic in each case. These variant EATs primarily 
approach the problem of minimising extraneous deliberation by imposing time pressure 
                                                 
32 Note that Rooke et al. (2008), like some other authors (e.g. Stacy, 1997), have choosen to distinguish 
among various different expectancy accessibility measures based upon their own particular theoretical 
ideas about what mental processes are being measured by each particular method. However, rather than 
subscribe prematurely to any particular hypothetical position within this area we opt like others in the 
literature to use the term EAT inclusively to refer to any method that targets implicit expectancies (i.e. 
whether conceptualised as networks of cognitive associations or as an emergent implicit effect of such 
networks on higher level expectancy-related cognitive systems; see Goldman et al., 2006; Kahler et al., 
2007, pp. 2067-2068; Leung & McCusker, 1999; Sayette, & Hufford, 1997; Stacy, 1997, pp. 62, 70; 
Stacy et al., 2006; Stacy & Wiers, 2010, p. 559). 
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on participants’ responses and/or by limiting the range of self-report options available to 
participants (e.g. to ‘Yes’ versus ‘No’ as opposed to open-ended response options; 
Goldman et al., 2006; McKee et al., 2003; Read et al., 2004; Rooke et al., 2008, pp. 
1316-1323). Therefore, we adopt the foregoing broad distinction between direct versus 
indirect EATs in an attempt to make the methodologically diverse research literature on 
smoking-related EATs more tractable for critical review.  
A Critical Review of Smoking-related EAT Research 
There are many reasons to be sceptical about the criterion validity of smoking-
related EATs. For example, upon close scrutiny Rooke et al.’s ostensibly promising 
findings regarding the criterion validity of addiction-related EATs are revealed as being 
overly optimistic. Rather than including all relevant EAT criterion effects within their 
meta-analysis, Rooke et al. (2008, p. 1318) specifically excluded any that resulted from 
experimental manipulations of criterion variables (e.g. manipulations of nicotine 
deprivatrion/satiation were excluded). And as a result, their EAT findings were based 
solely upon questionnaire-based criterion variables rather than experimental 
manipulations (i.e. including known-groups contrasts). This is particularly concerning 
given that EATs are essentially speeded questionnaire-based self-reports about word 
stimuli that are quite literally contrived to be (directly or indirectly) reminiscent of the 
very criterion variables in question. For example, words like ‘inhale’, ‘match’ or 
‘relaxes me’ are specifically incorporated into most smoking-related EATs on the basis 
that they are likely to remind smokers of smoking and/or their smoking-status. And as 
such, observing a relationship between smokers’ questionnaire-based tobacco cravings 
or smoking-status, and the number of speeded pro-smoking self-reports they emit on an 
EAT in response to smoking-related stimuli like ‘relaxes me’ or ‘inhale’ is arguably a 
trivial one. Just as it is possible to provide relatively accurate self-reports about 
smoking-status or CPD without revealing anything about the cognitive basis for tobacco 
addiction, the same applies to EATs even if they do happen to correlate with self-reports 
of smoking-status or CPD. To illustrate this point in the context of tobacco addiction, 
we focus now upon how smoking-related EATs have consistently failed to correlate 
with experimentally controlled changes in smoking-related variables. In recognition of 
the fact that direct EATs were developed against a backdrop of indirect EATs, we 
review the research literature on direct smoking-related EATs only after first dealing 
with that pertaining to their indirect counterparts. 
Research on Smoking-related Indirect EATs 
Despite the fact that research on addiction-related indirect EATs began more 
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than 25 years ago (see Leigh & Stacy, 1991, 1998; Litz, Payne, & Colletti, 1987; Palfai, 
2002, p. 322; Stacy et al., 2006), we could find only three research articles that used one 
of these methods in relation to smoking. And indeed, none of these articles involved 
experimentally controlled tobacco addiction criteria. Rather they relied solely upon 
questionnaire-based tobacco addiction criteria that were reminiscent of the 
questionnaire-based self-reports being contrived by the relevant EATs being tested. For 
example, the earliest research we could find involving an indirect smoking-related EAT 
was Kelly et al. (2006). They adopted a variation of Stacy et al.’s (1994) word 
association paradigm (see also Stacy, 1994, 1997) that involved asking participants to 
quickly report the first word they were reminded of when presented with each of 38 
different words in turn.  
Crucially, Kelly et al. actively concealed from participants that smoking was the 
topic of research. Indeed, only five of the 38 words presented to participants had any 
connotations with smoking, and even then those connotations were designed to be 
ambigious. In particular, all of five smoking-relevant stimulus words were chosen to be 
homographs having both smoking-related and smoking-irrelevant connotations (e.g. the 
word ‘match’ can be interpreted as an object used to light cigarettes or as a synonym for 
pairing objects). On this basis, Kelly et al. reasoned that the number of smoking-related 
self-reports participants provided across the five ambigious homographs would be 
indicative of the extent to which those participants possessed pre-potent networks of 
smoking-related cognitive associations that were established and elaborated (i.e. 
assuming that participants would not realise the smoking-related purposes of the 
relevant EAT). Unfortunately, however, the resulting frequency score only correlated 
modestly with explicit self-reports of smoking consumption (.15 ≤ rs ≤ 22, ps < .05 
without corrections for familywise statistical error; see Kelly et al., 2006, p. 53). 
Later, Grenard et al. (2008) adopted a more complex variation of Stacy et al.’s 
word association paradigm by combining three different word association tasks. The 
first task took the same approach as Kelly et al.’s EAT by asking participants to 
respectively self-report the word they were most immediately reminded of when 
presented with each word stimulus. However, the second and third tasks involved 
asking participants to self-report the first behaviour they were reminded of when 
presented with each word-based cue. Moreover, the second and third tasks used 
different word stimuli from those used in the first task, and also different word stimuli 
from each other. Specifically, Grenard et al.’s second word association task involved 
asking participants to respond to positive outcome phrases some of which were 
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homographic for smoking (e.g. feeling relaxed). And, the third task involved asking 
participants to respond to compound phrases specifying both an outcome and its setting 
with some being homographic for smoking (e.g. friend’s house – feeling good) and the 
remainder being smoking-irrelevant. Ultimately, Grenard et al. computed composite 
EAT scores by summing the number of smoking-related responses obtained across the 
smoking-homographes in all three tasks. 
The resulting EAT was relatively impressive in its ability to correlate cross-
sectionally with explicit self-reports of CPD (i.e. cigarettes smoked per day), producing 
an R2-change of .22 (i.e. r ≈ .46) even after controlling for background variables like 
working memory, education, gender and age. Interestingly, Grenard et al. also found 
that smoking-related EAT scores interacted significantly with working memory when 
regressed onto CPD. The relevant interaction indicated that smoking-related EAT scores 
were more closely correlated with CPD the lower a participant’s working memory – a 
finding in keeping with the popular idea that people will tend to rely more upon implicit 
processing to the extent that deliberative processes are limited. However, it is important 
to qualify the statistical significance of this interaction with its practical significance: it 
only accounted for an R2-change of .03 (i.e. r ≈ .17) on a main effect of r ≈ .46 (i.e. 
between CPD versus the relevant EAT scores); and both effects were cross-sectional. 
Most importantly, Grenard et al.’s cross-sectional findings, based as they were upon 
participants’ narrative descriptions of their introspections, provided only anecdotal 
evidence that implicit expectancies are causally involved in CPD (i.e. much less 
whether the availability of deliberative processing moderated that relationship to a 
practically significant degree). Likewise, when Zwann and Truitt (2000) demonstrated 
the moderate ability of another type of indirect smoking-related EAT to distinguish 
smokers from never-smokers, F(1, 44) = 5.38, p < .03 (i.e. r ≈ .33), this too was merely 
anecdotal about tobacco addiction per se.  
In response to the lack of clarity afforded by these narrative-based cross-
sectional methods, the only other existing study of indirect smoking-related EATs 
examined whether they correlated prospectively with (self-reported) tobacco addiction 
criteria. Specifically, Kelly et al. (2008) reused the same indirect EAT as described 
above for Kelly et al. (2006), and encouragingly, they found that it prospectively 
correlated with the number of days on which adolescents smoked in the subsequent 
month. However, the relevant prospective correlation was only marginally significant at 
p = .05 with a corresponding statistical effect that was relatively modest at r ≈ .25 (i.e. 
translated from a Z score of 1.94). Worse still, Kelly et al. only obtained this correlation 
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when they arbitrarily omitted all median EAT scores from their analysis (see Kelly et 
al., 2008. P. 646). Indeed, even if Kelly et al. had shown that indirect EAT scores can 
prospectively correlate with smoking without resorting to such cherry-picking, this 
would not be the same thing as demonstrating that such scores can predict changes in 
smoking (i.e. the latter being a causal matter). In other words, there is a complete lack of 
research, much less findings, about whether indirect EATs measure cognitive processes 
that are involved in experimentally controlled tobacco addiction criteria. 
Research on Smoking-related Direct EATs 
Unfortunately, the situation is only marginally better when it comes to research 
on direct smoking-related EATs. For example, Sayette, Martin, Wertz, Shiffman, and 
Perrott (2001) experimentally controlled abstinence from smoking and nicotine in order 
to examine how it changed the activation of smokers’ networks of cognitive 
associations about smoking. However, only one of the resulting experimental effects 
even approached statistical significance and it was a small interaction effect at that, F(1, 
123) = 3.3, p = .07 (i.e. r ≈ .16). The relevant interaction effect indicated a trend for 
heavy smokers to (implicitly) self-report more things they liked about smoking when 
nicotine-deprived as compared to when “minimally” deprived, but for light smokers to 
do the opposite. Notably, Sayette et al. did not report any tests of the simple effects 
comprising the relevant 2x2 interaction effect – and so at the very least the foregoing 
interpretation is questionable.  
Worse still, Sayette et al. only obtained their significant interaction effect by 
cherry-picking pro-smoking EAT data from among anti-smoking EAT data. The direct 
EAT that they employed asked participants to take three minutes to write as many 
different things that they liked or disliked about smoking. Crucially, Sayette et al. 
analysed the numbers of pro- versus anti-smoking EAT self-reports as separate 
dependent variables, even though these scores were derived from a method that put each 
smoker’s pro- versus anti-smoking self-reports in direct competition with each other. 
Sayette et al. do not explain why they took this course of analysis, but it appears as 
though it was necessary to justify testing the only (marginally) significant effect that 
they did find. If they had compared pro- versus anti-smoking EATs within their analysis 
Sayette et al.’s only marginally significant effect would have been a simple effect within 
an overarching omnibus effect, and that omnibus effect seems unlikely to have been 
significant (i.e. given the lack of any other significant effects reported by Sayette et al.).  
As such, we must view Sayette et al.’s solitary significant EAT effect as 
potentially arising from familywise statistical error. In fact, it seems that the main 
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reason why Sayette et al. (2001) emphasized the particular non-significant trends they 
did, was because they appeared to corroborate Sayette and Hufford’s (1997) findings 
using a similar direct EAT. Namely, Sayette and Hufford found that heavy33 smokers 
listed more positive relative to negative characteristics of smoking under a ‘high urge’ 
condition (i.e. holding a cigarette without smoking it having abstained from nicotine for 
12 hours), than under a ‘low urge’ condition (i.e. holding a smoking-irrelevant control 
object having smoked normally beforehand), F(1, 64) = 5.1, p < .03 (i.e. r ≈ .27).34  
Granted, there is other cross-sectional evidence for the criterion validity of other 
direct EATs that frame smoking in pro- versus anti-smoking terms. For example, 
Marks, O’Neill and Hine (2008) used one such direct EAT to show that implicit 
smoking-related expectancies regressed significantly on CPD, R2 = .19, r ≈ .44, p < .01, 
and were perhaps a little more predictive for experiential versus rational modes of 
cognition, R2 = .02, r ≈ .14, p < .05 (i.e. the latter corroborates their implicitness). In 
addition, Benthin et al. (1995) found that their direct EAT incorporating similarly 
relativistic tasks distinguished frequent- versus occasional- versus never-smokers, R2 = 
.14, r ≈ .37, p < .001. Indeed, Leung and McCusker (1999) found an even stronger 
known-groups effect showing that smokers listed a higher proportion of pro-smoking 
adjectives (i.e. relative to anti-smoking adjectives) within 120 seconds than non-
smokers, F(1, 76) = 37.23, p < .001, i.e. r ≈ .57. However, even taking the foregoing 
collection of findings at face value they still only amount to interesting anomalies about 
how smoking-status and/or nicotine abstinence differentially affect the relative 
accessibility of positive versus negative smoking expectancies en masse.  
Crucially, as explained earlier, it is unlikely that tobacco addiction is generally 
motivated by the simultaneous activation of one’s pro- and anti-smoking expectancies 
en masse in polarized competition relative to each other (i.e. apart from in limited 
situations involving ambivalence). Therefore, rather than measuring tobacco addiction 
processes per se, it seems likely that the foregoing known-groups effects were primarily 
a collateral artefact of such processes. In other words, it is possible that smokers tended 
                                                 
33 Sayette et al. defined ‘heavy smokers’ as smoking 21 or more cigarettes per day on average, and so by 
this standard Sayette and Hufford’s (1997) smokers were relatively heavy smokers given that they 
smoked an average of 16.4 cigarettes per day 
34 When Sayette and Hufford analysed the relevant positive versus negative characteristics separately it 
did indicate a somewhat stronger difference between high versus low urge conditions for the positive 
characteristics listed by heavy smokers, F(1, 64) = 9.2, p < .005, i.e. r ≈ .35; and no corresponding 
difference in terms of the negative characteristics listed by heavy smokers, ps > .15. However, as with 
Sayette et al. such non-relative analyses were inappropriate given that Sayette and Hufford used an EAT 
that required smokers to list positive and negative characteristics of smoking relative to each other (i.e. 
side by side on the same sheet of paper albeit in separate 90 second time intervals in contradistinction to 
Sayette et al.). 
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to list more pro- versus anti-smoking expectancies than non-smokers not because the 
evaluative processes involved in these listing tasks overlapped with those involved in 
tobacco addiction; but because these listing tasks specifically entailed rationalising 
one’s own (non)smoking in a post hoc and indeed ad hoc manner. Certainly, none of the 
relative implicit measures we have described so far have provided consistent findings 
about implicit pro- versus anti-smoking attitudes as a function of either smoking-status 
or nicotine deprivation (e.g. evaluative priming findings appear to directly contradict 
Sayette and Hufford’s, and Sayette et al’s findings; see Sherman et al., 2003, p. 29).  
Nonetheless, there is one other type of direct EAT that we have not yet 
considered. Namely, whereas the foregoing direct EATs all involved asking participants 
to choose relativistically between pro- and anti-smoking self-reports on each trial, there 
are some direct EATs that do not capture relativistic responding. In broad terms, such 
measures involve asking smokers to successively list, under time pressure, as many 
consequences they could of smoking specifically without reference to other topics. 
Crucially, therefore, insofar as these EATs record non-relativistic self-reports they are 
in principle more precise than any of the foregoing (direct) EATs with respect to 
distinguishing smoking-related implicit evalauting of particular topics. It is important to 
remember, however, that while the following direct EAT’s may involve non-relativistic 
tasks, they did nonetheless score smokers’ responses to those tasks in a relativistic 
fashion by scoring their smoking-related responses relative to their corresponding 
responses to (ambigious) control topics. 
For example, McKee et al. (2003) examined smokers’ first responses (under 
time pressure) to the sentence stem “When I smoke cigarettes I expect to...” (without 
issuing any instructions to list pro- or anti-smoking expectencies), and found that 
experimental mood induction tended to activate corresponding types of implicit 
expectancies about smoking among those with some history of smoking, χ2(4, N  = 109) 
= 12.44, p = .01 (i.e. r ≈ .34). Specifically, the authors reported that ‘ever-smokers’ 
were more likely to (first) list smoking as being positively reinforcing in the positive 
mood condition (relative to neutral/negative mood induction conditions); and when in 
the neutral or negative mood induction conditions to (first) list smoking in negative 
terms (i.e. as being negatively reinforcing or as having negative consequences). 
Crucially, McKee et al. interpreted these findings as experimental evidence that their 
EAT measured implicit expectancies that varied with context in ways that are 
characteristic of tobacco addiction. However, even if we accept McKee et al.’s 
overarching rationale it still remains that they only obtained their findings by arbitrarily 
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ignoring the 22% of their original sample who did not list any smoking-related 
expectancy.  
Furthermore, McKee et al. did not statistically test the two particular simple 
contrasts upon which their claim for criterion validity rested. Namely, they did not test 
whether the positive mood condition induced more first-listed expectancies that 
smoking is positively reinforcing (i.e. as compared to the other two mood conditions); 
and nor did they specifically test whether the neutral and negative mood conditions 
induced more first-listed expectancies that smoking is negatively reinforcing or aversive 
(i.e. as compared to the positive mood condition). Instead, they just provided the 
omnibus statistical effect reported above. In addition, all of McKee et al.’s foregoing 
analyses confounded smokers with ex-smokers (i.e. 28% of participants had not smoked 
for over 12 months), even though in other analyses McKee et al. also reported that such 
distinctions had a major impact on the relative accessibility of positively- versus 
negatively-oriented expectancies (p. 222). Thus, at best, McKee et al. provided only 
modest and ambiguous experimental evidence for the criterion validity of direct 
smoking-related EATs. 
It appears that the only experimental evidence for the criterion validity of 
partially-relative direct EATs like this (i.e. with non-relative tasks but relative scoring) 
in relation to tobacco addiction is a study by Palfai (2002). This study focused upon 
measuring daily smokers’ pro-smoking implicit expectancies by measuring how quickly 
participants chose to endorse smoking-related versus control sentence stems (i.e. having 
the option to also answer false). In particular, Palfai compared how smokers’ smoking-
related implicit expectancies varied as an experimental function of 6 hours of nicotine 
deprivation versus normal smoking conditions. This resulted in a significant positive 
relationship between the accessibility of pro-smoking expectancies and nicotine 
deprivation, rs ≈ .25-.30, ps < .05. Unfortunately, however, the remaining research 
literature on non-relativistic direct smoking-related EATs is not only cross-sectional and 
thus anecdotal as regards the criterion validity of these measures, but also inconsistent. 
Some studies indicated that non-relativisitic direct EATs can differentiate groups 
with different smoking-histories: (i) Fallon (1998) reported that the frequency and the 
speed of pro-smoking endorsements significantly and coherently related to smoking-
status, F[3, 67] = 8.19, 3.13, ps < .05, rs ≈ .33, .21, as did the frequency of anti-smoking 
endorsements, F[3, 67] = 3.39, p < .05, r ≈ .22;  (ii) Litz et al. (1987, p. 306) reported 
that smokers endorsed pro-smoking expectancies significantly faster than never-
smokers, p < .01, i.e. r > .35, and also significantly more frequently, p < .01, i.e. r > .35; 
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and (iii) McKee et al. (2003, p. 222) reported smoking-abstinence (in months) 
significantly and coherently moderated the frequency of different types of smoking-
expectancies, χ2[4, N  = 109] = 35.89, p < .001, i.e. r ≈ .57.  
Other studies have indicated correlations between partially-relative direct EATs 
and various self-reported criteria for tobacco addiction: (i) Hendricks and Brandon 
(2005) reported that various sub-scales of the SCQ correlated significantly with 
corresponding categories of pro- and anti-smoking implicit smoking expectancies, .21 ≤ 
r(99) ≤ .39, ps < .05; (ii) Palfai (2001, pp. 324-325) found that the accessibility of 
smokers’ pro-smoking expectancies correlated with CPD, r  = .32, p < .05, even when 
controlling for the negative reinforcement subscale of the SCQ, R2 = .15, r ≈ .39, p < 
.01, with which they also correlated, r  = .37, p < .05; (iii) Palfai (2001, pp. 324-325) 
also found that pro-smoking implicit expectancies correlated with the FTND, r  = .25, p 
< .05, the psychological symptoms subscale of the Withdrawel Symptoms 
Questionnaire [WSQ], r  = .25, p < .05, and with cued self-reported urges to smoke, r  = 
.32, p < .05.  
Although the foregoing lists may appear quite encouraging, it is important to 
note that such cross-sectional findings were obtained by cherry-picking from among a 
comparable number of corresponding null findings. For example, Palfai’s (2001) non-
relativstic direct EAT correlated with only one of seven subscales of the SCQ (i.e. the 
negative reinforcement subscale), even though each of the subscales were designed to 
measure smokers’ beliefs about the positive consequences of smoking. Likewise, the 
relevant EAT scores also did not correlate with any of the four WSQ subscales designed 
to measure different aspects of tobacco craving. Furthermore, in a follow-up to Litz et 
al. (1987), Fallon (1998) found that the frequency of anti-smoking endorsements on a 
partially-relative direct EAT significantly and coherently related to smoking-status (see 
above), but no such relationship was originally observed by Litz et al. Indeed, using a 
slightly different index of anti-smoking implicit expectancies based upon response 
latency, neither Fallon nor Litz et al. obtained a smoking-status effect (i.e. even though 
the corresponding pro-smoking latency measures did yield an effect in both cases).  
When Hendricks and Brandon (2005) used a partially-relative direct EAT to 
measure various categories of smoking-related implicit expectancies they also found 
rather puzzling findings. Only one of four types of implicit expectancies about different 
aspects of positive reinforcement from smoking correlated significantly with the 
positive reinforcement sub-scale of the SCQ (i.e. implicit expectancies about smoking-
induced social enhancement, r(99) = .21, p < .05). Worse still, Hendricks and Brandon 
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reported that general implicit expectancies of smoking-related positive reinforcement 
correlated significantly with the negative reinforcement subscale of the SCQ, r(99) = 
.20, p < .05; and, that implicit expectancies of negative reinforcement from smoking 
correlated with the positive reinforcement subscale of the SCQ, r(99) = .29, p < .005.  
In addition to such inconsistent findings, it appears that researchers in the area 
have been rather selective in reporting only significant statistical relationships with 
tobacco addiction criteria, while omitting any mention of null statistical relationships 
with other recorded tobacco addiction criteria that were even more important. For 
example, Litz et al. (1987) recorded both CPD and years smoking but they did not 
report statistical tests for the relationships between these tobacco-addiction criteria and 
the relevant smoking-related EAT scores they measured. Likewise, both studies by 
Hendricks and Brandon (2005, 2008) recorded smokers’ years smoking, CPD and also 
their nicotine dependence (ala the FTND) but did not report on their respective 
statistical relationships with corresponding implicit smoking-related expectancies 
measured using a partially-relative direct EAT (i.e. despite reporting statistically 
significant relationships with other criteria like the SCQ). As such, under-reporting of 
null criterion effects appears to be as much of a problem in the literature on non-
relativistic direct EATs as it is in the respective literatures on indirect EATs (see above) 
or on direct EATs that are relativistic (e.g. Sayette et al. did not report anything about 
the statistical relationships between their direct EAT versus CPD, years smoking or self-
reported cravings). 
On the Overall Feasibility of using EATs to Systematically Quantify Tobacco Addiction 
EATs, and in particular direct EATs, may at first appear to be more precise than 
the other implicit measures we have so far reviewed because they require participants to 
respond to very specific topics and/or to self-report those topics from trial to trial (under 
time pressure). However, a widely acknowledged problem with these methods is that 
much like regular questionnaire-based self-report measures it is relatively easy for 
participants to respond to EAT trials strategically – thus making EATs characteristically 
prone to confounding by demand characteristics, social desirability and most of the 
other extraneous variables to which questionnaire-based self-reports are prone (e.g. see 
Stacy & Wiers, 2010, pp. 555-561; Rooke et al., 2008, pp. 1316-1317). Moreover, even 
if we could assume that the self-report responses captured by smoking-related EATs 
were not influenced by extraneous variables, all EATs are fundamentally designed to 
score their smoking-related trials in a relative fashion that confounds whatever various 
types of implicit evaluating were involved from trial to trial.  
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For example, partially-relative direct EATs typically involve scoring 
participants’ responses to smoking-related trials against their responses to control trials 
specifically designed to measure implicit evalauting of topics with nothing obvious to 
do with smoking (i.e. based on the unfounded assumption that these responses would 
somehow be neutral, rather than indeterminate with respect to smoking). Crucially, 
therefore, EATs are fundamentally bound like the IAT and other relative measures to 
ignore important motivational distinctions between implicit evalauting of one smoking-
related topic versus others (see Chapter 2) – and as such it is simply not feasible to 
systematically improve the haphazard criterion validity of a smoking-related EAT. 
Indeed, bearing this out, despite over 25 years of research, as we have just reviewed the 
EAT literature has yielded a similarly lacklustre profile of hit and miss criterion validity 
in relation to tobacco addiction as the IAT, and other relative measures of smoking-
related implicit evaluating.  
3.3. The IRAP as the Only Current Alternative to the IAT that is Capable of Measuring 
Implicit Evaluating of One Topic at a Time 
A Conceptual Overview of IRAP Research 
In basic terms, the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2006) is a computer-based protocol that alternately requires participants 
to quickly respond to a given topic from two perfectly opposing evaluative perspectives 
designed to be respectively consistent versus inconsistent with their learning histories. 
The central rationale underpinning this approach is that under high time pressure it 
should take participants less time to correctly produce the prescribed IRAP responses 
that are most in keeping with their ongoing history of evaluative responding, than to 
produce those to the contrary. In particular, by comparing the speed with which a 
participant is able to provide opposing evaluative responses to a given topic on an IRAP 
(of which there are usually four), one is essentially assuming that the time difference 
between these two sets of responses will be mainly in proportion to how accustomed 
that participant is to responding in one way rather than the other, in the relevant 
measurement context (see Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). Thus, for example, in most 
contexts smokers should in principle require less time (under time pressure) to provide a 
prescribed response “True” to “Smoking makes me feel – Good” as compared to a 
prescribed response “False” (i.e. insofar as smokers are characteristically more 
accustomed to deriving reasons for rather than against their smoking).  
If, however, the IRAP presented participants with only one topic like “Smoking 
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makes me feel – Good” and simply required them to alternately respond “True” versus 
“False” to this topic, there would be nothing preventing them from quickly providing 
those responses as required but regardless of their intended topic. This is why the IRAP 
requires participants to coordinate their responding among four different types of trials 
– so as to minimise the possibility of any such extraneous responding. In particular, an 
IRAP’s four trial-types are always designed to be as topographically similar to each 
other as possible while also still maintaining complementary meanings relative to each 
other. For example, a smoking-related IRAP might generate four trial-types by pairing 
each of “Smoking makes me feel” versus “The Smoking-ban makes me Feel” 
respectively with stimuli describing positive versus negative moods. In other words, the 
four IRAP trial-types are essentially four different pairings beween two sets of two 
antonymic evaluative stimuli. And moreover, such that each of the two evaluative 
stimuli defining each IRAP trial-type is shared with one other trial-type, and also 
opposite to that in one other trial-type (i.e. four combinations of two stimuli from 
beween two sets of two antonymic evaluative stimuli). 
Crucially, therefore, when participants are randomly presented with four such 
highly interrelated trial-types in succession during the IRAP, they have no alternative 
but to process the identifying features of both evaluative stimuli defining each trial if 
they are to reliably provide the various ‘correct’ responses required for each respective 
IRAP trial among many. Specifically, although there is a 50% chance that participants 
will randomly choose the ‘correct’ response on any given trial, this likelihood 
diminishes exponentially over multiple IRAP trials, and/or as one requires greater levels 
of response accuracy from participants. In fact, on the basis of 50% likelihood per trial, 
there is less than a 1x10-35 chance that a given participant would randomly attain at least 
the 80% response accuracy criterion usually required across the test phase of standard 
IRAP (i.e. assuming 144 test trials as in most IRAPs currently in the literature).  
In other words, the main way in which the IRAP enforces its experimental 
control over what topics its participants are evaluating on each trial is by requiring them 
to respond as quickly as possible, in highly prescribed ways that are experimentally 
contingent on all features of the relevant topic presented on that trial. And moreover, 
when it comes to scoring IRAP responses, fundamentally, only trials that share a given 
topic are scored together. Therefore, rather than measuring implicit evaluating of one 
topic relative to another, IRAP measurements are specifically designed to 
experimentally control participants’ responses so that they are bound to be in terms of 
one specific topic as distinct from another. Crucially, no other measure of implicit 
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evaluating even attempts this at present (e.g. see Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014) – and 
in principle, this makes the IRAP rather uniquely capable of determining what aspects 
of implicit evaluating it is measuring; and thus also of distinguishing what aspects of 
implicit evaluating are most motivationally pivotal to (treating) tobacco addiction.  
Granted, as in any psychological response task, it is of course possible in 
principle for a participant to strategically reframe some or all of the four IRAP trial-
types in terms of extraneous topics. However, an IRAP always presents each of its four 
IRAP trial-types in random succession across trials, and as such, before a participant 
can correctly identify the prescribed response for a given trial they must first process 
both of its defining stimuli in distinction to three remaining trial-types. Recall, for 
example, that the literal meanings of the IRAP’s four respective trial-types are 
specifically chosen to be in distinction to each other; and moreover, that by contrast 
opposing IRAP stimuli are typically chosen to be topographically similar across 
multiple instances (i.e. participants are usually presented with at least six 
topographically similar versions of each IRAP trial-type). Thus, it is in principle a much 
more familiar task for participants to respond ‘correctly’ to IRAP trials in terms of the 
literal meaning of their defining stimulus combination, than it is to respond ‘correctly’ 
to those trials in terms of some improvised strategy based on ad hoc topographical 
features.  
And therefore, with all else being equal, participants should be much slower at 
providing ‘correct’ IRAP responses using the latter approach as compared to the former. 
Crucially, this makes it relatively difficult to distinguish one trial-type from another on 
a given trial, or thus the correct response required on that trial, without first processing 
the intended meaning of both aspects of that trial’s defining stimuli. Indeed, bearing in 
mind the minimal response latency criterion that the IRAP typically imposes based 
upon pilot testing, it seems even less likely that any given participant could respond 
with the high levels of response accuracy required by the IRAP (i.e. usually a minimum 
of 80% accuracy), without responding in terms of the intended (literal) meaning of each 
IRAP trial-type (e.g. see Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010). 
To illustrate, it would be akin to performing an abstract mathematical calculation, 
involving a network of at least 72 algebraic distinctions,35 with at 80% accuracy on each 
                                                 
35 Note that I calculated the relvant number of algebraic distinctions by assuming that there were six 
versions of each IRAP trial-type, thus requiring participants to repeatedly derive at least 24 highly 
unfamiliar topographical distinctions on each trial and then identify it as belong to one trial-type or 
another, currently requiring one response or another (i.e. they were required to not only topographically 
distinguish each of 24 trials as distinct from each other using mnemonics, but in each case, also as 
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of 144+ IRAP trials within a response latency window limited to somewhere between 
1.5 and 3 seconds on average. In fact, bearing this out, a high degree of participants 
never even manage to achieve the IRAP’s response latency and accuracy criteria in the 
first place, unless they have had the opportunity to practise those trials with some 
response rule that summarizes and thus guides what responses they are required to 
produce during each stage of the relevant IRAP (see Vahey et al., 2010). Moreover, 
preliminary research indicates that the IRAP is relatively immune to faking by 
employing strategic responding on a trial by trial basis (McKenna, Barnes-Holmes, 
Barnes-Holmes & Steward, 2007), and likewise, is also able to detect highly socially 
sensitive patterns of evaluating that are typically concealed in traditional questionnaire-
based self-reports (e.g. Dawson, Barnes-Holmes, Gresswell, Hart, & Gore, 2010; 
Power, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010; Roddy, Stewart, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2010). Furthermore, as perhaps the most important empirical testament to the 
IRAP’s experimental precision, a recent meta-analysis of 15 clinically-oriented IRAP 
studies, including two studies related to addiction, indicated that it achieved a relatively 
high degree of criterion validity as compared to all other implicit measures (i.e. r = .45; 
Vahey, Nicholson, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015). Indeed, in the only IRAP study to 
prospectively examine addiction processes to date, Carpenter, Martinez, Vadhan, 
Barnes-Holmes, and Nunes (2012) found multiple strong relationships between cocaine 
addicts’ implicit evaluating during early abstinence and their subsequent relapse (or not) 
from a contingency management treatment designed to treat cocaine addiction – and 
moreover, these were relationships that were not detected by corresponding 
questionnaire-based measures. 
In order to fully understand how the IRAP was developed to achieve such 
results, it is critically important to bear in mind that this technique was not designed to 
measure hypothetical mental constructs, such as networks of cognitive associations. 
Instead, rather uniquely, the IRAP was specifically developed in order to measure 
relational response biases (i.e. response probabilities) from the behaviour-analytic 
perspective of Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001; 
see also Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010; Stewart, 2015; 
Törneke, 2010). Crucially, from this point of view, it is not necessary to adopt 
mentalistic assumptions in order to systematically develop empirical theories of implicit 
evaluating (in any given domain; e.g. see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011; 
                                                                                                                                               
belonging to one of four respective trial-types, and to then chose which response was currently 
appropriate as per IRAP feeback contingencies). 
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Hughes, Barnes-Holmes & Vahey, 2012). Instead, RFT is based upon a functional 
epistemology wherein behaviour is conceptualised solely in terms of its functional (i.e. 
experimental) relationships with various aspects of the environment unfolding as a 
function of learning processes across time and context (see Hayes, 1993; Hayes, Hayes 
& Reese, 1988; Pepper, 1942). By implication, the IRAP was therefore not designed to 
measure implicit evalauting as a fundamentally different process to the explicit 
evaluating measured by traditional questionnaire-based self-report measures. Rather, as 
outlined earlier, the IRAP is designed to measure relatively brief and immediate 
relational responding (BIRRs) in a highly experimentally controlled fashion (i.e. in the 
sense of distinguishing responding in terms of one topic versus another). And as such, 
the only difference between the evaluative responding measured by the IRAP and 
traditional questionnaire-based self-reports is that the latter measures relatively 
elaborated and extended forms of relational responding (EERRs) with relatively little 
experimentally control or thus determinacy (for recent functional theoretical treatments 
of this continuum see Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010; 
Hughes, Barnes-Holmes & Vahey, 2012). 
Nonetheless, even though the IRAP was conceptualised from a functional 
theoretical perspective that does not incorporate mentalistic assumptions, this does not 
mean that existing mental concepts cannot serve as useful guides for defining the 
behavioural subject matter of IRAP research. In fact, since even before its inception the 
founders of RFT have recommended using mental concepts as a guide to broad 
structures in behaviour that require functional explanation (Hayes & Brownstein, 1986, 
pp. 179-180). And moreover, to this end, during the past four or five years prominent 
researchers from both the functional and mentalistic traditions have published multiple 
conceptual papers exploring how these two traditions might usefully (and legitimately) 
interface to the practical benefit of each other (see De Houwer, 2011; De Houwer, 
Fiedler, & Moors, 2011; see also De Houwer, Barnes‐Holmes, & Barnes‐Holmes, 2015; 
De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Moors, 2013; De Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2013; Fiedler, 2015; Liefooghe & De Houwer, 2015; Vahey & Whelan, 2015).  
In particular, mentalistic theories of implicit cognition are typically most 
concerned with identifying predictive relationships among hypothetical concepts, each 
invented to fully describe and (from a mechanistic perspective) thus explain some 
characteristically complex pattern of behavioural relations. Crucially, when it comes to 
developing a functional account of how implicit evaluating motivates tobacco addiction, 
these complexes of behavioural relations summarized by mentalistic theory are 
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inherently useful in defining a functional researcher’s subject matter. In other words, 
while discovering relations among different types of implicit evaluating might be an end 
in itself from the point of view of developing mentalistic theory; by contrast, it 
represents a starting point for the functional research whose ultimate goal is to 
understand what contextual variables govern each such relation (see Biglan & Hayes, 
1996; Hayes & Brownstein, 1986; Whelan & Barnes-Holmes, 2010).  
And yet, as reviewed earlier, the IRAP is relatively uniquely equipped to 
measure implicit evaluating of one topic as (experimentally) distinct from another, and 
as such most of the preceeding literature on smoking-related implicit cognition is based 
upon mentalistic concepts that are functionally nebulous (see Vahey & Whelan, 2015, 
pp. 349-350). On balance, therefore, even though the ultimate goal of the current 
research was to pursue a better functional understanding of how smoking-related 
implicit cognition variously motivates tobacco addiction depending upon context, 
initially, the current thesis first needed to identify what types of implicit evaluating were 
most related to tobacco addiction. In particular, it is worth emphasizing that from a 
functional perspective we were thus not trying to identify what aspects of implicit 
evaluating caused various tobacco addiction criteria per se, but rather which of those 
aspects participated most as a motivational facet of those criteria (e.g. cigarette 
consumption, tobacco cravings, relapse risk etc.; see Hayes & Brownstein, 1986, pp. 
179-180; Whelan & Barnes-Holmes, 2010, pp. 349-350). According, the first half of the 
current thesis was largely concerned with addressing similar questions of predictive 
validity as typically dominate cognitive theories of tobacco addiction. And then, having 
established what particular aspects of implicit evaluating are most predictive of tobacco 
addiction, the latter half of the current research sought to develop a preliminary 
functional account focused upon understanding how best to contextually control those 
aspects of implicit evaluating apparently motivating tobacco addiction. 
3.4. A Brief Summary of the Research Agenda Pursued in the Current Thesis 
Chapter 4: On developing a smoking-related IAT for Maximal Criterion Validity and 
Juxtaposing the Criterion Validity of an Analogous IRAP against It 
The IAT is by far the most popular measure of smoking-related implicit 
evaluating in the literature, and arguably, the measure of implicit evaluating that has 
achieved the best criterion validity with regard to tobacco addiction. And yet, as we 
have already reviewed, smoking-related IAT’s have on balance tended to fluctuate 
unpredictably in their relationships with tobacco addiction criteria. We concluded that 
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this state of affairs was primarily due to the fact that the relative nature of both the 
IAT’s individual tasks, and its scoring, are bound by design to experimentally confound 
implicit evaluating about different topics with each other. Nonetheless, rather than 
ruling the IAT out on a completely a priori basis, we reasoned that it would be useful in 
the current context to explore what criterion validity a smoking-related IAT might 
achieve if we specifically sought to offset its inherent relativity in our choice of its 
stimuli. In particular, we sought to coordinate our choice of the four categories of IAT 
stimuli so that most smokers would customarily respond to all of its trials from a similar 
smoking-related evaluative perspective likely to be involved in tobacco addiction. Then, 
once we had developed such an IAT via pilot testing, we designed a corresponding 
IRAP by analogy. Namely, we developed this IRAP using broadly the same stimuli as 
the IAT, and so that it would target exactly the same implicit evaluative perspectives as 
we designed the IAT trials to cue.  
Our primary purpose in doing so, was to demonstrate that IRAPs are capable of 
making key empirical distinctions about tobacco addiction that are just not possible with 
equivalent gold-standard IAT; and moreover, that such experimental distinctions 
ultimately yield greater levels of criterion validity in relation to tobacco addiction. 
Crucially, to our knowledge, this was the first experimental comparison of an addiction-
related IRAP with an IAT. And indeed, to date, only one small study has examined 
smoking-related implicit evaluating with an IRAP; and even then, the primary purpose 
of doing so was to illustrate, test and contextualise previous IRAP optimisations more 
broadly (Vahey, Boles, & Barnes-Holmes, 2010). In response, our first empirical study 
therefore sought to provide a much more comprehensive empirical basis for deciding 
whether the IRAP might be better equipped to examine tobacco addiction (in particular) 
than the IAT. 
Chapter 5: Developing an IRAP to Make Motivational Distinctions within Tobacco 
Addiction that are not Currently Possible with Other Implicit Measures 
The IRAP we used in our first empirical study was bound by design to examine 
only implicit evaluating that might be captured within the structural limitations of an 
IAT. As a result, the relevant IRAP may have measured smokers’ implicit evaluating of 
stereotypical reasons for and against smoking (and the Irish smoking-ban), but it was 
prevented from exploring how smokers’ implicit evaluating of different types of reasons 
for smoking might relate to tobacco addiction. Our second empirical study was 
primarily focused upon redressing this limitation. In particular, we designed an IRAP 
that was capable of measuring smokers’ implicit evaluating of smoking for reward 
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versus relief during positive versus negative craving-relatd moods. Crucially, we 
targeted these specific aspects of smokers’ implicit evaluating based upon a 
longstanding and empirically well supported consensus within the literature on tobacco 
addiction, that these motivational distinctions are pivotal to tobacco addiction. For 
example, as we will review in Chapter 5, there is extensive questionnaire-based self-
report evidence (and indeed theory) suggesting that smokers’ differentially evaluate 
smoking as providing reward versus relief during positive and negative moods, 
respectively. And moreover, that this is a highly characteristic and ritualized smoking 
strategy commonly used by smokers as a means of regulating their emotions on an 
ongoing basis. Furthermore, given that smoking for relief from negative affect is the 
pattern of smoking most commonly linked to a gradual intensification of tobacco 
addiction, we expected that the IRAP trial-type measuring this aspect of smokers’ 
implicit evaluating would be particularly predictive of the various tobacco addiction 
criteria we employed (i.e. as compared to the more general pro-smoking implicit 
evaluating we measured in our first empirical study, and also as measured by the three 
remaining trial-types in this our second empirical study). 
Chapter 6: A First Systematic Test of Thought Suppression as a Means of Bringing 
Intrusive Pro-smoking Implicit Evaluating Under Self-control 
The third and fourth empirical studies contained within the current thesis sought 
to provide a first momentary time-course analysis of how persistently and/or 
consistently thought suppression impacts any (smoking-related) implicit evaluating it 
contradicts (see McKay, Franklin, Patapis, & Lynch, 2006; Shiffman, 2009; see also 
Marhe, Waters, van de Wetering, & Franken, 2013; Waters et al., 2010). In particular, 
from the point of view that thought suppression may sometimes be useful in temporarily 
postponing (tobacco) cravings, we examined how immediately and persistently effective 
it would be in eliminating implicit evaluating integral to tobacco addiction. And as such, 
the research contained within the current chapter provided a first glimpse into the 
dynamics of how thought suppression impacts the intrusive aspects of implicit 
evaluating that it is generally used to contradict. Namely, our third study focused upon 
the impact of the ad hoc smoking-related thought suppression most commonly used by 
smokers during (unaided) abstinence, on those broad aspects of smokers’ pro-smoking 
implicit evaluating that appeared to be integral to tobacco addiction in our first 
empirical study.  
Then, in our fourth empirical study, we refined our analysis by exploring the 
widely speculated idea that focused thought suppression of particular aspects of tobacco 
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cravings might be more successful than an ad hoc approach at postponing and/or 
controlling any such intrusive pro-smoking implicit evaluating. In so doing, we were 
particularly keen to examine whether there would be a differential impact of focused 
thought suppression on aspects of pro-smoking implicit evaluating that it specifically 
contradicted versus not. Crucially, not only was this approach necessary in order to 
isolate the efficacy of any given instance of thought suppression (i.e. relative to the 
particular aspect of tobacco craving it was targeting). Moreover, it was also necessary to 
explore whether individual instances of focused thought suppression might 
inadvertently provoke secondary tobacco cravings, in turn requiring their own 
respective versions of thought suppression, and thus perpetuating an escalation of ad 
hoc patterns of thought suppression. Thus, our aim was to provide a first preliminary 
model of how (anti-smoking) thought suppression interacts over time, on a minute by 
minute basis, with the intrusive implicit evaluating it is designed to contradict. 
Chapter 7: A First Examination of How Smokers’ Implicit Evaluating is moderated by 
Suppression-oriented Nicotine Abstinence during Acute Stress 
Our fifth and final study sought to extend our analysis of the feasibility of anti-
smoking thought suppression to a more ecologically valid and indeed pivotal context for 
tobacco addiction. Namely, we examined how smokers’ smoking-related and quitting-
related implicit evaluating developed across 14-24 hours of suppression-oriented 
unaided nicotine abstinence; and indeed crucially, how this implicit evaluating 
responded on a minute by minute basis to acute stress during any such abstinence versus 
not. In particular, we deemed the latter part of our analysis as likely being critical in 
explaining why the literature had generally failed to find any changes in smoking-
related implicit evaluating as a result of nicotine deprivation per se. 
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CHAPTER 4: Testing the IRAP versus the IAT as Tools for Targeting Smoking-related 
Implicit Evaluating (Study 1) 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 The IAT literature has provided very little consensus about the role of implicit 
evaluating in tobacco addiction. For the most part, this lack of consensus is a direct 
result of the fact that an IAT is constrained by design to measure smoking-related 
evaluating in arbitrarily relative terms; namely, relative to some contrasting concept, 
and/or relative to two contrasting attributes, in unspecified ways. In particular, IAT 
researchers have to date been unable to identify any concept that stereotypically 
contrasts in a consistent manner with smoking. Instead, they have resorted to using 
contrast categories that are ambiguously related to smoking (e.g. ‘Sweets’, ‘Stealing’; 
Swanson et al., 2001), or else contrast categories that allude to some vague absence of 
smoking (e.g. ‘Nonsmoking’; De Houwer et al., 2006). And as a result, smoking-related 
IAT scores are not only indeterminate with respect to participants’ evaluations of 
smoking per se, but worse still, their relationship with tobacco addiction criteria has also 
fluctuated unpredictably from study to study as a function of changing contrast 
categories (see Swanson et al., 2001; Tibboel et al., 2011). 
In response, rather than arbitrarily choosing an unstable benchmark for the IRAP 
from among existing smoking-related IATs, we made the first overt attempt to design a 
smoking-related IAT that would systematically minimise its instability (and thus 
indeterminacy) with respect to smoking-related implicit evaluating. Our basic strategy 
was to design a smoking-related IAT so that smokers (and non-smokers) would 
consistently interpret its trials in a minimum number of ways all of which would be 
consistently relevant to tobacco addiction. Crucially, our intention was to design the 
most determinate and valid smoking-related IAT possible, so as to obtain the best 
quality benchmark against which to compare an analogous IRAP. In doing so, we 
adopted a very conservative approach, whereby the current IRAP was artificially 
restricted by design to measure only those aspects of smoking-related implicit 
evaluating that were most accessible in principle to an IAT. With these things in mind, 
we chose ‘Smoking-Ban’ as a suitable IAT contrast category for ‘Smoking’ because of 
the likelihood that our chosen sample would commonly consider “the Smoking-Ban” as 
being opposite to smoking in just a small number ways with respect to the positive 
versus negative smoking-related mood attributes we incorporated. Namely, we chose 
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positive mood attributes, like “Relaxed”, that are among the most stereotypical reasons 
that smokers offer for smoking; and likewise, we chose corresponding antonymic 
negative mood attributes, such as “Anxious”, whose reduction is also a stereotypical 
reason that smokers offer for smoking (e.g. DiFranza, Savageau, Fletcher, Ockene, 
Rigotti, McNeill, et al., 2002; DiFranza, Ursprung, & Biller, 2012; O’Loughlin et al., 
2002; Pfizer Ireland, 2009, pp. 12-19; Ursprung, DiFranza, Costa, DiFranza, 2009; 
Vahey et al., 2009). In addition, those positive and negative mood attributes were also 
selected to be in keeping with how non-smokers typically report that the Smoking-ban 
makes them feel (i.e. at the time, there was prolonged, widespread and highly consistent 
discourse among the Irish public about Ireland’s introduction of the World’s first 
outright smoking-ban in workplaces; Clancy, 2007; Fahy, Trench & Clancy, 2012).36  
Another important reason why we chose ‘Smoking-Ban’ as a useful contrast 
category for ‘Smoking’ was the opportunity it provided to contrast stigmatized versus 
non-stigmatized aspects of smoking-related evaluating. We reasoned that regardless of 
their private feelings, the current smokers were stigmatized for explicitly criticizing the 
Irish Smoking-ban because of the immediate and near-universal compliance of the Irish 
public with its restrictions (Clancy, 2007, p. 239-241; Fahy et al., 2012). On this basis, 
we predicted that the current smokers would explicitly approve of the Irish Smoking-
ban due to societal pressures for doing so, despite implicitly affirming that it makes 
them feel bad (i.e. due to the nicotine deprivation and stigma it routinely imposed upon 
smokers in Ireland; Lonergan, 2013). By contrast, we expected the smokers to approve 
of smoking both implicitly and explicitly due to the fact that they were not stigmatized 
for explicitly affirming that smoking makes them feel good (i.e. it provides smokers and 
non-smokers alike with one of the most popularly accepted explanations for tobacco 
addiction; e.g. DiFranza et al., 2002, 2012; O’Loughlin et al., 2002; Ursprung et al., 
2009; Vahey et al., 2010). Thus, we used the susceptibility of explicit evaluating to 
social desirability bias to highlight how the IRAP, but not the IAT, can detect conflicts 
between specific types of implicit versus explicit evaluating (i.e. addressing the same 
respective topics). 
In addition, an essential part of the current approach was to coordinate our 
choice of IAT stimuli with highly targeted sampling of the participants. For example, 
                                                 
36 We decided to use the traditional IAT format (i.e. of a target concept, a contrast concept and two 
contrasting attribute classes) because all IAT variants have comparably little supporting evidence, and 
because what evidence does exist suggests that they have failed to outperform (or sometimes even match) 
the traditional IAT format psychometrically (see Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014b; see also our introductory 
review of the smoking-related IAT literature). 
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we sampled regular smokers who had not contemplated or attempted to quit smoking 
during the previous 12 months – we reasoned that any other smokers, who had recently 
been attempting to quit smoking, would have been inclined to have relatively mixed 
evaluations of smoking, the Irish Smoking-ban, and therefore about the stimulus 
combinations employed in the current IAT. Likewise, we specifically sampled only 
those non-smokers who would be least likely to customarily exhibit mixed evaluating of 
smoking or the Irish Smoking-ban; namely, non-smokers who had never regularly 
smoked (i.e. who had not smoked at all during the previous 12 months and had only 
ever tried smoking a cigarette up to a maximum of 10 times; and for those who had, the 
majority reported only one or zero such occasions). Overall, therefore, the central 
hypothesis of the current study was that the IAT and the IRAP would both vary in line 
with known-group differences related to smoking-status but that crucially the latter 
would provide more information about implicit evaluating in doing so. 
Above all, the current research was not just about examining whether a 
smoking-related IRAP might rival a corresponding IAT in terms of correlating with 
tobacco addiction criteria. Rather, it was as much about demonstrating that IRAPs are 
capable of making key empirical distinctions about tobacco addiction that are just not 
possible with equivalent IATs. Therefore, in addition to incorporating standard cross-
sectional evidence for the criterion validity of both implicit measures, we introduced 
novel statistical analyses of IAT and/or IRAP data that were specifically designed to 
highlight the added precision afforded by the IRAP (see Results). To our knowledge, 
this was the first such experimental comparison of a smoking-related IAT with a 
counterpart IRAP. 
4.2. METHOD 
Known-groups Sampling Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
The primary aim here was to sample two groups of people, one with a stable 
behavioural history of regularly smoking for at least one year (i.e. smokers), versus 
another with a behavioural history within which smoking was generally irrelevant (i.e. 
non-smokers). Accordingly, of the 110 participants recruited, 18 were excluded from 
subsequent analyses because they were transitioning from smoker to non-smoker, or 
vice versa. Of the remaining 92 participants, 48 were smokers (23 females) who had not 
recently committed, or attempted to restrict their smoking; and 44 were non-smokers 
(23 females) who had not smoked any substances during the previous 12 months or 
indeed on more than 10 occasions before that. All participants were recruited for 
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experimentally naivety to both the IAT and the IRAP, and all were similarly exposed to 
the Irish Smoking-ban (i.e. all were continuously resident in Ireland throughout the 2-3 
years since its introduction at the time of the study).  
Key Demographics of the Smoker and Non-smoker Samples 
Participants were recruited throughout the Maynooth University campus, based 
upon whether they were observed to be smoking in the case of the smokers, and based 
upon whether they self-identified as never-smokers in the case the non-smokers. More 
specifically, the researcher approached potential participants in person and invited them 
to provide their contact details should they wish to be contacted by phone at a later 
point to dicuss the possibility of taking part in various studies examining tobacco 
addiction. Overall, smokers (Mage = 26.4 years; range = 18 - 44; SD = 7.3) and non-
smokers (Mage = 24.9 years; range = 18 - 45; SD = 6.0) were closely matched in terms of 
age, t(90) = 1.03; p = .30. On average, the smokers reported that they had been smoking 
regularly for 9.2 years (SD = 6.9; range = 0.75-26), and that they consumed 15 
cigarettes per day (SD = 7.0, range = 4-38).37 Similarly, most of these smokers 
exhibited moderate (physiological) nicotine dependence on the modified Fagerstrom 
Tolerance Questionnaire (mFTQ; M = 3.6; range = 1.3-6.0; SD = 1.3; see Prokhorov, 
Pallonen, Fava, Ding, & Niaura, 1996; Prokhorov, Koehly, Pallonen, & Hudmon, 1998, 
p. 42); and moderate psychological tobacco dependence on the Hooked on Nicotine 
Checklist (HONC; M = 6.8; range = 1-10; SD = 2.5; cf. Wellman, Di Franza, Pbert, et 
al., 2005; Wellman, Savageau, et al. 2006).  
Random Assignment of Smokers and Non-smokers to Experimental Groups 
Smokers and non-smokers were randomly assigned to complete either a 
smoking-related IAT or an analogous IRAP. In addition, for counterbalancing, all 
participants were also randomly assigned between two levels of a trial block order 
variable such that, they either commenced the relevant IAT/IRAP with a block of trials 
requiring pro-smoking/anti-smoking-ban versus anti-smoking/pro-smoking-ban 
responses (i.e. termed pro-smoking-first versus anti-smoking-first sequences, 
respectively). Participants in the IAT groups were well matched with the IRAP groups 
insofar as they did not differ significantly in terms of their age, the number of years they 
had been smoking, CPD, HONC scores, or mFTQ scores (ps > .4).  
                                                 
37 71% of the smokers reported smoking on a daily basis throughout the 30 days preceding participation; a 
further 18% reported having smoked between 20 and 29 of these days; and only 11% reported smoking 
on 10 to 20 of these 30 days. Indeed, upon completion of the current study, 68% of smokers reported that 
they would ‘definitely’ smoke a cigarette upon leaving, and the remaining 14% and 18% respectively 
reported that they would ‘probably’ and ‘possibly’ do so (i.e. none selected the alternative of ‘definitely 
not’).  
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Apparatus and Materials 
State and Trait Measures of Tobacco Addiction Intensity 
Participants completed two popular trait measures of tobacco addiction: the 
modified Fagerstrom Tolerance Questionnaire (mFTQ; Prokhorov, Koehly, Pallonen, & 
Hudmon, 1998, p. 42) and the Hooked on Nicotine Checklist (HONC; DiFranza et al., 
2002). Both measures are highly reliable and widely used measures of tobacco addiction 
(e.g. Sanouri et al., 2009; Wellman, Di Franza, Pbert et al., 2006). Whereas the more 
established mFTQ is primarily focused upon relatively severe behavioural and 
physiological features of nicotine dependence (Piper, McCarthy, & Baker, 2006), the 
HONC complements the mFTQ by focussing instead upon psychological aspects of 
tobacco dependence (i.e. subjective diminished autonomy over tobacco smoking; 
MacPherson, Strong, & Myers, 2008; Wellman, DiFranza, Savageau, Godiwala, 
Friedman, & Hazelton, 2005). In the present study the mFTQ achieved an  = .68 for 
smokers, and an  = .90 when smokers and non-smokers were considered collectively; 
the HONC achieved an  = .77 for smokers, and an  = .95 for smokers and non-
smokers considered collectively. Participants also completed a measure of state tobacco 
addiction intensity: a single item Likert-type question concerning their current craving 
for a cigarette. It consisted of the request “Please indicate how much you currently want 
to smoke” followed by a Likert scale ranging from -3 labeled ‘Not At All’, to 0 labeled 
‘Moderately’, and finally to +3 labeled ‘Very Much’. Lastly, a questionnaire called the 
demographic and behavioural history questionnaire (DBHQ) was used to conduct 
exhaustive semi-structured interviews with participants regarding their current and 
historical smoking-status as well as their basic demographics (see Appendix 2). The 
DBHQ was crucial in implementing the known-groups agendas described above, and it 
also measured two additional trait tobacco addiction criteria which bore much fewer 
theoretical assumptions than the mFTQ and HONC. Namely, participants’ self-reported 
estimates of: (a) how many years they had been smoking regularly (i.e. years smoking; 
YS); and (b) of how many cigarettes per day (CPD) they had smoked on the days they 
smoked during the previous 30 day period.  
The IAT and the IRAP as Measures of Smoking-related Implicit Evaluating 
The IAT and the IRAP software was presented to participants on a Dell desktop 
computer running Windows XP Service Pack 2 with a 17-inch color monitor. In both 
cases the relevant software was coded using Visual Basic 2008 Professional Edition and 
was compiled into a stand-alone executable program. Participant responses were written 
directly by the program to a comma-delimited text file, which also transformed the 
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relevant raw latency data into the standardised IAT and IRAP scores described below in 
Section 4.3.3 respectively. 
The IAT 
Basic presentation and response formats. As per Table 4.1, the IAT employed 
four six-item classes of target stimuli: two attribute classes and two concept classes. 
Every IAT trial commenced by presenting one of these target stimuli centre-screen, 
whereupon the participant’s task was to categorise it as quickly as possible by selecting 
the category label which best described it from the top left- versus right-hand corners of 
the screen. The current IAT used four such category labels with each designating one of 
the stimulus classes in Table 4.1: “Smoking”, “Smoking-Ban”, “Positive”, or 
“Negative”. As per the rationale laid out earlier, we chose six antonymic pairs of 
positive versus negative mood attributes as target exemplars of the positive versus 
negative attribute categories. In contrast, given that not all smoking-related exemplars 
have natural antonyms relating to the Irish smoking-ban, we independently choose six 
target exemplars for the smoking category and six for the smoking-ban category (see 
Table 4.1). Our main concern here, was to choose concept exemplars to be as 
emblematic of the smoking versus the smoking-ban, as appropriate, in the common 
vernacular. Thus, for example, we chose to present the target stimulus “NO 
SMOKING” in all capitals because this is how this phrase is normally presented in 
relation to smoking restrictions in the general Irish vernacular (i.e. on so-called no 
smoking signs).   
 
 
Table 4.1  
The four classes of target stimuli that were presented centre-screen across IAT trials.  
 
Concept stimulus classes Attribute stimulus classes 
‘Smoking’      
concept stimuli 
‘Smoking-Ban’ 
concept stimuli 
‘Positive’      
attribute stimuli 
‘Negative’       
attribute stimuli 
Cigarette-pack Restrict Relaxed Tense 
Match-box Anti-smoking Pleasant Unpleasant 
Marlboro Lights Non-smoking Comfortable Irritable 
Tobacco Prevent Better Worse 
Inhale Smoke-free Sociable Withdrawn 
Nicotine NO SMOKING Calm Stressed 
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On the trials which presented concept stimuli as targets, the labels “Smoking” 
and “Smoking-Ban” always appeared on opposite upper corners of the screen, and 
likewise on trials which presented attribute target stimuli the “Positive” versus 
“Negative” labels also always appeared on opposite upper corners of the screen. 
Furthermore, concept stimulus trials could either appear with just the concept labels as 
response options, or else with the concept labels positioned just under the attribute 
stimulus labels on opposite upper corners of the screen. And likewise, the attribute 
stimulus trials could either appear with just the attribute stimulus labels as response 
options, or else with the attribute stimulus labels above the concept stimulus labels on 
opposite upper corners of the screen (see Figure 4.1).  
 
 
Figure 4.1. The three panels show how IAT trials were presented to participants, with the upper and 
middle panels representing trials that involved categorizing a target word exclusively as one of two 
antonymic stimulus classes, and with the bottom panel representing trials that involved categorizing a 
target word as one of four stimulus types in a pro-smoking manner.  
 
Crucially, participants could only ever register their response to a given IAT trial 
in one of two ways using a QWERTY keyboard: either by selecting the label(s) on the 
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upper left corner of the screen by pressing the ‘d’ key or selecting the label(s) on the 
upper right corner of the screen by pressing the ‘k’ key (see Figure 4.1). Therefore, 
when the “Smoking” and “Positive” labels appeared together on one upper corner of the 
screen, and the “Smoking-Ban” and “Negative” labels appeared on the other upper 
corner of the screen, participants were intended to categorise the target stimuli in a pro-
smoking manner. And conversely, when the “Smoking” and “Negative” labels appeared 
together on one upper corner of the screen, and the “Smoking-Ban” and “Positive” 
labels appeared on the other upper corner of the screen, this was assumed to encourage 
participants to respond in an anti-smoking manner. The IAT actively cultivated these 
respective patterns of responding with both instructions and with ongoing response 
feedback to participants. First, the IAT involved asking participants to complete its 
trials as quickly and as accurately as possible. Second, the IAT presented participants 
with a red ‘X’ in the middle of the screen whenever they provided a trial response to a 
given target that did not correspond to its designated label; and the red ‘X’ remained 
onscreen until they emitted the relevant correct response. Namely, once participants 
responded by pressing the key assigned to a given target’s designated label, the IAT 
then displayed a blank white screen for 400 ms before presenting the next target word.  
A summary of the IAT trial block sequencing. The IAT comprised of a total of 
seven blocks of trials which were demarcated by interludes offering participant 
instructions. We mentioned earlier that participants were counterbalanced for trial block 
order, and for clarity we will describe the pro-smoking-first IAT sequence in detail. The 
anti-smoking-first IAT sequence was the same as the pro-smoking-first sequence except 
that relative to the former, the latter had blocks 1, 3, and 4 switched with Blocks 5, 6 
and 7, respectively (see Table 4.2). 
For those in the pro-smoking-first condition the first block of trials they 
completed comprised of 24 trials wherein the 12 concept stimuli in Table 4.1 were 
randomly presented twice without replacement and in the presence of just the 
“Smoking” and “Smoking-Ban” concept labels as response options. Although the left-
right positioning of these two concept labels was counterbalanced among participants 
for block 1, importantly, their positioning remained static for each participant 
throughout block 1. 
Block 2 of the pro-smoking-first sequence then required participants to complete 
24 trials wherein all of the 12 attribute stimuli in Table 4.1 were randomly presented 
without replacement twice and in the presence of just the two attribute stimulus labels 
as response options. Crucially, the left-right positioning of the attribute stimulus labels 
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coordinated with the presentation of the concept labels in Block 1 such that throughout 
Block 2 participants were presented in Block 1 with the “Positive” label on the same 
side as the “Smoking” concept label and the “Negative” label on the same side as the 
“Smoking-Ban” concept label; thus for each participant the attribute labels were 
presented in the same left-right position throughout block 2.  
 
Table 4.2   
A summary of the basic functional architecture of the seven IAT trial blocks. 
 
IAT pro-smoking-first sequence 
 
IAT Block  
Sequence 
Number of  
IAT trials 
Stimulus classes 
assigned to the left 
response-key** 
Stimulus classes assigned 
 to the right response-key** 
1st  24 “Smoking” “Smoking-Ban” 
2nd  24 “Positive” “Negative” 
3rd  24 “Smoking” & “Positive” “Smoking-Ban” & “Negative” 
4th  48 “Smoking” & “Positive” “Smoking-Ban” & “Negative” 
5th  24 “Smoking-Ban” “Smoking” 
6th  24 “Smoking-Ban” & “Positive” “Smoking” & “Negative” 
7th  48 “Smoking-Ban” & “Positive” “Smoking” & “Negative” 
Note. For the anti-smoking-first sequence blocks 1, 3 & 4, were respectively switched with blocks 5, 6, & 
7. Also, assignment of stimuli to left and right response-keys was counterbalanced across participants. 
 
Block 3 of the pro-smoking-first sequence required participants to ‘practise’ 24 
pro-smoking trials wherein all of the 24 stimuli in Table 4.1 were randomly presented 
once without replacement in the presence of all four response labels in the same 
respective left-right positions as in Blocks 1 and 2. 
Block 4 of the pro-smoking-first sequence required participants to complete 48 
pro-smoking ‘test’ trials wherein all of the 24 stimuli in Table 4.1 were randomly 
presented twice without replacement with the four response labels in the same 
respective left-right positions as in Blocks 3. 
Block 5 was the same as block 1 of this sequence in all respects except that for 
each participant the left-right positioning of the “Smoking” versus “Smoking-Ban” 
labels were transposed. 
Block 6 was the same as Block 3 except that it required participants to categorise 
concept and attribute target words in an anti-smoking manner (i.e. “Smoking” and 
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“Negative” labels with one response key, and “Smoking Ban” and “Positive” labels 
with the other key). 
Block 7 was the same as Block 4 (48 trials), except that Block 7 used the same 
key assignments as Block 6, and the following message appeared onscreen at the end of 
the block: “That is the end of this part of the experiment. Please report to the 
experimenter.’’  
The IRAP 
Basic presentation and response formats. Each IRAP trial involved the 
simultaneous presentation of a label stimulus at the centre top of the computer screen, a 
target stimulus in the middle of the screen and lastly two mutually exclusive response 
designators, “True” versus “False”, at opposite corners of the bottom of the screen. 
Table 4.3 shows the two specific ‘concept’ labels and six positive versus six negative 
‘attribute’ target stimuli employed within the IRAP.38 Thus, the IRAP included four 
different IRAP trial-types, each having six versions (i.e. obtained by crossing the two 
different concept labels with the two different six-member classes of attribute target 
stimuli; see Figure 4.2). Two trial-types attributed various desirable versus aversive 
mood outcomes to smoking, and the other two trial-types attributed those same mood 
outcomes to the smoking-ban. Therefore, the “True” versus “False” response options on 
each IRAP trial always specified particular pro- versus anti-smoking response options 
defined by that trial’s particular label and target combination (see Table 4.3 & Figure 
4.2). 
 
Table 4.3  
The current IRAP’s two ‘concept’ labels and two ‘attribute’ target stimulus classes. 
 
‘Concept’ Labels ‘Attribute’ Targets 
Smoking  
Concept 
Smoking-Ban 
Concept  
Positive 
Moods 
Negative 
Moods 
Smoking makes  
Me Feel 
The Smoking Ban 
makes Me Feel 
Relaxed Tense 
Pleasant Unpleasant 
Comfortable Irritable 
Better Worse 
Sociable Withdrawn 
Calm Stressed 
                                                 
38 As an aide-mémoire, we incorporate IAT nomenclature here in referring to the IRAP label stimuli as 
‘concept’ label stimuli, and to the IRAP target stimuli as ‘attribute’ target stimuli. Note however, that 
these terms do not generalize to all IRAPs. Rather, there are no a priori constraints upon the stimuli that 
can be used together as label, target and response designator stimuli within a given IRAP’s trials (i.e. 
including even characteristic pictures, sounds or textures), other than the fact that these stimuli must 
together convey an unambiguous collective meaning for the participant on each trial. 
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Figure 4.2. The pro- versus anti-smoking relational response options offered by each of the four IRAP 
trial-types. Arrows with superimposed text boxes indicate which response options were deemed pro-
smoking versus anti-smoking; boxes and arrows did not appear on screen. One concept label stimulus 
(‘Smoking makes Me Feel’ versus ‘The Smoking-Ban makes Me Feel’), a mood-based attribute target 
stimulus (the ‘positive’ versus ‘negative’ moods listed in Table 4.3), and both response designators (True 
versus False) appeared simultaneously on each trial. The left-right locations of the True and False 
response designators varied randomly from trial to trial with the constraint that they did not appear in the 
same locations across more than two successive trials. 
 
How the IRAP cultivated fast and accurate responses to its trials. A core feature 
of the IRAP was that it tasked participants with respectively providing only pro- versus 
anti-smoking responses on alternate blocks of trials; and with as much speed and 
accuracy as practicable. In line with previous research, we established via pilot testing 
that 3000ms was the fastest median response latency that the bulk of the current 
population could realistically maintain at a response accuracy of 80% across any given 
block of trials (i.e. with the particular stimulus composition and instruction 
contingencies employed by the current IRAP; cf. Vahey et al., 2010). For example, 
given that the IRAP randomly swapped the left-right onscreen positioning of the “True” 
versus “False” response designators from trial to trial (i.e. unlike the IAT’s response 
options which remained static within each block of trials these randomly switching 
options counterbalanced for the likely confounding effects of right versus left hand 
dominance in fast responding), participants were instructed on each trial to select ‘d’ for 
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the response designator presented on the bottom left of screen and to select ‘k’ for the 
response designator presented on the bottom right of screen (see Figure 4.1, noting that 
the ‘d’ and the ‘k’ keys are respectively on the middle left and middle right sides of a 
QWERTY keyboard). Thereafter, selecting the pro-smoking response option during a 
pro-smoking IRAP trial, or the anti-smoking option during an anti-smoking IRAP trial, 
cleared the screen for 400 ms before the next trial was presented; if the anti-smoking 
option was chosen during a pro-smoking trial, or the pro-smoking option during a anti-
smoking trial, a red ‘X’ appeared on screen underneath the target word until the 
participant emitted the alternative, correct response. In addition, at the end of each block 
of trials, the IRAP issued summary feedback and instructions about the accuracy and 
speed of the participant’s responding during the block of trials just completed.  
Crucially, participants were not allowed to progress to the IRAP test trials until 
they completed a given pair of pro- versus anti-smoking practise blocks with respective 
median response latencies of less than 3000ms and with respective average accuracies 
equal to or greater than 80%. In line with previous findings, the researcher took 
particular care during IRAP practise trials to coach participants in achieving and 
maintaining these response criteria (i.e. in addition to the automated instructions and 
feedback contingencies issued by the IRAP; see Vahey et al., 2009; 2010). In particular, 
the researcher instructed participants before each pro-smoking practise block to 
“Respond as if smoking makes you feel good, and the Irish Smoking-ban makes you 
feel bad”, and before each anti-smoking practise block to “Respond as if smoking 
makes you feel bad, and the Irish Smoking-ban makes you feel good”. Upon 
successfully completing the IRAP practise phase, participants were then instructed to 
strive for ever quicker responding so long as it did not undermine their response 
accuracy from trial-to-trial.  
A summary of IRAP trial block sequencing. The complete IRAP comprised of 
between one and four successive pairs of pro-smoking versus anti-smoking blocks of 
practise trials (i.e. depending upon how quickly participants achieved the 
aforementioned response latency and accuracy criteria), which were always followed by 
exactly three successive pairs of pro-smoking versus anti-smoking blocks of test trials. 
Crucially, as is standard, only the IRAP test trials were used for measurement purposes. 
In any case, each IRAP trial block comprised of 24 trials (i.e. one trial for each of the 
six versions of each IRAP trial-type; see Table 4.3), presented in quasi-random order 
such that the same IRAP trial-type was not repeated across two successive trials. In 
addition, like with the IAT, we counterbalanced the order in which successive 
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participants received pro- versus anti-smoking trial blocks from their first pair of 
practise blocks onwards to the end of the IRAP test phase (i.e. the trial block order 
variable mentioned above). Otherwise, the pro- versus anti-smoking-first IRAP 
conditions were identical to each other. 
Measures of Explicit Evaluating 
Feeling Thermometers 
We used separate feeling thermometers, derived from those used in earlier IAT 
research (Swanson et al., 2001), to measure participants’ global explicit evaluating of 
both smoking and the Irish Smoking-ban. These feeling thermometers were essentially 
vertical visual analogue scales graduated in 10 point increments from 0 to 99, with zero 
points labelled “Extremely Cold (Unfavourable)”, midpoints at 50 labelled “Neutral”, 
and their apexes at 99 labelled “Extremely Warm (Favourable)”. Participants were 
asked to use their initial “gut” responses to complete the two statements using the 
thermometer scale: either “Smoking Makes Me Feel” or “The Smoking-Ban Makes Me 
Feel”, respectively. Having done so, they were then asked to further clarify their answer 
in the following way: “Having placed an X on the thermometer please specify exactly 
which number it represents on the 0-99 scale.”  
Semantic Differentials 
We also used six semantic differential scales ranging from -3 to + 3 to address 
the question “How does Smoking make you feel?” with one scale for each of the 
attribute stimulus pairs listed in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 for the IAT and IRAP, respectively; 
and a further six scales for the question, “How does The Smoking Ban make you feel?” 
using the same six attribute stimulus pairs. In other words, the semantic differentials 
were specifically designed to measure explicit evaluating that corresponded to the 
implicit evaluating measured by the current IRAP (and perhaps the current IAT). In 
order to discourage inattentive responding, we sometimes labelled positive mood 
attributes with +3 and negative mood attributes with -3 and at other times labelled them 
vice versa. 
Procedure 
To minimize floor or ceiling effects in smoking-related cravings, the researcher 
individually reminded participants (via text-messaging) to smoke as usual up until an 
hour before taking part in the study before then abstaining fully until completion (see 
Field et al., 2009; Schuh & Stitzer, 1995). Before participating each smoker was 
required by the researcher to confirm that they had smoked as normal up until an hour 
beforehand and fully abstained thereafter. Importantly, these precautions appear to have 
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been successful insofar as the smokers in the IRAP and IAT groups both reported 
moderate tobacco cravings at completion (i.e. mean tobacco craving for the IAT and 
IRAP smoking groups were respectively -.2 and +0.6, with SDs of 1.8 and 1.9).  
Following completion of the IAT versus the IRAP (i.e. depending upon 
experimental assignment), all participants completed the four measures of explicit 
evaluating. Then, all participants completed the state and trait questionnaires measuring 
smoking compulsion intensity. Apart from initially receiving instructions and/or 
coaching during IRAP practise trials from the researcher, each participant completed 
these research tasks alone in a sound-proofed experimental cubicle. Then, lastly the 
researcher interviewed all participants using the DBHQ in an open-ended fashion to reveal 
any unanticipated details with relevance to the current known-groups sampling agenda. 
Ethical Considerations 
 The present research, as in Studies 2, 3 and 4 to follow, was approved by the 
Research Ethics Committee at Maynooth University. Each participant provided 
informed consent on their own behalf based explicitly on the idea that their participation 
was on an anonymous basis; and on the idea that they could voluntarily withdraw their 
participation from the study at any point in time and without explanation. 
4.3. RESULTS 
4.3.1. An Overview of the Current Statistical Analyses 
First, having performed various data preparation procedures, we began with a 
series of standard known-groups comparisons and in so doing showcased a new 
approach to IRAP data analysis. Crucially, this new approach of analyzing each IRAP’s 
trial-type effects by crossing the IRAP concept-type and target-type variables with each 
other provided the first means of systematically estimating the extent to which an 
IRAP’s four trial-type effects operated independently of each other with respect to any 
given experimental variable such as smoking-status. By contrast, IRAP research to date 
has typically combined IRAP trial-type scores with little if any stated empirical or a 
priori rationale for doing so (e.g. see Hussey, Thompson, McEnteggart, Barnes-Holmes, 
& Barnes-Holmes, 2015, pp. 160-162). And as such, the current approach to analysing 
the independence of trial-type effects offered the IRAP literature a more objective, 
systematic and indeed precise means of determining whether or not it is functionally 
appropriate to combine IRAP trial-type scores in one’s analysis or not 
Second, we widened the known-groups analysis to compare each implicit 
measure’s sensitivity and specificity with respect to smoking-status. As part of this 
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analysis we introduced the first direct means of quantifying the full range of trade-offs 
between the sensitivity (i.e. true positive rate) versus specificity (i.e. true negative rate) 
of any diagnostic technique. And in so doing, we revealed evidence of the inherently 
confounded nature of IAT (but not IRAP) scores.  
Third, we juxtaposed how well each implicit measure correlated with five core 
tobacco addiction criteria: years smoking (YS), tobacco cravings (TC), and three 
measures of trait tobacco addiction intensity (i.e., CPD, mFTQ and HONC). Fourth, we 
introduced the first causal model of smoking-related IAT/IRAP scores to test the extent 
to which they might strengthen over time (YS) as a casual function of trait tobacco 
addiction intensity. We offered this novel analysis to illustrate how an IRAP, but not an 
equivalent IAT, is capable of distinguishing what types of implicit evaluating might be 
causally involved in tobacco addiction from those which are unlikely to be. Fifth, we 
used stigmatized versus non-stigmatized aspects of smoking-related explicit evaluating 
to highlight how an IRAP, but not an IAT, can reveal which types of (pro-smoking) 
evaluating are masked in corresponding measures of explicit evaluating.  
Sixth, we compared the internal reliabilities yielded by both implicit measures. 
A core goal here was to highlight how varying patterns of internal reliability among 
IRAP trial-types could itself measure properties of implicit evaluating that were not 
only inaccessible to an IAT, but which had not previously been calibrated within the 
IRAP literature. As part of this analysis, we highlight for the first time why it is deeply 
misrepresentative to directly compare the internal reliability of DIATs to trial-type DIRAPs 
without accounting for the number of trials comprising each measure, and also the 
precision with which they target specific types of implicit evaluating.  
Lastly, we based all subsequent analyses in the current thesis upon effect size 
statistics in recognition of the fact that prominent journals such as Psychological 
Science have effectively banned null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) in favour 
of an emphasis upon the replicability of effect size statistics (Eich, 2014; see also 
Trafimow & Marks, 2015). Given that the particular IAT and IRAP used here had not 
previously been used in the literature we decided to adopt the relatively conservative 
approach of disregarding effect sizes that would conventionally be considered small 
according to Cohen’s (1988) widely-used effect size standards (e.g. ds < .35; rs < .20; 
Cramer’s Vs < .10, .07, .06 for dfs = 1, 2, 3; p
2s < .04). Crucially, while awaiting 
calibration within a given domain,39 Cohen’s (1988, pp. 25, 284-287) standards offer a 
                                                 
39 As Cohen (1988, p. 25) himself cautioned such effect size standards are somewhat arbitrary until 
calibrated via empirical research within a given domain.  
98 
 
consistent preliminary basis upon which to compare research findings (i.e. unlike p 
values which fluctuate not just as a function of the effects in question but also as an 
irrelevant function of sample size). Thus, even though not strictly necessary, we 
included p values in the current analyses only to accommodate the vast majority of 
psychological researchers who are still practicing NHST. We hope that by providing p 
values in the context of an analysis driven by effect size standards it will better illustrate 
for any NHST-practitioner how an effect size analysis operates in practical terms (i.e. by 
repeatedly exemplifying where the two analytic frameworks agree versus disagree). 
4.3.2. Screening the IRAP dataset for Accuracy and Speed 
Based on pilot testing, we decided to exclude a participant’s entire IRAP test 
data whenever it did not adhere to a minimum average response accuracy of 80% and a 
maximum average response latency of 3000ms. In all, two smokers and one non-smoker 
had their IRAP data excluded on this basis yielding 22 smokers and 22 non-smokers 
with eligible IRAP data (i.e. out of the 49 participants assigned to the IRAP condition). 
4.3.3. The IAT and IRAP Scoring Algorithms 
Participants naturally exhibit differing response speed variability due to a range 
of extraneous individual differences such as in age, cognitive ability, motor skills, or 
previous experience with the IAT (see Back, Schmukle, Egloff, & Gutenberg, 2005; 
Cai, Sriram, Greenwald, & McFarland, 2004; Greenwald et al., 2007; Mierke & Klauer, 
2003; Nosek, Bar-Anan, Sriram & Greenwald, 2012). We sought to control for such 
contaminating effects using so-called D-algorithms. In basic terms, these D-algorithms 
served to statistically standardize pro- versus anti-smoking latency difference scores, 
whether applied to IAT or IRAP data. The original method, called the ‘improved 
scoring algorithm’, was developed for the IAT by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003; 
p. 213), and due to its effectiveness this scoring algorithm has become customary within 
the IAT literature (for review of the algorithm’s development see Nosek, Greenwald, & 
Banaji, 2007, pp. 272-273). The D-algorithm we applied to the IRAP data here is a 
direct adaptation of Greenwald et al.’s algorithm. Indeed, it uses exactly the same 
statistical rationale as the DIAT-algorithm and it has likewise proven similarly effective 
at taking account of confounding variables related to cognitive ability (O’Toole & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2009; Vahey et al., 2009, 2010). However, whereas the D-algorithm 
yielded one score called a DIAT when applied to the IAT, the version adapted for the 
IRAP yielded four so-called trial-type DIRAP scores. For brevity’s sake, the DIAT-
algorithm is detailed in Appendix 3, and the DIRAP-algorithm in Appendix 4 (and for 
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details of the overall accuracy and latency characteristics underlying the DIAT versus 
trial-type DIRAP scores obtained here see Appendix 5). 
4.3.4. Validity with Respect to Smoking-status 
Known-Groups Differences 
The IAT 
A preliminary 2x2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) crossing smoking-status with 
trial block order on the DIAT score yielded a main effect for smoking status, F(1, 39) = 
9.67, p = .004, p
2 = .20, and also a main effect for trial block order such that those in 
the pro-smoking-first condition exhibited DIATs that were more pro-smoking/anti-ban 
and/or less anti-smoking/pro-ban, p = .21; p
2 = .04 (i.e. r ≈ .20). However, there was no 
interaction effect on DIAT between smoking-status and block order, p = .78; p
2 = .002. 
The IRAP 
The IRAP data were entered into a preliminary 2x2x2x2 mixed-repeated 
measures ANOVA, which crossed smoking-status (i.e. smokers versus non-smokers) 
and trial block order (i.e. pro-smoking-first versus anti-smoking-first) with the two 
repeated measures IRAP ‘trial-type’ variables, Concept Label (“Smoking makes Me 
Feel” versus “The Smoking Ban makes Me Feel”) and Attribute Stimulus Class 
(“Positive Moods” versus “Negative Moods”; see Appendix 6 for a detailed rationale 
justifying the incorporation of these nested IRAP variables). Four main effects were 
obtained (ps  .05, p
2s  .09), but critically these were qualified by a large three-way 
interaction effect between smoking-status, concept label and attribute class, F(1, 40) = 
12.21, p = .001, p
2 = .23. In broad terms, this indicates that all four trial-type DIRAP 
scores functioned differently from each other in comparing smokers versus non-
smokers. Crucially, this three-way interaction was not qualified by a four-way 
interaction with trial block order (p = .71, p
2 = .001), thus allowing us to interpret its 
constituent simple effects without reference to the trial block order variable. 
Nonetheless, there was a two-way interaction between smoking-status and trial block 
order, F(1, 40) = 3.10, p = .09, p
2 = .07. We focus first upon the interaction between 
smoking status and the two trial-type variables given that trial block order moderated 
smoking-status DIRAP comparisons similarly across both trial-type variables. 
The three-way trial-type DIRAP interaction among smoking-status, concept label 
and attribute stimulus class. The three-way interaction is illustrated in Figure 4.3. In 
brief, the smokers showed two large pro-smoking effects, one moderately pro-smoking 
effect, and one moderately pro-smoking-ban effect. In contrast, the non-smokers 
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showed only one non-zero IRAP effect and this was a large effect in the pro-smoking-
ban direction. A series of follow-up tests were used to explore the nature of the 
interaction. 
A mixed 2x2 ANOVA on the two smoking-related trial-type DIRAPs yielded a 
large interaction between smoking-status and attribute stimulus class, F(1, 42) = 8.55, p 
= .006, p
2 = .17. Two follow-up independent measures t-tests confirmed that the 
smokers exhibited Smoking-Pos DIRAPs that were more pro-smoking than the non-
smokers, t(42) = 3.92, one-tailed p = .0001, 2 = .27, but the groups did not differ in 
their Smoking-Neg DIRAPs, t(42) = .39, p = .34, 
2 = .004. Two paired-samples t-tests 
confirmed that the smokers were more pro-smoking on the Smoking-Pos DIRAP than on 
the Smoking-Neg DIRAP, t(21) = 3.71, p = .001, 
2 = .40, but that the non-smokers did 
not differ in this regard, t(21) = -.66 , p = .52, 2 = .02. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Mean trial-type DIRAP scores, with standard error bars, for smokers versus non-smokers. The 
labels on the bar chart’s horizontal axis show the attribute stimulus class variable (positive versus 
negative moods) nesting within the concept variable (the smoking label versus the smoking-ban label). A 
positive DIRAP score for the ‘Smoking-Pos’ trial-type indicated faster True rather than False responses to 
label-target combinations like Smoking makes Me Feel – Relaxed. Similarly, positive Smoking-Neg DIRAPs 
indicated faster False rather than True responses to label-target combinations like Smoking makes Me 
Feel – Tense. Likewise, positive Ban-Pos DIRAPs or Ban-Neg DIRAPs indicated faster anti-smoking-ban 
responses than pro-smoking-ban responses. By corollary, negative trial-type DIRAPs indicated the opposite 
to their positive counterparts, and those in the neighbourhood of zero (e.g. -.1 < DIRAP < .1) indicated that 
pro- versus anti-smoking(-ban) responses were produced with comparable fluency to each other. 
 
A second 2x2 ANOVA on the smoking-ban trial-type DIRAPs revealed large main 
effects for both smoking-status, F(1, 42) = 9.05, p = .004, p
2 = .18, and attribute 
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stimulus class, F(1, 42) = 30.77, p < .0001, p
2 = .42; the interaction was moderately 
sized, F(1, 42) = 3.21, p = .08, 2 = .07. All four follow-up t-tests were at least 
moderately-sized and in the expected directions, 1.61 ≤ t(42)s ≤ 6.07, one-tailed ps ≤ 
.057, .06 ≤ 2s ≤ .64,. 
Eight one-sample t-tests confirmed that the smokers’ Smoking-Pos DIRAPs and 
Ban-Neg DIRAPs were both very largely pro-smoking/anti-smoking-ban, t(21)s  4.66, 
one-tailed ps < .0001, 2s  .51; their Smoking-Neg DIRAPs were moderately pro-
smoking, t(21) = 1.31, one-tailed p = .10, 2 = .08; and their Ban-Pos DIRAPs were 
moderately pro-smoking-ban, t(21) = 1.35, one-tailed p = .10, 2 = .08 (see Figure 4.3). 
In contrast, the non-smokers’ Ban-Pos DIRAPs were strongly pro-smoking-ban, t(21) = -
4.15, one-tailed p = .0001, 2 = .45, but their three remaining trial-type DIRAPs did not 
differ from zero, t(21)s ≤ .51, one-tailed ps ≥ .31, 2s ≤ .01. 
The two-way interaction between smoking-status and trial block order. As 
illustrated in Figure 4.4, the order in which the smokers completed the IRAP blocks 
appeared to have little overall impact on their trial-type DIRAPs. In contrast, trial block 
order had a large overall impact on non-smokers’ IRAP responses: those who began the 
IRAP with an anti-smoking block exhibited a strong anti-smoking bias across the four 
trial-type DIRAPs, but those who began with a pro-smoking block exhibited a weak pro-
smoking bias overall.  
Four follow-up between-groups ANOVAs were used to explore the nature of the 
interaction. The first pair of ANOVAs indicated that overall, the smokers were a large 
degree more pro-smoking than the non-smokers in the anti-smoking-first IRAP 
sequence, F(1, 90) = 19.90, p < .0001, 2 = .20, but only to a small-to-moderate degree 
in the pro-smoking-first IRAP sequence, F(1, 90) = 3.25, p = .07, 2 = .04. As per 
Figure 4.4, this discrepancy was almost entirely due to the impact of trial block order 
upon the non-smokers’ trial-type DIRAPs (i.e. rather than the smokers’ trial-type DIRAPs). 
And indeed, the second pair of ANOVAs confirmed this showing that there was no 
overall difference between the two block orders for the smokers, F(1, 86) = .56, p = .46, 
2 = .01), but a moderate difference for the non-smokers, F(1, 86) = 9.43, p = .003, 2 = 
.10. Moreover, whereas the smokers implicitly evaluated in a similarly large pro-
smoking manner overall in both block order conditions, ts = 4.55, ps < .0001, 2s = .65, 
the non-smokers implicitly evaluated in opposite directions depending upon block 
order. Namely the non-smokers implicitly evaluated in a largely pro-smoking manner in 
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the pro-smoking-first condition, t(10) = 1.86, p = .09, 2 = .26, but in a largely anti-
smoking manner in the anti-smoking-first condition, t(10) = -2.24 , p = .05, 2 = .33. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. The interaction effect, with standard error bars, between smoking-status and trial block order 
across the four mean trial-type DIRAPs aggregated as one overall DIRAP score. Thus, positive overall DIRAPs 
indicate typically faster responding on the pro-smoking/anti-smoking-ban relative to the corresponding 
anti-smoking/pro-smoking-ban response classes among the four trial-types; negative overall DIRAPs 
indicate the opposite response pattern; and, finally, an overall DIRAP in the neighbourhood of zero (e.g. -.1 
< DIRAP < .1) indicates that on average participants provided pro- versus anti-smoking(-ban) responses 
with similar fluency.  
 
Known-Groups Sensitivity and Specificity: DIAT versus the trial-type DIRAPs 
The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC; Fawcett, 2006; IBM Corp., 2012, 
pp. 839-844; Rice & Harris, 2005) was used with the Area Under the Curve (AUC) 
statistic to compare the DIAT versus the various trial-type DIRAPs in terms of their 
specificity and sensitivity in classifying participants as smokers versus non-smokers 
(see Appendix 7 for a more detailed technical explanation of ROC and AUC). 
The Sensitivity and Specificity of the DIAT for Diagnosing Smoking-status 
The DIAT smoking-status ROC curve achieved a moderately sized smoking-status 
AUC = 0.74, p < .01, d = .63, r ≈ .30 (see Figure 4.5).40 This means that if a smoker and 
a non-smoker were chosen at random from the present sample, then 74% of the time the 
smoker would have a higher DIAT than the non-smoker (i.e. as compared to 50% of the 
time by chance). In addition, in Figure 4.6 we improvised the first direct means of 
analysing the full range of trade-offs between the sensitivity versus specificity of any 
diagnostic technique, the sensitivity versus specificity plot. This plot revealed that the 
DIAT cut-off which achieved the highest combined smoking-status sensitivity and 
                                                 
40 Cohen’s d calculated using Lowry’s (2012) software implementation of Hanley and McNeil’s (1982) Z-
test algorithm for comparing the significance of the difference between the areas under two independent 
ROC curves. 
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specificity within the current sample was DIAT = .13; it correctly classified smokers 68% 
of the time (i.e. sensitivity) and non-smokers 81% of the time (i.e. specificity).  
 
 
Figure 4.5. The DIAT smoking-status ROC curve with a shaded AUC = .74, p < .01. The dashed diagonal 
line corresponds to the ROC curve of measures that merely discriminate smoking-status by chance (i.e. 
AUCs = .5, ps = 1.0). The plateau in DIAT sensitivity in the middle of the ROC curve indicates that the 
trade-off between sensitivity versus specificity was not uniform throughout the observed range of DIATs 
(i.e. -.89 < DIAT < +.97). 
 
Travelling across the neighbourhood of zero in Figure 4.6 from the optimal cut-
off at DIAT = .13, to DIAT = -.23, the observed DIATs plateau in sensitivity while 
simultaneously plummeting in specificity from .81 to .47 (i.e. the plateau is also evident 
in Figure 4.5 between false positive rates .2-.5 approximately). This means that the non-
smokers’ DIATs were distributed continuously across the neighbourhood of DIAT = 0, but 
that the smokers scored on either side of the region of DIAT = 0 but not within it. In 
effect, smokers responded in a polarized, bimodal fashion to the IAT such that they 
tended to either strongly favour pro-smoking/anti-smoking-ban IAT trials over anti-
smoking/pro-smoking-ban IAT trials, or vice versa (see Appendix 8 for detailed 
statistical analyses which corroborate the dramatic nature of this discontinuity in 
smokers’ DIATs).  
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Figure 4.6. The sensitivity versus specificity plot of DIAT with respect to identifying smokers at each of its 
ROC curve coordinates. With lower values of DIAT these cut-offs come to include a higher proportion of 
the smoker sample’s DIATs (i.e. with sensitivity indicating the exact proportion); but conversely, the 
higher the value of these cut-offs the higher the proportion they will include of the non-smoker sample’s 
DIATs (i.e. with specificity indicating the exact proportion). The intersection between the dashed vertical 
line and the two dashed horizontal lines, at DIAT = .13, represents the point at which DIAT has maximal 
combined sensitivity and specificity for identifying smokers from the present sample.  
 
The Sensitivity and Specificity of the trial-type DIRAPs for Diagnosing Smoking-status 
The smoking trial-type DIRAPs. The Smoking-Pos DIRAP was diagnostic of 
smoking-status to a moderate-to-large degree with an AUC = 0.79, p < .001, d = .78, r ≈ 
.36. In contrast, the Smoking-Neg DIRAP was not diagnostic of smoking-status, AUC = 
.52, p = .79, d = .05, r ≈ .02 (see Figure 4.7). The Smoking-Pos DIRAP achieved its 
optimal combined sensitivity and specificity for identifying smokers at a threshold of 
Smoking-Pos DIRAP = .196; it correctly classified 91% of smokers and 62% of non-
smokers in the current sample (for relevant plots see Appendix 9). The regular shape of 
the Smoking-Pos DIRAP ROC curve indicates that unlike the DIAT the trade-off between 
its smoking-status sensitivity versus specificity was approximately uniform throughout 
the range of Smoking-Pos DIRAPs obtained (i.e. -.86 < Smoking-Pos DIRAP < +1.13).  
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Figure 4.7. The smoking-status ROC curves for the two ‘smoking’ trial-type DIRAPs: Smoking-Pos DIRAP, 
AUC = .79, p < .001; Smoking-Neg DIRAP, AUC = .52, p = .79. Note that the ROC curve for Smoking-Neg 
DIRAP was in close correspondence with the dashed diagonal line representing chance levels of smoking-
status diagnosis (i.e. a ROC curve with an AUC = .5). The uniformly graduated shape of the Smoking-Pos 
DIRAP ROC curve indicates that unlike the DIAT the trade-off between its smoking-status sensitivity versus 
specificity was approximately uniform throughout the range of Smoking-Pos DIRAPs obtained (i.e. -.86 < 
Smoking-Pos DIRAP < +1.13). 
 
 
The smoking-ban trial-type DIRAPs. Ban-Neg DIRAP had a moderately sized 
smoking-status AUC = .75, p = .006, d = .65, r ≈ .30, but Ban-Pos DIRAP was not 
diagnostic of smoking-status, AUC = 0.63, p = .14, d = .32, r ≈ .16 (see Figure 4.8). 
Ban-Neg DIRAP achieved its optimal combined smoking-status sensitivity and specificity 
at Ban-Neg DIRAP = .11 whereupon it correctly classified 77% of smokers and 62% of 
non-smokers in the current sample (for relevant plots see Appendix 9). Again, the 
uniformly graduated shape of the Ban-Neg DIRAP ROC curve indicated that unlike the 
DIAT the trade-off between sensitivity versus specificity for smoking-status was 
approximately uniform throughout the range of Ban-Neg DIRAPs obtained (i.e. -.68 < 
Ban-Neg DIRAP < +1.28). Otherwise, Z-tests indicated that the AUC for DIAT was nearly 
identical to the AUCs for both Smoking-Pos DIRAP and Ban-Neg DIRAP, |Zs| = .09, .49; ps 
= .92, .63; ds = .03, .15; rs ≈ .01, .07.  
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Figure 4.8. The smoking-status ROC curves of the smoking-ban trial-type DIRAPs: Ban-Pos DIRAP, AUC = 
.63, p = .14; Ban-Neg DIRAP, AUC = .75, p = .006. The uniformly graduated shape of the Ban-Neg DIRAP 
ROC curve indicates that unlike the DIAT its trade-off between sensitivity versus specificity for smoking-
status was approximately uniform throughout the range of Ban-Neg DIRAPs obtained (i.e. -.68 < Ban-Neg 
DIRAP < +1.28). 
 
4.3.5. Validity in Relation to Five Tobacco Addiction Criteria:  
DIAT versus the trial-type DIRAPs  
Preliminary Correlation Analyses 
The five tobacco addiction criteria all correlated with each other to a remarkably 
high degree in both the IAT group and the IRAP group (see Table 4.4; i.e. IAT group, 
.41 < rs < .94; all ps < .0001; IRAP group, .68 < rs < .91; all ps < .0001).41 In addition, 
DIAT correlated to a moderate degree with all five of these tobacco dependence criteria, 
.22 ≤ rs ≤ .40 (i.e. even if only the correlation with CPD was significant at a Bonferroni 
corrected alpha of p  .01; see Table 4.4). And indeed, Smoking-Pos DIRAP appeared to 
correlate even more strongly than DIAT in terms of its correlations with all five tobacco 
addiction criteria listed in Table 4.4, .36  rs  .55, ps  .01 (all five correlations were 
significant at the appropriate Bonferroni-corrected α = .01). Likewise, Ban-Neg DIRAP 
tended to exhibit large correlations with the three criteria addressing trait tobacco 
                                                 
41 Confirming that the IAT group versus IRAP group were well matched, a family of correlation Z-tests 
did not indicate any consistent between-group difference across the 10 correlations among YS, CPD, 
mFTQ, HONC and current tobacco cravings (.94 < |Zs| < 1.34, .18 < ps < .35, rs < .20). 
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addiction intensity, .39  rs  .47, .0008  one-tailed ps  .005 (i.e. CPD, mFTQ and 
HONC); even if it only correlated moderately with years smoking (YS), r = .33, and 
with TC, r = .27. Ban-Pos DIRAP did not correlate with YS, r = .16, or HONC, r = .18, 
but did correlate to a moderate degree with CPD, mFTQ and TC, .28 ≤ rs ≤ .39. In 
contrast, Smoking-Neg DIRAP did not correlate with any of the five tobacco addiction 
criteria, rs ≤ .14. 
 
Table 4.4 
A correlation matrix for the IAT group data, and another for the IRAP group data, with each 
incorporating the same five tobacco addiction criteria: Years Smoking (YS), CPD, mFTQ, HONC and 
tobacco cravings. 
 
 
 
The Four Trial-type DIRAPs & 
The Five Tobacco Addiction Criteria 
 
 YS CPD mFTQ HONC Tobacco Cravings 
IAT Group (n = 43) 
     
 DIAT .22 .40** .30* .31* .30* 
 YS -- .77**** .69**** .71**** .41** 
 CPD  -- .94**** .85**** .77**** 
 mFTQ   -- .84**** .65**** 
 HONC    -- .66**** 
IRAP Group (n = 44)      
 
Smoking-Pos DIRAP .54**** .50*** .50*** .55**** .36** 
 Smoking-Neg DIRAP .08 .08 -.11 .01 .14 
 
Ban-Pos DIRAP .16 .28*
 .30* .18 .39** 
 Ban-Neg DIRAP .33* .43*** .47*** .39** .27* 
 
YS -- .72**** .66**** .83**** .71**** 
 
CPD  -- .91**** .82**** .81**** 
 
mFTQ   -- .88**** .72**** 
 
HONC    -- .72**** 
#
p  .1, *p  .05, **p  .01, *** p   .001, **** p  .0001 (all ps one-tailed). Note. All ps are uncorrected, 
but note Bonferroni corrected p < .01 should be applied to each quintuple of correlations between the 
various Ds and the five tobacco dependence criteria because each constitutes a different domain of 
variability (Howell, 2012a). 
 
Models of DIAT and the trial-type DIRAPs in terms of the Tobacco Addiction Criteria 
We used the Hayes (2012) ‘PROCESS’ software for bootstrapped casual path 
analysis to compare the extent to which these implicit measures might have co-
developed with CPD, mFTQ or HONC across YS. That is, CPD, mFTQ and HONC 
were modelled separately as candidate mediators between YS and the various Ds.42 
                                                 
42 CPD, mFTQ and HONC were tested separately as candidate mediators between YS and each of the Ds 
because of the high degree of collinearity and conceptual reciprocity among them (i.e. both here and in 
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Crucially, we did this in order to model the extent to which DIATs, versus the four trial-
type DIRAPs, might each be casually involved in tobacco addiction.   
Modelling DIAT 
We found that that both CPD and mFTQ were dominant mediators between YS 
and DIAT, 
2s = .34, .20, ps  .05; as was HONC to a lesser extent, 2s = .13, p < .05 (i.e. 
i.e. 2 = .34 means that path ab was 34% of the maximum mediation effect possible 
given the observed patterns of variation between YS and DIAT; for relevant model tables 
and path diagrams see Appendix 10). However, given that YS accounted for only 5% of 
the variance in DIAT, R
2 = .05, p = .17, this implies that CPD mediated a null 1.7% of 
DIAT at most; mFTQ at most 0.6%; and HONC at most 0.2% (i.e. obtained by 
multiplying R2 = .05 by the corresponding 2 in each case).43 In contrast, even if HONC 
only explained a null 2.8% of DIAT when controlling for YS, mFTQ and CPD 
respectively explained 10% and 15% of DIAT when controlling for YS, Fs = 4.35, 7.08, 
ps = .04, .01. This implies that 15% and 10% of DIAT respectively resulted from, rather 
than in, CPD and mFTQ; but that only a null 2.8% appeared to result from HONC.44 
Modelling the trial-type DIRAPs 
The relationship between YS and Smoking-Pos DIRAP appeared to be dominantly 
mediated by all three tobacco addiction intensity traits (i.e. 2s = .22, .17, .30; ps  .05; 
for CPD, mFTQ and HONC; see Appendix 10). Moreover, the relationship between YS 
and Smoking-Pos DIRAP was large, F(1, 41) = 10.23, R
2 = .20. Thus, for example, 
approximately (2 =) 30% of the 20% shared variance between YS and Smoking-Pos 
DIRAP could, in principle, have developed in tandem with HONC; which approximately 
amounts to a moderate 6% of Smoking-Pos DIRAP overall (or an r ≈ .25). And likewise, a 
moderate-to-small 4.4% and 3.4% of Smoking-Pos DIRAP (or rs ≈ .21, .18) could in 
principle have developed in tandem with CPD and mFTQ, respectively. Our analysis 
                                                                                                                                               
the literature they constitute indeterminately overlapping aspects of the trait intensity of smoking 
compulsions; see DiFranza, Ursprung, & Biller, 2012; O’Loughlin et al., 2002, p. 359; Wellman et al., 
2006). 
43 According to Preacher and Kelley (2011, pp. 107-108) 2 should be judged according to the same size 
conventions as Cohen’s (1988) standards for coefficients of determination. They recently introduced the 
2 statistic as the first effect-size statistic capable of characterizing the size of indirect (e.g. mediation) 
effects in a generally interpretable manner (i.e. a standardized, bounded, efficient and unbiased estimator 
of effect size). Specifically, 2 quantifies the size of the observed indirect effect as a proportion of its 
maximum size possible with the observed profile of shared variances among the various modelled 
variables involved. 
44 In principle, the additional variance in Enjoy-Pos DIRAP respectively explained by the three criteria in 
addition to YS may have reflected some recent causal influence of implicit evaluating upon tobacco 
addiction (i.e. within the previous year). However, our participants were specifically sampled for stable 
patterns of smoking during the preceding year, and therefore it seems likely that the majority of the 
relevant partial correlations instead reflected the causal influence of tobacco addiction (as per CPD, 
mFTQ or HONC) upon DIAT.  
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also indicated that CPD, mFTQ and HONC all accounted for Smoking-Pos DIRAP even 
while controlling for YS, respective R2-changes = .09, .05, .10, F(1, 41)s = 5.30, 2.91, 
6.08, ps = .03, .10, .02. We therefore estimated that up to 9%, 5% and 10% of Smoking-
Pos DIRAP respectively resulted from, rather than in, CPD, mFTQ and HONC. 
Smoking-Neg DIRAP did not correlate with YS, CPD, mFTQ or HONC. We 
therefore deemed it pointless to model Smoking-Neg DIRAP with respect to any of these 
four aspects of tobacco addiction. Similarly, Ban-Pos DIRAP did not qualify for 
meditational analysis on the grounds that it did not correlate with YS or HONC, rs = 
.16, .18. Granted, Ban-Pos DIRAP did correlate with both CPD and mFTQ, rs = .28, .30. 
However, given that YS did not account for any variance in Ban-Pos DIRAP in addition 
to CPD or mFTQ, R2-changes = -.05, .002, F(1, 41)s = .01, .10, ps = .91, .76, it ruled 
out either CPD or mFTQ as mediators between YS and Ban-Pos DIRAP (i.e. otherwise, 
CPD or mFTQ may have acted as suppressor mediators between YS and Ban-Pos DIRAP 
such that higher YS scores would yield lower Ban-Pos DIRAPs while controlling for CPD 
or mFTQ). In contrast, mFTQ explained approximately 6% of Ban-Pos DIRAP when 
controlling for YS, R2-change =.06, F(1, 41) = 3.01, ps =.09; even if CPD and HONC 
did not appear to influence Ban-Pos DIRAP independently of YS, R
2-changes = .02,.03, 
Fs = .70, .21, ps = .41,.65. Overall, therefore, we estimated that up to 6% of Ban-Pos 
DIRAP respectively resulted from, rather than in, mFTQ; but that it was unrelated either 
way to CPD or HONC. 
The relationship between YS and Ban-Neg DIRAP appeared to be dominantly 
mediated by CPD, mFTQ and HONC, respectively, 2s = .19, .19, .19 (for relevant 
model tables and path diagrams see Appendix 10). However, given that the relationship 
between YS and Ban-Neg DIRAP was only moderate to begin with, F(1, 42) = 5.23, R
2 = 
.11, p = .03, therefore only a null 2% of Ban-Neg DIRAP could have developed in tandem 
with CPD, mFTQ or HONC across YS (i.e. r = .14). In contrast, 5-8% of Ban-Neg DIRAP 
was respectively explained by each of the three smoking-compulsion intensity traits 
while controlling for YS, R2-changes = .08, .07, .05, F(1, 41)s = 3.92, 3.52, 2.34, ps = 
.05, .07, .13. Therefore, we estimated that up to 8%, 7% and 5% of Ban-Neg DIRAP 
respectively resulted from, rather than in, CPD, mFTQ and HONC. 
4.3.6. Validity with Respect to Explicit Evaluations: DIAT versus trial-type DIRAPs  
All four explicit measures were rescored so that the polarity of their scores 
concurred with those of the various DIRAPs (i.e. positive  pro-smoking, and negative  
anti-smoking), and so that zero ratings purported to be neutral. The resulting smoking 
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and smoking-ban related semantic differentials both had extremely high internal 
reliability with Cronbach alphas of  = .96 and  = .94, respectively.  
 
Table 4.5 
The means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of the two semantic differential scores, and the two feeling 
thermometer scores, for the IAT group versus the IRAP group split by smoking-status. 
  
  Semantic Differentials Feeling Thermometers 
  Smoking Smoking-Ban Smoking Smoking-Ban 
IAT Group     
 Smoker M = 1.43, SD = 1.11 
M = -.32, 
SD = 1.26 
M = 11.05, 
SD = 27.07 
M = -15.59, 
SD = 27.31 
 Non-smoker M = -1.97, 
SD = .86 
M = -2.5, 
SD = .85 
M = -39.23, 
SD = 14.53 
M = -44.96, 
SD = 10.65 
IRAP Group     
 Smoker M = 1.21, 
SD = 1.19 
M = -.47, 
SD = 1.40 
M = 24.77, 
SD = 16.98 
M = -7.59, 
SD = 28.08 
 Non-smoker M = -1.51, 
SD = .99 
M = -1.90, 
SD = 1.10 
M = -32.33, 
SD = 19.34 
M = -35.48, 
SD = 18.27 
Note. Thermometer scores ranged from -50 to +50, and semantic differential scores ranged from -3 to +3. 
Positive scores are pro-smoking, negative scores are anti-smoking, and neutral scores purport neutrality 
with respect to smoking and/or the smoking-ban.  
 
 
Table 4.6 
Correlations of DIAT and the trial-type DIRAPs each with the four explicit evaluation scores.   
  Semantic Differentials Feeling Thermometers 
  Smoking Smoking-Ban Smoking Smoking-Ban 
IAT Group     
 DIAT .43** .34** .42** .26* 
IRAP Group     
 Smoking-Pos DIRAP .43** .54**** .41** .44*** 
 Smoking-Neg DIRAP .24
#
 .14 .09 .23
#
 
 Ban-Pos DIRAP .24
#
 .21
#
 .24
#
 .23
#
 
 Ban-Neg DIRAP .30* .27* .24
#
 .07 
#
 p  .10, * p  .05, ** p  .01, *** p   .001, **** p  .0001, with all ps one-tailed. 
 
Overall, as detailed by Table 4.5, smokers explicitly evaluated smoking as 
moderately favourable, t(43)s  5.08, one-tailed ps  .0001, 2  .38, and to a lesser 
extent also explicitly evaluated the Irish smoking-ban as moderately favourable, t(43)s  
-1.99, one-tailed ps  .03, 2  .04.45 In contrast, the non-smokers explicitly evaluated 
both smoking very unfavourably, t(42)s  -12.11, one-tailed ps  .0001, 2  .78, and 
the Smoking-ban very favourably, t(42)s  -14.24, one-tailed ps  .0001, 2  .83.46 As 
                                                 
45 Note that here we interpreted the degree of (dis)favour in relation to the respective Likert-type scales 
rather than in relation to the size of the relevant statistical effect. 
46 Note, as detailed in Table 5, that the IAT group matched the IRAP group closely on all four varieties of 
explicit evaluating scores, |t(85)s|  1.60, ps  .11, 2s ≤ .03; even when split according to smoking-status, 
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per Table 4.6, DIAT correlated strongly with explicit evaluating of smoking, and perhaps 
somewhat less so with ban-related explicit evaluating. In contrast, Smoking-Pos DIRAP 
correlated strongly with both explicit evaluating of smoking and of the Smoking-ban, 
but the remaining three trial-type DIRAPs did so only to a moderate-to-small degree if at 
all.47 
4.3.7. Validity in Relation to Internal Reliability: DIAT versus the trial-type DIRAPs 
The Spearman-Brown corrected split-half correlations (rsb) for each group’s IAT 
effect was computed by correlating the DIATs produced by odd versus even IAT data 
trials. Similarly the rsb for a given trial-type DIRAP was computed by correlating the D 
scores produced by odd versus even data trials from that IRAP trial-type. Whereas DIAT 
rsb was impressively high regardless of smoking-status, rsbs  .80, one-tailed ps < .0001, 
in contrast the internal consistency of trial-type DIRAPs varied dramatically with both 
smoking-status and trial-type (see Table 4.7).  
 
Table 4.7 
Spearman-Brown split-half reliabilities (rsb) for smokers’ versus non-smokers’ various Ds. ‘Compensated 
DIRAP rsbs’ approximated what rsbs the various DIRAPs would have if, with all else equal, they were 
comprised of the same number of trials as a DIAT (see Appendix 11 for relevant algorithm).  
 
 DIRAP 
rsb 
Z-test  of         
DIRAP rsb 
with 
Compensated 
DIRAP rsb 
Z-test  of  
Compensated  
DIRAP rsb with 
Smokers     
  DIAT rsb  
(= .93****)a  
DIAT rsb  
(= .93****)a 
 
Smoking-Pos DIRAP
 b .68**** Z = 2.52**                             .90**** Z = .57                              
Smoking-Neg DIRAP
 a .03 Z = 5.02****                              .06 Z = 4.93****                              
Ban-Pos DIRAP 
c .08 Z = 4.73****                                   .26 Z = 4.17**** 
Ban-Neg DIRAP
 c
 .01 Z = 4.94****                              .05 Z = 4.82**** 
     
Non-Smokers     
 
 
DIAT rsb  
(= .80****)
b
 
 
DIAT rsb  
(= .80****)
b
 
 
Smoking-Pos DIRAP
 c .67**** Z = .85                             .89**** Z = -.96                             
Smoking-Neg DIRAP
b
 .63*** Z = 1.07                              .87**** Z = -.70                              
Ban-Pos DIRAP
 c .69**** Z = .74                                   .90**** Z = -1.11                                    
Ban-Neg DIRAP
 c
 .10 Z = 2.95**                              .32
#
 Z = 2.27* 
a n = 22; 
b n = 21; c n = 20. 
#
 p  .10, * p  .05; ** p  .01; *** p  .001; **** p  .0001; all ps for rsb one-
tailed but all ps two-tailed for correlation Z-tests.  
 
And yet, of the four group trial-type DIRAPs which exhibited good internal 
consistency only the smokers’ Smoking-Pos DIRAPs and the non-smokers’ Smoking-Neg 
                                                                                                                                               
|ts|  2.09, ps  .04, 2s ≤ .05 (i.e. noting that a Bonferroni-type correction should apply to these effect-
sizes). 
47 On balance, we interpreted the few, sporadic null correlations between the trial-type DIRAPs and the 
explicit evaluating measures as being instances of type II family-wise error. 
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DIRAPs had lower internal reliabilities than DIAT, respectively, ps = .01, .28; Zs = 2.52, 
1.07; rs ≈ .55, .23. Moreover, when we compensated trial-type DIRAP internal reliability 
for the four times as many trials which comprised the current DIATs all such differences 
disappeared (e.g. mean compensated internally consistent trial-type DIRAP rsb = .89 
versus mean DIAT rsb = .87; for details of the compensation algorithm see Appendix 11). 
And reassuringly, the compensation algorithm did not spuriously grant internal 
consistency to any trial-type DIRAPs that had not been internally consistent to begin with. 
4.4. DISCUSSION 
The current IAT design succeeded in providing an uncommonly high-quality 
benchmark against which to compare the criterion validity of any smoking-related 
IRAP. It outperformed its predecessors in terms of correlating with all of the cross-
sectional tobacco addiction criteria that we employed. Moreover, in all cases, the size of 
the relevant criterion correlations were either unprecedented, or else at the upper end of 
those previously achieved in the domain. It is therefore impressive, that the smoking-
related IRAP we used performed consistently better in terms of the known-groups co-
variations it achieved with all relevant tobacco addiction criteria. Indeed, as we will 
now review, the IRAP added something crucial to our analysis that was lacking from 
the IAT data; namely, the ability to measure different types of implicit evaluating 
individually. 
Testing Implicit Measures for Relationships with Tobacco Addiction Criteria 
Known-groups Contrasts of Implicit Evaluating 
Whereas the IAT yielded only one known-groups smoking-status difference that 
did not specify what particular types of implicit evaluating were involved, the IRAP 
yielded four known-groups smoking-status effects which did. Indeed, collectively, the 
four IRAP trial-type effects were differentially impacted by smoking-status specifically 
in line with known-groups predictions about the particular types of implicit evaluating 
each effect measured. Namely, the IRAP confirmed that smokers were implicitly much 
more pro-smoking than non-smokers when addressing smokers’ usual reasons for 
smoking as per Smoking-Pos DIRAP; or when addressing the nicotine withdrawal 
symptoms that smokers typically experience due to smoking-bans as per Ban-Neg 
DIRAP. By contrast, when the IRAP addressed positive feelings toward the Irish 
Smoking-ban as per Ban-Pos DIRAP, the smokers were only moderately less pro-ban 
than the non-smokers (i.e. in line with Irish smokers’ immediate and near universal 
adherence to the Irish Smoking-ban despite the aforementioned inconveniences it posed 
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for them; see Clancy, 2007; Fahy et al., 2012; Lonergan, 2013). And indeed, when the 
IRAP addressed the current smokers’ characteristically ambivalent misgivings toward 
smoking as per Smoking-Neg DIRAP, there was no smoking-status effect at all. 
Accordingly, the Smoking-Pos DIRAP and Ban-Neg DIRAP both diagnosed smoking-status 
with similar sensitivity and specificity as DIAT, but neither Smoking-Neg DIRAP nor Ban-
Pos DIRAP was diagnostic of smoking-status. At the very least, the IRAP thus 
highlighted the need not only to measure implicit evaluating of different attitude-objects 
separately, but also to measure positively-framed smoking-related implicit evaluating 
separately from corresponding negatively-framed implicit evaluating. 
Known-groups Conflicts between Implicit versus Explicit Smoking-related Evaluating 
The IRAP detected one known-groups conflict and seven known-groups 
agreements between corresponding types of implicit and explicit evaluating. Most 
notably, smokers’ pro-ban explicit evaluations were at odds with their strongly anti-ban 
Ban-Neg DIRAP effects (i.e. as per widespread social pressure for pro-ban explicit 
evaluating; see Introduction section). Indeed, this was despite the fact that the smokers 
evaluated smoking favourably on both explicit measures of smoking, and also on both 
Smoking-trial-type DIRAPs. In contrast, as expected, the non-smokers exhibited no 
evaluative conflicts between the four trial-type DIRAPs and corresponding measures of 
explicit evaluating. Crucially, the IAT was unable to detect any such conflicts or 
agreements because it could not distinguish particular types of implicit evaluating.  
Known-groups Correlations with Tobacco Addiction Criteria 
Even though DIAT correlated moderately with all five continuous tobacco 
addiction criteria we measured (i.e. YS, CPD, mFTQ, HONC and TC) these correlations 
did not provide any information about the types of implicit evaluating involved. In 
contrast, the four trial-type DIRAPs yielded a differential pattern of correlations with 
these five criteria that comported well with a priori known-groups expectations about 
the particular types of implicit evaluating each IRAP effect measured. For instance, 
Smoking-Pos DIRAP correlated to a large degree with all five tobacco addiction criteria – 
and this supported the literature’s foundational assumption that the more addicted a 
person is the more they will implicitly affirm that smoking is emotionally satisfying 
(e.g. Tibboel et al., 2011). In contrast, the Smoking-Neg DIRAP did not correlate with any 
of the five criteria – and there was no a priori basis for predicting that it should have. To 
the contrary, our known-groups sampling specified that it was irrelevant to the current 
smokers’ ongoing smoking behaviour for them to focus upon whether or not smoking 
makes them feel bad (i.e. insofar as none of them had planned to restrict their smoking 
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during the previous 12 months). Indeed, from this point of view, the current smokers 
were unlikely to have frequently engaged in relating the perceived benefits and 
drawbacks of smoking directly to each other – and confirming this, Smoking-Pos DIRAP 
and Smoking-Neg DIRAP did not correlate among the smokers. 
Although there was no basis for predicting that the current smokers’ implicit 
evaluating of the Smoking-ban might influence their level of tobacco addiction (e.g. the 
ban had yet to impact smoking-cessation rates within the Irish population; see 
Lonergan, 2013, p. 14), there were clear a priori reasons for predicting the converse. In 
particular, the heavier a smoker is the more likely they are to be frustrated on an 
ongoing basis by any smoking-ban (see Bancroft, Wiltshire, Parry, & Amos, 2003). 
Confirming this, stronger anti-ban bias for Ban-Neg DIRAP correlated at a moderate-to-
large degree with all three criteria addressing aspects of tobacco consumption, namely 
CPD, mFTQ and TC. Likewise, the smaller the smokers’ pro-ban bias on the Ban-Pos 
DIRAP the more it predicted increased tobacco consumption, but to a lesser degree than 
their anti-ban bias on Ban-Neg DIRAP. The key point here is that in the former trial-type 
coordinated the Smoking-ban with positive attributes whereas the latter trial-type 
coordinated it with negative attributes. Insofar as the smokers will have experienced 
negative rather than positive reactions to the ban (e.g., when prevented from smoking 
while in a state of deprivation) the Ban-Neg trial-type should thus correlate more 
strongly with actual smoking behaviour than the Ban-Pos trial-type. In addition, YS and 
HONC are both related, albeit indirectly, to how often a Smoking-ban might frustrate a 
smokers’ opportunity to smoke. Thus, likewise, it makes sense that Ban-Neg DIRAP 
correlated with YS and HONC, but that Ban-Pos DIRAP did not. Granted these latter 
interpretations are somewhat speculative. However, at the very least, even when IRAP 
findings are unanticipated like this they may still be useful insofar as they highlight 
precisely which types of implicit evaluating do versus do not merit further investigation 
in relation to tobacco addiction – something that the IAT is incapable of. 
Testing the Potential of Implicit Measures to Reveal Tobacco Addiction 
Processes 
On the Development of Tobacco Addiction via Implicit Evaluating 
All standard measures of tobacco addiction are based upon rational, 
questionnaire-based self-reports and so they are fundamentally limited in their ability to 
disentangle the irrational nature of tobacco addiction (see for example Wiers, Houben, 
Roefs, de Jong, Hofmann, & Stacy, 2010). By contrast, implicit measures are 
specifically designed to measure automatic evaluating, which is presumably the basis 
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for irrational conditions like tobacco addiction. We have already argued that implicit 
evaluating is causally involved in driving the responses that individuals provide on self-
report measures of the intensity of tobacco addiction. To test this basic idea we 
modelled the extent to which the current IAT and IRAP effects were involved in driving 
self-reported measures of addiction intensity (i.e. CPD, a standard self-report measure 
of smoking consumption; mFTQ, a standard measure of the physiological aspects of 
tobacco dependence; and finally, HONC, a standard measure of the psychological 
aspects tobacco addiction). We reasoned that the more a particular type of implicit 
evaluating (e.g. Smoking-Pos DIRAP) is involved in driving such intensity, the stronger 
that implicit effect should be as YS increases.  
Consistent with the foregoing rationale, we used mediational analyses to rule out 
the possibility that DIAT functioned in this way (i.e. presumably because it could not 
target particular types of implicit evaluating in isolation). By contrast, mediational 
analyses of the IRAP data confirmed multiple known-groups predictions about which 
types of implicit evaluating might (versus not) be involved in addiction intensity. 
Specifically, the only IRAP trial-type to have its relationship with YS mediated by 
CPD, mFTQ or HONC was the one which addressed smokers’ stereotypical reasons for 
smoking, namely, Smoking-Pos. Of course, the current findings do not allow us to 
precisely determine to what extent the Smoking-Pos effect was involved in causing 
CPD, mFTQ or HONC – that would require showing that experimental manipulations 
of Smoking-Pos effect bring about consequent changes in these three intensity measures. 
The most important point here is that the IRAP, but not the IAT, provides the means to 
both guide and pursue the required experimental research. 
On the Development of Implicit Evaluating via Tobacco Addiction 
Given that one cannot be addicted to a behaviour that has not yet become 
“habitual”, implicit evaluating is relatively unlikely to drive the initial development of 
that habit. As the behaviour becomes established, however, implicit evaluating likely 
strengthens (via repeated evaluating of that behaviour), and may thus feedback to drive 
the relevant behaviour on other occasions. It is therefore important to distinguish 
between the extent to which implicit evaluating is integral to existing tobacco addiction 
(i.e. drives the intensity), or emerges as a collateral result of it (i.e. without necessarily 
feeding back into that intensity). For example, imagine a smoker who repeatedly 
evaluates smoking as being enjoyable in response to his or her relief from nicotine 
withdrawal. When pro-smoking evaluating initially arises in this way, it is unlikely to 
influence any further smoking in that immediate context because the smoker has already 
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relieved themselves of their cravings. However, the more often this occurs, the more 
likely it will be that the relevant smoker implicitly evaluates smoking favourably even 
before they relieve their cravings by smoking. Crucially, if the smoker later attempts to 
quit smoking they may thus implicitly evaluate smoking positively in proportion to how 
much they are experiencing tobacco cravings – in which case, the relevant implicit 
evaluating is integral in tobacco addiction to some extent, while also continuing to arise 
collaterally in other contexts (e.g., when smoking reduces a craving). 
As noted previously, only the Smoking-Pos (DIRAP) trial-type’s relationship to 
YS was mediated by measures of addiction intensity (i.e., CPD, mFTQ and/or HONC). 
As such, this trial-type effect appears to be integral, rather than solely collateral, to 
tobacco addiction. Insofar as the DIAT’s relationship to YS was not mediated by intensity 
it could be argued that the relationship was largely collateral. Given that one of the key 
aims of the current research programme was to develop an implicit measure of the 
“driving processes” of tobacco addiction, rather than its secondary effects the IRAP, or 
more precisely the Smoking-Pos effect appears to have outperformed the IAT in this 
regard. 
Exploring the Involvement of Implicit Evaluating in Explicit Evaluating 
The current DIAT correlated with all four explicit measures of smoking-related 
evaluating, but could not reveal what types of implicit evaluating were involved. In 
contrast, the four trial-types structure of the IRAP provided more information. In 
summary, Smoking-Pos DIRAP correlated strongly with both explicit evaluating of 
smoking and of the Smoking-ban, but the remaining three IRAP trial-type effects did 
not correlate strongly in this regard. This suggests that both smoking- and ban-related 
explicit evaluating were most influenced by the positive implicit evaluating of smoking. 
Notably, such findings raise the possibility of identifying what types of implicit 
evaluating are particularly likely to interfere with (or strengthen) a smoker’s ongoing 
explicit evaluating about whether to continue smoking or not. 
On Re-casting Old Psychometric Problems as New Types of Measurement 
In line with classic psychometric practice, the implicit cognition literature has 
traditionally viewed implicit measures that exhibit trial block order effects, or low 
internal reliability, as a sign that they lack validity due to extraneous influences (e.g. 
Teige-Mocigemba, Klauer, & Sherman, 2010; Levin, Hayes, & Waltz, 2010). We argue 
to the contrary here that both variables can in principle provide us with new insights 
into tobacco addiction provided that they are applied to scores like those from IRAP 
trial-types which experimentally control what topic participants are implicitly 
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responding in terms of in each case. Crucially, to the best of our knowledge, no other 
measure of implicit evaluating is specifically designed to experimentally compare 
implicit responding for versus against a topic phrased specifically as a propostion (see 
Chapters 1-3). And therefore, unlike other implicit measures, as follows each IRAP 
trial-type score is interpretable in terms of the participant implicitly evaluating some 
specific topic regardless of whether it has reduced internal consistency and regardless of 
whether trial block order cues variation in its absolute size. In principle, therefore, 
unlike other implicit measures, each IRAP trial-type score is interpretable in terms of a 
given participant implicitly evaluating some specific topic – and crucially, as follows, 
even when background variable(s) like trial block order or smoking-status affect the 
absolute size and/or internal consistency of that IRAP trial-type score it is still 
interpretable as an evaluative response bias toward a particular topic.  
Trial-type DIRAP Internal Reliability as a Measure of Implicit Indecisiveness 
The internal reliability of a trial-type DIRAP is, by definition, a measure of how 
consistently participants implicitly evaluate with respect to that trial-type’s topic. 
Therefore, conversely, the lower the internal reliability of a trial-type effect the more it 
indicates that the corresponding implicit evaluating is inconsistent in the relevant 
context. We would argue that the lack of such trial-type DIRAP internal reliability could 
be interpreted as a measure of implicit indecisiveness – that is, the extent to which 
implicit evaluating of a given topic fluctuates automatically between opposing 
perspectives on that particular topic within a given context. This could be important 
because conflicted evaluating is at the heart of what defines the problem of (tobacco) 
addiction. Consider, for example, when a smoker is trying to quit smoking and perhaps 
cycles between evaluating smoking as undesirable in one moment, and as compellingly 
desirable in the next. 
Confirming the foregoing rationale, the current smokers exhibited good internal 
reliability on the only trial-type to address the perceived benefits of smoking, Smoking-
Pos DIRAP; but no internal consistency on the remaining trial-types – all of which 
addressed topics relevant to anti-smoking arguments, about which smokers are 
characteristically conflicted. Likewise, the non-smokers exhibited good internal 
reliability on all trial-type DIRAPs except Ban-Neg DIRAP – the only trial-type to address a 
relatively conflicted topic for non-smokers. That is, despite the fact that Irish non-
smokers overwhelmingly supported the Irish Smoking-ban, they often complained 
about its implications (e.g. social gatherings commonly gravitating to makeshift outdoor 
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smoking areas that were cold and wet; see Currie & Clancy, 2011, pp. 16-17; Lonergan, 
2013, pp. 18-19).  
Interestingly, the DIAT exhibited exemplary, and sometimes higher internal 
reliabilities than the four IRAP trial-type effects, but crucially the IAT effect was unable 
to provide any information about the so-called implicit indecisiveness implicit 
evaluating with regard to any particular topic. Furthermore, when we compensated the 
internal reliability of the IRAP trial-type effects for the fourfold greater number of trials 
comprising the current IAT (see Appendix 11), the latter no longer outperformed the 
internal reliability of any of the IRAP trial-type effects that addressed a topic about 
which participants were likely to be unambivalent. And reassuringly, the relevant 
compensation algorithm did not spuriously grant internal reliability to any of the D-
IRAP trial-types that did not already possess it.  
IRAP Trial Block Order Effects as a Measure of Perspective-switching Tendencies 
The trial block order variable determined whether participants commenced the 
current IRAP (or IAT) with a pro-smoking/anti-ban block of trials versus an anti-
smoking/pro-ban block of trials. The current IRAP specifically involved instructing 
participants (during practise) to respond with one overarching pro-smoking response 
rule for the blocks of trials with pro-smoking response contingencies; and with the 
opposite overarching response rule for the blocks of trials with anti-smoking response 
contingencies (see Method). Thus, by the time participants completed the first IRAP 
trial block, they had already spent 24 trials adopting whatever pro- or anti-smoking 
perspective the response rule for that block required. And moreover, when it came to 
formulating how to respond to the second block, the IRAP explicitly informed 
participants that the previous response rule would be reversed during the next block: 
IMPORTANT: DURING THE NEXT PHASE THE PREVIOUSLY CORRECT 
AND WRONG ANSWERS ARE REVERSED. THIS IS PART OF THE 
EXPERIMENT. PLEASE TRY TO MAKE AS FEW ERRORS AS POSSIBLE. 
 
As participants proceeded to each subsequent pair of IRAP blocks all that was required 
of them was to repeat the foregoing sequence. In effect, the IRAP trial block order 
variable could be seen as an experimental manipulation of whether participants were 
instructed to respond from an overarching pro-smoking perspective or from an 
overarching anti-smoking perspective (for a related point of view regarding the IAT, see 
Klauer & Mierke, 2005; Nosek et al., 2005).  
Crucially, however, the foregoing instructions manipulated by IRAP trial block 
order did not ensure that participants coded their pro- and anti-smoking IRAP responses 
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in terms of any particular rule. For example, smokers are characteristically pre-inclined 
to evaluate smoking from pro- but not anti-smoking perspectives. Therefore, even when 
an anti-smoking-first IRAP instructs a smoker to adopt an anti-smoking perspective, in 
principle, they are more likely on each trial, at least initially, to adopt a pro-smoking 
perspective than an anti-smoking perspective. Moreover, when participants are 
responding as fast as they can it minimizes any possibility of participants strategically 
adopting secondary perspectives. And as such, smokers are relatively unlikely to 
respond even to the anti-smoking blocks of an anti-smoking-first IRAP from an anti-
smoking perspective. Instead, smokers are pre-inclined to make the required anti-
smoking responses in opposition to whatever pro-smoking evaluative perspective they 
would normally adopt, at least initially (e.g. using a response rule like ‘in anti-smoking 
trials respond with the opposite response that I would normally give’). By contrast, non-
smokers do not frequently evaluate smoking from either pro- or anti-smoking 
perspectives, it is less likely that they might have any pre-inclinations that would 
compete with adherence to either type of IRAP trial block order instructions. In other 
words, there was nothing preventing the current non-smokers from adopting pro- and 
anti-smoking perspectives throughout the pro- and anti-smoking first IRAP conditions, 
respectively. In fact, the current non-smokers were young adults, and as such, they were 
characteristically similarly (un)accustomed to switching between the pro- and anti-
smoking perspectives dealt with by the current trial-types depending upon context (see 
Chassin et al., 2007; Clancy, 2007; Dal Cin et al., 2007; Fahy et al., 2012; Fitz, 
Kaufman, & Moore, 2015; Pfizer Ireland, 2009).  
Overall, therefore, with all else being equal, block order effects should only 
emerge on a given trial-type effect to the extent that participants have a similar amount 
of experience being cued to adopt each of the two opposing evaluative response 
perspectives it targeted in a given context (e.g. True versus False with respect to 
‘Smoking makes me feel Relaxed’). And by extension, when participants are 
characteristically pre-inclined like smokers to adopt pro- over anti-smoking evaluative 
perspectives in most contexts, it follows that they will be less prepared to respond in 
line with any block order instructions contradicting those pre-inclinations. Crucially, in 
this way, the IRAP block order variable has the potential to measure an individual’s 
automatic tendency in any given context to sustainably switch between opposing 
implicit evaluating perspectives when instructed or otherwise cued to do so. Indeed, 
confirming this rationale, there was a moderate interaction effect between block order 
and smoking-status, whereby the non-smokers but not the smokers exhibited an overall 
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block order effect. In particular, it appeared as though the smokers were relatively 
disinclined to sustain switches from pro- to anti-smoking perspectives (i.e. recall that all 
four of the smokers’ IRAP effects were mainly in the pro-smoking direction and did not 
differ across the block order variable). In contrast, the trial-type effects for the non-
smokers did show some sensitivity to the block order variable, suggesting a tendency to 
adopt either anti- or pro-smoking perspectives in a sustained manner.  
However, no such information was available from the IAT block order variable 
owing the IAT’s inability to distinguish particular types of implicit evaluating. Rather, 
both smokers and non-smokers alike exhibited moderate block order effects on DIAT 
such that those in the pro-smoking-first condition were more pro-smoking/anti-ban than 
those who completed the IAT in the anti-smoking-first condition. In other words, IAT 
block order did not interact with any of the above known-groups differences, much less 
identify them. As such, whereas IRAPs have the potential (pending further research) to 
measure an individual’s automatic tendency to sustainably switching between opposing 
(pro- versus anti-smoking) implicit evaluating perspectives within a given context, the 
IAT certainly does not. Crucially, tobacco addiction might broadly be characterised as a 
pervasive inability to sustain anti-smoking (implicit) evaluating as opposed to pro-
smoking (implicit) evaluating. And therefore, in having the potential to measure an 
individual’s tendency for such things, the IRAP might be better equipped than the IAT, 
in yet another way, to facilitate more differentiated understandings of tobacco addiction.  
On the Confounded Nature of DIAT with respect to Implicit Evaluating 
All four of the smokers’ trial-type IRAP effects were continuously and normally 
distributed, and consistent with very precise known-groups block order predictions – 
thus supporting the idea that they measured only one type of implicit evaluating each. 
However, in contrast, the smokers’ DIATs were distributed in a polarized, bimodal 
fashion around zero such that they tended either to favour pro-smoking/anti-smoking-
ban IAT trials over anti-smoking/pro-smoking-ban IAT trials, or vice versa. As such, 
the IAT confounded not just qualitatively different types of implicit evaluating among 
participants, but contrasting types; and moreover it did so even among smokers who 
were specifically sampled for pro-smoking evaluating as opposed to anti-smoking 
evaluating (i.e. frequent smokers who had not contemplated quitting within the previous 
30 days). In addition, the current pattern of DIAT block order effects suggested that the 
IAT not only confounded implicit evaluating among smokers (i.e. as per the bi-modal 
distribution of their DIATs), but also among contexts as follows. 
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Specifically, it is interesting that both the smokers and non-smokers showed 
block order effects on the IAT. One might expect such an effect for the non-smokers 
given that their implicit evaluating of smoking would be relatively weak and thus 
malleable by minor procedural variables. However, insofar as smokers’ possess 
relatively established implicit evaluating of smoking it seems unlikely that smokers’ 
evaluating should be similarly malleable by IAT block order. Therefore, the fact that we 
observed a similarly sized IAT block order effect for the smokers as for the non-
smokers suggests that the smokers’ DIATs were measuring different types of implicit 
evaluating in the pro- versus anti-smoking-first conditions. Moreover, this was not the 
case for the four IRAP trial-type effects – which suggests again that participants’ 
implicit evaluating was homogenous on each IRAP trial-type between block orders.  
Overall, therefore, it appears as though the IRAP trial-type effects each 
measured implicit evaluating that was relatively homogeneous both from participant to 
participant, and from pro- to anti-smoking contexts (i.e. insofar as the pro- and anti-
smoking-first conditions were pro- and anti-smoking contexts, respectively). And in 
contrast, the current IAT effects appeared to have been comprised not just of different 
post hoc rationalisations of smoking from smoker to smoker (i.e. as per the bimodal 
distribution of smokers’ DIATs), but it also appeared as though the smokers’ IAT effects 
were comprised of arbitrarily different mixes of implicit evaluating from context to 
context (i.e. as per the similarly sized IAT block order effects for both smokers and non-
smokers). Certainly, this interpretation tallies well with the fact that smoking-related 
IAT effects have typically failed to exhibit good test-retest reliability (see Chapter 2).  
Granted, DIAT internal reliability was high for both smokers and non-smokers. 
However, all this indicated was that participants tended to persist throughout a given 
IAT session with whatever particular response strategy or approach they initially 
adopted for completing the relevant IAT at the beginning of that session. It says nothing 
about the extent to which different participants might respectively respond using various 
different approaches to the same IAT within a given situation (see for example the 
quadruple process model; Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005); 
or indeed about the extent to which each participant might adopt various different 
approaches to completing a given IAT from occasion to occasion (e.g. as when the IAT 
exhibits low test-retest reliability). In summary, therefore, the bottom line is that even if 
we had found that the current IAT effects were at least somewhat integral to tobacco 
addiction, we would not have been able to identify what particular types of implicit 
evaluating were responsible like we did with the Smoking-Pos DIRAP.  
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Conclusions 
On balance, the current research convincingly demonstrated that the IRAP has 
greater potential than the IAT as a means of systematically guiding research toward a 
more differentiated understanding of tobacco addiction. Even though the IAT 
outperformed its predecessors, its counterpart IRAP provided much more information 
about smoking-related implicit evaluating. In all cases, the additional information 
resulted from the IRAP’s ability to measure different types of implicit evaluating 
individually. Moreover, this was the case even though the current IRAP was artificially 
restricted, by design, to measure only those aspects of smoking-related implicit 
evaluating that were most accessible in principle to an IAT. Therefore, in order to 
explore the IRAP’s full promise as a means of discovering the nature of tobacco 
addiction, the remainder of the current thesis addressed smoking-related implicit 
evaluating that is simply not discernible with an IAT. In particular, the next chapter will 
begin this exploration by pursuing a more precise understanding of smokers’ typical 
reasons for smoking, which was the topic addressed by the most valid trial-type IRAP 
effect from the present study, Smoking-Pos DIRAP. 
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CHAPTER 5: Testing the IRAP as a Means of Determining the Relative Motivational 
Importance of Smoking for Reward versus for Relief (Study 2) 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding empirical chapter was primarily about demonstrating that the 
IRAP is more effective than the IAT as a means of investigating tobacco addiction. A 
key part of this demonstration was establishing that the IRAP but not the IAT could 
distinguish what types of smoking-related implicit evaluating are integral to tobacco 
addiction. In particular, the IRAP revealed that implicit evaluating of stereotypical 
reasons against smoking (e.g. feelings about the Irish Smoking-ban, or the potential 
drawbacks of smoking) was not integral to tobacco addiction, but that implicit 
evaluating of stereotypical reasons for smoking was. Crucially, however, the IRAP used 
in Study 1 did not distinguish among different types of stereotypical reasons for 
smoking – rather it focused upon just one particular type of pro-smoking implicit 
evaluating, namely, addressing how much smoking makes one feel good. Therefore, in 
order to improve our understanding of which types of implicit evaluating are most 
integral to tobacco addiction, the current study sought to develop an IRAP that would 
distinguish among additional stereotypical reasons for smoking. 
There are of course many competing ways in which the literature implicates 
reasons for smoking in tobacco addiction (for reviews see Conklin et al., 2004; Köpetz 
et al., 2013; Piasecki et al., 2010; Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2003; West, 2001). And 
yet, crucially, the literature is united in pivoting around the core issue of how much 
(tobacco) addiction is governed by reward- and/or relief-focused evaluating. That is, 
addiction theorists usually describe (tobacco) addiction as being some sort of interplay 
between behaviour dominated by the pursuit of pleasing feelings such as increased 
confidence, and behaviour dominated by the pursuit of relief from displeasing feelings 
such as drug-withdrawal symptoms (see Baker, Piper, McCarthy, Majeskie, & Fiore, 
2004; Chassin et al., 2007; DiFranza et al., 2012; DiFranza, 2015; Everitt & Robbins, 
2005; Glautier, 2004; Hyman et al., 2006; Koob, & Le Moal, 2008; McCallion & 
Zvolensky, 2015). Granted, some prominent theorists have argued over the past 10-15 
years that reward- and relief-focused evaluative processes are merely secondary to 
(tobacco) addiction. Nevertheless, their so-called incentive-sensitization theories were 
generally formulated in a manner that attempts to clarify how reward- and relief–
focused evaluating each interacts with addiction (Everitt & Robbins, 2005, p. 1483; 
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Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2003, 2008). As such, by far the most unified way in which 
the literature distinguishes people’s stereotypical reasons for tobacco addiction is 
between the feelings of reward versus relief that they attribute to smoking. 
We therefore deemed it a major priority for the current study to employ an IRAP 
that could distinguish implicit evaluating of stereotypical reward- versus relief-focused 
reasons for smoking. In addition, most theories of tobacco addiction at least implicate 
mood as a primary moderator of pro-smoking (implicit) evaluating (Conklin et al., 
2004; Robinson & Berridge, 2003; Spada, Albery, & Moss, 2015). In particular, it is a 
generally well-established fact that negative moods are an important trigger for pro-
smoking evaluating (i.e. cravings) and thus also for relapse during abstinence from 
smoking (for meta-analysis see Heckman, Kovacs, Marquinez, Meltzer, Tsambarlis, 
Drobes, & Brandon, 2013; Perkins, 2009 see also Childs & De Wit, 2010; Conklin & 
Perkins, 2005; Germeroth, Wray, Gass, & Tiffany, 2013;  Hwang & Yun 2015; McKee, 
Sinha, Weinberger, Sofuoglu, Harrison, Lavery, & Wanzer, 2011; Parrott & Murphy, 
2012; Perkins, Ciccocioppo, Conklin, Milanak, Grottenthaler, & Sayette, 2008; Perkins, 
Karelitz, Giedgowd, & Conklin, 2013; Torres & O’Dell, 2015; Wetter, Kenford, Smith, 
Fiore, Jorenby, & Baker, 1999; Wray et al., 2013). Indeed, even though the evidence is 
less compelling, some researchers have claimed that positive emotions can trigger pro-
smoking evaluations and/or smoking (Cook, Spring, McChargue, & Hedeker, 2004; 
Heckman et al., 2013; Veilleux, Conrad, & Kassel, 2013). Moreover, there is extensive 
self-report evidence that smokers’ differentially apply reward versus relief evaluating to 
positive and negative moods, respectively, in order to regulate their emotions on an 
ongoing basis (see Bancroft et al., 2003; DiFranza, 2012, 2015; Koole, Webb, 
& Sheeran, 2015). Namely, smokers typically describe smoking as a discretionary way 
to enhance their enjoyment of positive moods regardless of their level of addiction; and 
in contrast, as they become more addicted they are characteristically more likely to 
describe themselves as needing to smoke in order to regulate their negative moods. In 
summary, there is extensive evidence that smokers explicitly evaluate smoking in 
highly mood-consistent reward- and relief-focused ways that are characteristic of 
tobacco addiction. 
Furthermore, many cognitive theories of addiction are based around the idea that 
complex evaluating, like the foregoing mood-specific types, can gradually become 
habitual and thus implicit over time by repetition (e.g. as in constructs such as schemas, 
implementation intentions, implicit outcome expectancies, motivational orientations; 
see Goldman, Del Boca, & Darkes, 1999; Goldman, Reich & Darkes, 2006; Hendricks 
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& Brandon, 2005, 2008; Koole et al., 2015; McKee et al., 2003; Palfai & Wood, 2001; 
Rooke et al., 2008; Stacy & Wiers, 2010, p. 559; Tiffany, 1990; Watson et al., 2012). 
Crucially, however, the addiction literature has not yet succeeded in measuring any such 
mood-specific types of implicit evaluating as distinct from each other. The main reason 
for this state of affairs is that most implicit measures have been specifically designed to 
measure simple rather than complex types of implicit evaluating. And moreover, of 
those few methods that were designed to measure more complex instances, none apart 
from the IRAP have been designed in such a way as to allow them to distinguish one 
type of implicit evaluating from another (see Chapter 3). We therefore set out to address 
this important research deficit by designing an IRAP to measure not just how much 
individuals implicitly affirm versus deny reward- and/or relief-focused reasons for 
smoking, but also how much they do so in the mood-regulating ways outlined in the 
previous paragraph.  
We began by coordinating our selection of IRAP label and target stimuli based 
upon extensive surveys of the vernacular ways in which smokers stereotypically phrase 
their reward- versus relief-focused reasons for smoking (see Bancroft et al., 2003; 
DiFranza 2012, 2015; McEwen et al., 2007; O’Connor et al., 2007; Pfizer Ireland, 
2009). This resulted in an IRAP that incorporated the concept labels “I ENJOY 
SMOKING when I’m” and “I NEED to SMOKE when I’m”, combined with six target 
words describing positive moods (e.g. Delighted) and six target words describing 
negative moods (e.g. Upset), and the response options “True” versus “False” (see 
Method). Thus, in summary, the first and second IRAP trial-types were designed to 
measure implicit evaluating of whether smoking is enjoyable when one is feeling good 
versus bad, respectively (i.e. for brevity we call these the Enjoy-Pos and Enjoy-Neg 
trial-types). And likewise, the third and fourth IRAP trial-types respectively measured 
implicit evaluating of whether smoking is needed when one is feeling good versus bad, 
respectively (i.e. for brevity we call these the Need-Pos and Need-Neg trial-types).  
In particular, we expected that committed daily smokers (versus non-smoking 
controls) would implicitly evaluate reward- versus relief-focused reasons for smoking in 
a highly mood-consistent fashion. That is, we expected that such smokers would 
implicitly evaluate smoking as being enjoyable during positive moods but not during 
negative moods; and to implicitly evaluate smoking as being needed during negative 
moods but not during positive moods. Moreover, out of all the stereotypical reasons 
smokers offer for their habit, evaluating a need to smoke for relief from negative affect 
is the literature’s most popularly cited reason for the gradual intensification of tobacco 
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addiction (i.e. as opposed to initiating smoking which is often viewed as being 
motivated by reward-focused evaluating; see Baker et al., 2004; Conklin et al., 2004; 
DiFranza, 2012, 2015). As such, we were particularly interested in testing whether the 
Need-Neg trial-type effect might be more integral to tobacco addiction than the reward-
focused Smoking-Pos effect reported in Study 1. Indeed, with similar concerns for 
discriminative validity in mind, we also sought to test whether the Need-Neg effect 
might be more integral to tobacco addiction than the other three trial-type effects 
measured by the current IRAP. 
5.2. METHOD 
Participants 
We implemented the same known-groups sampling strategy as in Study 1 of the 
current thesis, but more stringently. As before, all participants were randomly assigned 
without replacement between the two levels of the IRAP trial block order variable (see 
below). In all we recruited 37 undergraduate participants, excluding five for failure to 
progress to the IRAP’s test phase within four pairs of practise blocks (see below), and 
retaining 16 smokers (8 females) and 16 non-smokers (8 females). The qualifying non-
smokers had not smoked any substances during the previous 12 months or indeed on 
more than one occasion before that (i.e. as opposed to a maximum of 10 previous 
occasions in Study 1). 
By contrast, the smokers reported that they had not attempted, or even 
contemplated restricting their smoking during the previous 12 months as defined by the 
transtheoretical model of behavioural change (e.g. see Norcross, Krebs, & Prochaska, 
2011; i.e. as opposed to within the previous 30 days in Study 1). Indeed, 75% of the 
smokers had never attempted to quit smoking before, and the remainder had only ever 
attempted to quit once before. On average, the current smokers had: been smoking 
regularly for 4.6 years (SD = 1.6; range = 2-7); smoked on 99% of the previous 30 days; 
consumed 11.9 CPD on those days (SD = 4.6, range = 6-20); and, were moderately 
nicotine dependent both physiologically and psychologically as per respectively the 
mFTQ (M = 4.3; SD = 1.1; range = 3-7; see Prokhorov et al., 1996; Prokhorov et al., 
1998, p. 42) and the HONC (M = 3.3; SD = 2.4; range = 1-7; cf. Wellman, Di Franza, 
Pbert, et al., 2005; Wellman, Savageau, et al. 2006). Moreover, at the end of the current 
study the smokers reported moderate-to-large tobacco cravings (TC) on average (M = 
2.1; SD = .6; range = 1-3; see below for scaling), and 81% of them reported that they 
would ‘probably’ or ‘definitely’ smoke a cigarette upon leaving (i.e. only 19% reported 
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that they would ‘possibly’ do so, and none selected the remaining alternative 
‘definitively not’). Otherwise, the smokers (Mage = 21.7 years; SD = 1.1; range = 20-23) 
and non-smokers (Mage = 21.3 years; SD = 1.7; range = 19 - 24) were closely matched in 
terms of age, t(30) = .76; p = .46.  
Apparatus and Materials 
State and Trait Measures of Tobacco Addiction Intensity 
We used all of the measures of trait tobacco addiction intensity from Study 1; 
namely, CPD, mFTQ, the HONC. Also, as a measure of state tobacco addiction 
intensity, we used a slightly modified version of the TC scale from Study 1 (i.e. we 
renumbered it such that it now scaled from 0 to 6 instead of from -3 to +3. Moreover, 
we screened participants using a DBHQ based upon that from Study 1, but with many 
additional clarifications about sampling which emerged across participant interviewing 
in Study 1 (see Appendix 12). In addition, unlike Study 1, the current study employed 
Gifford’s (2002) Avoidance and Inflexibility Scale, a 13-item questionnaire designed to 
determine how inclined smokers’ are to adopt experientially-avoidant and inflexible 
strategies for managing tobacco cravings (see Appendix 13). A recent large-scale study 
of the AIS indicated that its total score could optionally be sub-divided into a 9-item 
“thoughts/feelings” factor (focused upon cravings experienced as thoughts and 
feelings), and a 4-item “somatic sensations” factor (focused upon cravings experienced 
as bodily sensations; see Farris, Zvolensky, DiBello, & Schmidt, 2015). Crucially, 
Farris et al. concluded that both AIS scales exhibited highly promising psychometric 
properties as measures of smoking-specific experiential avoidance (e.g. Cronbach’s αs 
≥ .89; test-retest rs = .52-.76). Confirming this, the current study obtained a Cronbach’s 
αs ≥ .95 on both the AIS total scale and its sub-scales whether the smokers were 
considered with the non-smokers or alone. 
An IRAP Measuring Implicit Evaluating of Mood-dependent Smoking 
We employed the same version of the IRAP program as in Study 1, but using 
different label and target stimuli. As before, participants were presented with the 
response options “True” and “False” on every IRAP trial but this time the concept label 
stimuli were “I ENJOY SMOKING when I’m” and “I NEED to SMOKE when I’m”, 
and the target stimuli used in Study 1 were modified for compatibility with these label 
stimuli (i.e. especially from a typical smokers’ perspective). Namely, the positive target 
words were: Relaxed, Happy, Delighted, Chilled-out, Satisfied, and Confident. And the 
negative target words were: Tense, Suffering, Upset, Anxious, Irritated, and 
Embarrassed. The researcher instructed participants before each mood-consistent 
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practise block to “Respond as if you enjoy smoking when you feel good, and as if you 
need smoking when you feel bad”, and before each mood-inconsistent practise block to 
“Respond as if you enjoy smoking when you feel bad, and as if you need smoking when 
you feel good.” Otherwise, the current IRAP was the same as that used in the Study 1. 
For half the participants all of the odd numbered IRAP blocks required a mood-
consistent pattern of responding and the even numbered blocks mood-inconsistent 
responding; for the remaining participants the opposite applied (odd numbered blocks 
required mood-inconsistent responding and even numbered blocks mood-consistent 
responding).  
Measures of Explicit Evaluating 
We employed four feeling thermometers, much like those used in Study 1, but 
which were designed to be respectively analogous to the current IRAP’s four trial-types. 
In each case, participants were asked to mark a thermometer visual analogue scale 
ranging from zero labelled “Extremely Cold (Disagree)” to ninety-nine labelled 
“Extremely Warm (Agree)”, in response to a statement summarizing one of the IRAP 
trial-types. The four statements in question were “I ENJOY SMOKING when I’m 
Feeling GOOD”, “I ENJOY SMOKING when I’m Feeling BAD”, “I NEED to SMOKE 
when I’m Feeling GOOD”, and “I NEED to SMOKE when I’m Feeling BAD”. In 
addition, we also employed four different types of semantic differential scales, also 
respectively addressing the four IRAP trial-types, but which individually incorporated 
each IRAP antonymic mood word pair. Thus, in all, we employed 12 semantic 
differential scales ranging from -3 to + 3. As in Study 1, we sometimes labelled positive 
mood attributes with +3 and negative mood attributes with -3, and at other times 
labelled them vice versa in order to discourage inattentive responding,  
Procedure 
Participants completed the IRAP, followed by the four measures of explicit 
evaluating, and then by the state and trait tobacco addiction questionnaires. Thereafter, 
the researcher interviewed participants using the DBHQ in an open-ended fashion to 
reveal any unanticipated details with relevance to the current known-groups sampling 
agenda. Apart from during the interview, and during the IRAP practise trials, the 
participants completed their tasks alone in a sound-proofed cubicle.  
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5.3. RESULTS 
5.3.1. Scoring the IRAP Data 
We scored the IRAP test data in exactly the same way as we did in Study 1 – 
using the DIRAP-algorithm described in Appendix 4, and such that participants were 
excluded from analysis if they responded slower than 3000ms, or less accurately than 
80%, on average to the IRAP test trials. All 32 participants who completed the IRAP 
test phase qualified by a comfortable margin for inclusion in the current analysis. 
Specifically, the smokers completed the mood-consistent and -inconsistent test blocks 
with average respective latencies of 1807ms and 2125ms, and average respective 
accuracies of 92% and 87%. Likewise, the non-smokers completed the mood-consistent 
and -inconsistent test blocks with average respective latencies of 1955ms and 2057ms, 
and average respective accuracies of 91% and 89%.   
5.3.2. Validity with Respect to Smoking-status 
Known-Groups Differences 
The IRAP data were entered into a preliminary 2x2x2x2 mixed factorial 
ANOVA, which crossed smoking-status (i.e. smokers versus non-smokers) and trial 
block order (i.e. mood-consistent-first versus mood-inconsistent-first) with the two 
repeated measures IRAP ‘trial-type’ variables concept type (i.e. “I ENJOY SMOKING 
when I’m” and “I NEED to SMOKE when I’m”) and target type (i.e. positive versus 
negative moods). We obtained a large main effect for smoking-status, F(1, 28) = 12.67, 
p = .001, p
2 = .31, but no main effects for the remaining three variables, p
2s ≤ .03, p ≥ 
.54.  
However, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, the main effect for smoking-status was 
qualified by a moderate four-way interaction with both trial block order and the two 
IRAP variables, F(1, 28) = 1.93, p = .18, p
2 = .07. In addition, concordantly, smoking-
status interacted moderately with concept type, F(1, 28) = 3.68, p = .07, p
2 = .12, and 
there were moderate interactions between smoking-status and target-type, F(1, 28) = 
2.23, p = .15, p
2 = .07, and between smoking-status, target-type and trial block order, 
F(1, 28) = 1.79, p = .19, p
2 = .06, as well as between smoking-status, concept-type, and 
target-type, F(1, 28) = 2.20, p = .15, p
2 = .07. Thus, overall, it appeared as though each 
of the four trial-type DIRAPs operated differently with respect to the interaction between 
smoking-status and block order. We therefore conducted four follow-up 2x2 between-
groups ANOVAs to respectively analyse the impact of smoking-status and block order 
on each of the four trial-type DIRAPs. 
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Figure 5.1. Mean trial-type DIRAP scores, with standard error bars, for smokers and non-smokers split by 
trial block order, by IRAP concept-type and by IRAP target-type. A positive DIRAP score for the Enjoy-
Pos trial-type indicated faster True rather than False responses to label-target combinations like I ENJOY 
SMOKING when I’m – Relaxed. Positive Enjoy-Neg DIRAPs indicated faster False rather than True 
responses to label-target combinations like I ENJOY SMOKING when I’m – Anxious. And likewise, 
positive Need-Pos DIRAPs or Need-Neg DIRAPs also indicated faster mood-consistent than mood-
inconsistent responses. By corollary, negative trial-type DIRAPs indicated the opposite to their positive 
counterparts; and those in the neighbourhood of zero (e.g. -.1 < DIRAP < .1) indicated that mood-consistent 
and -inconsistent responses were produced with comparable fluency to each other. 
 
 
Exploring Interactions between Smoking-status and Block Order 
Smoking-status by block order on Enjoy-Pos DIRAP. There was a moderate-to-
large main effect of smoking-status, F(1, 28) = 3.51, p = .07, p
2 = .11, on Enjoy-Pos 
DIRAP; but no main effect of block order, F(1, 28) = .12, p = .73,
 p
2 = .004. However, 
block order did interact to a moderate-to-large degree with smoking-status, F(1, 28) = 
3.94, p = .06, p
2 = .12, and so we conducted multiple follow-up contrasts to unpack this 
interaction. Most notably, block order not only impacted smokers’ DIRAP, but it did so in 
an ironic fashion which was also in the opposite direction to its impact upon non-
smokers’ DIRAPs. Namely, the smokers’ DIRAP was more mood-consistent in the mood-
inconsistent-first condition than in the mood-consistent-first condition (i.e. rather than 
vice versa), t(14) = 1.38, p = .19, 2 = .12. And in contrast, the non-smokers’ DIRAP was 
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more mood-consistent in the mood-consistent-first condition than in the mood-
inconsistent-first condition, t(14) = 1.53, p = .15, 2 = .14. Thus, whereas the non-
smokers’ responses to the Enjoy-Pos trial-type were influenced in line with the block 
order manipulation, the smokers’ responses to the Enjoy-Pos trial-type appeared to 
rebound against it. Ultimately, this resulted in there being no difference between 
smokers and non-smokers on Enjoy-Pos DIRAP in the mood-consistent-first condition, 
t(14) = .09, p = .93, 2 = .0006, but a large smoking-status difference in the mood-
inconsistent-first condition, t(14) = 2.43, p = .03, 2 = .30. Indeed, the non-smokers 
implicitly evaluated smoking in a similarly large mood-consistent fashion on the Enjoy-
Pos trial-type during the mood-consistent-first block order, t(7) = 5.16, p = .001, 2 = 
.79, as the smokers did during both block orders of the Enjoy-Pos trial-type, t(7)s = 
1.99, 3.64, p = .09, .01, 2 = .36, .65. In contrast, however, the non-smokers implicitly 
evaluated smoking in only a moderately mood-consistent fashion in the mood-
inconsistent-first condition, t(7) =.76, p = .47, 2 =.08. 
Smoking-status by block order on Enjoy-Neg DIRAP. There was a large main 
effect of smoking-status, F(1, 28) = 5.03, p = .03, p
2 = .15, on Enjoy-Neg DIRAP; but no 
main or interaction effects with block order, F(1, 28)s ≤ .53, p ≥ .47, p
2 ≤ .02. In 
summary, the smokers and the non-smokers both implicitly evaluated smoking mood-
consistently, but the smokers did so, t(15) = 4.40, p = .0001, 2 = .56, to a greater 
degree than the non-smokers, t(14) = 1.82, p = .09, 2 = .18. 
Smoking-status by block order on Need-Pos DIRAP. There was a moderate-to-
large main effect of smoking-status, F(1, 28) = 3.43, p = .08, p
2 = .11, on Need-Pos 
DIRAP; but no main or interaction effects with block order, F(1, 28)s ≤ .36, p ≥ .56,
 p
2 ≤ 
.01. In summary, the smokers and the non-smokers both implicitly evaluated smoking 
mood-consistently, but the smokers did so, t(15) = 4.22, p = .001, 2 = .54, to a greater 
degree than the non-smokers, t(14) = 1.27, p = .22, 2 = .10. 
Smoking-status by block order on Need-Neg DIRAP. There was a large main 
effect of smoking-status, F(1, 28) = 22.86, p < .0001, p
2 = .45, on Need-Neg DIRAP; but 
no main or interaction effects with block order, F(1, 28)s ≤ 1.31, p ≥ .26, p
2 ≤ .04.48 In 
summary, the smokers implicitly evaluated smoking mood-consistently, t(15) = 6.12, p 
                                                 
48 The main effect of block order was on Cohen’s threshold for a moderate effect, F(1, 28) = 1.31, p = .26, 
p
2 = .04. Crucially, however, this main effect was clearly non-existent as a simple effect for the non-
smokers, as per Figure 5.1, even though the relevant interaction was null by the same standards, F(1, 28) 
= .35, p = .56, p
2 = .01. On balance, therefore, given the relatively small sample size involved in each 
experimental cell (n = 8), we concluded that it would be most prudent to interpret this borderline main 
effect as null until further evidence emerges to the contrary. 
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< .0001, 2 = .71, but in contrast the non-smokers implicitly evaluated smoking 
indecisively49, t(14) = .17, p = .87, 2 = .002. 
Known-Groups Sensitivity and Specificity in Diagnosing Smoking-status 
The Need-Neg DIRAP ROC curve exhibited the largest AUC = .88, p = .07, d = 
1.15, (i.e., r ≈ .50), of the four IRAP trial-type effects. This means that if a smoker and a 
non-smoker were chosen at random from the present sample, then 88% of the time the 
smoker would have a higher Need-Neg DIRAP than the non-smoker (i.e. as compared to 
50% of the time by chance). Not only did Need-Neg DIRAP achieve a higher AUC, Z = 
1.37; p = .09; d = .49 (i.e., r ≈ .24),50 than the Need-Pos DIRAP, AUC = .69, p = .07, d = 
.49, (i.e., r ≈ .24) (see Figure 5.2), but likewise it also achieved a higher AUC than both 
of the Enjoy-related trial-type DIRAPs, respectively, Zs = 1.90, 1.37; ps = .03, .09; ds = 
.72, .49 (i.e., rs ≈ .34, .24). Specifically, the Enjoy-Pos DIRAP exhibited a null AUC = 
.66, p = .12, d = .27 (i.e., r ≈ .14), and the Enjoy-Neg DIRAP did only slightly better 
insofar as it achieved a moderate-to-small sized smoking-status AUC = 0.73, p = .03, d 
= .43 (i.e., r ≈ .21; see Figure 5.3).  
 
                                                 
49 Note however, that this could indicate either of two types of implicit indecisiveness. For example, if an 
IRAP effect arises in the neighbourhood of zero with a lack of internal reliability, in principle it would 
indicate active indecisiveness insofar as its lack of internal reliability reflected that participants were pre-
inclined to respond in both competing ways to its constituent trials. In contrast, if for example an IRAP 
effect arises in the neighbourhood of zero with good internal reliability, and without being affected by 
block order, it would in principle indicate passive indecisiveness – insofar as good internal reliability 
indicates that participants are not pre-inclined to respond in both competing ways to the relevant trial-
type, and insofar as an IAT effect close to zero and not moderated by block order indicates that 
participants were also not pre-inclined to respond in one way more than the other on that trial-type. In 
other words, passive indecisiveness denotes that a participant is relatively unfamiliar with whatever topic 
of implicit evaluating is in question. Crucially, we can only determine this latter eventuality by knowing 
the vectoring of an IRAP effect and its internal reliability and whether it was moderated by block order. 
50 Calculated using Lowry’s (2012) software implementation of Hanley and McNeil’s (1982) Z-test 
algorithm for comparing the significance of the difference between the areas under two independent ROC 
curves. 
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Figure 5.2. The smoking-status ROC curves for Need-Pos DIRAP and Need-Neg DIRAP. Note that the 
dashed diagonal line represents chance levels of smoking-status diagnosis (i.e. a ROC curve with an AUC 
= .5). 
 
 
Figure 5.3. The smoking-status ROC curves for Enjoy-Pos DIRAP and Enjoy-Neg DIRAP. Note that the ROC 
curve for Enjoy-Pos DIRAP in particular was in close correspondence with the dashed diagonal line 
representing chance levels of smoking-status diagnosis (i.e. a ROC curve with an AUC = .5).  
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4.3.3. Modelling the trial-type DIRAPs in terms of Tobacco Addiction Criteria 
Preliminary Correlation Analyses 
Of the four IRAP trial-type effects, the Need-Neg DIRAP correlated to the greatest 
degree with the six tobacco addiction criteria – not only did it correlate with all six 
criteria, it did so to a large degree in each case, average r = .61 (see upper panel of 
Table 5.1). Granted, the other three IRAP trial-type effects also correlated with all six 
criteria – but overall, they did so moderately rather than largely: Enjoy-Pos DIRAP, 
average r = .32; Enjoy-Neg DIRAP, average r = .39; Need-Pos DIRAP, average r = .36 
(Table 5.1). Indeed, confirming this, correlation Z-tests among the averaged criterion 
correlations for each trial-type effect indicated that Need-Neg DIRAP achieved 
moderately higher criterion correlations on average than Enjoy-Pos DIRAP, Enjoy-Neg 
DIRAP, and also Need-Pos DIRAP, Z = 1.44, 1.13, 1.26; ps = .07, .13, .10; ds = .52, .41, .45 
(i.e. rs ≈ .25, .20, .22). 
 
Table 5.1 
A zero-order correlation matrix of the four IRAP trial-type effects and six tobacco addiction criteria: YS, 
CPD, mFTQ, HONC, AIS and TC. 
 
 
 
 The Four IRAP Trial-type Effects & 
The Five Tobacco Addiction Criteria 
 
 YS CPD mFTQ HONC AIS TC 
 
Enjoy-Pos DIRAP .34* .29* .33* .39* .27
# .29# 
 
Enjoy-Neg DIRAP .37* .38* .37* .47** .40* .34* 
 
Need-Pos DIRAP .35* .39* .37* .39* .32*~
 .35* 
 
Need-Neg DIRAP .59*** .58*** .66**** .58*** .62**** .65**** 
 
YS -- .92**** .94**** .75**** .75**** .92**** 
 
CPD  -- .90**** .69**** .85****~ .90**** 
 
mFTQ   -- .75**** .97****~ .98**** 
 
HONC    -- .69**** .71**** 
 
AIS     -- .87*** 
#
p  .1, *p  .05, **p  .01, *** p   .001, **** p  .0001 (all ps one-tailed). N = 32 except where ~ 
indicated N = 31. Note. All ps are uncorrected for familywise error, but note Bonferroni corrected p < .01 
should be applied to each sextuple of correlations between each trial-type DIRAPs and the six tobacco 
dependence criteria because each constitutes a different domain of variability (Howell, 2012a). 
 
Causal Path Analyses 
We used the Hayes (2012) ‘PROCESS’ software for bootstrapped casual path 
analysis to estimate the extent to which the four IRAP trial-type effects measured 
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implicit evaluating that could have been integral to tobacco addiction intensity. In 
particular, we tested CPD, mFTQ, HONC and AIS separately as candidate mediators 
between YS and each of the DIRAPs because of the high degree of collinearity and 
conceptual reciprocity among them, .69 < rs < .98; all ps < .0001 (see lower panel of 
Table 5.1; see also DiFranza, Ursprung, & Biller, 2012; O’Loughlin et al., 2002, p. 359; 
Wellman et al., 2006). 
Overall, Need-Neg DIRAP was the only IRAP trial-type effect in the current study 
to have been substantially mediated by any of the four tobacco addiction intensity 
criteria. More specifically, we estimated that up to 10.2%, 12.6%, 6.7% and 10.5% of 
Need-Neg DIRAP could have developed integrally with CPD. mFTQ, HONC and AIS, 
respectively. In each case we calculated the relevant estimation by multiplying the 2 
for the relevant candidate mediator (i.e. 2s = .35, .36, .19, .31, ps  .05, respectively for 
CPD, mFTQ, HONC and AIS) by the percentage of shared zero-order variance 
observed between YS and the Need-Neg DIRAP for each of the respective mediation 
models (i.e. F[1, 28] = 11.52, R2 = .29, for the CPD model; F[1, 30] = 14.81, R2 = .35, 
for the mFTQ and HONC models; F[1, 29] = 12.45, R2 = .34, for the AIS model; for 
more detailed statistics see Appendix 14). Thus, for example, approximately (2 =) 35% 
of the 29% shared variance between YS and Need-Neg DIRAP could, in principle, have 
developed integrally with mFTQ; which amounts to 10.2% of Need-Neg DIRAP overall.  
In contrast, the respective relationships between YS and each of the three other 
trial-type effects were not sufficient, 3.86 ≤ F(1, 30)s ≤ 4.68, .07 ≤ R2s ≤ .15, for any of 
the four addiction intensity criteria to have an overall impact as candidate mediators on 
any of these trial-type effects (i.e. overall percentage of relevant trial-type effects 
mediated ≈ 0.4-3.6%; see Appendix 14). Furthermore, not only was Need-Neg DIRAP 
unique among the three other trial-type effects with regard to being integral to tobacco 
addiction intensity, the former was also more extensively related to these criteria 
collaterally than the latter. Namely, CPD, mFTQ, HONC and AIS, respectively, 
explained 9%, 9%, 4%, and 8% of Need-Neg DIRAP in addition to YS (i.e. F-changes = 
3.94, 4.85, 1.99, 4.12; ps = .06, 04, .17, .05; R2-changes = .09, .09, .04, .08).51 And in 
contrast, the remaining three trial-type effects did not exhibit distinct collateral paths 
from any of the tobacco addiction intensity criteria, .03 ≤ F-changes ≤ 1.10 , .87 ≥ ps ≥ 
                                                 
51 In principle, the additional variance in Need-Neg DIRAP explained by each of the tobacco addiction 
criteria in addition to YS may have reflected some recent causal influence of implicit evaluating upon 
tobacco addiction (i.e. within the previous year). However, our participants were specifically sampled for 
stable patterns of smoking during the preceding year, and therefore it seems likely that the majority of the 
relevant partial correlations instead reflected the causal influence of tobacco addiction (as per CPD, 
mFTQ, HONC and/or AIS) upon Need-Neg DIRAP.  
136 
 
.30, 0.001 ≤ R2-changes ≤ .035, except for all of them with HONC, 1.32 ≤ F-changes ≤ 
3.38, .26 ≥ ps ≥ .08, .04 ≤ R2-changes ≤ .09. Overall, therefore, Need-Neg DIRAP 
appeared to be 7-13% integral and 4-9% collateral to CPD, mFTQ, HONC and AIS, but 
the remaining three trial-type effects each only exhibited distinct collateral paths with 
HONC (4-9%) and each lacked integral relationships with any of the four intensity 
criteria. 
5.3.4. Validity with Respect to Explicit Evaluations 
All eight explicit measures were rescored so that their polarity concurred with 
those of the four IRAP trial-type effects (i.e. positive  mood-consistent, and negative  
mood-inconsistent), and so that zero ratings purported to be neutral. The resulting 
semantic differentials all exhibited extremely high internal reliability with Cronbach 
alphas ranging from .980 to .995. In broad terms, as per Table 5.2, the smokers 
explicitly evaluated in a highly pro-smoking (and mood-consistent) fashion that 
smoking is enjoyable when one is feeling good and needed when one is feeling bad, 
t(15)s  4.57, one-tailed ps  .0002, 2  .58.  
By contrast, however, smokers were more equivocal in their explicit evaluating 
of smoking as enjoyable when one is feeling bad, or needed when one is feeling good. 
Specifically, on the relevant semantic differentials they evaluated smoking in a 
moderately pro-smoking (and mood-inconsistent) fashion, t(15)s  -1.32, one-tailed ps 
≥ .90, 2  .10 (i.e. that smoking is enjoyable when one is feeling bad, and is needed 
when one is feeling good), but by contrast on the corresponding feeling thermometers 
they evaluated smoking in a moderately anti-smoking (and mood-consistent) manner, 
t(15)s  1.35, one-tailed ps  .10, 2  .11 (i.e. that smoking is not enjoyable when one 
is feeling bad, and not needed when one is feeling good).52 The non-smokers explicitly 
evaluated smoking in a broadly opposite manner to the smokers: they tended to 
explicitly evaluate smoking as being not enjoyable and not needed whether one is 
feeling good or bad, t(15)s  6.03, one-tailed ps  .0001, 2  .71. 
As per Table 5.3 Enjoy-Pos DIRAP and Need-Pos DIRAP both failed to correlate 
with any of the eight measures of explicit evaluating. In contrast, both Enjoy-Neg DIRAP 
and Need-Neg DIRAP correlated to a moderate-to-large positive degree with explicit 
evaluating of smoking as enjoyable when one is feeling good, and with explicit 
evaluating of smoking as needed when one is feeling bad, .37 ≤ rs ≤ .58, ps ≤ .05. 
Moreover, conversely, both Enjoy-Neg DIRAP and Need-Neg DIRAP correlated to 
                                                 
52 Note that here we interpreted the degree of (dis)favour in relation to the respective Likert-type scales 
rather than in relation to the size of the relevant statistical effect. 
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moderate-to-large negative degree with explicit evaluating of smoking as enjoyable 
when one is feeling bad, and with explicit evaluating of smoking as needed when one is 
feeling good, -.61 ≤ rs ≤ -.32, ps ≤ .10. 
 
Table 5.2 
The means and bracketed standard deviations of the four semantic differential scores, and the four feeling 
thermometer scores split by smoking-status. 
  
  Semantic Differentials Feeling Thermometers 
  Enjoy-
Pos 
Enjoy-
Neg 
Need-
Pos 
Need-
Neg 
Enjoy-
Pos 
Enjoy-
Neg 
Need-
Pos 
Need-
Neg 
Smoker 
1.7   
(1.4) 
-0.5 
(1.0) 
-0.3 
(1.0) 
2.1 
(1.4) 
25         
(22) 
23    
(27) 
15    
(16) 
35      
(24) 
Non-smoker 
-2.3 
(1.5) 
2.4  
(1.2) 
2.5  
(1.2) 
-2.3 
(1.6) 
-41        
(27) 
41    
(24) 
45    
(15) 
-41   
(27) 
Note. Thermometer scores ranged from -50 to +50, and semantic differential scores ranged from -3 to +3. 
Positive scores indicated mood-consistent evaluating of smoking, negative scores indicated mood-
inconsistent evaluating of smoking, and near-zero scores purported neutral evaluating of smoking.  
 
 
Table 5.3 
The correlation matrix of the four IRAP trial-type effects crossed with the eight explicit evaluation scores. 
 
  Semantic Differentials Feeling Thermometers 
 Enjoy-
Pos 
Enjoy-
Neg 
Need-
Pos 
Need-
Neg 
Enjoy-
Pos 
Enjoy-
Neg 
Need-
Pos 
Need-
Neg 
Enjoy-Pos DIRAP .14 -.19 -.17 .16 .11 -.12 .15 .14 
Enjoy-Neg DIRAP .37* -.38* -.38* .40* .38* -.37* -.32
# .40* 
Need-Pos DIRAP .03 .05 .05 -.001 -.03 .07 .08 -.002 
Need-Neg DIRAP .57*** -.61*** -.59*** .56*** .57*** -.47** -.51** .58*** 
#
 p  .10, * p  .05, ** p  .01, *** p   .001, **** p  .0001, with all ps one-tailed. (N = 32). 
 
5.3.5. Validity in Relation to Internal Reliability 
The smokers exhibited relatively high internal reliability on all four of the IRAP 
trial-type effects as per the upper part of Table 5.4, .47 ≤ rsbs ≤ .87; and particularly 
when we compensated our estimates for the typically fourfold greater test-length held 
by IATs, .78 ≤ compensated-rsbs ≤ .96. Similarly, the non-smokers exhibited acceptable 
internal reliability on Enjoy-Pos DIRAP, Need-Pos DIRAP, and Neg-Pos DIRAP, .52 ≤ rsbs ≤ 
.64; .81 ≤ compensated-rsbs ≤ .88. Thus, apart from the non-smokers’ Enjoy-Neg IRAP 
effects, which almost completely lacked internal consistency, it appeared as though both 
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the smokers and non-smokers responded consistently to each of the four IRAP trial-
types.  
 
Table 5.4 
The Spearman-Brown split-half reliabilities (rsb) for smokers’ versus non-smokers’ IRAP trial-type 
effects. ‘Compensated DIRAP rsbs’ approximated what rsbs the various DIRAPs would have if, with all else 
equal, they were comprised of the same number of trials as an IAT effect (for algorithm see Appendix 10).  
 
 DIRAP rsb Compensated DIRAP rsb 
Smokers   
 
Enjoy-Pos DIRAP
 a .87**** 96**** 
Enjoy-Neg DIRAP
 a .62** .87**** 
Need-Pos DIRAP 
a .47* .78*** 
Need-Neg DIRAP
 b
 .66** .89**** 
Non-Smokers   
 
Enjoy-Pos DIRAP
 a .52* .81**** 
Enjoy-Neg DIRAP
 a .13 .37# 
Need-Pos DIRAP 
a .64** .88**** 
Need-Neg DIRAP
 a
 .55** .83**** 
Smokers & Non-Smokers   
 Enjoy-Pos DIRAP
c .73**** .92**** 
 Enjoy-Neg DIRAP
c -- -- 
 Need-Pos DIRAP 
c .62**** .87**** 
 Need-Neg DIRAP
 c
 .75**** .92**** 
a n = 16; 
b n = 14, c n = 32. 
#
 p  .10, * p  .05; ** p  .01; *** p  .001; **** p  .0001; all ps for rsb one-
tailed. 
 
 
Table 5.5 
Zero-order Pearson correlations among the four trial-type DIRAPs. 
 
 Enjoy-Pos 
DIRAP 
Enjoy-Neg 
DIRAP 
Need-Pos 
DIRAP 
Need-Neg 
DIRAP 
Enjoy-Pos DIRAP -- .61
 a****  .45 a** .54 a*** 
Enjoy-Neg DIRAP  -- .50
 b** .67 a**** 
Need-Pos DIRAP   -- .43
 b** 
Need-Neg DIRAP    -- 
a n = 32; 
b n = 31. 
#
 p  .10, * p  .05; ** p  .01; *** p  .001; **** p  .0001; all ps for rsb one-tailed. 
 
It therefore seemed appropriate, as per the bottom panel of Table 5.4, to 
calculate internal reliabilities for the Enjoy-Pos, Need-Pos, and Neg-Pos trial-type 
effects across both smokers and non-smokers. Crucially, this indicated that the overall 
internal reliability of all three of these trial-type effects was relatively high, .62 ≤ rsbs ≤ 
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.75, particularly when we compensated our estimates for the fourfold greater test-length 
typically held by IATs, .87 ≤ rsbs ≤ .92. In addition, as illustrated in Table 5.5, the four 
trial-type DIRAPs were inter-correlated to a large degree with each other thus indicating 
that they were highly consistent not just internally but also with each other. 
5.4. DISCUSSION 
Overall, the current IRAP appeared to improve upon the precision with which 
our first study’s IRAP captured implicit evaluating that was integral to tobacco 
addiction. In particular, the current IRAP allowed us to determine that even when 
phrased in terms of stereotypical reasons for smoking, only certain types of implicit 
evaluating were integral to tobacco addiction. And that by contrast, other very similar 
types of implicit evaluating nevertheless appeared to be related to tobacco addiction in a 
mainly collateral fashion. We proceed now to review the various implications of these 
findings for the literature on smoking-related implicit cognition. 
Smoking for Relief from Negative Affect as a Primary Motivator of Tobacco Addiction 
All four IRAP trial-type effects confirmed our key known-groups prediction that 
smokers would be more mood-consistent than non-smokers in their implicit evaluating 
of reward- and relief-focused reasons for smoking (i.e. endorsing smoking for emotional 
reward during positive but not negative craving-related moods, and endorsing smoking 
for emotional relief during corresponding negative but not positive craving-related 
moods). Moreover, both smokers and non-smokers were decisive in this pattern of 
implicit evaluating insofar as both groups exhibited relatively high internal reliability, 
overall, across the current IRAP trial-types. In fact, the only trial-type effect to exhibit 
low internal reliability for either group was the non-smokers’ Enjoy-Neg effect, and all 
this indicated was that the current non-smokers were relatively conflicted about denying 
that they enjoy smoking when feeling bad. Indeed, in any case, all four trial-type effects 
correlated at least moderately with all six of the continuous tobacco addiction criteria 
(i.e. YS, CPD, mFTQ, HONC, AIS and TC); and not only were the four trial-type 
DIRAPs internally consistent for the most part, they were also highly consistent with each 
other insofar as all trial-type DIRAP correlated to a large degree with every other one. 
Therefore, all four of the current IRAP trial-types appeared to be at least moderately 
related to tobacco addiction, and moreover, in a highly systematic fashion that cohered 
different (implicit) reasons for smoking depending upon positive versus negative 
craving-related moods. 
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Interestingly, the Need-Neg effect exhibited known-groups smoking-status 
differences that were far greater than any of the other three IRAP trial-types. This 
indicated that implicitly affirming one’s need to smoke for relief from negative affect 
was a much more important aspect of tobacco addiction intensity than the other three 
types of implicit evaluating. Furthermore, the Need-Neg effect consistently correlated 
more strongly with tobacco addiction criteria than the three other trial-type effects. This 
was impressive given that the three relevant trial-types each correlated at least 
moderately with all six of the tobacco addiction criteria. Moreover, Need-Neg was the 
only trial-type to diagnose smoking-status with a high degree of sensitivity and 
specificity – and in particular, unlike its counterparts, Enjoy-Pos failed to diagnose 
smoking-status at all. Crucially, this suggested that Need-Neg was the only one of the 
current trial-types that could have been integral to tobacco addiction (i.e. insofar as it is 
not possible, by definition, for any measure to be integral to tobacco addiction without 
first being able to diagnose addicted smokers from among never-smokers).53 Indeed, 
bearing this out, our mediational analyses indicated that Need-Neg was the only one of 
the current trial-types to exhibit an integral relationship with trait tobacco addiction 
intensity; and moreover, it did so to a large degree with all four trait criteria (i.e. CPD, 
mFTQ, HONC and AIS). 
Overall, therefore, the current findings consistently supported the idea that 
implicitly evaluating smoking as being needed during negative craving-related moods 
was a primary motivator of tobacco addiction. And that, by contrast, implicitly 
affirming one’s need to smoke while already experiencing craved positive moods, or 
implicitly affirming smoking as being enjoyable when one is feeling positive or 
negative craving-related moods, did not appear to motivate tobacco addiction to the 
same degree. Importantly, this pattern of findings is highly consistent with the 
traditional theoretical view that tobacco addiction gradually intensifies as a primary 
function of how much one evaluates smoking as being necessary to regulate negative 
moods resulting from tobacco withdrawal (i.e. rather than as a function of how much 
one evaluates smoking as being emotionally rewarding; see Baker et al., 2004; 
DiFranza, 2015; D’Souza, & Markou, 2011, p. 5; McCallion & Zvolensky, 2015). 
                                                 
53 Note that in order for any measure to obtain a high degree of smoking-status sensitivity and specificity 
it is not enough for it to share a high degree of variance with smoking-status as per correlation. Rather it 
also requires that changes in the relevant measure are associated with a relatively high degree of change 
in smoking-status (cf. linear regression for the difference between non-standardized regression 
coefficients and r statistics). Crucially, this explains why Enjoy-Pos, Enjoy-Neg and Need-Pos correlated 
at a consistently moderate-to-large degree with tobacco addiction criteria but yet performed poorly in 
diagnosing smoking-status. 
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Reward-focused Implicit Evaluating as a Secondary Motivator of Tobacco Addiction 
At first glance, the failure of the current reward-focused trial-types to exhibit 
integral relationships with tobacco addiction might appear to contradict the fact that the 
reward-focused Smoking-Pos effect from Study 1 was moderately integral to addiction 
intensity (i.e. CPD, mFTQ and HONC). However, the current trial-types incorporated a 
theoretically important conditionality that was not a part of the IRAP from Study 1. 
Namely, the previous study asked how smoking (or the smoking-ban) makes one feel, 
but in contrast the current IRAP was phrased in terms of asking under what (positive 
versus negative) craving-related mood conditions one finds smoking to be enjoyable 
versus needed. Crucially, IRAP research in other domains has shown that even very 
particular changes to the stimuli presented in an IRAP can impact quite dramatically 
and systematically upon the extent to which specific trial-types correlate with criterion 
variables (Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012; Remue, Hughes, De Houwer, & De 
Raedt, 2014).  
Therefore, rather than contradicting our findings in Study 1, the current reward-
focused trial-type findings served to qualify those earlier findings in potentially useful 
ways. Specifically, tobacco addiction may be implicitly motivated by smoking to 
increase positive affect as per our Smoking-Pos findings in Study 1, but crucially, the 
current IRAP data suggested that this likely only holds when one is not already 
experiencing particularly pleasing or displeasing moods. In other words, reward-focused 
implicit evaluating of reasons for smoking are perhaps most likely to be integral to 
tobacco addiction when smokers are going about routine aspects of their daily business 
and are not currently experiencing strong craving-related moods. Interestingly, this 
pattern of findings corroborated the fact that researchers have been relatively 
unsuccessful in inducing tobacco cravings with positive mood inductions (Heckman et 
al., 2013; Wray, Gass, & Tiffany, 2013). And moreover, it also corroborated the fact 
that smokers tend to explicitly cite reward-focused reasons for smoking only when not 
nicotine deprived (Veilleux et al., 2013), and/or in the context of performing mundane 
daily routines (Bancroft et al., 2003; Cook et al., 2004; Copeland et al., 1995; McEwen, 
West, & McRobbie, 2008; Vidrine, Vidrine, Costello, Mazas, Cofta-Woerpel, Mejia, & 
Wetter, 2009). Overall, therefore, the findings thus far suggest that smokers' implicit 
evaluating appears to motivate tobacco addiction in a highly systematic manner 
depending on the presence of positive versus negative craving-related moods.  
Further Clarifications on the Involvement of Implicit Evaluating in Tobacco Addiction  
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Reward-focused Implicit Evaluating during Positive Mood as a Risk Factor for 
Initiating Tobacco Smoking 
Reward-focused implicit evaluating may not be integral to tobacco addiction 
intensity during craving-related positive moods, but most theories of tobacco addiction 
strongly implicate reward-focused (implicit) evaluating during positive moods as being 
a primary motivator for non-smokers initiating smoking. For example, a classic 
explanation of why young smokers continue to smoke even before they are addicted is 
to gain popularity among their peers (Vahey et al., 2010). Indeed, more broadly, non-
smoking adolescents’ are characteristically prone to describe smoking as being an 
inherently celebratory activity (i.e. rewarding, discretionary, and as not ever having the 
potential to be needed for emotional relief; see Chassin et al., 2007; Fitz et al., 2015; 
Glautier, 2004; O’Connor et al., 2007; Vahey et al., 2010). 
Interestingly, the current non-smokers’ IRAP trial-type effects comported very 
closely with this complex pattern of characteristic evaluating. Namely, they implicitly 
evaluated smoking as being an enjoyable adjunct to positive moods (i.e. as per Enjoy-
Pos), and did not implicitly evaluate it as being enjoyable or needed otherwise (i.e. as 
per the other three trial-types). And moreover, this was despite the fact that these non-
smokers had not smoked within the past 12 months, or on more than one occasion 
previously. Therefore, the findings from all four of the current trial-types appeared to 
systematically converge on the idea that contexts involving craving-related positive 
affect may be a uniquely important risk factor for young non-smokers initiating 
smoking – and particularly, given that all four trial-type effects were at least moderate 
risk factors for smoking (i.e. as per criterion correlations).54 Overall, therefore, the 
current IRAP findings were systematic in corroborating at an implicit level the 
prevailing non-implicit explanation for why young people begin smoking – namely that 
young (non-)smokers tend to view smoking as being an inherently celebratory activity. 
In fact, to our knowledge, this is the first time in the literature that any implicit measure 
has specifically corroborated this standard account at an implicit level (e.g., Larsen, 
Kong, Becker, Cousijn, Boendermaker, Cavallo, Krishnan-Sarin, & Wiers, 2014; see 
also Chassin et al., 2007; Glautier, 2004; Fitz et al., 2015; Vahey et al., 2010).55 
                                                 
54 Note that we are not saying, for example, that Enjoy-Pos is necessarily integral to young non-smokers 
initiating smoking. Rather, Enjoy-Pos might be relatively collateral to young non-smokers initiating 
smoking and yet still be a risk factor for this process. 
55 In Study 1, the non-smokers’ were equally able to sustain pro- versus anti-smoking perspectives on 
Smoking-Pos in the pro- and anti-smoking-first block order conditions, respectively – however, unlike the 
current findings, this did not identify anything about the circumstances under which non-smokers tend to 
implicitly evaluate from a pro-smoking perspective. 
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Implicit versus Explicit Evaluating of Reward- and Relief-focused Smoking 
Known-groups Conflicts between Implicit versus Explicit Evaluating 
 We confirmed multiple known-groups conflicts and agreements between each 
groups’ implicit versus explicit evaluating of the four trial-type topics. For instance, the 
non-smokers explicitly evaluated all four trial-type topics in an anti-smoking manner on 
both the feeling thermometers and the semantic differentials, but only implicitly 
evaluated two of the IRAP trial-types in an anti-smoking manner. More specifically, 
they implicitly evaluated Enjoy-Neg and Need-Pos in an anti-smoking manner, but were 
implicitly pro-smoking with respect to Enjoy-Pos and implicitly indifferent with respect 
to Need-Neg (i.e. passively indecisive). Crucially, we anticipated this pattern of non-
smoker findings on the basis that to qualify for participation in the current study, the 
current non-smokers had to explicitly identify themselves as not having smoked during 
the previous 12 months or on more than one occasion before that. As such, to do 
anything thereafter but explicitly deny the topics dealt with by Enjoy-Pos and/or Need-
Neg would have been socially stigmatized for the current non-smokers (i.e. regardless of 
their characteristic tendency to otherwise explicitly evaluate smoking during 
celebrations as being enjoyable; Chassin et al., 2007; Fitz et al., 2015; Glautier, 2004; 
O’Connor et al., 2007; Vahey et al., 2010). Moreover, we expected that the non-
smokers would explicitly deny the topics dealt with by Enjoy-Pos and/or Need-Pos on 
the basis that it not only comported with their own characteristic mood-consistent 
evaluating of smoking (see above), but also directly comported with their having 
explicitly identified themselves as being committed non-smokers at the outset. Thus, 
overall, the current IRAP confirmed its ability to reveal pro-smoking aspects of non-
smokers’ evaluating that were obscured by the impact of social desirability bias on 
equivalent measures of explicit evaluating. 
 Furthermore, the current smokers explicitly evaluated the four trial-type topics 
in a broadly similar mood-consistent fashion as they implicitly evaluated those topics on 
the IRAP. In particular, we anticipated that this would be the case on the basis that 
smokers are not generally stigmatized, but rather are more likely to be socially accepted 
for offering the relevant reward- and/or relief-focused reasons for their smoking (see 
Chassin et al., 2007; Fitz et al., 2015; Vahey et al., 2010). Granted, two of the eight 
measures of the smokers’ explicit evaluating indicated mood-inconsistent evaluating 
contrary to our expectations – namely, that the smokers explicitly affirmed both the 
Enjoy-Neg and Need-Pos topics on their respective semantic differentials. It was not 
clear exactly why the smokers explicitly endorsed smoking conditionally on the feeling 
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thermometers but unconditionally on the semantic differentials. Crucially, however, this 
finding appeared to contradict not just our corresponding feeling thermometer findings, 
but also the tobacco addiction literature more broadly (see above). On balance, 
therefore, whatever the explanation for this discrepant subset of explicit evaluating,56 it 
appeared to further underscore the idea that the IRAP is less prone to distorted 
measurement than corresponding questionnaire-based methods. Thus, overall, the 
current IRAP was successful in confirming multiple known-groups conflicts and/or 
agreements between each group’s implicit versus explicit evaluating. 
Exploring the Involvement of Implicit Evaluating in Explicit Evaluating 
Two of the IRAP trial-type effects, Enjoy-Neg and Need-Neg, correlated with all 
eight of the explicit measures; but that the other two trial-type effects, Enjoy-Pos and 
Need-Pos, correlated with none of these eight explicit measures. In particular, Enjoy-
Neg and Need-Neg consistently correlated with explicitly endorsing smoking as being 
both unconditionally rewarding and unconditionally relieving.57 That is, the Enjoy-Neg 
and Need-Neg effects not only correlated positively with explicitly affirming the Enjoy-
Pos and Need-Neg topics, but they each also correlated negatively with explicitly 
denying the Enjoy-Neg and Need-Pos topics. In other words, crucially, the current 
participants’ (reward- and relief-focused) explicit evaluating of smoking appeared to be 
driven rather exclusively by implicit evaluating that smoking is needed (as per Need-
Neg) and not enjoyed (as per Enjoy-Neg) during negative craving-related moods. 
Notably, such findings further emphasize the possibility of identifying what types of 
implicit evaluating are particularly likely to interfere with (or strengthen) a smoker’s 
ongoing explicit evaluating about whether to continue smoking or not. And thus, the 
current pattern of implicit-explicit correlations provided even further corroboration of 
the idea that tobacco addiction gradually intensifies as a primary function of how much 
                                                 
56 One possible explanation was that the current smokers responded in this way as a spurious response 
heuristic to simplify and thus expedite their completion of the twelve semantic differentials. Indeed, by 
the time the smokers were completing the twelve semantic differentials they had already completed at 
least 192 very similarly formatted IRAP trials. As such, the smokers may have been reluctant to fully 
attend to the semantic differentials because of fatigue with respect to such tasks formatted like IRAP trials 
(e.g. including response options that randomly alternated their left-right positioning). Certainly, this 
interpretation would explain why the smokers’ feeling thermometers were not similarly affected – only 
four feeling thermometers were presented (directly after the IRAP); and they had a novel, simpler 
response format as compared to the IRAP trials (and the corresponding semantic differentials). 
57 Note that this further supports the idea put forward in the previous sub-section that the current smokers 
were merely employing a post hoc heuristic when they explicitly evaluated in an unconditionally pro-
smoking fashion on the semantic differentials. 
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one (implicitly) evaluates smoking as being necessary to regulate negative (and not 
positive) craving-related moods.58 
The IRAP Block Order Variable as a Measure of Perspective-switching Tendencies 
The Enjoy-Pos effect was the only one of the current trial-types to exhibit an 
interaction between smoking-status and block order, and it was an almost perfect cross-
over interaction. Specifically, whereas the non-smokers’ Enjoy-Pos effects were 
influenced in line with block order (i.e. more mood-consistent in the mood-consistent-
first condition than in the mood-inconsistent-first condition), interestingly, block order 
influenced the smokers’ Enjoy-Pos effects in the opposite direction. Crucially, as 
follows, this pattern of block order effects comported closely with the characteristically 
opposing patterns of perspective-switching that both groups were known to be 
characteristically accustomed to. 
As per our discussion of our findings in Study 1, participants should only 
respond in line with block order on a given trial-type to the extent that they are similarly 
(un)accustomed to adopting each of the two opposing evaluative responses it targeted in 
separate respective contexts (e.g. ‘I ENJOY SMOKING WHEN I’m Relaxed – True 
versus False’). In particular, it is well known fact that young non-smokers tend to adopt 
perspectives affirming that smoking is enjoyable when they are feeling good (e.g. as 
when celebrating with pro-smoking peers), but that they are also at least somewhat 
accustomed to switching to perspectives that deny this as required by other contexts 
(e.g. as when celebrating with anti-smoking peers or authority figures; see Chassin et 
al., 2007; Dal Cin et al., 2007; Fitz et al., 2015, p. 441; O’Connor et al., 2007; Pfizer 
Ireland, 2007; Piontek, Buehler, Rudolph, Metz, Kroeger, et al., 2008). Therefore, it 
was closely in line with the current non-smokers’ known-groups tendency for 
perspective-switching that they exhibited a mood-consistent (i.e. pro-smoking) Enjoy-
Pos effect in both block order conditions, but less so in the mood-inconsistent-first 
condition.59  
                                                 
58 Indeed, bearing this interpretation out even further, post hoc analyses tentatively suggested that Enjoy-
Neg might have correlated with explicit evaluating only as a function of Need-Neg – the one trial-type 
here that directly addressed the relevant process of tobacco addiction, smoking for relief from negative 
moods. In particular, Need-Neg correlated with all eight explicit measures to a consistently larger degree 
than Enjoy-Neg did; and moreover, the correlation between Enjoy-Neg and Need-Neg was strong, and 
indeed stronger than that between any other pairing of the current trial-types. In other words, in lieu of a 
more systematic experimental treatment, it tentatively appeared as though Need-Neg was simultaneously 
driving both Enjoy-Neg and the eight explicit measures so that they correlated with each other but did not 
necessarily interact with each other. 
59 Incidentally, the non-smokers’ Enjoy-Pos effect was just as pro-smoking as the smokers’ large Enjoy-
Pos effect in the mood-consistent-first block order condition, if not more so, but far less pro-smoking than 
the smokers on all other combinations of the current trial-types with block order. Crucially, this pattern of 
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By contrast, the current smokers smoked daily and had not even contemplated 
restricting their smoking within the previous 12 months – and as such, they were not 
only characteristically inclined to adopt perspectives that affirm smoking as being 
enjoyable when one is feeling good (see Cook et al., 2004; Copeland et al., 1995; 
DiFranza et al., 2012; DiFranza, 2015; Fitz et al., 2015; Glautier, 2004; McEwen et al., 
2008; Pfizer Ireland, 2007; Vidrine et al., 2009), but were also characteristically 
resistant to adopting any perspectives denying this (McCallion & Zvolensky, 2015; 
Moss, Erskine, Albery, Allen, & Georgiou, 2015; Rhodes, Roskos-Ewoldsen, Edison, & 
Bradford, 2008; Sayers & Sayette, 2013; Schueller, Pérez-Stable, & Muñoz, 2013). In 
principle, therefore, the current smokers were not only pre-inclined to respond to Enjoy-
Pos in line with the mood-consistent-first instructions, but also pre-inclined to 
(re)actively resist the mood-inconsistent-first (i.e. anti-smoking) instructions on this 
trial-type in particular. And crucially, this is just what we found. Namely, the smokers’ 
Enjoy-Pos effect was more pro-smoking in the mood-inconsistent-first condition than 
the mood-consistent condition, even though the former encouraged anti-smoking 
perspectives and the latter encouraged pro-smoking perspectives. Overall, therefore, the 
cross-over interaction between smoking-status and block order on Enjoy-Pos supported 
the idea that it was measuring perspective-switching tendencies.  
Furthermore, as follows, the fact that the remaining three trial-types did not 
exhibit any interactions between block order and smoking-status was also in line with 
the idea that block order was measuring perspective-switching tendencies. Firstly, 
smokers and (young) non-smokers are well known for having mood-consistent beliefs 
about enjoying smoking such that they would deny Enjoy-Neg (see above), but 
crucially, it is not a characteristic of either group that they should ever switch 
perspectives to affirm Enjoy-Neg in a sustained fashion. Indeed, insofar as enjoyment is 
generally incompatible with feeling bad, it is hard to imagine any situation in which 
either group would maintain a perspective that involved affirming smoking (or anything 
else) as being enjoyable when one is feeling bad.60 Moreover, neither group was 
                                                                                                                                               
block order effects further corroborates the previous section’s findings that non-smokers’ implicit 
evaluating is particularly likely to put them at risk of initiating smoking while they are celebrating.  
60 Smokers may sometimes report enjoying euphoric relief when they smoke while experiencing 
unusually severe cravings (see Cook et al., 2004; Glautier, 2004; Henningfield, Miyasato, & Jasinski, 
1985; Pillitteri, Kozlowski, Sweeney, & Heatherton, 1997; Toll, Schepis, O’Malley, McKee, & Krishnan-
Sarin, 2007). However, by definition, such situations are unusual, fleeting and moreover markedly 
different from the current measurement context (i.e. the current smokers were not nicotine deprived; also 
see Bancroft et al., 2003). It was therefore rather unlikely that they (or non-smokers) were prepared to 
sustain any perspective on Enjoy-Neg that was in line with the mood-inconsistent-first instructions. 
Granted, the non-smokers were actively indecisive on Enjoy-Neg (i.e. low internal reliability) such that 
their dominant tendency to deny Enjoy-Neg (i.e. an anti-smoking perspective) was intermittently 
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characteristically accustomed to resist affirming Enjoy-Neg, thus ruling out any 
likelihood of block order rebound effects. As such, the current pattern of block order 
effects on Enjoy-Neg was consistent with both groups’ respective known-groups 
perspective-switching capacities.  
In addition, we have already outlined that smokers are well-known for 
evaluating that they strictly only need to smoke during certain negative moods and not 
when they are already experiencing positive moods. As such, the current smokers were 
not only characteristically pre-inclined to respond to Need-Pos from mood-consistent 
perspectives (i.e. denying it), but also characteristically unaccustomed to switching from 
perspectives denying Need-Pos to any affirming it. Crucially, therefore, the current 
smokers were well prepared to respond to Need-Pos from perspectives in line with the 
mood-consistent-first instructions, but not from perspectives in line with the mood-
inconsistent-first instructions. Moreover, the current smokers were probably 
unaccustomed to rationally defending their tendency to deny Need-Pos (i.e. given that 
their non-smoker peers tend to view smoking as being relatively discretionary) – and as 
such, they were unlikely to exhibit any rebound effect on Need-Pos during the mood-
inconsistent-first condition. The fact that block order did not moderate either the 
smokers’ or the non-smokers’ Need-Pos effects was therefore highly consistent with the 
idea that the IRAP block order variable measures perspective-switching tendencies.  
Furthermore, (young) non-smokers are characteristically pre-inclined to evaluate 
smoking as being both discretionary and enjoyable in celebratory contexts (i.e. even if 
they are otherwise disinclined to recommend smoking; see above). And as such, the 
current non-smokers were accustomed to adopting perspectives that deny Need-Pos, and 
unaccustomed to adopting perspectives that either affirm affirming Need-Pos. 
Moreover, insofar as it is unusual for anyone (smokers or non-smokers) to affirm Need-
Pos, it follows that non-smokers are characteristically unlikely to ever be confronted 
with having to rationally justify their tendency to deny Need-Pos (i.e. as means of 
resisting others’ perspectives affirming Need-Pos). Thus, overall, the fact that the 
current non-smokers’ exhibited similarly mood-consistent Need-Pos effects in both 
block order conditions closely confirmed the current rationale. 
Likewise, in relation to the Need-Neg effects, the only reason that (young) non-
smokers typically say that they might smoke is to enhance positive mood during 
                                                                                                                                               
interfered with by some opposing recessive perspective(s) affirming Enjoy-Neg. However, if anything, 
this further corroborated the current non-smokers’ difficulty sustaining switches between the perspectives 
dealt with by Enjoy-Neg (i.e. insofar as they were not even able to reliably sustain their dominant 
perspective to deny Enjoy-Neg, much less switch to any recessive perspective affirming Enjoy-Neg). 
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(certain) celebrations – and as such, the current non-smokers were characteristically 
unaccustomed to either affirming or denying reasons that they might smoke during 
negative moods (see Chassin et al., 2007; DiFranza et al., 2012; DiFranza, 2015; Fitz et 
al., 2015; Glautier, 2004; O’Connor et al., 2007; Vahey et al., 2010). And crucially, the 
current findings comported very closely with this known-groups criterion insofar as the 
current non-smokers exhibited a passively indecisive Need-Neg effect (i.e. internally 
reliable, in the neighbourhood of zero, and not moderated by block order), indicating 
that they were indifferent to this topic. 
However, as daily smokers who had not restricted their smoking within the 
previous 12 months, the current smokers were not only characteristically inclined to 
affirm Need-Neg but probably also well accustomed to rationally defending this 
perspective. In particular, it is common for smokers to be confronted by non-smokers 
who typically dispute one’s need to smoke (i.e. because they view smoking as 
discretionary; Chassin et al., 2007; DiFranza et al., 2012; DiFranza, 2015; Fitz et al., 
2015; Glautier, 2004; O’Connor et al., 2007; Vahey et al., 2010). Therefore, the current 
smokers should have been characteristically pre-inclined not only to affirm Need-Neg, 
but perhaps also to actively resist any perspectives denying Need-Neg (i.e. as per the 
current mood-inconsistent-first instructions). Confirming this, the current smokers 
produced a positive Need-Neg in both block order conditions, and exhibited a strong 
trend towards Need-Neg being more positive in the mood-inconsistent-first condition. 
Indeed, the relevant trend was sufficiently large that it generated a main effect for block 
across smoking-status even though the non-smokers’ Need-Neg was clearly unaffected 
by block order (see Figure 5.1).  
To complicate matters, however, the impact of block order on the smokers’ 
Need-Neg was not sufficiently large to generate a smoking-status by block order 
interaction (i.e. particularly given that the non-smokers did not exhibit an opposing 
block order effect like they did with Enjoy-Pos; see Figure 5.1). Thus, technically, we 
were disqualified from acknowledging the large simple effect of block order on the 
current smokers’ Need-Neg scores (see Figure 5.1). And yet, it would have been equally 
inappropriate to interpret the current lack of a legitimate block order rebound effect on 
the smokers’ Need-Neg as being evidence against the idea that IRAP block order 
measures perspective-switching. In particular, that would be to ignore the highly 
consistent pattern of known-groups perspective-switching effects we have reported so 
far despite relatively small block order condition sample sizes in both studies (ns = 8-
12; i.e. which would have underestimated rather than inflated our ability to detect such a 
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consistent pattern of known-groups patterns; see Bachetti, 2013; LeBel & Paunonen, 
2011; Shoukri, Asyali, & Donner , 2004; Sidman, 1960; Quinlan, 2013; Wainer & 
Thissen, 2001; Webb et al., 2007, p. 87).  
Overall, therefore, the smokers’ ironic Need-Neg block order effect provided 
tentative additional support for the idea that the IRAP block order variable measures 
one’s perspective-switching tendency. And furthermore, insofar as this was the case, the 
smokers’ ironic Enjoy-Pos and Need-Neg block order effects may have succeeded in 
directly measuring an instance of repressive coping for the first time. Repressive coping 
is broadly conceptualised as being a relatively automatic counterpart to thought 
suppression, whereby individuals strategically contradict and/or dissociate from 
evaluative perspectives that they typically perceive as being aversive (e.g. as when a 
smoker experiences tobacco cravings during abstinence, or an anti-smoking message 
while smoking; see Myers 2010; Moss et al., 2015). There are decades of research 
implicating repressive coping (and thought suppression) as playing central roles in 
(tobacco) addiction, and indeed in psychopathology more broadly (e.g. Myers, 2010). In 
particular, repressive coping (and thought suppression) is likely to hamper adaptive 
behavioural change to the extent that it makes one less sensitive, and thus less adaptive 
to changing contingencies in one’s environment (see Chawla, N., & Ostafin, 2007; 
Geraerts, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Smeets, 2006; Hayes, 1993; Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, 
Follette, & Strosahl, 1996; Moss et al., 2015; Törneke, Luciano, & Valdivia-Salas, 
2008; for related ethical issues see also Kjærsgaard, 2015). Indeed, confirming this 
repressive coping (and thought suppression) predict both poor mortality and long-term 
health outcomes (Geraerts et al, 2006; Myers, 2010).  
Crucially, however, this literature has relied exclusively upon anomalies in 
questionnaire-based measures, and as such it has provided only indirect evidence of 
repressive coping. Thus, repressive coping has remained a relatively nebulous even if 
well-established concept, with little if any research distinguishing between what 
particular automatic processes might be involved in it. Certainly, the literature has yet to 
examine repressive coping in terms of implicit evaluating61 – with the most likely 
reason being that measures of implicit evaluating were not equipped to distinguish one 
type of complex implicit evaluating from another, nor thus one aspect of repressive 
coping from another, until the advent of the IRAP. The IRAP block order variable, as a 
                                                 
61 Granted, some studies of repressive coping have employed rudimentary measures of psycho-
physiological arousal – however, these measures were not interpreted as instances of repressive coping 
but rather as evidence of whatever evaluating was supposedly being automatically repressed from 
corresponding questionnaires (see Myers, 2010; Moss et al., 2015). 
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measure of perspective switching tendencies, may therefore be a promising means of 
revealing key processes in addiction and psychopathology more broadly by revealing 
key processes involved in repressive coping and thought suppression. In particular, 
there is emerging evidence that repressive coping is a more advanced form of thought 
suppression that is more effective in eliminating unwanted (smoking-related) evaluative 
perspectives from an individual’s ongoing experiences (see Geraerts et al., 2006; 
McGreevy, Bonanno, & D’Andrea, 2015; Moss et al., 2015; Myers, 2010; see also 
Brandt, Bakhshaie, Garey, Schmidt, Leventhal, & Zvolensky, 2015). 
On balance, however, it is important to acknowledge that the current study was 
not specifically designed to reveal the aforementioned known-group differences in the 
extent to which trial block order interacted with smoking-status among the four IRAP 
trial-types. Rather as one of the first smoking-related IRAP studies, it was primarily 
concerned with establishing whether the absolute size of its trial-type effects would 
covary with various criterion variables for tobacco addiction (e.g. such as smoking-
status, CPD or years smoking). Therefore, regardless of how systematic the foregoing 
IRAP trial block order effects appeared to be, it is important to remain sceptical about 
whether they measured one’s tendency to perspective switch on each trial-type’s 
evaluative topic – particularly given the relatively modest sample size of the current 
study and the rather borderline smoking-status by block order interaction obtained on 
Need-Neg DIRAP. In other words, we must specifically sample and/or experimentally 
manipulate variables related to perspective switching on a given trial-type topic, before 
we can firmly establish whether IRAP block order measures a person’s tendency to 
perspective switch (or thus repress) their implicit response to that trial-type topic. 
Conclusions 
The foregoing network of findings is perhaps most valuable from the point of 
view that it revealed major systematic differences between the mood contexts likely to 
occasion non-smokers to begin smoking versus those that implicitly motivate tobacco 
addiction thereafter. In summary, we found that non-smokers are likely to be rather 
uniquely at risk of initiating smoking in contexts involving the enjoyment of positive 
craving-related moods, but that in contrast, such contexts do not appear to motivate an 
intensification of tobacco addiction (i.e. such contexts already involve the positive 
moods that addicted smokers stereotypically crave). And that in contrast, tobacco 
addiction is likely to be primarily motivated by contexts involving some implicit need 
for relief from craving-related negative affect; and that in the absence of both positive 
and negative moods, tobacco addiction is likely to be secondarily motivated by contexts 
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that involve implicitly evaluating smoking as a means of achieving stereotypically-
craved positive moods. Crucially, the key point here is that with just two IRAPs, we 
were able to reveal that smokers and non-smokers both exhibited highly coherent and 
distinctive networks of implicit evaluating with respect to smoking for mood regulation. 
Namely, that the mood contexts which are likely to implicitly motivate tobacco 
addiction among established smokers are characteristically different from those which 
are likely to be instrumental in implicitly motivating young people to begin smoking in 
the first place.  
In addition, these findings offered a plausible means of reconciling multiple 
contradictory points of view in the tobacco addiction literature. Unlike most dominant 
(implicit) theories of tobacco addiction which argue about whether tobacco addiction is 
driven by reward- versus relief-focused (implicit) evaluating (see Conklin et al., 2004; 
Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Farris et al., 2015; Robinson & Berridge, 2008; Stacy & 
Wiers, 2010), the current findings systematically allowed for both possibilities 
depending upon mood context. Namely, the current findings alerted us to the possibility 
that tobacco addiction is alternately motivated by both reward- and relief-focused in 
different respective contexts. Indeed, whatever about such findings being at the fringe of 
the questionnaire-based tobacco addiction literature (DiFranza et al., 2012; DiFranza, 
2015; Köpetz et al., 2013; Fitz et al., 2015; Hendricks & Brandon, 2008; Hendricks, 
Wood, Baker, Delucchi, & Hall, 2011; Spada et al., 2015; Wetter et al., 1999; Wray et 
al., 2013), they are almost entirely unprecedented in the literature dealing with smoking-
related implicit cognition (for the only other example we are aware of see McKee et al., 
2003; and for concordant reviews see Hendricks & Brandon, 2008; Jajodia & 
Earleywine, 2003; Rooke et al., 2008; Tibboel et al., 2007; Watson et al., 2012; Stacy & 
Wiers, 2010). 
As such, overall, it therefore appeared as though the two IRAP’s we have used 
so far were a precise means of determining how implicit evaluating motivates tobacco 
addiction. And yet, even though the current research modelled the impact of YS on 
various gold-standard criteria for tobacco addiction the fact still remains that our 
findings were cross-sectional with respect to existing criteria for tobacco addiction. 
Crucially, in order to discover more precise understandings of tobacco addiction with 
regard to its treatment there is no substitute for experimental research that 
systematically develops new criteria by qualifying old criteria ever more precisely (e.g. 
DiFranza, 2010; Gifford & Humphreys, 2007, pp. 356-358; Tønnesen, 2009, p. S22; 
Tiffany, 2008; Tiffany et al., 2004; Wiers et al., 2010; Wray et al., 2013). Thus, for the 
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remainder of the current thesis we focused upon conducting experimental research that 
would provide an ever more precise understanding of how implicit evaluating 
differentially motivates tobacco addiction depending upon context. In particular, we 
sought to determine not just how the relevant implicit evaluating perspectives vary 
depending upon context, but also how one might change these patterns via learning 
processes as a means of treating tobacco addiction (i.e. as we outlined at the end of 
Chapter 3; see also De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Moors, 2013; Hayes & Brownstein, 
1986; Whelan & Barnes-Holmes, 2010, pp. 347-350).  
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CHAPTER 6: A First Systematic Test of Thought Suppression as a Means of Bringing 
Problematic Implicit Evaluating Under Self-control (Studies 3 & 4) 
 
6.1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION: CHAPTER 6 
Studies one and two were primarily concerned with providing a first test of the 
IRAP as a means of distinguishing between smoking-related implicit evaluating that 
was correlated integrally with tobacco addiction versus not. One of our most important 
findings from these preliminary studies was that tobacco addiction appeared to be 
motivated in a very systematic context-dependent manner by implicit evaluating. Not 
only did we find cross-sectional evidence that smokers (and non-smokers) implicitly 
evaluate smoking differently depending upon their perceived mood. We also found 
preliminary experimental evidence, in the form of IRAP trial block order effects, that 
smokers (and non-smokers) implicitly evaluate smoking differently depending upon 
whether they are cued to relate from the overarching perspective of a smoker versus a 
non-smoker. In particular, we found that non-smokers were generally inclined to 
implicitly evaluate smoking (and the Irish smoking-ban) in line with whichever 
perspective they were cued to adopt by block order; but that smokers were not. In fact, 
the smokers even appeared to repress (i.e. automatically suppress) those block order 
instructions that most directly contradicted implicit evaluating integral to tobacco 
addiction (i.e. during the mood-inconsistent-first instructions on the Enjoy-Pos and 
Need-Neg trial-types). 
Thus, insofar as smokers were disinclined to switch to perspectives contradicting 
any type of implicit evaluating that was integral to tobacco addiction, it followed by 
definition that these smokers were unlikely to be able to deliberately suppress any such 
integral implicit evaluating for long. In particular, the very fact that smokers were 
disinclined to switch perspectives on any of the relevant IRAP trial-types implied that 
they would be relatively disinclined to continue (deriving) the relevant (implicit) anti-
smoking perspectives once the typically temporary cues for doing so had passed (see 
Geraerts et al., 2006; Moss et al., 2015; Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & Vahey, 2012, pp. 
24-34; and particularly among young smokers; Wiers, Boelema, Nikolaou, & Gladwin, 
2015). Crucially, this tallies well with the fact that there is an extensive questionnaire-
based evidence demonstrating that smokers’ attempts at thought suppression of pro-
smoking perspectives not only fail to persist (particularly under cognitive load), but that 
they often lead to ironic increases in tobacco cravings and even smoking (Erskine, 
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Georgiou, & Kvavilashvili, 2010; Erskine, Ussher, Cropley, Elgindi, Zaman, & Corlett, 
2012; Moss et al., 2015, pp. 66-67; Sayers & Sayette, 2013; Schueller et al., 2013). 
Moreover, those who smoke as a means of suppressing aversive aspects of their 
ongoing evaluating tend to be more addicted to smoking than those who tend not to (see 
Erskine et al., 2010; Erskine et al., 2012; Farris et al., 2015; Lee, An, Levin, & Twohig, 
2015; McCallion & Zvolensky, 2015; Moss et al., 2015; Toll, Sobell, Wagner, & 
Sobell, 2001). Indeed, more broadly, in his final review of the thought suppression 
literature, its originator and main protagonist Daniel Wegner concluded that “The 
apparent inevitability of thought suppression failure suggests that it is useful to explore 
strategies people could use…to escape their unwanted thoughts without recourse to 
thought suppression” (Wegner, 2011, p. 672). And accordingly, many of the alternative 
strategies that Wegner (2011) reviewed, such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
(ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011), are fundamentally designed to teach 
individuals how to disengage from unhelpful patterns of thought suppression broadly 
termed experiential avoidance (see Chawla & Ostafin, 2007; Hayes et al., 1996; 
McCallion & Zvolensky, 2015; Moss et al., 2015, pp. 67-68; Strosahl et al., 2004; 
Wolgast, Lundh, & Viborg, 2013).  
Crucially, however, some of the relevant authors have raised the possibility, at 
least in passing, that thought suppression strategies might sometimes be useful in certain 
limited situations as long as they do not conflict with behaving in the ways one values 
(see Geraerts et al., 2006; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011, pp. 73-74; Kashdan, 
Barrios, Forsyth, & Steger, 2006, pp. 1301-1302; Van Dijk, 2009, pp. 102-104; Wegner, 
2011; Wilson & DuFrene, 2009, p. 49; but see Hooper, Stewart, Duffy, Freegard, & 
McHugh, 2012). For example, thought suppression may sometimes be useful to 
abstinent smokers during particularly acute tobacco cravings as a means of temporarily 
resisting smoking until he/she can sufficiently remind themselves of the core reasons 
why they quit smoking in the first place (cf. Bloom, Matsko, & Cimino, 2014; Brown et 
al., 2005; Cox et al., 2006; Dawkins, Powell, Pickering, Powell, & West, 2009; Whelan, 
Conrod, Poline, Lourdusamy, Banaschewski, Barker, et al., 2012; McCallion & 
Zvolensky, 2015; Moss et al., 2015). Indeed, the literature on repressive coping suggests 
that with practise any such inhibitory strategies are likely to become more efficient in 
serving protective functions (i.e. requiring less deliberation and thus less likely to 
provoke rebound effects; see Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 2004; 
Coifman, Bonanno, Ray, & Gross, 2007; Litvin, Kovacs, Hayes, & Brandon, 2012; 
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Moss et al., 2015; Myers, 2010; also cf. Robusto, Cristante, & Vianello, 2008, pp. 955, 
959; Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar, 2011). 
And yet, apart from citing exceptional cases where thought suppression 
strategies might in principle be helpful, to date there has been disappointingly little 
questionnaire-based research examining the relative efficacy of different thought 
suppression strategies by context (see Aldao, 2013; Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012, 
pp. 3-4; Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Sensibaugh, 2014; Wegner, 2011, p. 672; Wenzlaff 
& Wegner, 2000, pp. 73-74; Wolgast et al., 2013; see also Gross, 2015; Myers, 2010, 
pp. 6, 9; Najmi et al., 2007, p. 1963; Sheeran et al., 2013; Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 
2012; Webb, Sheeran & Pepper, 2012). Moreover, to our knowledge, only two studies 
have examined the impact of thought suppression on implicit evaluating, and neither 
was related to (tobacco) addiction (i.e. Hooper et al., 2010; Ritzert, Forsyth, Berghoff, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Nicholson, 2015; also cf. Liefooghe & De Houwer, 2015; Moss et 
al., 2015). In fact, the first of these two studies did not specify what thought suppression 
strategy its participants should use, and crucially, nor did it measure any implicit 
evaluating related to the content that participants were instructed to suppress evaluating 
about (Hooper et al., 2010). And although the other study, by Ritzert et al. (2015), did 
coordinate the target of their thought suppression instructions with what type of implicit 
evaluating they measured, the relevant thought suppression strategy was specifically 
designed not to change that implicit evaluating (see p. 114). Namely, rather than 
instructing participants to challenge the content of the relevant intrusive evaluating, 
Ritzert et al. instructed participants to temporarily distract themselves from it with an 
unrelated task delivered well before, rather than during measurement of the relevant 
implicit evaluating (i.e. unlike the timeframe within which thought suppression effects 
are typically captured; see Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000; see also Wegner, 2011, pp. 672-
673).62 
                                                 
62 There are of course many studies that measure the efficacy with which individuals can inhibit 
established biases in their evaluative responding, using (confounded) methods such as the Addiction 
Stroop test (Cox et al., 2006; see Chapter 1), or the Sheffield lie test (Debey, Ridderinkhof, De Houwer, 
De Schryver, & Verschuere, 2015). Crucially, however, this literature has not examined the impact of 
thought suppression on implicit evaluative biases, but rather it has focused upon measuring how long it 
takes an individual to inhibit the expression of pre-established implicit evaluative biases (e.g. see Whelan,  
et al., 2012; Liefooghe & De Houwer, 2015). In addition, apart from that literature, we are aware of only 
four other studies that have incidentally examined concepts related to thought suppression using measures 
of implicit evaluating. However, none of these studies involved instructing participants to engage in 
thought suppression. In fact, two of these studies were specifically designed to circumvent the relevant 
deliberative processes by using cognitive training techniques to induce novel implicit evaluating 
perspectives as a means of automatically contradicting some problematic aspect of implicit evaluating 
(Deutsch, Gawronski, & Strack, 2006, p. 400; Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008; see 
also repressive coping; Moss et al., 2015). Finally, the remaining study, by Krank et al. (2010), may have 
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Granted, the thought suppression literature has always focused upon implicit 
aspects of evaluating insofar as it sought to examine how successfully individuals could 
suppress intrusive aspects of their own evaluating like smokers’ tobacco cravings (i.e. 
that enter one’s awareness unintentionally, somewhat uncontrollably, and to an aversive 
extent). However, in all such cases, the relevant implicit evaluating was inferred not 
from measures of implicit evaluating per se, but instead based exclusively upon 
participants’ explicit self-reports of how much they noticed themselves evaluating in an 
inadvertent and/or uncontrollable fashion about some topic (for reviews see Moss et al., 
2015; Myers, 2010; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). Indeed, the literature on thought 
suppression has yet to the examine the impact of specific thought suppression strategies 
as distinct from each other, preferring instead to simply instruct research participants to 
suppress intrusive aspects of their evaluating in whatever way they prefer on that 
occasion (see Erskine et al., 2015, pp. 1-3; Sensibaugh, 2014; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 
2000, pp. 73-74; see also Myers, 2010, p. 6; Najmi et al., 2007, p. 1963). 
This lack of systematic research is all the more remarkable when one considers 
that thought suppression is traditionally the most commonly proposed strategy offered 
for treating (tobacco) addiction in the literature on addiction-related implicit cognition, 
and also within the wider (neuro-)cognitive literatures addressing addiction (i.e. 
including via medication; see Abrams et al., 2003; Brandon et al., 2004; Fujita, 2011; 
Gifford & Humphreys, 2007; Hayes et al., 1996; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Heyman, 
2009; Hughes, 2008; Moss et al., 2015; Stead et al., 2012; Volkow, Fowler, & Wang, 
2004; Wiers, Gladwin et al., 2013; Wiers, Houben et al., 2010; Wiers & Stacy, 2006a). 
Indeed, more specifically, one of the most popular professional tactics for treating 
tobacco addiction is to advise smokers to deliberate about scenarios that make them feel 
like a non-smoker in order to “resist” and/or “overcome” their cravings by direct 
contradiction (Abrams et al., 2003; Brandon et al., 2004; Fujita, 2011; Friese et al., 
2011; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Hofman et al., 2012; O’Connell et al., 2006; Roefs 
et al., 2011; Wiers et al., 2010). Likewise, most cognitive theories view (tobacco) 
addiction as being primarily an issue of not being able to sustain pro-abstinence/anti-
addiction rumination extensively enough to permanently contradict, and thus prevent 
pro-smoking/anti-abstinence implicit evaluating from interjecting to motivate addictive 
                                                                                                                                               
engaged deliberative processes by confronting participants with written statements that labelled their 
usual alcohol-related expectancies as myths. However, in doing so, Krank et al. made no attempt to 
experimentally determine what those deliberative processes were. Thus, not only was it unclear how these 
three studies related to thought suppression, insofar as all three studies used confounded measures of 
implicit evaluating it was also unclear how these three studies related to implicit evaluating (as per our 
reviews of the relevant implicit measures in Chapters 1-3).   
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behaviour (see concepts such as ego/cognitive depletion, cognitive efficiency, and dual 
processes of cognitive control; Baumeister & Vonasch, 2015; Friese et al., 2011, p. 337; 
Fujita, 2011; Hoffman, Vohs & Baumeister, 2012; Wiers, Houben et al., 2010; Spada et 
al., 2015; Stacy & Wiers, 2010; Wiers, Gladwin et al., 2013; Tiffany, 1990, 2008). Even 
putting this aside, contradiction-based thought suppression is one of the primary 
methods used by smokers who attempt to quit smoking unaided (Baumeister, 
Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Farris et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2015; McCallion & Zvolensky, 
2015; O’Connell, Gerkovich, Bott, Cook, & Shiffman, 2002; O'Connell, Hosein, 
Schwartz, & Leibowitz, 2007, p. 79; Najmi, Reese, Wilhelm, Fama, Beck, & Wegner, 
2010; O'Connell, Hosein, & Schwartz, 2006; Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994; Sayers & 
Sayette, 2013). 
In sum, therefore, we deemed it a major priority to examine how thought 
suppression instructions specifically designed to contradict implicit evaluating integral 
to tobacco addiction, would impact that implicit evaluating. Crucially, insofar as 
different treatments for tobacco addiction involve different thought suppression 
strategies, this type of component process research is a fundamental prerequisite for 
systematically refining any such treatments (e.g. see Abrams et al., 2003, pp. 21-23; De 
Houwer, 2011; De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-Holmes, 2015; Kapson et al., 
2012; Kazdin, 2007; Gifford & Humphreys, 2007; Levin et al., 2011; Liefooghe & De 
Houwer, 2015; Murphy et al., 2009; Roefs et al., 2011, pp. 185-186; Vahey & Whelan, 
2015). To this end, the current chapter contains two experiments, testing thought 
suppression instructions specifically designed to contradict the addiction-integral 
implicit evaluating observed in Study 1 on the reward-focused Smoking-Pos trial-type; 
and the other testing thought suppression instructions designed to contradict the 
addiction-integral implicit evaluating observed in Study 2 on the relief-focused Need-
Neg trial-type. As such, unlike the extant literature, the current research examined the 
impact of thought suppression on its intended target in a much more precise way than 
the extant literature – which has typically instructed its participants merely to “avoid 
thinking” and/or “stop thinking” about some broad topic of concern such as smoking 
without measuring (any particular aspect of) implicit evaluating (e.g. Erskine et al., 
2015; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987, p. 6; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). And 
in effect, therefore, the current research sought to provide a first systematic examination 
of how thought suppression impacts any problematic aspects of (smoking-related) 
implicit evaluating it contradicts (see Hooper et al., 2010; Hooper et al., 2010, pp. 234, 
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239; Moss et al., 2015; Myers, 2010; Najmi et al., 2007, p. 1963; Rhodes et al., 2008; 
Spada et al., 2015; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). 
6.2. INTRODUCTION (STUDY 3) 
Testing Thought Suppression as a Means for Smokers under Cognitive Load to 
Deliberately Control Implicit Evaluating Integral to Tobacco Addiction 
In brief, the first experiment, Study 3, involved instructing smokers to 
continually deliberate, throughout the IRAP described in Study 1 (i.e. the 
unconditional-feelings-IRAP), about any familiar scenarios that helped them to maintain 
the stereotypically contrary perspective of a lifelong non-smoker. This strategy was 
designed to contradict the strongly pro-smoking Smoking-Pos DIRAP exhibited by 
smokers in Study 1, in the broadest possible terms. Crucially, our primary aim in doing 
so was to ensure that we did not inadvertently rule out smokers’ favourite, and thus 
perhaps most personally effective, strategies for contradicting their reward-focused 
tobacco cravings (i.e. particularly given that this was the first research of its kind; for 
relevant theoretical concerns see Aldao, 2013; Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012, p. 4; 
Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Erskine et al., 2015, pp. 1-3; Kazdin, 2007; Myers, 2010, pp. 
5-6; Sensibaugh, 2014). Indeed, in order to find out more about smokers’ preferred 
strategies for deliberately suppressing craving-related evaluating by contradiction, we 
required participants to summarize their preferred strategies for doing so both before 
and after the IRAP. 
In addition, we were also particularly interested in providing first estimates of 
how immediately, persistently and indeed consistently contradiction-based thought 
suppression would impact intrusive aspects of (pro-smoking) implicit evaluating. This 
was important to examine from the point of view that thought suppression strategies 
tend to have only temporary (ironic) effects on questionnaire-based measures of 
whatever intrusive evaluating they contradict (e.g. Erskine et al., 2015; Wegner & 
Erber, 1992, p. 905; Wegner et al., 1987, p. 6). Indeed, judging from the response times 
garnered in Studies One and Two, the extant thought suppression literature suggested 
that any dynamics in implicit evaluating due to thought suppression were likely to occur 
in a shorter timeframe than it would take to complete an entire set of IRAP practise and 
test trials (i.e. approximately 20 minutes on average). To account for this, we therefore 
modified the standard DIRAP scoring algorithm to allow an analysis of each trial-type 
DIRAP from one successive pair of IRAP trial blocks to the next, beginning with the final 
pair of IRAP practise blocks (i.e. which, by definition, satisfied the same response 
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latency and accuracy criteria as those in the IRAP test phase; for the details of the 
relevant extended DIRAP algorithm see Appendix 15). Again, judging from the response 
times garnered in Studies One and Two, we estimated that this approach would provide 
us with valid IRAP effect data for four successive measurement intervals lasting 
approximately two minutes each on average for each IRAP implementation. 
Furthermore, one of the most important findings from the literature on thought 
suppression is that this strategy becomes harder to maintain, and thus less effective, the 
more one is required to engage in secondary tasks that also require relatively high levels 
of deliberation (i.e. requiring relatively high levels of relational responding low in 
derivedness as per Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & Vahey, 2012, pp. 24-34; for examples 
see Erskine et al., 2015; Moss et al., 2015; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). This issue is 
particularly relevant to tobacco addiction insofar (abstaining) smokers are classically at 
most risk of smoking when they are under cognitive load during stressful situations (see 
Baker et al., 2004; Brandon et al., 2004; Erskine et al., 2015; Farris et al., 2015; 
Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Heckman et al., 2013; McCallion & Zvolensky, 2015; 
Shiffman & Waters, 2004). Thus, during the very times when thought suppression 
would in principle be most needed, it seems likely to be least effective in relation to 
problematic implicit evaluating. In order to model this process in terms of implicit 
evaluating we therefore examined the impact of the current thought suppression 
instructions when they were issued at two different stages of the IRAP from Study 1, 
each imposing a different degree of cognitive load. 
Specifically, an IRAP practise phase typically involves learning how to master a 
given stimulus set according to a given set of challenging response latency and accuracy 
criteria (usually over multiple practise blocks); but crucially, an IRAP test phase does 
not. And as such, it follows that even though an IRAP test phase is designed to be 
cognitively challenging (i.e. as per the strict response criteria it imposes; see Vahey et 
al., 2010), the IRAP practise phase preceding it will always place a heavier cognitive 
(i.e. deliberative) load on participants. Indeed, if anything, this is particularly likely to 
be the case for those who have not previously completed an IRAP (i.e. it would require 
one to learn how to respond not just to a given IRAP stimulus set, but also to the more 
general features shared among all IRAPs). And confirming this, it is now well 
established in the IAT literature that the more unfamiliar the IAT responses required 
(i.e. those in so-called inconsistent IAT blocks) the more they tend to speed up over 
one’s first two encounters with an IAT (see Greenwald et al., 2003, p. 211; Robusto et 
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al., 2008, pp. 955, 959; and indeed, for related practise effects on the impact of IAT 
block order see Nosek et al., 2005).  
We therefore recruited the current smokers, as in Study 1, so that they had 
absolutely no experience completing an IRAP; and we randomly assigned these recruits 
between the following two experimental groups designed to vary the amount of 
cognitive load they experienced during the IRAP test phase. Namely, one group 
received the relevant thought suppression instructions before the IRAP practise phase 
(i.e. the pre-practise group); and the other received those same instructions just before 
the IRAP test phase (i.e. the post-practise group). As such, by the time the pre-practise 
group reached the IRAP test phase, in principle, they should have been experiencing 
more cognitive load on the thought suppression task than the post-practise group owing 
to fatigue. That is, unlike the post-practise smokers, by the time the pre-practise 
smokers reached the IRAP test phase they would have already been continually deriving 
the relevant non-smoker scenarios for 5-10 minutes under the relatively high cognitive 
load of learning to master the IRAP’s stringent response criteria.  
In addition, we specifically recruited the current smokers according to the same 
criteria as those used in study one, and this allowed us to incorporate the smokers’ 
IRAP data from study one as a quasi-experimental control for the pre- and post-practise 
groups’ implicit evaluating. This control group was particularly important given that the 
current study was focused upon the immediacy and persistency with which the thought 
suppression instructions impacted smokers’ implicit evaluating. In particular, given the 
well known instability of response latency measures, it was possible that each respective 
trial-type DIRAP might have varied from block pair to block pair even in the absence of 
treatment (e.g., see Greenwald et al., 2003, p. 211; LeBel & Paunonen, 2011; Nosek et 
al., 2005; Robusto, Cristante, & Vianello, 2008, pp. 955, 959). To mitigate this 
possibility, it was important that we therefore judged all changes in the perspective 
switchers’ trial-type DIRAPs from block pair to block pair against the control group’s 
corresponding block pair trial-type DIRAPs.  
Moreover, another key benefit of this approach was that, in principle, it 
maximised the timeframe across which we could examine the developmental trajectory 
of thought suppression on implicit evaluating. Crucially, whereas the three successive 
pairs of post-practise IRAP test blocks measured the immediate impact of thought 
suppression on implicit evaluating, the four pre-practise IRAP trial blocks from the 
criterion practise blocks onwards extended this timeframe by up to another four pairs of 
trial blocks (i.e. depending upon the average number of practise blocks it took the pre-
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practise group to reach the criterion practise blocks). In other words, the pre- and post-
practise groups together had the potential to measure the impact of thought suppression 
on implicit evaluating across a range of up to seven pairs of IRAP trial blocks (i.e. if 
participants completed three pairs of practise blocks before reaching the criterion 
practise blocks). Indeed, even with some overlap between the thought suppression 
ranges examined by the three post-practise IRAP test blocks, and the four qualifying 
pre-practise IRAP trial blocks, it would provide an important opportunity to check for 
time-lagged replication of thought suppression effects between the two groups block-
pair trial-type DIRAPs. 
Of course, any comparisons with a quasi-experimental control group must be 
viewed with a certain degree of scepticism owing to the lack of random assignment 
across such comparisons. On balance, however, we designed the current study to 
mitigate such concerns in multiple ways. Not only did we employ the same strict 
sampling criteria for all three groups (i.e. a form of experimental control in its own 
right), but the post-practise group’s IRAP data also provided supplementary control data 
against which to gauge how well the smokers from study one matched the current 
smokers at baseline on the current IRAP. Namely, the fact that the post-practise group 
had completed the IRAP practise phase before being instructed to engage in thought 
suppression, allowed us to compute a supplementary baseline control in the form of 
trial-type DIRAPs derived from the final pair of IRAP practise blocks in each case. 
Crucially, not only did the resulting trial-type DIRAPs satisfy the same response criteria 
as conventionally imposed upon IRAP test data, but these criterion practise trial-type 
DIRAPs were also randomly assigned with respect to the other thought suppression 
group.63 And therefore, the post-practise group’s criterion practise trial-type DIRAPs 
provided us with a strong experimental safeguard on using the smokers’ IRAP data 
from Study One as a quasi-experimental control group here.  
Moreover, given the relative rarity of regular smokers in the general population 
at any given time who have not recently planned or attempted to quit smoking, it 
seemed to us particular wasteful of our limited resources in the current project to collect 
a fully randomised control group for the current study (i.e. less than one quarter of the 
Irish population report smoking at least once per week, and contrary to our sampling 
                                                 
63 Note, however, that although the post-practise group’s criterion practise trial-type DIRAPs provided an 
experimental control for the pre-practise group’s criterion practise trial-type DIRAPs they did not 
necessarily provide a stable baseline, or thus an experimental control, for any trial-type DIRAPs computed 
from IRAP test phase data (i.e. whether computed on a block pair by block pair basis across the entire 
IRAP test phase; see above). 
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criteria, approximately 20-57% of these smokers were typically transitioning towards 
smoking-cessation at any given time; see Borland, Partos, Yong, Cummings, & Hyland, 
2012; Irish Cancer Society, 2014; Morgan et al., 2008, p. 76-77). Critically, the current 
thesis sought to provide a first systematic exploration of the IRAP as a means of 
understanding tobacco addiction. And therefore, rather than essentially replicating the 
relatively particular IRAP findings we obtained for smokers in Study 1, we instead 
deemed it a higher priority to dedicate our limited resources to exploring tobacco 
addiction more broadly as per the remainder of the current thesis. This strategy was 
mainly born from the simple idea that notwithstanding our firm commitment to 
replicating theoretically important findings, one must first conduct research across 
multiple aspects of a given topic before it becomes possible to judge what theoretical 
priority particular findings should have for (ever more precise) replication (for reviews 
of related issues see Cumming, 2013; Field & Gillett, 2010, pp. 666-668; Francis, 2012; 
Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001, pp. 64-70). 
Overall, therefore, we made only tentative predictions about the extent to which 
the current thought suppression instructions might succeed in suppressing the pattern of 
pro-smoking implicit evaluating we observed among smokers in Study 1. As we 
reviewed earlier, the extant literature on thought suppression was based upon explicit 
evaluating of implicit evaluating, and thus it provided us with little basis to predict how 
the current thought suppression strategy would impact any implicit evaluating that it 
contradicted; much less how immediately and persistently this would occur. 
Nonetheless, on the basis that high cognitive load is likely to interfere with any thought 
suppression strategy, and given that the IRAP is cognitively demanding, we predicted 
that the current thought suppression instructions would only temporarily reduce those 
aspects of smokers’ pro-smoking implicit evaluating that it contradicted. That is, we 
expected these instructions to only temporarily reduce smokers’ coherent tendency to 
affirm the Smoking-Pos and Ban-Neg topics, and also their tendency to deny the 
Smoking-Neg topic. Indeed, further along these lines, we also predicted that such 
reductions would be less in the pre-practise group than in the post-practise group; and 
particularly for any pre-practise group IRAP effects occurring more than three trial 
blocks after the thought suppression instructions were introduced (i.e. outside the 
thought suppression timeframe covered by the pre-practise group’s IRAP test phase). 
In addition, thought suppression rebound effects typically only occur on explicit 
measures (of implicit evaluating) once participants (a) report having been engaged in 
thought suppression for protracted periods of time under cognitive load, and (b) they are 
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reporting a precipitous decrease in their attempts to do so (e.g. due to fatigue; see 
Erskine et al., 2015; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). On this basis, therefore, we also 
tentatively predicted that if the current thought suppression instructions were to provoke 
rebound effects it would only be on those aspects of the smokers’ implicit evaluating 
that they contradicted; and only after a delay of at least one IRAP block pair following 
their introduction. And furthermore, we also expected the current thought suppression 
instructions would temporarily increase the smokers’ tendency to affirm the Ban-Pos 
IRAP trial-type without provoking any rebound effects, because these instructions 
ostensibly encouraged rather than contradicted the smokers’ implicit tendency to affirm 
the Ban-Pos topic.  
Finally, as a secondary aim of the current research we also sought to explore 
how the thought suppression instructions would interact with the IRAP trial block order 
variable. Critically, the current thought suppression instructions specifically directed 
participants to interpret all IRAP instructions, including those relevant to block order, 
from the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker (i.e. thus incorporating the vague block 
order instructions within the thought suppression instructions). And therefore, we were 
interested in examining how the thought suppression instructions interacted with IRAP 
block order sequencing, rather than with the minimal and rather ambiguous block order 
instructions we described in discussing Study 1. However, we had little or no basis upon 
which to predict the extent to which our thought suppression instructions would operate 
by interfering with any implicit evaluating it contradicted versus by facilitating any 
complementary implicit evaluating that it (therefore) affirmed. And as such, without any 
knowledge of how it would operate upon implicit evaluating, we had no basis for 
predicting how the relevant thought suppression processes would interact with the 
current IRAP’s trial block order sequencing.  
Nonetheless, it is well-known that individuals typically engage in thought 
suppression less over time, and particularly under cognitive load. Therefore, given that 
the IRAP is designed to impose a relatively high cognitive load on participants, we 
tentatively predicted that the current smokers would be somewhat less inclined to 
adhere to the thought suppression instructions in any given IRAP trial block pair 
whenever the first trial block in each pair rendered those instructions redundant. For 
example, having received the current thought suppression instructions those completing 
the anti-smoking-first IRAP would initially have to maintain thought suppression during 
an anti-smoking trial block where it would apparently not be needed, before they 
reached a pro-smoking trial block where it would apparently be needed. Crucially, given 
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that thought suppression typically diminishes over time, with such a delay in relevancy 
it seemed likely that the current smokers would engage less with thought suppression 
across any given IRAP block pair (i.e. the basic unit of all IRAP effects); and indeed, 
particularly for IRAP block pairs delivered further after the relevant thought 
suppression instructions. Therefore, we expected that the thought suppression 
instructions would be somewhat more successful in reducing the smokers’ pro-smoking 
implicit evaluating during the pro-smoking-first block order than during the anti-
smoking-first block order; and particularly under the additional cognitive load 
experienced by the pre-practise group. 
6.3. METHOD (STUDY 3) 
Participants 
We recruited 43 smokers to the current study using strictly the same criteria for 
recruiting smokers as in Study 1, and of these participants we excluded five for failure 
to progress to the IRAP’s test phase within four pairs of practise blocks. The remaining 
38 smokers (19 female) were each randomly assigned without replacement between the 
two thought suppression conditions. In summary, 18 (9 female) were instructed to adopt 
the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker throughout both the practise and test phases of 
the IRAP (i.e. the pre-practise group); and 20 (9 female) were instructed to adopt that 
perspective throughout the IRAP test phase but not during its practise phase (i.e. the 
post-practise group). In addition, as usual, all participants were randomly assigned 
between the two levels of the IRAP block order variable for counterbalancing. 
Crucially, the 38 smokers in question were well matched to those who 
completed the IRAP in Study 1 (i.e. the smoker control group within the current study). 
On average, they were 25 years of age (SD = 6.4; range = 18-40), had been smoking 
regularly for 8.9 years (SD = 7.1; range = 0.5-30), smoked on 96% of the previous 30 
days, and consumed 15.2 CPD on those days (SD = 5.3, range = 4-25). Thus, not only 
were there no differences between the smoker controls and the thought suppression 
groups with respect to age, t(57) = .48; p = .63 (i.e. r ≈ .06), this was also the case with 
respect to YS, t(57) = -.05; p = .46 (i.e. r ≈ .01), CPD, t(57) = -.03; p = .97 (i.e. r ≈ 
.004), and the percentage of the previous 30 days each participant had smoked, t(57) = -
.82; p = .42 (i.e. r ≈ .11). Also, as in Study 1, all 38 of the thought suppression smokers 
were naive to the IRAP, and had been similarly exposed to the Irish Smoking-ban (i.e. 
continuously resident in Ireland throughout the approximately 3 years since its 
introduction at the time of the current study). In addition, none had recently committed, 
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or attempted to restrict their smoking – indeed, 60% had never attempted to quit 
smoking before (as compared to 75% in Study 1), and it had been at least ten months 
since the remainder had made any such attempt. Furthermore, we found no differences 
in the foregoing criterion variables when we compared the pre- versus post-practise 
thought suppression groups with each other and with the smoker controls taken from 
Study 1, F(2, 56)s ≤ 1.34, ps ≥ .27 (i.e. rs ≤ .15). 
Apparatus 
We employed the same unconditional-feelings-IRAP, and also the entire set of 
questionnaire measures used in Study 1, but with some important differences. Unlike 
the smoker controls from Study 1, the thought suppression smokers were formally 
instructed to adopt the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker either throughout the IRAP 
(i.e. the pre-practise group) or during just the IRAP test phase (i.e. the post-practise 
group). The specific wording of these instructions were as follows (see Appendix 16 for 
specific formatting):   
 
In this study we wish to investigate the extent to which smokers are able to pretend 
they are non-smokers. 
 
Accordingly, I would like you to do your very best to imagine yourself as a 
lifelong NON-SMOKER while you are completing the following tasks. Remember, 
however, that to complete the following tasks properly your response-times must be 
as accurate and fast as possible (i.e., go fast and avoid the red X).  
 
In other words, think of yourself as a non-smoker and avoid the appearance of 
the red X’s while also responding quickly. 
 
In your own words, what do you think you are now required to do and what 
strategy do you intend to use to accomplish it (if you don’t know inform the 
researcher): 
 
In addition as a manipulation check, both thought suppression groups were also 
instructed to complete all of the Study 1 questionnaires from the perspective of a life-
long non-smoker, but with the exception of the DBHQ (i.e. it would have confounded 
the current known-groups agenda for participants to have pretended being a lifelong 
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non-smoker while answering the DBHQ). For details of these instructions see Appendix 
17. 
Crucially, both sets of instructions required participants to describe in writing 
what specific strategy they intended to use in order to respond from the perspective of a 
lifelong non-smoker. Moreover, in those relatively few cases (not recorded) where a 
written account failed to describe at least one concrete scenario related to being a non-
smoker, the researcher prompted the relevant participant to conversationally describe 
some such scenario that reminded them of how they felt about smoking at a time before 
they first started smoking . Indeed, along similar lines, the researcher also took 
particular care to ensure that each participant’s written account (and/or conversational 
description) of this perspective switching task also emphasized the need to respond 
quickly while avoiding the onscreen appearance of red X’s during IRAP trials. 
Furthermore, once the researcher had verified the foregoing for each participant, he 
instructed all thought suppression smokers to make a special effort to keep their chosen 
scenario(s) ‘in mind during all of the following computerized tasks whenever it does not 
prevent you from achieving at least 80% accuracy and at most 3000ms median response 
speed on those tasks.’ Indeed, the researcher advised participants that they would find 
this combined task more manageable if they deliberately set aside 30 seconds in 
between each ‘block of the computerized tasks’ to concentrate upon visualising their 
chosen non-smoker scenario(s) in preparation for each successive block.  
In addition, as further manipulation checks, both thought suppression groups 
also completed one set of three questions specifically relating to the IRAP-based 
perspective switching task (see Appendix 18), and another set of matched questions 
relating to the questionnaire-based perspective switching task (see Appendix 19). In 
particular, both sets of manipulation check questionnaires began by asking participants 
to rate ‘from their own perspective’: (a) how successful they reckoned they had been at 
pretending to be a lifelong non-smoker during the relevant perspective switching task; 
and (b) how motivated they felt in doing so (i.e. on six-point Likert-type scales ranging 
from ‘O [Not At All]’ to 3 [Moderately]’ to ‘6 [Very Much]’; see Appendices 18 & 19). 
Lastly, both sets of manipulation check questionnaires concluded by asking participants 
to retrospectively summarize (again from their ‘own perspective’) how they had 
attempted to adopt the perspective of lifelong non-smoker on the relevant 
IRAP/questionnaires. 
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Procedure 
The current study employed the same procedure as Study 1 except for the 
following additions. The pre-practise group were formally instructed before the IRAP 
practise phase to adopt the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker ‘throughout the 
following set of computerized tasks’; and the post-practise group received no such 
instruction until the interval between the IRAP practise and test phases (for details of 
the relevant instruction sets see the Apparatus section above). Thus, whereas the pre-
practise group were instructed to respond from the perspective of a lifelong smoker 
during both the IRAP practise and test phases, the post-practise group were not 
instructed to do so until after the IRAP practise phase. After completing the IRAP test 
phase both perspective switching groups were asked to answer the above-described 
manipulation check questionnaire relating to the preceding IRAP-based perspective 
switching task, followed by being formally instructed to again adopt the perspective of a 
lifelong non-smoker while answering all of the questionnaires from Study 1 (i.e. barring 
the DBHQ). Having done so, both thought suppression groups then completed the 
above-described manipulation check questionnaire relating to the preceding 
questionnaire-based perspective switching task. Lastly, the researcher interviewed all of 
the current participants using the DBHQ in the same semi-structured manner as 
described for Study 1. 
6.4. RESULTS (STUDY 3) 
6.4.1. Scoring and Analysing the IRAP Data 
Of the 38 thought suppression smokers who succeeded in progressing to the 
IRAP test phase, we excluded four from further analyses on the basis that they did not 
maintain an average response accuracy of at least 80% and/or a response speed of at 
most 3000ms across its trials. We scored the remaining 16 pre-practise and 18 post-
practise groups’ IRAP data using both the standard DIRAP-algorithm (see Appendix 4), 
and also an ‘extended’ DIRAP-algorithm (see Appendix 15). 
6.4.2 Manipulation Checks for the Thought suppression Instructions 
The core aim of the current study was to examine how attempting to continually 
maintain the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker would impact committed smokers’ 
implicit evaluating of the current trial-type topics. Therefore, in order to verify the 
degree to which the current thought suppression instructions were effective in 
encouraging such attempts, we examined multiple manipulation checks related to the 
manner in which participants adopted the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker. 
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Self-reported Perceptions of Success and Motivation 
The thought suppression groups differed to a moderate statistical degree, in 
terms of the success they reported in responding from the perspective of a lifelong 
smoker throughout the IRAP, t(32) = 1.45; p = .16; 2 = .06 (i.e. r ≈ .25); but not with 
respect to the questionnaire-based thought suppression task, t(32) = -.09; p = .92; 2 
=.0003 (i.e. r ≈ .02). In practical terms, however, the relevant differences were relatively 
minor insofar as these groups reported being successful to a similarly moderate degree 
in adopting the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker during the IRAP (i.e. respectively, 
Ms = 3.3, 3.9; SDs = 1.5, 1.1); and to a similarly moderate-to-large degree during the 
relevant questionnaires (i.e. respectively, Ms = 4.1, 4.1; SDs = 1.7, 1.4). Moreover, there 
was no statistical difference between the pre- and post-practise groups in terms of how 
motivated they reported feeling to complete the IRAP-based thought suppression task, 
t(32) = -.09; p = .93; 2 = .0003 (i.e. r ≈ .02), or its questionnaire-based counterpart, 
t(32) = -.05, p = .96, 2 =.0001 (i.e. r ≈.01). Rather, both groups reported feeling a 
moderate-to-large degree motivated both during the relevant IRAP-based (i.e. 
respectively, Ms = 3.4, 4.1; SDs = 1.5, 1.3), and questionnaire-based tasks (i.e. 
respectively, Ms = 4.3, 4.3; SDs = 1.3, 1.6).  
Furthermore, given the extensive concordance between participants’ 
retrospective perceptions of success in completing the thought suppression tasks and 
their subsequent self-reported motivation in doing so, we examined the extent to which 
these two variables were correlated with each other. This resulted in  large correlations 
between these measures both in relation to the IRAP- and questionnaire-based thoughts 
suppression tasks (i.e. respectively, r(32)s = .64, .65; ps < .0001). Crucially, this might 
explain why the pre-practise group, t(15) = -1.74, p = .10, 2 = .17 (i.e. r ≈ .41), but not 
the post-practise group, t(17) = -.34, p = .74, 2 = .007 (i.e. r ≈ .08), reported less 
motivation in completing the IRAP-based perspective switching task than its 
questionnaire-based counterpart (see relevant descriptive statistics above). Namely, as a 
result of the pre-practised group having first retrospectively reported less success in 
completing the IRAP-based task relative to the questionnaire-based task, t(15) = -.32, p 
= .21, 2 = .10 (i.e. r ≈ .32), and the post-practise group exhibiting no such difference, 
t(17) = -.57, p = .58, 2 = .02 (i.e. r ≈ .14).  
Content Analyses of the Various Thought Suppression Strategies Adopted in Practise 
The thought suppression instructions did not prescribe specific scenarios for 
participants to imagine the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker. Therefore, in order to 
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determine in broad terms what types of perspective switching strategies participants 
adopted we first performed exploratory thematic analyses of the pre- and post-practise 
groups’ open-ended descriptions of how they attempted to adopt these perspectives in 
practise. This resulted in four basic themes (see below) which we then used to perform 
the following content analyses of these open-ended descriptions. Crucially, the thought 
suppression groups did not differ from each other with respect to any of these four 
content analysis themes, 2(1, 34)s ≤ .95, ps ≤ .33, Cramer’s Vs ≤ .17.  
Instead, with regard to the first theme, every participant in both thought 
suppression groups reported imagining an anti-smoking scenario in order to respond 
from the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker both during the IRAP- and questionnaire-
based perspective switching tasks. And moreover, with regard to the second theme, a 
similarly high proportion of both thought suppression groups did not mention imagining 
scenarios that typified the benefits of abstinence (or smoking-bans) during either the 
IRAP- or the questionnaire-based perspective switching tasks (i.e. respectively, 87% 
and 94% during the IRAP-based task, and 100% and 89% during the questionnaire-
based task). 
In addition, with regard to the third theme, just over half of both groups reported 
difficulty maintaining the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker during the IRAP (i.e. 
respectively, 63% and 56%), and in contrast no participant in either group reported 
difficulty maintaining the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker while answering the 
relevant questionnaires. Indeed, with regard to the fourth and final theme, just under 
half of both groups reported abandoning their efforts to perspective switch before 
completing the IRAP (i.e. respectively, 44% and 38%), but none of either group 
reported doing so during the relevant questionnaires.  
The Questionnaire-based Thought Suppression Task 
The thought suppression groups explicitly evaluated in a very similarly anti-
smoking/pro-ban manner to each other on both the semantic differentials and feeling 
thermometers, t(32)s ≤ |.89|, ps ≥ .38, 2s ≤ .03 (i.e. rs ≤ .16). Namely, the pre- and 
post-practise groups both explicitly evaluated smoking with strong disfavour on the 
smoking-related semantic differentials (i.e. respectively, Ms = -2.1, -2.1; SDs = 0.9, 
1.1), and feeling thermometers (i.e. respectively, Ms = -40.6, -34.5; SDs = 13.3, 24.1). 
And moreover, both groups explicitly evaluated the smoking-ban with strong favour on 
the ban-related semantic differentials (i.e. respectively, Ms = -2.2, -2.2; SDs = 0.8, 1.0), 
and also on the ban-related feeling thermometers (i.e. respectively, Ms = -39.9, -39.4; 
SDs = 15.7, 14.7). Crucially, this was in strong contrast to the control group, t(32)s ≥ 
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|3.20|, ps ≤ .003, 2s ≥ .22 (i.e. rs ≥ .47), who explicitly evaluated the same semantic 
differentials and feeling thermometers in both a moderately pro-smoking (i.e. 
respectively, Ms = 1.2, 24.8; SDs = 1.2, 17.0), and moderately pro-ban manner (i.e. 
respectively, Ms = -.5, -7.6; SDs = 1.4, 28.1). 
Likewise, when it came to the mFTQ, HONC and tobacco craving (TC) 
measures both thought suppression groups were similarly effective in portraying 
themselves as being absent of the symptoms of tobacco addiction. Namely, the pre- and 
post-practise groups both exhibited mFTQ scores that incorrectly indicated that these 
groups were comprised of infrequent- and/or non-smokers (i.e. respectively, Ms = 1.0, 
0.5; SDs = 1.3, 0.9); as did both groups’ HONC scores (i.e. respectively, Ms = 0.6, 0.3; 
SDs = 2.2, 1.0), and indeed their TC scores (i.e. respectively, Ms = 0.3, 0.3; SDs = 1.0, 
0.8). This was in contrast to the control group whose mFTQ, HONC and TC scores 
consistently indicated moderate levels of nicotine dependence (i.e. respectively, Ms = 
3.5, 7.0, 3.2; SDs = 1.1, 2.5, 2.0), even though these smokers’ smoking histories closely 
matched those of both thought suppression groups (see Method).64 Overall, therefore, it 
appeared as though the current cohort of committed smokers consistently imagined non-
smokers’ perspectives in terms of being strongly against smoking (i.e. rather than 
indifferent to it), and as being characteristically free from the symptoms of tobacco 
addiction. 
6.4.3. IRAP trial-type by Thought Suppression by Block Sequence Analyses 
A second major aim of the current study was to use the IRAP to explore how 
immediately, persistently and indeed consistently that the thought suppression 
instructions would impact committed smokers’ implicit evaluating of each of the current 
trial-type topics. We therefore entered the ‘extended’ block-pair DIRAP data into a 
3x2x2x4 mixed ANOVA, which crossed the thought suppression variable (i.e. smoker 
controls versus the pre-practise smokers and post-practise smokers), with the two IRAP 
trial-type variables, and IRAP trial block sequence (i.e. four levels with one for each 
successive pair of IRAP trial blocks from the criterion practise blocks onwards; as per 
the extended DIRAP algorithm; see Appendix 15). This resulted in a moderately-sized 
interaction among all four variables, F(6, 159) = 3.72, p = .08, p
2 = .07 (i.e. r ≈ .26), 
                                                 
64 Indeed, the relevant differences between the control group and each perspective switching group was 
statistically very large for each of these three measures, ts ≥ 5.30, ps ≤ .0001, 2s ≥ .44 (i.e. rs ≥ .66). In 
addition, even though there was statistically moderate difference between the two perspective switching 
groups on mFTQ, t(32) = 1.41, p = .17, 2 = .06 (i.e. r = .24), it was very small in practical terms 
(Prokhorov et al., 1998, p. 42); and moreover, there were no such statistical differences in terms of 
HONC or TC, t(32)s ≤ .60, ps ≥ .55, 2s ≥ .01 (i.e. rs ≥ .11). 
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which qualified multiple lower-level interactions and main effects.65 In broad terms, this 
indicated that thought suppression had a different impact on each of the four trial-type 
effects across IRAP block sequence. In order to unpack this four-way interaction, we 
conducted the following four follow-up ANOVAs, each examining the impact of 
thought suppression on one of the four trial-type effects across block sequence.  
Thought Suppression by Block Sequence on Smoking-Pos DIRAP 
There was no main effect of block sequence on Smoking-Pos DIRAP, F(3, 159) = 
1.61, p = .19, p
2 = .03 (i.e. r ≈ .17), but there was a moderate main effect of thought 
suppression, F(2, 53) = 1.93, p = .16, p
2 = .07 (i.e. r ≈ .26); and indeed crucially, 
thought suppression and block sequence interacted with each other to a moderate degree 
on Smoking-Pos DIRAP, F(6, 159) = 2.30, p = .04, p
2 = .08 (i.e. r ≈ .28). To unpack the 
nature of this interaction, illustrated in Figure 6.1, we conducted twelve planned 
comparison t-tests to respectively compare Smoking-Pos DIRAP between each pairing of 
the thought suppression groups with the control group on each level of block sequence. 
There was no difference between the control group and the post-practise group 
on Smoking-Pos DIRAP during the criterion practise blocks, t(38) = -.345, p = .73, 
2 = 
.003 (i.e. r ≈ .06). Crucially, this indicated that both thought suppression groups were 
well matched at baseline to the control group on Smoking-Pos DIRAP from Study 1 (i.e. 
given random assignment of participants between the thought suppression groups). 
Thereafter, upon introducing the thought suppression instructions, there was little 
difference between the post-practise and control groups on Smoking-Pos DIRAP during 
the first two pairs of IRAP test blocks (i.e. respectively, t(38)s = .86, .05; ps = .39, .96; 
2s = .02, .00006; rs ≈ .14, .008). However, during the final pair of test blocks the post-
practise group did exhibit a Smoking-Pos DIRAP that was a large degree less pro-smoking 
than the smoker control group’s Smoking-Pos DIRAP, t(38) = 2.74, p = .01, 
2 = .17 (i.e. 
r ≈ .41; see Figure 6.1). 
                                                 
65 Namely, there were main effects observed for both IRAP concept label, F(1, 53) = 13.62, p = .001, p
2 
= .20 (i.e. r ≈ .45), and IRAP attribute stimulus class, F(1, 53) = 6.67, p = .01, p
2 = .11 (i.e. r ≈ .33). And 
in addition to the foregoing interaction among all four variables, these two main effects were qualified by 
a large interaction between the trial-type variables, F(1, 53) = 53.45, p < .0001, p
2 = .50 (i.e. r ≈ .71); a 
moderate interaction between thought suppression and the trial-type variables, F(2, 53) = 2.29, p = .11, 
p
2 = .08 (i.e. r ≈ .28); and also moderate three-way interactions between block sequence, thought 
suppression and both IRAP concept label, F(6, 159) = 1.14, p = .34, p
2 = .04 (i.e. r ≈ .20), and IRAP 
attribute stimulus class, F(6, 159) = 1.05, p = .39, p
2 = .04 (i.e. r ≈ .20). Furthermore, there were also 
moderate two-way interactions between thought suppression and both block sequence, F(6, 159) = 1.76, p 
= .11, p
2 = .06 (i.e. r ≈ .25), and IRAP attribute stimulus class, F(2, 53) = 1.83, p = .17, p
2 = .06 (i.e. r ≈ 
.25). All remaining main and interaction effects were null, Fs ≤ .79, ps ≥ .38, p
2s ≤ .03 (i.e. rs ≤ .17). 
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Figure 6.1. The two-way interaction between thought suppression and IRAP trial block sequence on 
Smoking-Pos DIRAP (with standard error bars).  
 
Crucially, planned F-test contrasts revealed that the relevant Smoking-Pos DIRAP 
interaction between the control group and the post-practise group from criterion practise 
to test pair 1 was null, F(1, 38) = .67, p = .42, p
2 = .02 (i.e. r ≈ .13); as was the 
interaction between test pairs 1 and 2, F(1, 38) = .26, p = .62, p
2 = .007 (i.e. r ≈ .08); 
but in contrast, that between test pairs 2 and 3 was large, F(1, 38) = 4.78, p = .04, p
2 = 
.11 (i.e. r ≈ .33). Thus, in summary, it appeared as though the thought suppression 
instructions had a relatively delayed, but eventually large impact on Smoking-Pos DIRAP 
(see Figure 6.1). Indeed, bearing this out, the post-practise group’s Smoking-Pos DIRAP 
was positive to a similar degree throughout the criterion practise blocks and test pairs 1 
and 2 (i.e. respectively, t[17]s = 1.49, 3.00, 2.66; ps = .16, .008, .02; 2s = .11, .35, .29; 
rs = .34, .59, .54), but then reduced to the neighbourhood of zero during test block pair 
3, t(17) = -.55, p = .60, 2 = .02, r = .13.66 
The pre-practise group, by contrast, who had received the thought suppression 
instructions before the criterion practise blocks, nevertheless did not differ from either 
the control group or the post-practise group on the criterion practise Smoking-Pos 
                                                 
66 We highlighted the changing size of the post-practise group’s Smoking-Pos DIRAPs relative to zero to 
provide a preliminary indication of the qualitative impact of the perspective switching instructions on 
Smoking-Pos DIRAP (i.e. whether these instructions succeeded in removing smokers’ implicit preference 
for responding True rather than False to the Smoking-Pos trial-type topic). It is important to note, 
however, that this heuristic approach would not have been interpretable had the size of the control group’s 
block-pair Smoking-Pos DIRAPs not been at least somewhat stable in relation to each other, 2.55 ≤ t(21)s ≤ 
4.05; ps ≤ .01; .24 ≤ 2s ≤ .44; .49 ≤ rs ≤ .66 (see Figure 5.4.1).  
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DIRAP, respectively, ts = -.37, .08; ps = .71, .94; 
2s = .0004, .0002 (i.e. rs ≈ .06, .01). 
This provided us with double confirmation that the thought suppression from pre-
practise had a no impact on smokers’ Smoking-Pos DIRAPs during the criterion practise 
blocks. And yet, crucially, during the IRAP test phase, the pre-practise group oscillated 
between being less than versus broadly similar to the control group on Smoking-Pos 
DIRAP. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 6.1, the pre-practise group’s Smoking-Pos 
DIRAP were less than the smoker control group’s Smoking-Pos DIRAP on test block pairs 1 
and 3 (i.e. respectively, t(36)s = 3.07, 1.62; ps = .004, .11, 2s = .21, .07; rs ≈ .46, .26), 
but broadly similar to (if not more than) the smoker control’s Smoking-Pos DIRAP on test 
block pair 2, t(36) = -1.08, p = .29, 2 = .031 (i.e. r ≈ .18). 
Confirming this pattern, planned F-tests revealed that the Smoking-Pos DIRAP 
interaction between the control group and the pre-practise group from criterion practise 
to test pair 1 was large and negative, F(1, 36) = 7.37, p = .01, p
2 = .17 (i.e. r ≈ .41); but 
that the corresponding Smoking-Pos DIRAP interaction between test pairs 1 and 2 was in 
the opposite direction to a similar extent, F(1, 36) = 8.75, p = .005, p
2 = .20 (i.e. r ≈ 
.44); and moreover, that that the corresponding Smoking-Pos DIRAP interaction between 
test pairs 2 and 3 again reversed direction and was moderately-sized, F(1, 36) = 3.29, p 
= .08, p
2 = .08 (i.e. r ≈ .29).  
In addition, we observed aconcordant pattern of effects between the pre- and 
post-practise groups’ respective block-pair Smoking-Pos DIRAPs. Namely, both groups 
exhibited broadly similar Smoking-Pos DIRAPs to each other during the criterion practise 
blocks, t(32) = -.08, p = .94, 2 = .0002 (i.e. r ≈ .01), and thereafter they oscillated 
between being greater versus less than each other on Smoking-Pos DIRAP. Indeed, more 
precisely, the pre-practise group exhibited Smoking-Pos DIRAPs that were largely less 
pro-smoking than the post-practise group during the 1st test block pair, t(32) = -2.37, p 
= .02, 2 = .15 (i.e. r ≈ .39), but during the 2nd and 3rd test block pairs it was the other 
way around to a moderate-to-small degree (i.e. respectively, t(32)s = 1.11, 1.89; ps = 
.28, .24; 2 = .04, .04;  rs ≈ .20, .21).  
Thus, in summary, it appeared as though the pre-practise thought suppression 
instructions had no impact on Smoking-Pos DIRAP during the criterion practise blocks, 
but had a large impact on Smoking-Pos DIRAP during test block pair 1, which 
disappeared during test block pair 2, and then reappeared during test block pair 3 (see 
Figure 6.1). Indeed, bearing this out, the pre-practise group’s Smoking-Pos DIRAP was 
largely positive to begin with during the criterion practise block pair, t(15) = 2.51, p = 
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.02, 2 = .29, r = .54, but decreased to the neighbourhood of zero during test block pair 
1, t(15) = -.73, p = .48, 2 = .03, r = .18; and then became largely positive again during 
test block pair 2, t(15) = 3.56, p = .003, 2 = .46, r = .68, before becoming moderately 
positive during test block pair 3, t(15) = 1.21, p = .24, 2 = .09, r = .30. And 
furthermore,  
Overall, therefore, it appeared as though the thought suppression instructions 
had broadly the same, relatively delayed impact on the size of both the pre- and post-
practise groups’ block-pair Smoking-Pos DIRAPs. In particular, as illustrated in Figure 
6.1, the thought suppression instructions first impacted the pre-practise group’s 
Smoking-Pos DIRAP (i.e. relative to the control group’s Smoking-Pos DIRAP) in test block 
pair 1, in a very similar manner as they first impacted the post-practise group’s 
Smoking-Pos DIRAP in test block pair 3. Namely, in test block pairs 1 and 3 the control 
group’s Smoking-Pos DIRAPs were largely pro-smoking, t(21)s ≥ 3.56, ps ≤ .002, 
2s ≥ 
.38 (i.e. rs ≥ .61), but in contrast the pre-practise group’s Smoking-Pos DIRAP in test pair 
1, and the post-practise group’s Smoking-Pos DIRAP in test pair 3 were both at least 
trending in an anti-smoking direction (i.e. respectively, t(21)s = -.73, -.54; ps = .48, .59; 
2s = .05, .02; rs = .22, .13).  
Moreover, not only did the thought suppression instructions have a similar first 
impact on Smoking-Pos DIRAP for both the pre- and post-practise groups, but they also 
occurred after a broadly similar delay for both groups. Namely, the post-practise group 
completed two pairs of IRAP test blocks before the thought suppression instructions 
first impacted their Smoking-Pos DIRAP during IRAP test block pair 3 (see Figure 6.1). 
And similarly, the pre-practise group had completed an average of three pairs of IRAP 
practise blocks before the relevant instructions first impacted their block-pair Smoking-
Pos DIRAPs on test block pair 1. Crucially, the additional delay of one block pair for pre-
practise group may be explained by the differing cognitive demands placed on these 
groups during the IRAP practise phase.  
Namely, unlike the control group or the post-practise group, the pre-practise 
group had to focus upon perspective switching while learning how to master the IRAP 
practise trials (for the first time), and this likely interfered with achieving the relevant 
response latency and accuracy criteria. And bearing this out, it took the pre-practise 
group almost one extra pair of practise blocks before they progressed to the IRAP test 
phase (i.e. 0.7 on average relative to the other two groups; F(1, 50) = 5.96, p = .02, p
2 
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= .11 (i.e. r ≈ .33).67 And moreover, thereafter, both the pre- and post-practise groups 
exhibited similar response accuracies and latencies during the IRAP test blocks68 – thus 
suggesting that mastering the IRAP delayed, rather than modified, the successive impact 
of the perspective taking instructions on the pre-practise group’s block-pair trial-type 
DIRAPs. On balance, therefore, it appeared as though the thought suppression instructions 
had broadly the same (delayed and oscillatory) progression on Smoking-Pos DIRAP in 
both thought suppression groups. 
Thought suppression by Block Sequence on Smoking-Neg DIRAP 
There was no main effect of block sequence on Smoking-Neg DIRAP, F(3, 159) = 
.36, p = .78, p
2 = .007 (i.e. r ≈ .08), but there was a moderate main effect of thought 
suppression, F(2, 53) = 1.00, p = .37, p
2 = .036 (i.e. r ≈ .19); and indeed crucially, both 
thought suppression and block sequence interacted with each other to a moderate degree 
on Smoking-Neg DIRAP, F(6, 159) = 1.08, p = .37, p
2 = .04 (i.e. r ≈ .20). To unpack the 
nature of this interaction, we conducted the following planned comparisons to 
respectively compare Smoking-Neg DIRAP between each pairing of the thought 
suppression groups with the control group on each level of block sequence. 
There was no difference between the control group and the post-practise group 
on Smoking-Neg DIRAP during the criterion practise blocks, t(38) = .287, p = .78, 
2 = 
.002 (i.e. r ≈ .05). Thus, crucially, both thought suppression groups were well matched 
at baseline to the control group on Smoking-Neg DIRAP from Study 1. Thereafter, upon 
introducing the thought suppression instructions, there was little difference between the 
post-practise and control groups on Smoking-Pos DIRAP during the first two pairs of 
IRAP test blocks (i.e. respectively, t(38)s = 1.03, .19; ps = .31, .85; 2s = .026, .001; rs 
≈ .16, .03). However, contrary to the thought suppression instructions, the post-practise 
group was a moderate degree more pro-smoking than the control group on Smoking-Neg 
DIRAP during the final pair of test blocks, t(38) = -1.87, p = .07, 
2 = .08 (i.e. r ≈ .29; see 
Figure 6.2).  
 
                                                 
67 Specifically, whereas the pre-practise group completed an average of 3.2 practise block pairs before 
progress to the IRAP test phase, this took the control group an average of 2.5 practise block pairs, and the 
post-practise group an average of 2.4 practise block pairs.  
68 Namely, the 16 pre-practise switchers completed the pro- and anti-smoking test blocks with average 
respective accuracies of 89% and 95%, and average respective latencies of 2622ms and 2500ms. And 
likewise, the post-practise switchers completed the pro- and anti-smoking test blocks with average 
respective accuracies of 85% and 93%, and average respective latencies of 2699ms and 2610ms.  
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Figure 6.2. The two-way interaction between thought suppression and IRAP trial block sequence on 
Smoking-Neg DIRAP (with standard error bars).  
 
Confirming this pattern, planned F-test contrasts revealed that the relevant 
Smoking-Neg DIRAP interaction between the control group and the post-practise group 
from criterion practise to test pair 1 was null, F(1, 38) = .21, p = .65, p
2 = .005 (i.e. r ≈ 
.07); as was the interaction between test pairs 1 and 2, F(1, 38) = .21, p = .65, p
2 = .005 
(i.e. r ≈ .07); but in contrast, there was a moderately-sized interaction between test pairs 
2 and 3, F(1, 38) = 2.02, p = .16, p
2 = .05 (i.e. r ≈ .22). Thus, in summary, it appeared 
as though the thought suppression instructions had a relatively delayed, moderately 
sized ironic impact on Smoking-Neg DIRAP (see Figure 6.2). Indeed, bearing this out, the 
post-practise group’s Smoking-Neg DIRAP was in the neighbourhood of zero throughout 
the criterion practise blocks and test pairs 1 and 2 (i.e. respectively, t[17]s = -.27, .12, 
.53; ps ≥ .60; 2s ≤ .02; rs ≤ .13), but then became largely pro-smoking during test block 
pair 3, t(17) = 2.55, p = .02, 2 = .28, r = .53.69 
The pre-practise group, by contrast, were a similarly large degree greater than 
the control group on the Smoking-Neg DIRAP during the criterion practise blocks, t(36) = 
-1.41, p = .17, 2 = .05, r ≈ .23, as the post-practise group was during test block pair 3 
(i.e. when the thought suppression instructions first impacted the post-practise group’s 
Smoking-Neg DIRAP; see above). And indeed, confirming this, the pre-practise group 
                                                 
69 And crucially, the control group’s Smoking-Neg DIRAP was in the neighborhood of zero during test 
block pair 3, t(21) = -.12, p = .91, 2 = .0006, r ≈ .03, as it had been in broad terms during the preceding 
three trial block pairs; respectively, t(21)s = .13, 1.78, .65; ps = .90, .09, .52; 2s = .0008, .13, .02; rs ≈ 
.03, .36, .14 (see Figure 5.4.2). 
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was also a similarly moderate degree more pro-smoking on criterion practise Smoking-
Neg DIRAP than the supplementary control provided by pre-practise group on criterion 
practise Need-Neg DIRAP, t(32) = 1.57, p = .13, 
2 = .07, r ≈ .27. And moreover, both 
differences corresponded closely with the estimated size of the initial impact of these 
thought suppression instructions on the post-practise group’s block pair Smoking-Neg 
DIRAPs (i.e. see the relevant interaction above between the test block pairs 2 and 3). 
The pre-practise group, by contrast, were moderately more pro-smoking on 
Smoking-Neg DIRAP than the control group during both the criterion practise blocks and 
test block pair 3 (i.e. respectively, t(36)s = -1.407, -1.24; ps = .17, .22, 2s = .05, .04; rs 
≈ .23, .20). And, confirming this, the pre-practise group was a similarly more pro-
smoking on criterion practise Smoking-Neg DIRAP than the supplementary control 
provided by pre-practise group on criterion practise Smoking-Neg DIRAP, t(32) = 1.57, p 
= .13, 2 = .07, r ≈ .27. Indeed, whereas the pre-practise group’s Smoking-Neg DIRAP 
was largely pro-smoking during the criterion practise blocks and test block pair 3 (i.e. 
respectively, t(15)s = 1.79, 1.62; ps = .09, .13; 2s = .18, .15; rs ≈ .42, .39), during test 
pairs 1 and 2 it was much like for both other groups; namely, bordering on being pro-
smoking (i.e. respectively, t(15)s = .64, 1.10; ps = .53, .29; 2s = .03, .07; rs ≈ .16, .27). 
Thus, as illustrated in Figure 6.2, all three groups were similar to each other on 
Smoking-Neg DIRAP during test block pairs 1 and 2 (i.e. |t|s ≤ 1.03 ; ps ≥ .58; 
2s ≤ .03; rs 
≤ .16); as were the two thought suppression groups during test block pair 3, t(32) = -.57; 
p =.57; 2 =.01, r ≈.10.  
Crucially, planned F-test contrasts confirmed that the relevant Smoking-Neg 
DIRAP interaction between the control group and the pre-practise group from criterion 
practise to test pair 1 was moderately positive, F(1, 36) = 2.03, p = .16, p
2 = .05, r ≈ 
.23); that between test pairs 1 and 2 was null, F(1, 38) = .23, p = .64, p
2 = .006 (i.e. r ≈ 
.08); and in contrast, that between test pairs 2 and 3 was moderately negative, F(1, 38) = 
.47, p = .50, p
2 = .01 (i.e. r ≈ .11). Overall, therefore, it appeared as though the thought 
suppression instructions had broadly the same, relatively delayed ironic impact on the 
size of both the pre- and post-practise groups’ block-pair Smoking-Neg DIRAPs (i.e. 
especially given that on average the pre-practise group completed three pairs of practise 
blocks). Namely, the thought suppression instructions appeared to take two pairs of 
IRAP trial blocks before first (ironically) impacting the smokers’ Smoking-Neg DIRAPs; 
and thereafter, they appeared to be ineffective for two successive pairs of IRAP trial 
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blocks before inducing a second rebound-type effect on the next block-pair Smoking-
Neg DIRAP (see Figure 6.2). 
Thought suppression by Block Sequence on Ban-Pos DIRAP 
There was no main effect of block sequence on Ban-Pos DIRAP, F(3, 159) = .39, 
p = .76, p
2 = .007 (i.e. r ≈ .09), but there was a moderate main effect of thought 
suppression, F(2, 53) = 1.24, p = .30, p
2 = .05 (i.e. r ≈ .21); and indeed crucially, both 
thought suppression and block sequence interacted with each other to a moderate degree 
on Ban-Pos DIRAP, F(6, 159) = 1.38, p = .23, p
2 = .05 (i.e. r ≈ .22). To unpack the 
nature of this interaction, illustrated in Figure 6.3, we conducted the following planned 
comparisons to respectively compare Ban-Pos DIRAP between each pairing of the 
thought suppression groups with the control group on each level of block sequence. 
 
 
Figure 6.3. The two-way interaction between thought suppression and IRAP trial block sequence on Ban-
Pos DIRAP (with standard error bars). 
 
The post-practise group was closely matched to the control group on criterion 
practise Ban-Pos DIRAPs, t(38) = -.32, p = .75, 
2 = .003, r ≈ .05. Thus, both thought 
suppression groups appeared to be well matched at baseline to the control group on 
Smoking-Pos DIRAP from Study 1 (i.e. given random assignment of participants between 
the thought suppression groups). Moreover, curiously, the post-practise group and the 
controls did not differ on Ban-Pos DIRAPs during any of the three test block pairs, t(38)s 
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≤ |.72|, ps ≥ .48, 2s ≤ .01 (i.e. rs ≤ .12). Confirming this, planned F-tests revealed that 
there were no Ban-Pos DIRAP interactions between successive block pairs for these two 
groups, F(1, 38) = .32, p = .58, p
2 = .008, r ≈ .09. Indeed, both the post-practise group 
and the control group each remained in the broad neighbourhood of zero on Ban-Pos 
DIRAP during the criterion practise blocks, |t|s ≤ .25; ps ≥ .80, 
2s ≤ .004; rs ≤ .06, and 
test pairs 1 and 2, |t|s ≤ .82 ; ps ≥ .42; 2s ≤ .03; rs ≤ .19; only becoming negative during 
test pair 3 (i.e. respectively, t(38)s = -2.22, -1.11; p = .04, .28; 2 = .19, .07; r ≈ .44, .26; 
see Figure 6.3). 
By contrast, the pre-practise thought suppression did appear to move Ban-Pos 
DIRAP in an anti-smoking direction. Namely, the pre-practise group were more pro-ban 
than the control group with respect to both the criterion practise and test block pair 1 
Ban-Pos DIRAPs; respectively, t(36)s = 1.49, 1.47; ps = .14, .15; 
2s = .06, .06; rs ≈ .24, 
.24. And indeed, the same was true of the pre-practise group as compared to the post-
practise group, respectively, t(32)s = -1.09, -1.17; ps = .07, .25; 2s = .10, .04; rs ≈ .32, 
.20. However, when it came to test block pair 2 there was no difference between the 
pre-practise group and either of the other two groups on Ban-Pos DIRAPs, |t|s ≤ .95 ; ps ≥ 
.35; 2s ≤ .02; rs ≤ .16; and indeed, during test block pair 3 pre-practise thought 
suppression appeared to have a counterproductive influence on Ban-Pos DIRAP relative 
to both the control group and the post-practise group, ts = -1.86, -1.15; ps = .07, .25; 2s 
= .09, .04; rs ≈ .30, .20.  
Confirming this pattern, planned F-tests indicated that the Ban-Pos DIRAP 
interaction between the control group and the pre-practise group from criterion practise 
to test pair 1 was null, F(1, 36) = .0005, p = .98, p
2 = .00001, r ≈ .004; but those 
between test pairs 1 and 2, F(1, 36) = .33, p = .57, p
2 = .01, r ≈ .10, and between test 
pairs 2 and 3 together became gradually moderately negative, F(1, 36) = 3.62, p = .07, 
p
2 = .09, r ≈ .30. Indeed, the pre-practise group was largely and similarly negative on 
Ban-Pos DIRAP during both the criterion practise pair and test pair 1 (i.e. respectively, 
t[15]s = -2.53, 2.28; ps = .02, .03; 2s = .30, .26; rs ≈ .55, .51); but during test block pair 
2 they were only moderately negative on Ban-Pos DIRAP, t(15) = -1.23, p = .24, 
2 = .09, 
r ≈ .30, and indeed trending positive on Ban-Pos DIRAP during test block 3, t(15) = .55, p 
= .59, 2 = .02, r ≈ .14. Overall, therefore, it appeared as though the thought suppression 
instructions did not impact the post-practise group’s block-pair Ban-Pos DIRAPs, but did 
initially impact the pre-practise group block-pair Ban-Pos DIRAPs in a large pro-ban 
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direction until it diminished in test block pair 2, and then became ironic in test block 
pair 3 (see Figure 6.3). 
Thought suppression by Block Sequence on Ban-Neg DIRAP 
There was no main effect of block sequence on Ban-Neg DIRAP, F(3, 159) = .62, 
p = .60, p
2 = .01 (i.e. r ≈ .11), but there was a moderate main effect of thought 
suppression, F(2, 53) = 1.09, p = .34, p
2 = .04 (i.e. r ≈ .20); and indeed crucially, both 
thought suppression and block sequence interacted with each other to a moderate degree 
on Ban-Pos DIRAP, F(6, 159) = 1.06, p = .23, p
2 = .04 (i.e. r ≈ .20). To unpack the 
nature of this interaction, illustrated in Figure 6.4, we conducted the following planned 
comparisons to respectively compare Ban-Pos DIRAP between each pairing of the 
thought suppression groups with the control group on each level of block sequence.  
 
 
Figure 6.4. The two-way interaction between thought suppression and IRAP trial block sequence on Ban-
Neg DIRAP (with standard error bars). 
 
The post-practise group was closely matched to the control group on criterion 
practise Ban-Neg DIRAP, t(38) = .28; p = .78; 
2 = .002, r ≈ .04. However, thereafter, 
once the thought suppression instructions had been introduced, the post-practise group 
became moderately less anti-ban on Ban-Neg DIRAP than the control group during test 
block pair 1, t(38) = 1.92; p = .06; 2 = .09 (i.e. r ≈ .30); before oscillating between 
being similar during test block pair 2, t(38) = -.91; p =.38; 2 = .02, r ≈ .15, and 
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moderately less anti-ban during test block 3, t(38) = 1.51; p = .14; 2 = .06, r ≈ .24, than 
the control group on Ban-Neg DIRAP. Confirming this pattern in broad terms, the Ban-
Neg DIRAP interaction between the control group and the post-practise group from 
criterion practise to test pair 1 may have been null, F(1, 38) = 1.13, p = .29, p
2 = .03 
(i.e. r ≈ .17); but the interaction between test pairs 1 and 2 was moderately negative, 
F(1, 38) = 5.62, p = .02, p
2 = .13 (i.e. r ≈ .36); and in contrast, there was a moderately-
sized positive interaction between test pairs 2 and 3, F(1, 38) = 2.68, p = .11, p
2 = .07 
(i.e. r ≈ .26). Thus, on balance, it appeared as though the thought suppression 
instructions had a relatively immediate, moderately-sized impact on Ban-Neg DIRAP in 
the pro-ban direction (see Figure 6.4).  
The pre-practise group, by contrast, was similar to both the control group and 
the post-practise group on criterion practise Ban-Neg DIRAP; respectively, t(38)s = -.08, 
.37; p = .94, .72; 2 = .0002, .004; r ≈ .01, .06 (i.e. even though they had already 
received the thought suppression instructions). In fact, the only block pair during which 
the pre-practise group differed from the control group on Ban-Neg DIRAP was test block 
pair 1, such that the pre-practise group was moderately less anti-ban than the control 
group, t(36) = 2.29; p = .03; 2 = .13, r ≈ .36. And as such, there was also no difference 
between the pre-practise group and the control group on Ban-Neg DIRAP during test 
blocks 2 and 3; respectively, t(38)s = .34, .11; p = .74, .91; 2 = .003, .003; r ≈ .06, .02. 
Confirming this pattern, the Ban-Neg DIRAP interaction between the control group and 
the pre-practise group from criterion practise to test pair 1 was moderately negative, 
F(1, 36) = 2.31, p = .14, p
2 = .06,  r ≈ .25; but the corresponding interaction between 
test pairs 1 and 2 was moderately positive, F(1, 36) = 2.24, p = .14, p
2 = .06 (i.e. r ≈ 
.25); and in contrast, that between test pairs 2 and 3 was null, F(1, 36) = .02, p = .90, p
2 
= .0005, r ≈ .02. Overall, therefore, the thought suppression instructions appeared to 
initially oscillate twice between effective versus ineffective from one block pair to the 
next on Ban-Neg DIRAP (i.e. as per the post-practise group’s block-pair Ban-Neg DIRAPs 
across the IRAP test phase); before thereafter, deteriorating rapidly into ineffectiveness 
(i.e. as per the pre-practise group’s full sequence of block-pair Ban-Neg DIRAPs).
70  
6.4.4 Analyses of Thought suppression by IRAP Block Order by IRAP trial-type 
                                                 
70 Note also, that the impact of thought suppression appeared to progress similarly in the pre- and post-
practise groups. Namely, it impacted the post-practise group’s Ban-Neg DIRAP during test pair 3 very 
similarly to how it impacted the pre-practise group’s Ban-Neg DIRAP during test pair 1 and in each case the 
relevant effect occurred approximately three IRAP block pairs after the introduction of the relevant 
perspective switching instructions. 
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A secondary aim of the current study was to examine how the thought 
suppression instructions would interact with IRAP trial block order to affect committed 
smokers’ implicit evaluating of the current trial-type topics. We therefore entered the 
standard trial-type DIRAP data into a 3x2x2x2 mixed-repeated measures ANOVA, which 
crossed the two between-groups variables thought suppression (i.e. smoker controls 
versus pre-practise perspective switchers versus post-practise perspective switchers) and 
trial block order (i.e. pro-smoking-first versus anti-smoking-first), with the two 
repeated measures IRAP ‘trial-type’ variables, Concept Label (i.e. “Smoking makes Me 
Feel” versus “The Smoking Ban makes Me Feel”) and Attribute Stimulus Class (i.e. 
positive versus negative craving-related moods).71  
We obtained no main effect for block order, F(1, 50) = .42, p = .52, p
2 = .008 
(i.e. r ≈ .09), but did for the thought suppression variable, F(2, 50) = 1.30, p = .28, p
2 = 
.05 (i.e. r ≈ .22), concept label, F(1, 50) = 7.54, p = .009, p
2 = .13 (i.e. r ≈ .36), and for 
attribute stimulus class, F(1, 50) = 7.16, p = .01, p
2 = .13 (i.e. r ≈ .35). Critically, 
however, these main effects were qualified by a moderately sized three-way interaction 
effect with each other, as illustrated in Figure 6.5, F(2, 50) = 2.76, p = .07, p
2 = .10 
(i.e. r ≈ .32); and by an large two-way interaction effect between the two trial-type 
variables, F(1, 50) = 32.43, p < .0001, p
2 = .39 (i.e. r ≈ .62). In broad terms, this 
indicated that all four trial-type DIRAP scores functioned differently from each other with 
respect to the thought suppression variable. To explore the nature of this three-way 
interaction, we therefore conducted a one-way follow-up ANOVA of thought 
suppression on each trial-type DIRAP. 
The Smoking-Pos and Ban-Neg both exhibited moderately sized main effects for 
thought suppression (i.e. respectively, F[2, 53]s = 2.74, 1.47;  ps = .07, .24; p
2s = .10, 
.05; rs ≈ .32, .22), but the Smoking-Neg and Ban-Pos effects did not (i.e. respectively, 
F[2, 53]s = .33, .23; ps = .72, .80; p
2s = .01, .009; rs ≈ .11, .09). Furthermore, follow-
up t-tests confirmed that as per Figure 6.5 the pre-practise perspective switchers 
                                                 
71 Note that we did not include IRAP block order in an analysis with IRAP block sequence because the 
current study did not incorporate enough participants per block order condition to make it feasible to 
analyse stable block order effects at the level of block-pair trial-type DIRAPs. In particular, each block-pair 
trial-type DIRAP incorporated a minimal number of pairs of IRAP response latencies (i.e. six), and the 
current study incorporated only the minimum number of participants per IRAP block order condition to 
make parametric statistical comparisons of difference legitimate (i.e. ns = 7-12; see see Lane et al., 2007; 
pp. 88-90; VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007, p. 48). Indeed, based on the fact that we have already observed 
stable patterns of block order effects at the level of standard trial-type DIRAPs during studies one and two, 
we estimated that the current study would have required at least three times as many participants as it did 
in order to observe stable block order effects at the level of block-pair trial-type DIRAPs (i.e. assuming that 
three times as many participants would compensate for the three times as many response latencies 
comprising a standard versus block-pair trial-type DIRAP). 
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exhibited moderately reduced Smoking-Pos and Ban-Neg effects relative to the control 
group, respectively, t(36)s = 2.09, 1.38, one-tailed ps = .02, .10, 2s = .11, .05 (i.e. rs ≈ 
.33, .22). And that likewise, the post-practise perspective switchers also exhibited 
moderately reduced Smoking-Pos and Ban-Neg effects relative to the control group, 
respectively, t(38)s = 2.04, 1.45, one-tailed ps = .02, .08, 2s = .10, .05 (i.e. rs ≈ .31, 
.23). Thus, crucially, it appeared as though both the Smoking-Pos and Ban-Neg effects, 
but not the Smoking-Neg and Ban-Pos effects, were moderately influenced in line with 
the thought suppression variable. 
 
 
Figure 6.5. The three-way interaction between thought suppression and the two IRAP trial-type variables 
in terms of mean standard trial-type DIRAP scores (with standard error bars).  
 
Follow-up analyses indicated that the thought suppression instructions made 
their impact on the Smoking-Pos and Ban-Neg effects by delaying (i.e. interfering with) 
pro-smoking responses more than anti-smoking IRAP trial responses (for details see 
Appendix 20). Crucially, this indicated that the thought suppression instructions made 
Smoking-Pos DIRAP and Ban-Neg DIRAP less pro-smoking by interfering with pro-
smoking responding (i.e. with smokers’ pre-existing implicit evaluating perspectives), 
rather than by facilitating anti-smoking responding (i.e. facilitating smokers’ pre-
existing anti-smoking implicit evaluating perspectives). 
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All of the interactions between block order and the two trial-type variables were 
null, Fs ≤ .72, ps ≥ .40, p
2s ≤ .01; rs ≤ .12. However, as illustrated in Figure 6.6, the 
foregoing three-way interaction between the thought suppression variable and the two 
IRAP trial-type variables, was accompanied by a moderate two-way interaction between 
thought suppression and block order across the four trial-type effects, F(2, 50) = 1.67, p 
= .20, p
2 = .06, r ≈ .24. Crucially, follow-up F-test contrasts indicated that pre- and 
post-practise thought suppression both had an overall impact on the current trial-type 
DIRAPs in the pro-smoking-first block order (i.e. respectively, Fs = 6.76, 2.47, ps = .02, 
.13, 2s = .26, .11; rs ≈ .51, .33), but not in the anti-smoking-first block order (i.e. 
respectively, Fs = .09, .04, ps = .77, .84, 2s = .006, .002; rs ≈ .08, .05).  
 
 
Figure 6.6. The two-way interaction between thought suppression and IRAP trial block order across the 
four trial-type DIRAPs (with standard error bars).  
 
As a result, the pre-practise group exhibited a small-to-moderate main effect of 
block order across all four trial-type DIRAPs, F(1, 62) = 2.12, p = .15, p
2 = .03, r = .18, 
but the control group did not, F(1, 86) = .56, p = .46, 2 = .001, r ≈ .08, and nor did the 
post-practise group, F(1, 70) = .20, p = .65, 2 = .002, r ≈ .05 (see Figure 6.6). 
Moreover, using an extension of the method used to determine that thought suppression 
influenced the current trial-type DIRAPs mainly by interfering with pro-smoking IRAP 
responding, it appeared that block order mainly facilitated thought suppression by 
facilitating anti-smoking responding. Namely, pro-smoking-first block order helped 
make the pre-practise group’s trial-type DIRAPs less pro-smoking mainly by speeding up 
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their anti-smoking IRAP responding, t(14) = -1.52, p = .15; 2 = .14, r ≈ .38, rather than 
by interfering with their pro-smoking IRAP responding which were actually moderately 
faster than in the anti-smoking-first pre-practise group, t(14) = -.90, p = .38; 2 = .06, r 
≈ .23 (i.e. the relevant interaction was moderately-sized, F(1, 14) = .92, p = .35, p
2 = 
.06, r = .25). In other words, the thought suppression instructions appeared to operate 
synergistically with the pro-smoking-first condition, and relatively independently of the 
anti-smoking-first condition. 
6.4.5. The Impact of the Thought suppression Instructions on trial-type DIRAP Internal 
Reliability 
The thought suppression groups both exhibited a similar lack of internal 
reliability on all four standard trial-type DIRAPs, -.54 ≤ rsbs ≤ .31, one-tailed ps ≥ .12. 
Crucially, this was in contrast to the control group who exhibited good internal 
reliability on the standard Smoking-Pos DIRAP, rsbs = .68, one-tailed ps < .0001, but no 
internal reliability on the remaining three standard trial-type DIRAPs addressing anti-
smoking topics, rsbs ≤ .08, one-tailed ps > .10.
72 
6.5 DISCUSSION (STUDY 3) 
Manipulation checks confirmed that the current smokers experienced high 
cognitive load during the IRAP-based thought suppression tasks, with approximately 
60% of the smokers from both the pre- and post-practise groups offering unsolicited 
reports that they were unable to avoid adhering less and less to the thought suppression 
instructions as the IRAP progressed. Moreover, approximately 41% of both thought 
suppression groups even offered unsolicited reports that they had found the thought 
suppression instructions so difficult to adhere to during the IRAP that they ceased 
attempting to do so well before completing it.  
In addition, manipulation checks also indicated the current smokers were 
remarkably consistent in viewing the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker as being 
primarily anti-smoking rather than pro-abstinence. That is, whereas all of the smokers in 
both thought suppression groups reported deriving anti-smoking scenarios as a means of 
responding from the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker during the IRAP, only 0-13% 
of these participants mentioned deriving any scenarios on the benefits of abstinence 
                                                 
72 Note that it would have been possible to calculate Spearman-Brown corrected split-half reliabilities for 
each group’s extended trial-type DIRAPs. However, the pre-practise group was instructed to thought 
suppress during the criterion practise blocks but the post-practise and control groups were not, and 
therefore it would have confounded the thought suppression instructions (with time since their delivery) 
to have compared these three groups with respect to the internal reliabilities of their respective extended 
trial-type DIRAPs. 
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and/or smoking-bans in order to do so. Indeed, these smokers consistently responded to 
the questionnaire-based tobacco addiction scales and explicit evaluating scales from 
Study 1 as if non-smokers’ were strongly against smoking (i.e. rather than indifferent to 
it), and characteristically free from the symptoms of tobacco addiction. As such, it 
appeared as though the current committed smokers’ experience of non-smokers was 
stigmatizing rather than socially supportive in ways that are likely to foster abstinence 
(see Gifford & Humphreys, 2007, p. 359). 
Critically, this stigmatizing approach to thought suppression was relatively 
ineffective as a means for smokers to eliminate, or even just control, their pro-smoking 
implicit evaluating. Namely, it had only an unstable and often counterproductive impact 
on smokers’ implicit evaluating of both pro- and anti-smoking topics alike. For 
example, there was a delay of 2-3 pairs of IRAP trial blocks for both thought 
suppression groups before the relevant instructions first impacted smokers’ Smoking-
Pos DIRAPs. And although that initial impact eliminated the smokers’ positive Smoking-
Pos DIRAP to zero, this effect was unstable insofar as it oscillated in direction from trial 
block pair to trial block pair. More specifically, having initially eliminated the smokers’ 
positive Smoking-Pos DIRAP to zero for one trial block pair, the thought suppression 
instructions appeared to lead to a borderline rebound effect on the subsequent trial block 
pair (i.e. more pro-smoking than the control group); followed lastly by a second smaller 
reduction in the smokers’ positive Smoking-Pos DIRAP. In other words, relative to the 
control group who responded rather consistently to the Smoking-Pos trial-type 
throughout the IRAP trial block sequence, those receiving the thought suppression 
instructions did so in a rather conflicted, inconsistent and diminishing manner. Indeed, 
confirming this even further, whereas the control group exhibited good internal 
reliability on Smoking-Pos DIRAP, both thought suppression groups exhibited poor 
internal reliability on Smoking-Pos DIRAP (i.e. indicating conflicted implicit evaluating).  
Admittedly, the thought suppression instructions were more immediate in 
eliminating the smokers’ positive Smoking-Neg DIRAP to zero than they did so for the 
smokers’ positive Smoking-Pos DIRAP. However, having done so during the first pair of 
IRAP trial blocks after the thought suppression instructions were introduced, this 
moderately-sized thought suppression effect disappeared for one trial block pair; before 
reversing direction to a moderate degree to result, crucially, in a moderately-sized 
rebound effect on the next trial block pair. Moreover, thereafter, following two more 
trial block pairs wherein there was no thought suppression effect another moderately-
sized rebound effect appeared on the trial block pair furthest from those instructions. 
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And, again, accordingly the thought suppression groups both exhibited low internal 
reliability on Smoking-Neg DIRAP (albeit that this was also originally the case for the 
control group). 
Next, much like the impact of the current thought suppression instructions on the 
previous two trial-type effects, they also had a relatively delayed impact on the 
smokers’ Ban-Pos effects which did not appear until 3-4 pairs of trial block pairs after 
the instructions were introduced. In fact, as such, the thought suppression instructions 
implemented post-practise did not appear to have enough time across the IRAP test 
phase to make an impact on any of the three block-pair Ban-Pos DIRAPs collected across 
that phase. Rather, having initially made the pre-practise group’s Ban-Pos DIRAP a large 
degree more pro-smoking-ban than the control group for two successive pairs of trial 
block pairs, the impact of the thought suppression instructions disappeared for one trial 
block before becoming a moderately-sized rebound effect on the trial block pair furthest 
from those instructions. And again, accordingly, the thought suppression groups both 
exhibited low internal reliability on Ban-Pos DIRAP (albeit that this was also originally 
the case for the control group). 
Lastly, the thought suppression instructions affected an immediate but 
oscillating and temporary reduction on smokers’ Ban-Neg DIRAPs. Specifically, having 
initially brought about a moderate, incomplete reduction in the smokers’ Ban-Neg DIRAP 
during the first block pair after the instructions, the relevant reduction disappeared in the 
next trial block pair, before returning for one trial block, and disappearing for the 
remaining two trial block pairs. And, again, accordingly the thought suppression groups 
both exhibited low internal reliability on Ban-Neg DIRAP (albeit that this was also 
originally the case for the control group).  
Overall, therefore, the current thought suppression instructions had a pervasive 
influence on smokers’ implicit evaluating of both pro- and anti-smoking topics, but that 
influence was rather unstable and often counterproductive across successive pairs of 
IRAP trial blocks. Indeed, as anticipated, when the thought suppression instructions 
provoked rebound effects in smokers’ implicit evaluating it was always after a delay of 
at least one IRAP block pair following their introduction. In fact, in line with the pre-
practise group being subject to more prolonged cognitive load by the IRAP 
measurement phase than the post-practise group, the former’s block-pair trial-type 
effects exhibited more instability than the latter’s. And indeed, confirming this 
prediction further, the pre-practise group retrospectively reported being less successful 
in adhering to the IRAP-based thought suppression instructions than the post-practise 
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group did (albeit to a relatively minor degree). Thus, even though the thought 
suppression instructions reduced the pre- and post-practise smokers’ standard Smoking-
Pos and Ban-Neg effects to a similarly moderate overall degree (i.e. but not their 
standard Smoking-Neg and Ban-Pos effects), it did so only sporadically and temporarily 
in both cases; and particularly so for the pre-practise group.  
With this in mind, we also found a moderate interaction between thought 
suppression and IRAP trial block order confirming our tentative predictions that the 
thought suppression instructions would be more effective during the pro-smoking-first 
IRAP block order than during its anti-smoking-first counterpart. Indeed, in line with our 
tentative predictions, we found that the thought suppression instructions appeared to 
have broadly the same impact across all four of the smokers’ standard trial-type effects 
in the pro-smoking-first condition, but none in the anti-smoking-first condition.  
Finally, as a key part of our exploratory analyses of how thought suppression 
instructions operate upon any implicit evaluating they contradict, we found that the 
current ones almost exclusively made smokers’ Smoking-Pos DIRAP and Ban-Neg DIRAP 
less pro-smoking by means of interfering with pre-established aspects of their pro-
smoking implicit evaluating perspectives (for details of analyses see Appendix 20). 
Nonetheless, in addition, we also found that these thought suppression effects were 
supplemented to a relatively small degree by alternative means in the pro-smoking-first 
IRAP block order. Namely, we found that relative to the anti-smoking-first block order, 
the pro-smoking-first block order consistently empowered the thought suppression 
instructions (see Figure 6.6) to facilitate (i.e. speed up) anti-smoking responses across 
all four trial-type to a similarly small degree (i.e. otherwise, the thought suppression 
instructions neither facilitated nor interfered with smokers’ anti-smoking responses; for 
details see Appendix 21).  
In hindsight, this pattern of block order effects on pro- versus anti-smoking 
IRAP response latencies could perhaps be explained by the fact that the relevant anti-
smoking implicit evaluating is characteristically unfamiliar to committed smokers. And 
as such, the current smokers were relatively ill-equipped to immediately switch to an 
anti-smoking implicit evaluating perspective, as was required by the thought 
suppression instructions delivered during the anti-smoking-first IRAP. Rather, instead, 
it appeared that by engaging in the relevant perspective switching for one pro-smoking 
trial block before each anti-smoking trial block, such practise within each block pair 
increased the fluency with which smokers provided all four anti-smoking IRAP 
responses during the latter half of each such block pair (i.e. the key unit upon which all 
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IRAP effects are based). Indeed, comporting with the fact that the pre-practise group 
had been required engage in thought suppression for substantially longer than the post-
practise group by the IRAP measurement phase, only the former group exhibited the 
relevant increase in anti-smoking response fluency.  
In any case, at the very least, our IRAP block order analyses revealed that the 
current thought suppression instructions operated synergistically with the pro-smoking-
first IRAP sequencing, particularly when issued pre-practise (i.e. under additional 
cognitive load); but relatively independently of the anti-smoking-first condition under 
either thought suppression condition. And moreover, our block order analyses also 
confirmed our tentative prediction that the thought suppression instructions would be 
more successful in reducing smokers’ pro-smoking implicit evaluating during the pro-
smoking-first block order than during the anti-smoking-first block order, and in 
proportion to the cognitive load imposed on them during the IRAP measurement phase. 
In other words, whatever fleeting success the current thought suppression instructions 
had in reducing any of the four standard trial-type effects measured here, in each case 
that reduction appeared to be somewhat amplified during the pro-smoking-first block 
order relative to its anti-smoking-first counterpart – and particularly, under the 
additional cognitive load imposed during the IRAP measurement phase by the pre-
practise instructions. 
6.6. INTRODUCTION (STUDY 4) 
Testing Thought Suppression as a Means for Smokers under Cognitive Load to 
Deliberately Control Implicit Evaluating Integral to Tobacco Addiction Selectively 
Our findings from Study 3 indicated that when committed smokers were 
instructed to respond from the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker they consistently 
did so in an anti-smoking manner that stigmatized pro-smoking implicit evaluating in 
general. And although this broad thought suppression strategy did initially reduce 
smokers’ pro-smoking implicit evaluating pervasively across both pro- and anti-
smoking topics, these reductions were short-lived, intermittent and indeed periodically 
oscillated into rebound effects. According to the most dominant theory of thought 
suppression effects, ironic process theory, the broader one’s strategy for thought 
suppression the greater one’s cognitive load in doing so, and crucially the greater the 
range of evaluative rebound effects one will inadvertently provoke (see Wenzlaff & 
Wegner, 2000, pp. 66-70; see also Wegner, 2011, pp. 672-673). As such, our findings 
from Study 3, though unprecedented in measuring the progression of thought 
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suppression effects with respect to particular types of implicit evaluating, were 
nevertheless somewhat expected. Crucially, however, the literature on thought 
suppression and/or repressive coping has little to say theoretically, or empirically about 
whether a more focused approach to thought suppression would improve one’s 
efficiency in controlling intrusive aspects of implicit evaluating (e.g. see Erskine et al., 
2015; Moss et al., 2015; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). In fact, apart from a limited 
selection of questionnaire-based findings suggesting that thought suppression by 
focused-distraction is more efficient than by unfocused-distraction, we are aware of no 
other research examining this topic; and particularly not in relation to contradiction-
based thought suppression strategies (Wegner, 2011, pp. 672-673). 
Therefore, in order to further test the potential of contradiction-based thought 
suppression for (temporarily) eliminating implicit evaluating integral to tobacco 
addiction, Study 4 employed the same range of experimental safeguards as Study 3 but 
if anything with greater precision. Namely, we instructed smokers to continually 
deliberate, throughout the IRAP from Study 2 (i.e. the conditional-feelings-IRAP), 
about familiar scenarios in which they would typically not evaluate any need to smoke 
as their primary means of maintaining the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker. And as 
such, these instructions directly contradicted the relief-focused Need-Neg (and Need-
Pos) implicit evaluating exhibited by smokers in Study 2, but not their reward-focused 
Enjoy-Pos (or Enjoy-Neg) implicit evaluating which was found to be merely collateral 
to tobacco addiction.  
In other words, rather than instructing smokers to continually derive scenarios 
that contradicted all aspects of pro-smoking (implicit) evaluating being measured as in 
Study 3, instead Study 4 involved specifically instructing smokers to engage in thought 
suppression of just that specific aspect of implicit evaluating that we had so far found to 
be most integral to tobacco addiction. Crucially, this approach provided the opportunity 
to examine whether more focused contradiction-based thought suppression strategies 
would indeed improve one’s efficiency in controlling intrusive aspects of implicit 
evaluating involved in tobacco addiction (i.e. as appears to be the case for distraction-
based thought suppression; see Wegner, 2011, pp. 672-673). In particular, we were keen 
to explore whether the current thought suppression instructions, focused upon 
contradicting the Need-Neg (and Need-Pos) trial-type, would perhaps better reduce 
smokers’ pro-smoking Need-Neg trial-type effects (and increase their inclination to 
deny Need-Pos) having avoided impacting their pro-smoking Enjoy-Pos trial-type 
effects (or their inclination to deny Enjoy-Neg). 
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Lastly, although it was not a primary focus of the current exploratory research, 
the current thought suppression instructions were also designed so that they would have 
similar relevance for the current smokers during both the mood-consistent and mood-
inconsistent trial blocks of the conditional-feelings-IRAP. Namely, in contrast to the 
thought suppression instructions in Study 3 which effectively required smokers to 
derive various unspecified anti-smoking scenarios on demand as needed, the current 
thought suppression instructions required smokers to focus upon deriving details about 
certain very particular familiar scenarios. Thus, crucially, the current thought 
suppression instructions were in principle no less relevant in the sense of being cued 
during one IRAP trial block order versus another. On this basis, therefore, we 
tentatively predicted that the current thought suppression instructions would minimize 
the likelihood of any interactions between thought suppression and IRAP block order 
sequencing on the conditional-feelings-IRAP. In other words, we predicted that unlike 
in Study 3, the current smokers would engage as much in thought suppression during 
suppression-consistent IRAP blocks (i.e. the mood-inconsistent trial blocks) as during 
the suppression-inconsistent IRAP blocks (i.e. the mood-consistent trial blocks). 
6.7. METHOD (STUDY 4) 
Participants 
We recruited 34 smokers to the current study using the same sampling criteria as 
in Study 2 insofar as possible (for minor exceptions see below), and of these 
participants we excluded one participant for failure to progress to the IRAP’s test phase 
within four pairs of practise blocks. The remaining 33 smokers (21 female) were each 
randomly assigned without replacement between the two relevant thought suppression 
conditions. Namely, 17 (11 female) pre-practise group smokers were instructed to 
thought suppress in the manner described below throughout both the practise and test 
phases of the IRAP; and 16 (10 female) post-practise group smokers were instructed to 
thought suppress in the same manner but just not until just before the IRAP test phase. 
In addition, as usual, all participants were randomly assigned between the two levels of 
the IRAP block order variable for counterbalancing. 
Crucially, the current smokers in question were generally well matched 
demographically to the corresponding control group provided by Study 2. Namely, there 
were no differences between the control group and the thought suppression groups with 
respect to age, t(46) = -1.22, p = .23 (i.e. r ≈ .17), or with respect to CPD, t(46) = -.41, p 
= .68 (i.e. r ≈ .06). On average, the perspective switchers were 25 years of age (SD = 
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6.4; range = 18-40), and consumed 12.6 CPD during the previous 30 days (SD = 6.6, 
range = 3-28). Also, as in Study 2, all 33 of the thought suppression smokers were naive 
to the IRAP and none had recently committed, or attempted to restrict their smoking 
within the previous 30 days – indeed, 41% had never attempted to quit smoking before 
(as compared to 75% in Study 2).  
There were however three relatively minor, but nonetheless inadvertent 
differences between the thought suppressors and the control group. First, the thought 
suppressors reported smoking an average of 1.8 days fewer of the previous 30 days than 
the controls (i.e. respectively, Ms = 93%, 99%; SDs = 8.3, 4.1; ranges = 83-100, 83-
100; t(46) = 2.64, p = .01, r ≈ .36). Second, none of the control group from Study 2 had 
attempted or even contemplated quitting smoking during the previous 12 months, but 
five of the 33 thought suppressors had attempted to quit smoking as recently as 2 
months previously (i.e. the remainder had not attempted to quit smoking in the previous 
12 months). As such, a small subset of the thought suppressors were potentially more 
ambivalent about their smoking than the control smokers provided by Study 2. Third, on 
average, the thought suppressors reported smoking regularly for 3 years more than the 
control group, t(46) = -1.95, p = .06 (i.e. r ≈ .28; 7.6 versus 4.6 years, SDs = 6.5, 1.6; 
ranges = 1.5-30, 2-7). 
Apparatus 
The current study employed the conditional-feelings-IRAP described in Study 2, 
and also the same entire set of questionnaire measures as used in Study 2 – but with 
some important differences. Unlike the smoker controls from Study 2, the thought 
suppression smokers were formally instructed to respond from the perspective of a 
lifelong non-smoker during various parts of the IRAP, and while completing all of the 
Study 2 questionnaires except the DBHQ (i.e. it would have confounded the current 
known-groups agenda for participants to have pretended being a lifelong non-smoker 
while answering the DBHQ). In particular, the current study used the same thought 
suppression instructions as used in Study 3 except for one crucial addition. Namely, 
when it came to participants formulating a strategy for imagining themselves as lifelong 
non-smokers the researcher suggested that:  
In order to imagine yourself as a lifelong non-smoker you should focus upon 
visualizing any scenarios where you would personally not normally feel any need to 
smoke (e.g. while having a shower, exercising, or doing some other familiar activity 
at a time before you started smoking). 
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In particular, based upon anecdotal accounts we obtained from smokers for the purposes 
of designing the current study, we chose the illustrative scenarios of having a shower or 
exercising as being scenarios that are typically viewed as being quintessentially 
incompatible with smoking. 
Procedure 
The current study modified the procedure for Study 2 in much the same way in 
which Study 3 modified the procedure for Study 1. Namely, it used the same 
sequencing of thought suppression instructions as was used in Study 3, but with the 
additional instruction to visualize scenarios where one would not personally feel any 
need to smoke (see above). Thus, the pre-practise group were instructed to imagine 
themselves as lifelong non-smokers throughout all phases of the IRAP and all 
subsequent questionnaires from Study 2 except the DBHQ; and the post-practise group 
were instructed to do the same but from the end of the IRAP practise phase onwards. 
6.8. RESULTS (STUDY 4) 
6.8.1. Scoring the IRAP Data 
Of the 33 thought suppressors who succeeded in progressing to the IRAP test 
phase, we excluded one from further analyses on the basis that they did not maintain a 
minimum response accuracy of 80% and/or a maximum response speed of 3000ms on 
average across the IRAP test trials. As in Study 3, we scored the remaining 16 pre-
practise and 16 post-practise thought suppressors’ IRAP data using both the standard 
DIRAP-algorithm (see Appendix 4), and the extended DIRAP-algorithm (see Appendix 15).  
6.8.2. Manipulation Checks for the Thought suppression Instructions 
In order to verify the degree to which the current thought suppression 
instructions were effective, as follows, we examined multiple manipulation check 
variables focusing on determining what strategy(s) the current smokers used in practise 
to respond from the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker. 
Self-reported Perceptions of Success and Motivation 
The thought suppression groups differed to a statistically moderate degree with 
regard to how successful they reported they were in responding from the perspective of 
a lifelong smoker during the IRAP, t(28) = 1.65; p = .11; 2 = .09 (i.e. r ≈ .30); and to a 
large degree with regard to doing so during the questionnaire-based thought suppression 
task, t(24) = -2.39; p = .03; 2 =.19 (i.e. r ≈ .44). In practical terms, however, the 
relevant differences were relatively minor insofar as both groups reported being 
successful to a moderate-to-small degree in adopting the perspective of a lifelong non-
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smoker during the IRAP (i.e. respectively, Ms = 3.2, 2.2; SDs = 1.8, 1.5); and to a 
moderate-to-large degree during the relevant questionnaires (i.e. respectively, Ms = 3.7, 
5.0; SDs = 1.5, 1.1). Concordantly, there was also a statistically moderate-to-large 
difference in the degree to which the two thought suppression groups reported feeling 
motivated to perform their IRAP-based thought suppression task, t(28) = 2.20; p = .04; 
2 =.15 (i.e. r ≈.38), that was relatively minor in practical terms. Namely, both groups 
reported feeling moderately motivated to perform the IRAP-based thought suppression 
task (i.e. respectively, Ms = 3.8, 2.7; SDs = 1.4, 1.2). And likewise, both groups 
reported feeling highly motivated to similar degree to each other in performing the 
questionnaire-based thought suppression task (i.e. respectively, Ms = 4.5, 4.6; SDs = 
1.5, 1.3; t(24) = -.15, p = .88, 2 = .0009, r ≈.03).  
Furthermore, given the extensive concordance between participants’ 
retrospective perceptions of success in completing the thought suppression tasks and 
their subsequence self-reported motivation in doing so, we examined the extent to 
which these two variables were correlated with each other. This resulted in a large 
correlation between self-report success and motivation in relation to the IRAP-based 
thought suppression task, r(26) = .65; p < .0001; and a moderate correlation between the 
corresponding measures relating to the questionnaire-based thought suppression task, 
r(26) = .29; p = .15. And given that in each case, participants reported how successful 
they felt in relation to thought suppression just before they reported how motivated they 
felt in this regard, it therefore seems likely that latter self-reports were largely a post-
hoc function of the former self-reports. Crucially, this might explain why both groups 
not only reported less success in completing IRAP-based thought suppression task as 
compared to its questionnaire-based counterpart (i.e. respectively, ts = -1.26, -6.68; ps 
= .23, .0001; 2s = .11, .80; rs ≈ .33, .90), but thereafter also reported feeling less 
motivated in completing the former relative to the latter task (i.e. respectively, ts = -
1.93, -3.36; ps = .08, .006; 2s =.22, .51; rs ≈ .47, .71). 
Content Analyses of the Various Thought suppression Strategies Adopted in Practise 
To further explore what types of contradiction-based thought suppression 
strategies participants adopted in practise, we performed exploratory thematic analyses 
of thought suppressors’ open-ended descriptions of what strategies they employed to 
respond from the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker. This resulted in four basic 
themes which we then used to perform the following content analyses of these open-
ended descriptions. First, the pre- and post-practise groups were both highly inclined to 
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report imagining a familiar positive non-smoking scenario in order to adopt the 
perspective of a lifelong non-smoker during the IRAP (i.e. respectively, 73% and 93%); 
even if the post-practise group were somewhat less inclined than the pre-practised group 
to do so, 2(1, 30) = 2.16, p = .13, Cramer’s V = .27. However, only the post-practise 
group showed a broadly similar inclination during the questionnaire-based thought 
suppression task (i.e. respectively, 17% and 67%; 2[1, 27] = 6.75, p = .01, Cramer’s V 
= .50).  
Second, and at least somewhat concordantly, the pre- and post-practise groups 
both exhibited a relatively small inclination to report imagining a familiar anti-smoking 
scenario in order to adopt the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker during the IRAP (i.e. 
respectively, 40% and 20%; 2(1, 30) = 1.43, p = .23, Cramer’s V = .22); but both 
exhibited a relatively large inclination to report such things in relation to the 
questionnaire-based thought suppression task (i.e. respectively, 83% and 60%; 2(1, 27) 
= 1.74, p = .19, Cramer’s V = .25). 
Third, the pre-practise group were somewhat less inclined than the post-practise 
group to report difficulty maintaining the perspective of a lifelong non-smoker during 
the IRAP (i.e. respectively, 67% and 87%; 2(1, 30) = 1.68, p = .20, Cramer’s V = .24). 
Fourth, however, the pre-practise group were no less inclined than the post-practise 
group to report relenting in their efforts to adopt the perspective of a lifelong non-
smoker during the IRAP (i.e. respectively, 47% and 60%; 2(1, 30) = .54, p = .46, 
Cramer’s V = .13). Finally, by contrast, both groups were highly disinclined to 
retrospectively report difficulty persisting with the questionnaire-based thought 
suppression task (i.e. respectively, 7% and 8%; 2(1, 30) =.03, ps = .87, Cramer’s V = 
.03), and none of either group reported abandoning this task before completion. 
The Questionnaire-based Thought-suppression Task 
The thought suppression groups explicitly evaluated in a very similarly anti-
smoking manner to each other on all of the semantic differentials and feeling 
thermometers, |t(28)|s ≤ .76, ps ≥ .45, 2s ≤ .02 (i.e. rs ≤ .14), except the two relating to 
the Need-Neg topic where they differed only to a minor practical degree (i.e. 
respectively, t(28)s = 2.07, 1.53, ps = .05, .14, 2s = .13, .08; rs ≈ .36, .28). Namely, 
the pre- and post-practise groups both explicitly evaluated smoking as not being 
enjoyable during positive moods (i.e. respectively the semantic differentials, Ms = -1.5, 
-1.9; SDs = 1.6, 1.3; and the feeling thermometers, Ms = -28.6, -33.2; SDs = 28.3, 31.4), 
or during negative moods (i.e. respectively, the semantic differentials, Ms = 2.0, 2.1; 
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SDs = 1.1, 1.6; and the feeling thermometers, Ms = 31.0, 37.7; SDs = 23.0, 24.5). And 
moreover, both groups explicitly evaluated smoking as not being needed during positive 
moods (i.e. the respective semantic differentials, Ms = 2.0, 2.2; SDs = 1.2, 1.3; and the 
respective feeling thermometers, Ms = 42.5, 44.7; SDs = 11.9, 13.3), or during negative 
moods (i.e. the respective semantic differentials, Ms = -.90, -2.0; SDs = 1.8, 1.1; and the 
respective feeling thermometers, Ms = -15.8, -35.1; SDs = 39.0, 29.0). 
Likewise, when it came to the mFTQ, HONC and tobacco craving (TC) 
measures both thought suppression groups were similarly effective in portraying 
themselves as being absent of the symptoms of tobacco addiction. Namely, the pre- and 
post-practise groups both exhibited mFTQ scores that incorrectly indicated that these 
groups were comprised of infrequent- and/or non-smokers (i.e. respectively, Ms = .93, 
0.71; SDs = 1.7, 1.3); as did both groups’ HONC scores (i.e. respectively, Ms = 1.60, 
0.53; SDs = 3.5, 1.8), and indeed their TC scores (i.e. respectively, Ms = 1.07, 0.33; SDs 
= 1.67, 1.29). This was in contrast to the control group whose mFTQ, HONC and TC 
scores consistently indicated moderate levels of nicotine dependence (i.e. respectively, 
Ms = 4.8, 3.3, 2.1; SDs = 1.1, 2.3, .57), even though these smokers’ smoking histories 
extensively matched those of both thought suppression groups (see Method).73  
6.8.3. IRAP trial-type by Thought suppression by Block Sequence Analyses 
A major aim of the current study was to use the IRAP to explore how 
immediately, persistently and indeed consistently that the current thought suppression 
instructions would impact the smokers’ Need-Neg and Need-Pos effects as opposed to 
their Enjoy-Pos and Enjoy-Neg effects. As in Study 3, we therefore entered the 
‘extended’ block-pair DIRAP data into a 3x2x2x4 mixed ANOVA (see Appendix 15), 
crossing the thought suppression variable, with the two IRAP trial-type variables, and 
IRAP trial block sequence. This resulted in a moderately-sized interaction among all 
four variables, F(6, 135) = 1.38, p = .23, p
2 = .06 (i.e. r ≈ .24), which qualified 
multiple lower-level interactions and main effects.74 In broad terms, this indicated that 
                                                 
73 Indeed, the relevant differences between the control group and each thought suppression group was 
consistent for each of these three measures, ts ≥ 1.57, ps ≤ .13, 2s ≥ .08 (i.e. rs ≥ .28). Even though there 
was statistically moderate difference between the two thought suppression groups on TC, t(28) = 1.35, p 
= .19, 2 = .06 (i.e. r = .25), and on HONC t(28) = 1.05, p = .30, 2 = .04 (i.e. r = .20), the relevant 
differences were very small in practical terms (Schuh & Stitzer, 1995; Wellman, Di Franza, Pbert, et al., 
2005; Wellman, Savageau, et al. 2006); and moreover, there were no such statistical differences in terms 
of mFTQ, t(28) = .41, p = .69, 2 =.006 (i.e. r = .08). 
74 There were main effects observed for both thought suppression, F(2, 45) = 6.02, p = .005, p
2 = .21 (i.e. 
r ≈ .46), and IRAP concept label, F(1, 45) = 4.93, p = .03, p
2 = .10 (i.e. r ≈ .31). In addition, these two 
main effects were also qualified by a large interaction between the trial-type variables, F(1, 45) = 33.22, p 
< .0001, p
2 = .42 (i.e. r ≈ .65); a large two-way interaction between thought suppression and IRAP 
concept label, F(2, 45) = 5.60, p = .007, p
2 = .20 (i.e. r ≈ .45); a moderate interaction between thought 
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thought suppression had a different impact on each of the four trial-type effects across 
IRAP block sequence. In order to unpack this four-way interaction, we conducted four 
follow-up mixed ANOVAs, each examining the impact of thought suppression on one 
of the four trial-type effects across block sequence. We unpacked the statistical 
implications of each of these ANOVAs in the following sub-sections. 
Thought Suppression by Block Sequence on Need-Neg DIRAP 
There was a moderately-sized interaction between thought suppression and 
block sequence on Need-Neg DIRAP, F(6, 135) = 1.73, p = .12, p
2 = .07 (i.e. r ≈ .27), 
which qualified a large main effect of thought suppression, F(2, 45) = 4.91, p = .01, p
2 
= .18 (i.e. r ≈ .42), and a null main effect of block sequence, F(3, 135) = .84, p = .45, 
p
2 = .02 (i.e. r ≈ .14). To unpack the nature of this interaction, illustrated in Figure 6.7, 
we conducted the following planned comparisons to respectively compare Need-Neg 
DIRAP between each pairing of the thought suppression groups with the control group on 
each level of block sequence. 
The post-practise group differed to a statistically moderate degree from the 
control group on the criterion practise Need-Neg DIRAP, t(30) = 1.44, p = .16, 
2 = .06, r 
= .25 (i.e. even though they had not yet been introduced to thought suppression 
instructions at this stage). However, given that the control group and the post-practise 
group both exhibited large positive criterion practise Need-Neg DIRAPs (i.e. respectively, 
t(15)s = 4.33, 2.65; ps ≤ .02; 2s = .56, .32; rs = .56, .76), therefore, on balance, it 
appeared as though the thought suppression groups were reasonably well matched to the 
control group on Need-Neg DIRAP. In any case, upon introducing the thought 
suppression instructions this moderate difference became large for test block pair 1, 
t(30) = 2.62, p = .01, 2 = .19 (i.e. r ≈ .43), and for test block pair 2, t(30) = 2.30, p = 
.03, 2 = .15 (i.e. r ≈ .39); before then gradually returning to the original moderate 
difference in test block pair 3, t(30) = 1.16, p = .25, 2 = .04 (i.e. r ≈ .21).  
Indeed, confirming this pattern, planned F-test contrasts revealed that the 
relevant Need-Neg DIRAP interaction between the control group and the post-practise 
group from criterion practise to test pair 1 was moderately-sized, F(1, 30) = 1.52, p = 
.23, p
2 = .05 (i.e. r ≈ .22); and that in contrast the interaction between test pairs 1 and 2 
was relatively small, F(1, 30) = .06, p = .82, p
2 = .002 (i.e. r ≈ .04); as was that 
                                                                                                                                               
suppression and the trial-type variables, F(2, 45) = 1.49, p = .24, p
2 = .06 (i.e. r ≈ .25); a moderate three-
way interaction between block sequence, thought suppression and IRAP concept label, F(6, 135) = 1.41, 
p = .21, p
2 = .06 (i.e. r ≈ .24); and finally, also a moderate two-way interaction between thought 
suppression and block sequence, F(6, 135) = 2.01, p = .07, p
2 = .08 (i.e. r ≈ .29). All remaining main and 
interaction effects were null, Fs ≤ 1.11, ps ≥ .35, p
2s ≤ .02, (i.e. rs ≤ .16). 
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between test pairs 2 and 3, F(1, 30) = .50, p = .48, p
2 = .02 (i.e. r ≈ .13). Thus, in 
summary, it appeared as though the post-practise thought suppression instructions had a 
relatively immediate, moderately-sized impact on Need-Neg DIRAP, which faded 
gradually but entirely across the Need-Neg DIRAPs for test block pairs 2 and 3 (see 
Figure 6.7).  
 
 
Figure 6.7. The two-way interaction between thought suppression and IRAP trial block sequence on 
Need-Neg DIRAP (with standard error bars). 
 
Indeed, more specifically, the post-practise instructions had cumulatively 
reduced Need-Neg DIRAP by 
2 = .05 (r ≈ .22) during test block pair 1 (i.e. as per the 
relevant F-test contrast); by approximately2 = .048 (r ≈ .22) during test block pair 2 
(i.e. by subtracting the 2-effect for the relevant F-test contrast from its immediate 
predecessor); and finally by (approximately) a null 2 = .028 (r ≈ .17) during test block 
pair 3 (i.e. by adding the 2-effect for the relevant F-test contrast from its immediate 
predecessor). Bearing this out, the post-practise group’s Need-Neg DIRAP was large to 
begin with during the criterion practise block pair (see above), but reduced to the 
neighbourhood of zero during test block pair 1, t(15) = .54, p = .60, 2 = .02, r = .14; 
and then became small-to-moderate during test block pair 2, t(15) = .75, p = .47, 2 = 
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.036, r = .19, before becoming moderately-sized during test block pair 3, t(15) = 1.28, p 
= .22, 2 = .10, r = .31.75 
The pre-practise group, by contrast, were a similarly large degree less than the 
control group on the Need-Neg DIRAP during the criterion practise blocks, t(30) = 2.74, p 
= .01, 2 = .20 (i.e. r ≈ .45), as the post-practise group was during test block pairs 1 and 
2 just after they had received the thought suppression instructions (see above). And 
indeed, confirming this, the pre-practise group was a moderate degree less on criterion 
practise Need-Neg DIRAP than the supplementary control provided by pre-practise group 
on criterion practise Need-Neg DIRAP, t(30) = -1.77, p = .09, 
2 = .09, r ≈ .31. In 
particular, the size of this latter difference corresponded closely with the estimated size 
of the initial impact of these thought suppression instructions on the post-practise 
group’s block pair Need-Neg DIRAPs (i.e. the size of the interaction produced between 
the control and post-practise groups on Need-Neg DIRAP from the criterion practise 
blocks to test block pair 1; see above). 
However, after criterion practise, during the IRAP test phase, the difference 
between the control group and the pre-practise group reduced to moderately-sized in test 
block pair 1, t(30) = 1.14, p = .26, 2 = .04 (i.e. r ≈ .20), became large again in test 
block pair 2, t(30) = 2.84, p = .008, 2 = .21 (i.e. r ≈ .46), and finally almost 
disappeared in test block pair 3, t(30) = .42, p = .68, 2 = .006 (i.e. r ≈ .08). Confirming 
this pattern, planned F-tests revealed that the Need-Neg DIRAP interaction between the 
control group and the pre-practise group from criterion practise to test pair 1 was 
moderately sized, F(1, 30) = 1.94, p = .17, p
2 = .06 (i.e. r ≈ .25); and that the 
corresponding Need-Neg DIRAP interaction between test pairs 1 and 2 was similarly 
sized but in the opposite direction, F(1, 30) = 1.11, p = .30, p
2 = .036 (i.e. r ≈ .19); and 
moreover, that that the corresponding Need-Neg DIRAP interaction between test pairs 2 
and 3 was also moderately-sized but in the opposite direction to that between test block 
pairs 1 and 2, F(1, 30) = 3.38, p = .08, p
2 = .10 (i.e. r ≈ .32). Furthermore, whereas the 
pre-practise group were a moderate degree less than the post-practise group on Need-
Neg DIRAP during the criterion practise blocks (see above), this relationship reversed 
during test block pair 1, t(30) = 1.39, p = .18, 2 = .06, r = .25, before disappearing 
                                                 
75 We highlighted the changing size of the post-practise group’s Need-Neg DIRAPs relative to zero to 
provide a preliminary indication of the qualitative impact of the thought suppression instructions on 
Need-Neg DIRAP (i.e. whether these instructions succeeded in removing smokers’ implicit preference for 
responding True rather than False to the Need-Neg trial-type topic). It is important to note, however, that 
this approach would not have been interpretable had the size of the control group’s block-pair Need-Neg 
DIRAPs not been relatively stable in relation to each other, 3.18 ≤ t(15)s ≤ 5.29; ps ≤ .006; .40 ≤ 
2s ≤ .65; 
.63 ≤ rs ≤ .81 (see Figure 5.8.1).  
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during test block pairs 2 and 3 (i.e. respectively, t(30)s = -.26, .81; ps = .79, .42; 2 = 
.002, .02; r = .05, .15). 
Thus, by accounting for the relevant baseline discrepancy, the pre-practise 
instructions reduced the smokers’ criterion practise Need-Neg DIRAP by a moderately-
sized 2 = .09 (r ≈ .31; i.e. as per the difference observed between the pre- and post-
practise groups on criterion practise Need-Neg DIRAP). And thereafter, the pre-practise 
instructions resulted in a cumulative reduction Need-Neg DIRAP by test block pair 1 of 
approximately p
2 = .03 (i.e. by subtracting the 2 = .06 effect for the F-test contrast for 
the pre- versus post-practise interaction between criterion practise and test block pair 1, 
from the revised-2 = .09 reduction observed in the criterion practise block pair to the 
2 = .06). And likewise, the pre-practise instructions resulted in a cumulative reduction 
Need-Neg DIRAP by test block pair 2 of approximately p
2 = .066, but a cumulative 
increase in Need-Neg DIRAP by test block pair 3 of approximately p
2 = .034.  
On balance, therefore, the pre-practise thought suppression instructions 
moderately reduced Need-Neg DIRAP during the criterion practise blocks, and this effect 
disappeared during test block pair 1, reappeared during test block pair 2, and again 
disappeared during test block pair 3 (see Figure 6.7). Indeed, bearing this out, the pre-
practise group’s Need-Neg DIRAP was in the neighbourhood of zero to begin with during 
the criterion practise block pair, t(15) = -.55, p = .59, 2 = .02, r = .14, but increased to a 
large positive effect during test block pair 1, t(15) = 2.46, p = .03, 2 = .29, r = .54; but 
then became near zero again during test block pair 2, t(15) = .45, p = .66, 2 = .01, r = 
.12, before returning to a large size during test block pair 3, t(15) = 2.83, p = .01, 2 = 
.35, r = .59 (i.e. just as the post-practise group was at baseline during the criterion 
practise blocks). 
In addition, the average number of pairs of practise blocks completed by the pre-
practise group was 2.5, and as such, the foregoing pattern of effects collectively 
indicated that the impact of thought suppression on the pre-practise group’s block pair 
Need-Neg DIRAPs appeared to have a broadly similar developmental trajectory as it did 
with the post-practise group. In particular, as illustrated in Figure 6.7, the successive 
impact of the thought suppression instructions on the pre-practise group’s criterion 
Need-Neg DIRAP and test pair 1 Need-Neg DIRAP (i.e. relative to the control group) was 
very similar in its progression to the impact of these instructions on the post-practise 
group’s Need-Neg DIRAPs for test blocks two and/or three (see Figure 6.7; and also 
compare the size of the relevant F-test interaction contrasts above). Overall, therefore, it 
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appeared as though the thought suppression instructions moderately reduced the current 
smokers’ Need-Neg DIRAP (relative to the control group) for the first two pairs of IRAP 
blocks after their introduction (i.e. as per the post-practise groups’ block pair Need-Neg 
DIRAPs), but thereafter only in an oscillating manner from block pair to block pair until 
at least the fourth such pair (i.e. as per the pre-practise groups’ block pair Need-Neg 
DIRAPs). 
Thought Suppression by Block Sequence on Need-Pos DIRAP 
There was a moderately-sized interaction between thought suppression and 
block sequence on Need-Pos DIRAP, F(6, 135) = 1.19, p = .31, p
2 = .05 (i.e. r ≈ .22), 
which qualified a large main effect of thought suppression, F(2, 45) = 9.63, p = .0003, 
p
2 = .30 (i.e. r ≈ .55), and a null main effect of block sequence, F(3, 135) = .10, p = 
.96, p
2 = .002 (i.e. r ≈ .05). To unpack the nature of this interaction, illustrated in 
Figure 6.8, we conducted the following planned comparisons to respectively compare 
Need-Pos DIRAP between each pairing of the thought suppression groups with the 
control group on each level of block sequence. 
The post-practise group differed to a statistically moderate degree from the 
control group on the criterion practise Need-Pos DIRAP, t(30) = 1.30, p = .20, 
2 = .05; r 
= .23 (i.e. even though they had not yet been introduced to thought suppression 
instructions at this stage). Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 6.8, whereas the control 
group exhibited large positive criterion practise Need-Pos DIRAP, t(15) = 2.15, p = .05, 
2 = .24; r = .49, the post-practise group’s one was near zero, t(15) = .12, p = .90, 2 = 
.001; r = .03. Therefore, on balance, it appeared as though there was somewhat of a 
mismatch between the thought suppression groups and the control group on Need-Pos 
DIRAP at baseline (i.e. insofar as the control group exhibited an implicit preference for 
responding False rather than True to the Need-Pos trial-type topic at the criterion 
practise baseline, but the post-practise group did not). Nonetheless, upon introducing 
the thought suppression instructions this moderately-sized difference became large for 
test block pair 1, t(30) = 2.97, p = .006, 2 = .23 (i.e. r ≈ .48), and test block pair 2, t(30) 
= 4.35, p = .0001, 2 = .39 (i.e. r ≈ .62); before returning (at least somewhat) in test 
block pair 3 to the original moderately-sized difference, t(30) = 2.28, p = .03, 2 = .15 
(i.e. r ≈ .38). 
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Figure 6.8. The two-way interaction between thought suppression and IRAP trial block sequence on 
Need-Pos DIRAP (with standard error bars). 
 
Confirming this pattern, planned F-test contrasts revealed that the relevant Need-
Pos DIRAP interaction between the control group and the post-practise group from 
criterion practise to test pair 1 was moderately-sized, F(1, 30) = 1.50, p = .23, p
2 = .05 
(i.e. r ≈ .22); but the corresponding interaction between test pairs 1 and 2 was null, F(1, 
30) = .37, p = .55, p
2 = .01 (i.e. r ≈ .11); and that between test pairs 2 and 3 was of a 
similar size to that between test pairs 1 and 2 but in the opposite direction, F(1, 30) = 
3.14, p = .09, p
2 = .09 (i.e. r ≈ .31). Thus, in summary, it appeared as though the post-
practise thought suppression instructions had a relatively immediate, moderately-sized 
impact on Need-Pos DIRAP, which lasted for block pairs 1 and 2 but disappeared during 
test block pair 3 (see Figure 6.8). 
Indeed, more specifically, the post-practise instructions had cumulatively 
reduced Need-Pos DIRAP by 
2 = .05 (r ≈ .22) during test block pair 1 (i.e. as per the 
relevant F-test contrast); by approximately2 = .06 (r ≈ .24) during test block pair 2 (i.e. 
by adding the 2-effect for the relevant F-test contrast from its immediate predecessor); 
but had cumulatively increased Need-Pos DIRAP by (approximately) a null 
2 = .03 (r ≈ 
.17) during test block pair 3 (i.e. by subtracting the 2-effect for the relevant F-test 
contrast from its immediate predecessor). However, it is important to bear in mind that 
the post-practise group’s Need-Pos DIRAP was near-zero to begin with during the 
criterion practise block pair (see above), but reduced to a moderately negative effect 
during test block pair 1, t(15) = -1.46, p = .16, 2 = .12, r = .35; before then reducing 
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further to large negative effect during test block pair 2, t(15) = 2.80, p = .01, 2 = .34, r 
= .59, before returning towards the neighbourhood of zero during test block pair 3, t(15) 
= -.75, p = .47, 2 = .036, r = .19.76 As such, crucially, the post-practise thought 
suppression instructions appeared to initially have a temporary ironic impact on Need-
Pos DIRAP inducing a type of pro-smoking implicit evaluating that was not present at 
baseline. Namely, the post-practise instructions made it more likely initially that 
smokers would implicitly affirm that they do need to smoke when feeling positive 
craving-related emotions. 
The pre-practise group, by contrast, were only a moderate-to-large degree less 
than the control group on the Need-Pos DIRAP during the criterion practise blocks, t(30) 
= 2.13, p = .04, 2 = .13 (i.e. r ≈ .36); and they did not differ from the baseline control 
provided by the post-practise group on the criterion practise Need-Pos DIRAP, t(30) = -
.63, p = .53, 2 = .01, r ≈ .11 (i.e. who had yet to receive the thought suppression 
instructions). Thus, on balance, it appeared as though pre-practise thought suppression 
had a null impact on the criterion practise Need-Pos DIRAP (i.e. despite the pre-practise 
criterion practise Need-Pos DIRAP being moderately negative, and thus pro-smoking, 
unlike the other two groups, t(15) = -.85; p = .41; 2 = .05; r ≈ .21). Similarly, 
thereafter, during the IRAP test phase, the thought suppression instructions appeared to 
have only a borderline and fleeting impact on Need-Pos DIRAP. Namely, the pre-practise 
group remained similarly less than the control group on Need-Pos DIRAP not only during 
the criterion practise blocks (see above), but also during test block pair 1, t(30) = 1.12, p 
= .27, 2 = .04 (i.e. r ≈ .20), test block pair 2, t(30) = 2.22, p = .03, 2 = .14 (i.e. r ≈ 
.38), and test block pair 3, t(30) = 1.63, p = .11, 2 = .08 (i.e. r ≈ .29).  
Confirming this pattern, the Need-Pos DIRAP interaction between the control 
group and the pre-practise group from criterion practise to test pair 1 was null, F(1, 30) 
= .56, p = .46, p
2 = .02 (i.e. r ≈ .14); and the corresponding Need-Pos DIRAP interaction 
between test pairs 1 and 2 was only borderline moderately-sized in the opposite 
direction, F(1, 30) = 1.41, p = .25, p
2 = .045 (i.e. r ≈ .21); followed by the 
corresponding Need-Neg DIRAP interaction between test pairs 2 and 3 which reversed 
direction again but only to a null degree, F(1, 30) = .30, p = .59, p
2 = .01 (i.e. r ≈ .10).  
                                                 
76 We highlighted the changing size of the post-practise group’s Need-Pos DIRAPs relative to zero to 
provide a preliminary indication of the qualitative impact of the thought suppression instructions on 
Need-Pos DIRAP (i.e. whether these instructions succeeded in removing smokers’ implicit preference for 
responding False rather than True to the Need-Pos trial-type topic). It is important to note, however, that 
this approach would not have been interpretable had the size of the control group’s block-pair Need-Pos 
DIRAPs not been relatively stable in relation to each other, 2.15 ≤ t(15)s ≤ 3.34; ps ≤ .05; .24 ≤ 
2s ≤ .43; 
.49 ≤ rs ≤ .65 (see Figure 5.8.3).  
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Thus, accounting for the relevant baseline discrepancy, the pre-practise 
instructions reduced the smokers’ criterion practise Need-Pos DIRAP by a null 
2 = .01, 
(r ≈ .11; i.e. as per the difference observed between the pre- and post-practise groups on 
criterion practise Need-Pos DIRAP); and this led to a null cumulative increase of 
approximately p
2 = .01 during test block pair 1, a borderline moderate cumulative 
decrease of approximately p
2 = .035 during test block pair 2, and finally a null 
cumulative increase by test block 3 of approximately p
2 = .025. Indeed, bearing this 
out, the pre-practise Need-Pos DIRAP started out in the neighbourhood of zero during 
criterion practise (see above), before then becoming moderately positive during test 
block pair 1, t(15) = 1.09; p = .30; 2 = .07; r ≈ .27, and again reducing to the 
neighbourhood of zero during test block pairs 2 and 3 (i.e. respectively, t(15)s = -.11, -
.21; ps =.91, .84; 2s = .0008, .003; rs ≈ .03, .05). As such, the pre-practise instructions 
appeared to have only a borderline, somewhat delayed and fleeting impact on Need-Pos 
DIRAP during just test block pair 2, and it was in the desired direction. Overall, therefore, 
it appeared as if the thought suppression instructions initially had null to ironic effects 
on Need-Pos DIRAP for the first three or four trial block pairs after their introduction (i.e. 
as per both suppressor groups’ block pair Need-Pos DIRAPs), followed by a fleeting 
desired effect for one trial block pair which disappeared in the final block pair thereafter 
(i.e. as per the pre-practise groups’ last two block pair Need-Pos DIRAPs; see Figure 6.8). 
Thought Suppression by Block Sequence on Enjoy-Neg DIRAP 
There was a moderately-sized interaction between thought suppression and 
block sequence on Enjoy-Neg DIRAP, F(6, 135) = 2.71, p = .02, p
2 = .11 (i.e. r ≈ .33), 
which qualified a moderate-to-large main effect of thought suppression, F(2, 45) = 3.10, 
p = .055, p
2 = .12 (i.e. r ≈ .35), and a null main effect of block sequence, F(3, 135) = 
1.30, p = .28, p
2 = .03 (i.e. r ≈ .17). To unpack the nature of this interaction, illustrated 
in Figure 6.9, we conducted the following planned comparisons to respectively compare 
Enjoy-Neg DIRAP between each pairing of the thought suppression groups with the 
control group on each level of block sequence 
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Figure 6.9. The two-way interaction between thought suppression and IRAP trial block sequence on 
Enjoy-Neg DIRAP (with standard error bars). 
 
The post-practise group was moderately greater than the control group on the 
criterion practise Enjoy-Neg DIRAP, t(30) = -1.20, p = .24, 
2 = .05; r = .21 (i.e. even 
though they had not yet been introduced to the thought suppression instructions). 
However, given that the control group and the post-practise group both exhibited 
positive criterion practise Need-Neg DIRAPs (i.e. respectively, t(15)s = 1.35, 2.15; ps = 
.20, .005; 2s = .11, .42; rs = .33, .65), therefore, on balance, it appeared as though the 
thought suppression groups were reasonably well matched to control group on Enjoy-
Neg DIRAP. In any case, upon introducing the thought suppression instructions this 
moderate difference completely reversed for test block pair 1, t(30) = 1.94, p = .06, 2 = 
.11 (i.e. r ≈ .33) and test block pair 2, t(30) = 4.11, p = .0003, 2 = .36 (i.e. r ≈ .60); 
before then disappearing during test block pair 3, t(30) = .56, p = .58, 2 = .01 (i.e. r ≈ 
.10). Confirming this pattern, planned F-test contrasts revealed that the Enjoy-Neg DIRAP 
interaction between the control group and the post-practise group from criterion practise 
to test pair 1 was large, F(1, 30) = 9.67, p = .004, p
2 = .24 (i.e. r ≈ .49); and that in 
contrast the interaction between test pairs 1 and 2 was moderate-to-small, F(1, 30) = 
1.44, p = .24, p
2 = .05 (i.e. r ≈ .21); but that between test pairs 2 and 3 was moderate-
to-large and in the opposite direction, F(1, 30) = 1.65, p = .05, p
2 = .13 (i.e. r ≈ .36). 
Indeed, more specifically, the post-practise instructions had cumulatively reduced 
Enjoy-Neg DIRAP by 
2 = .24 (r ≈ . 49) during test block pair 1 (i.e. as per the relevant F-
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test contrast); by approximately2 = .29 (r ≈ .54) during test block pair 2 (i.e. by adding 
the 2-effect for the relevant F-test contrast from its immediate predecessor); and had 
cumulatively decreased Enjoy-Neg DIRAP by approximately 
2 = .16 (r ≈ .40) during test 
block pair 3 (i.e. by subtracting the 2-effect for the relevant F-test contrast from its 
immediate predecessor). 
Thus, it appeared as though the post-practise thought suppression instructions 
had a relatively large immediate impact on Enjoy-Neg DIRAP, which strengthened 
moderately during test block pair 2, and then diminished by a moderate-to-large degree 
during test pair 3 (see Figure 6.9). However, before drawing this conclusion, it is 
important to bear in mind that the post-practise group’s Enjoy-Neg DIRAP became largely 
negative during test block pair 2, t(15) = -1.78, p = .09, 2 = .18, r = .42. Thus, 
crucially, the post-practise thought suppression instructions appeared to have an ironic 
impact on Enjoy-Neg DIRAP during test block pair 2, inducing a type of pro-smoking 
implicit evaluating that was not otherwise present. This was in contrast to the post-
practise group’s largely positive Enjoy-Neg DIRAP during criterion practise (see above), 
which reduced to the neighbourhood of zero during test block pair 1, t(15) = .33, p = 
.74, 2 = .007, r = .08, and test block pair 3, t(15) = .68, p = .51, 2 = .03, r = .17.77  
The pre-practise group, by contrast, remained non-negative on Enjoy-Neg DIRAP 
throughout all four block pairs. Namely, they exhibited an Enjoy-Neg DIRAP that was 
moderately positive during criterion practise, t(15) = 1.11, p = .29, 2 = .07, r ≈ .26, and 
during test pairs 1 and 2 (i.e. respectively, t[15]s = 1.79, .89; ps = .09, .39; 2s = .18, 
.05; rs ≈ .42, .22), but in the neighbourhood of zero during test block pair 3, t(15) = -
.74, p = .47, 2 = .03, r ≈ .18. And although the pre-practise group were similar to the 
control group on the Enjoy-Neg DIRAP during the criterion practise blocks, t(30) = .08, p 
= .94, 2 = .0002 (i.e. r ≈ .01), crucially, they were moderately less than the baseline 
control provided by the post-practise group, t(30) = -1.21, p = .24, 2 = .09 (i.e. r ≈ .30). 
On balance, therefore, given randomly assignment between the two thought suppression 
groups, it appeared that the pre-practise group’s criterion practise Enjoy-Neg DIRAP was 
moderately reduced by the thought suppression instructions.  
                                                 
77 And moreover, this was despite the fact that the control group’s Enjoy-Neg DIRAP changed in the 
opposite direction to the post-practise group’s Enjoy-Neg DIRAP across all three block pair transitions. 
That is, the control group’s Enjoy-Neg DIRAP was largely positive during test block pairs 1 and 2 (i.e. 
respectively, t(15)s = 3.13, 3.91; ps ≤ .007; 2s = .40, .50; rs = .63, .71), but only moderately so during 
test block pair 3, t(15) = 1.60, p = .13, 2 = .15, r = .38. 
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Thereafter, during the IRAP test phase, the pre-practise group’s Enjoy-Neg DIRAP 
trended less than the control group during test block pair 1, t(30) = 1.01, p = .32, 2 = 
.03 (i.e. r ≈ .18), and moderately less than the control group during test block pairs 2 
and 3 (i.e. respectively, t(30)s = 2.13, 1.68; ps = .04, .10; 2s = .13, .09; rs ≈ .36, .30). 
Confirming this pattern of gradual reduction, planned F-tests revealed that the Enjoy-
Neg DIRAP interaction between the control group and the pre-practise group from 
criterion practise to test pair 1 was relatively small, F(1, 30) = .67, p = .42, p
2 = .02 
(i.e. r ≈ .15); as was that between test pairs 1 and 2, F(1, 30) = .58, p = .45, p
2 = .02 
(i.e. r ≈ .14); followed by an even smaller Need-Neg DIRAP interaction in the same 
direction between test pairs 2 and 3, F(1, 30) = .08, p = .78, p
2 = .003 (i.e. r ≈ .05). 
Thus, by accounting for the relevant baseline discrepancy, the pre-practise thought 
suppression instructions reduced the smokers’ criterion practise Enjoy-Neg DIRAP by 
approximately 2 = .09 (r ≈ .30; i.e. as per the difference observed between the pre- and 
post-practise groups on criterion practise Need-Pos DIRAP); and this led to a cumulative 
reductions of approximately p
2 = .11, p
2 = .13 and p
2 = .127 during test block pairs 1, 
2 and 3, respectively. On balance, therefore, the thought suppression instructions 
appeared to immediately, persistently and indeed ironically eliminate the smokers’ 
positive Enjoy-Neg effect across a sequence of approximately 5-6 trial block pairs after 
the introduction of those instructions. And moreover, the impact of those instructions 
was consistent across all of such trial block pairs except for one; an ironic pro-smoking 
Enjoy-Neg effect on post-practise IRAP test block pair 2 (see Figure 6.9). 
Thought Suppression by Block Sequence on Enjoy-Pos DIRAP 
There was no main effect of thought suppression, F(2, 45) = .13, p = .87, p
2 = 
.006 (i.e. r ≈ .08), or block sequence on Enjoy-Pos DIRAP, F(3, 135) = .19, p = .91, p
2 = 
.004 (i.e. r ≈ .06); and indeed the relevant two-way interaction was also null, F(6, 135) 
= .15, p = .99, p
2 = .007 (i.e. r ≈ .08). Bearing this out, all four block pair Enjoy-Pos 
DIRAP for all three groups were positive to a large degree, t(15)s ≥ 2.33; ps ≤ .03; 
2s ≥ 
.27; rs ≥ .52. 
6.8.4 IRAP trial-type by Thought suppression by Order Analyses 
We entered the standard trial-type DIRAP data into a 3x2x2x2 mixed-repeated 
measures ANOVA, which crossed the two between-groups variables thought 
suppression (i.e. smoker controls versus pre-practise perspective switchers versus post-
practise perspective switchers) and trial block order (i.e. pro-smoking-first versus anti-
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smoking-first), with the two IRAP trial-type variables.78  We obtained no main effect 
for order, F(1, 42) = .34, p = .56, p
2 = .008 (i.e. r ≈ .09), or for attribute stimulus class, 
F(1, 42) = .09, p = .76, p
2 = .002 (i.e. r ≈ .05), but did for the thought suppression 
variable, F(2, 42) = 5.68, p = .007, p
2 = .21 (i.e. r ≈ .46), and marginally for concept 
label, F(1, 42) = 1.59, p = .21, p
2 = .04 (i.e. r ≈ .19). And critically, all four main 
effects were qualified by a moderately sized interaction effect with each other, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.10, F(2, 42) = 1.93, p = .16, p
2 = .08 (i.e. r ≈ .29), and by 
multiple lower order interaction effects.79  
 
 
Figure 6.10. The three-way interaction between the thought suppression, block order and the two IRAP 
trial-type variables in terms of mean standard trial-type DIRAP scores with standard error bars.  
 
                                                 
78 We did not include IRAP block order in an analysis with IRAP block sequence in the current study for 
the same reasons as cited in Study 3 (i.e. related to the larger sample sizes that would have been required 
to compensate for the relatively few pairs of latency scores comprising each block-pair trial-type DIRAP 
coupled with the instability of block order effects; see Lane et al., 2007; pp. 88-90; Nosek et al., 2005; 
VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007, p. 48). 
79 Namely, there was a moderate three-way interaction between thought suppression and the two trial-type 
variables F(2, 42) = 1.77, p = .18, p
2 = .08 (i.e. r ≈ .28); a large two-way interaction effect between the 
two trial-type variables, F(1, 42) = 22.51, p < .0001, p
2 = .35 (i.e. r ≈ .59); a moderate-to-large two-way 
interaction between thought suppression and concept label, F(2, 42) = 3.47, p = .04, p
2 = .14 (i.e. r ≈ 
.38); a moderate three-way interaction between block order and the two trial-type variables, F(1, 42) = 
2.70, p = .11, p
2 = .06 (i.e. r ≈ .25); and finally, a moderate two-way interaction between thought 
suppression and block order, F(2, 42) = 1.15, p = .21, p
2 = .05 (i.e. r ≈ .23). All six remaining interaction 
effects were null, Fs ≤ .50, .204, ps ≥ .61, p
2s ≤ .02 (i.e. rs ≤ .15). 
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In broad terms, this indicated that all four trial-type DIRAP scores functioned 
differently from each other with respect to the interaction between the thought 
suppression and block order variables. To explore the nature of this four-way 
interaction, we therefore conducted a one-way follow-up ANOVA on each trial-type 
DIRAP crossing thought suppression and block order. 
Thought Suppression by Block Order on Need-Neg DIRAP 
There was a moderate-to-large main effect of thought suppression on Need-Neg 
DIRAP, F(2, 42) = 3.83, p = .03, p
2 = .15 (i.e. r ≈ .39); no main effect of block order, 
F(1, 42) = 1.04, p = .31, p
2 = .02 (i.e. r ≈ .15); and indeed, only a null interaction 
between block order and thought suppression, F(2, 42) = .11, p = .90, p
2 = .005 (i.e. r ≈ 
.07). Planned comparisons indicated that the pre- and post-practise groups exhibited 
similarly sized Need-Neg DIRAPs, t(30) = .87, p = .39, 
2 = .02 (i.e. r ≈ .16), that were 
respectively a moderate and large degree less than the control group’s Need-Neg DIRAP 
(i.e. respectively, t(30)s = 1.96, 2.81; one-tailed ps = .03, .004; 2s = .11, .21; rs ≈ .34, 
.47). However, as we highlighted in our block sequence analysis above, the post-
practise group was moderately less than the control group on criterion practise Need-
Neg DIRAP to begin with (i.e. before the post-practise neither group had received the 
thought suppression instructions; 2 = .09, r ≈ .31). And, therefore, we estimated that 
the overall impact of the thought suppression instructions on the pre- and post-practise 
group’s respective Need-Neg DIRAPs were null and moderate, respectively, revised-
2 = 
.02,  .12; revised-rs = .14, .35. Indeed, accordingly, the control group and the pre-
practise group both exhibited a largely positive Need-Neg DIRAP (i.e. respectively; t[15]s 
= 6.12, 2.58; ps ≤ .02; 2s = .71, .31; rs ≈ .84, .55), but in contrast, the post-practise 
group merely exhibited a moderately positive Need-Neg DIRAP, t(15) = 1.21, p =.24, 
2 
= .09, r ≈.30 (i.e. much the same as at criterion practise baseline). 
Thought Suppression by Block Order on Need-Pos DIRAP 
Thought suppression interacted with block order on Need-Pos DIRAP, F(2, 42) = 
2.85, p = .07, p
2 = .12 (i.e. r ≈ .35), and this interaction qualified a large main effect of 
thought suppression, F(2, 42) = 7.82, p = .001, p
2 = .27 (i.e. r ≈ .52), and a null main 
effect of block order, F(1, 42) = .02, p = .89, p
2 = .0004 (i.e. r ≈ .02). Follow-up t-tests 
indicated that block order did not impact Need-Pos DIRAP in the control group, t(14) = -
.28, p = .78, 2 = .006 (i.e. r ≈ .07), but had an opposing impact on the pre-practise 
group, t(14) = -1.18, p = .26, 2 = .09 (i.e. r ≈ .30), relative to the post-practise group, 
t(14) = 2.41, p = .03, 2 = .29 (i.e. r ≈ .54). Namely, planned comparisons indicated that 
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the pre- and post-practise groups exhibited similarly-sized Need-Pos DIRAPs in the 
mood-consistent-first block order, t(13) = -.56, p = .58, 2 = .02, r ≈ .15, but largely 
different Need-Pos DIRAPs from each other in the mood-inconsistent-first block order, 
t(15) = 2.63, p = .02, 2 = .32, r ≈ .56. As illustrated in Figure 6.10, the pre-practise 
group exhibited a moderately negative Need-Pos DIRAP in the mood-consistent-first 
condition, t[8] = -.70, p = .51, 2 = .06, r ≈ .24, but a moderately positive Need-Pos 
DIRAP in the mood-inconsistent-first condition, t(6) = .89, p = .41, 
2 = .12, r ≈ .34. And 
conversely, the post-practise group exhibited a Need-Pos DIRAP that was in the 
neighbourhood of zero during the mood-consistent-first condition, t(5) = .14, p =.89, 2 
= .004, r ≈ .06, but negative to a large degree during the mood-inconsistent-first 
condition, t(9) = -3.96, p = .03, 2 = .64, r ≈ .80. In fact, the latter effect was as negative 
as the control group’s Need-Pos DIRAP was positive across both block orders (i.e. t[15] = 
4.22; p = .001; 2 = .54; r ≈ .74) 
Thus, as illustrated in Figure 6.10, the pre-practise instructions appeared to 
reduce the smokers’ Need-Pos DIRAP by a large degree (relative to the control group) in 
the mood-consistent-first block order, t(15) = 2.78, p = .01, 2 = .34 (i.e. r ≈ .58), but 
only to a moderate-to-small degree in the mood-inconsistent block order, t(13) = .78, p 
= .45, 2 = .045 (i.e. r ≈ .21). And moreover, in contrast, the post-practise instructions 
appeared to reduce Need-Pos DIRAP by a large amount in the mood-consistent-first block 
order, t(12) = 2.14, p = .05, 2 = .28 (i.e. r ≈ .53); and by a very large amount that 
effectively reversed the polarity of Need-Pos DIRAP in the mood-inconsistent-first block 
order, t(16) = 4.33, p = .001, 2 = .54 (i.e. r ≈ .73). In other words, during the pre-
practise mood-inconsistent-first condition and the post-practise mood-inconsistent-first 
condition, the thought suppression instructions appeared to reduce how mood-consistent 
Need-Pos DIRAP was without making it negative (or thus ironically pro-smoking); and in 
contrast, the pre-practise mood-consistent-first and the post-practise mood-inconsistent-
first conditions both appeared to make Need-Pos DIRAP negative.  
Indeed, we obtained broadly the same findings even when we accounted for the 
fact that the post-practise group was moderately less than the control group on criterion 
practise Need-Pos DIRAP (i.e. before either group had received the thought suppression 
instructions; 2 = .05; r = .23). Namely, our revised estimates indicated that the overall 
reduction on Need-Pos DIRAP due to the thought suppression instructions remained large 
in pre-practise mood-consistent-first condition (i.e. revised-2 = .29, revised-r ≈ .54), 
large in the post-practise mood-consistent-first block order (i.e. revised-2 = .23, 
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revised-r ≈ .48), and also large in the post-practise mood-consistent-first block order 
(i.e. revised-2 = .49, revised-r ≈ .70). Only the pre-practise mood-inconsistent-first 
group did not exhibit any overall impact of the thought suppression instructions once we 
had accounted for the aforementioned baseline discrepancy (i.e. revised-2 = .005, 
revised-r ≈ -.07). Thus, crucially, the only condition in which smokers’ Need-Pos DIRAPs 
were made less mood-consistent without making them pro-smoking was in the post-
practise mood-consistent-first condition. And apart from the null effect of the pre-
practise mood-inconsistent-first condition, both other thought suppression conditions 
ironically induced pro-smoking implicit evaluating among the current smokers (i.e. 
inducing a tendency to affirm one’s need to smoke when experiencing positive craving-
related emotions). 
Thought Suppression by Block Order on Enjoy-Neg DIRAP 
Thought suppression interacted to a moderate degree with block order on Enjoy-
Neg DIRAP, F(2, 42) = 1.10, p = .34, p
2 = .05 (i.e. r ≈ .22), thus qualifying a large main 
effect of thought suppression, F(2, 42) = 4.47, p = .02, p
2 = .18 (i.e. r ≈ .42), and a null 
main effect block order, F(1, 42) =.16, p = .69, p
2 = .004 (i.e. r ≈ .06). Follow-up t-
tests indicated that block order did not impact Enjoy-Neg DIRAP in either the control 
group, t(14) = -.30, p = .77, 2 = .006 (i.e. r ≈ .08), or the pre-practise group, t(14) = -
.45, p = .66, 2 = .01 (i.e. r ≈ .12), but did have a moderate impact on Enjoy-Neg DIRAP 
in the post-practise group, t(14) = 1.48, p = .16, 2 = .14 (i.e. r ≈ .38).  
Planned comparisons indicated that the pre- and post-practise groups exhibited 
similarly-sized Enjoy-Neg DIRAPs in the mood-consistent-first block order, t(13) = -.46, 
p = .65, 2 = .02, r ≈ .13, but moderately different Enjoy-Neg DIRAPs from each other in 
the mood-inconsistent-first block order, t(15) = 1.61, p = .13, 2 = .15, r ≈ .38 (see 
Figure 6.10). In particular, the mood-inconsistent-first post-practise group exhibited a 
moderate-to-large negative Enjoy-Neg DIRAP, t(9) = -1.13, p = .28, 
2 = .12 (i.e. r ≈ .35), 
but the mood-consistent-first post-practise group and both block order pre-practise 
groups exhibited Enjoy-Neg DIRAPs that at least trended positively. That is, the mood-
inconsistent-first pre-practise group exhibited a moderate-to-large positive Enjoy-Neg 
DIRAP, t(6) = 1.17, p = .29, 
2 = .15, r ≈ .38, as did the mood-consistent-first post-
practise group, t(5) = .95; p = .39, 2 = .15, r ≈ .39; and the mood-consistent-first pre-
practise group trended towards a positive Enjoy-Neg DIRAP, t[8] = .38, p = .71, 
2 = .02, 
r ≈ .13. 
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Crucially, the control group exhibited a strongly positive Enjoy-Neg DIRAP in 
both block orders, t(15) = 4.40, p = .001, 2 = .56 (i.e. r ≈ .75), and thus, it appeared 
that pre- and post-practise thought suppression each reduced Enjoy-Neg DIRAP by at least 
a moderate degree. Specifically, Enjoy-Neg DIRAP was reduced, relative to the control 
group, by a moderate-to-large degree across the pre-practise block order groups, t(30) = 
2.33, p = .03, 2 = .15 (i.e. r ≈ .39), to a moderate degree for the mood-consistent-first 
post-practise group, t(12) = .98, p = .35, 2 = .07 (i.e. r ≈ .27), and indeed, to a large 
degree for the mood-inconsistent-first post-practise group, t(16) = 3.39, p = .004, 2 = 
.42 (i.e. r ≈ .65). Indeed, these reductions were even larger when we accounted for the 
fact that the post-practise group was moderately more than the control group on 
criterion practise Enjoy-Neg DIRAP (i.e. before either group had received the thought 
suppression instructions; 2 = .09, r ≈ .30). Namely, our revised-estimates indicated that 
the overall reduction on Enjoy-Neg DIRAP due to the thought suppression instructions 
was large for the pre-practise group (i.e. revised-2 = .24, revised-r ≈ .49), and indeed 
large for both post-practise block orders (i.e. respectively, revised-2s = .16, .51; 
revised-rs ≈ .40, .71). Thus, in summary, the pre-practise thought suppression 
instructions reduced the degree to which smokers were mood-consistent on Enjoy-Neg 
DIRAP without making them ironically pro-smoking in either block order. And the post-
practise thought suppression instructions did so only in the mood-consistent-first block 
order. However, by contrast, the post-practise mood-inconsistent-first condition 
ironically induced negative Enjoy-Neg DIRAPs, such that smokers implicitly affirmed 
that they enjoy smoking when they experience negative craving-related feelings. 
Thought Suppression by Block Order on Enjoy-Pos DIRAP 
There was no main effect of either thought suppression or block order on Enjoy-
Pos DIRAP, Fs ≤ 1.14, ps ≥ .29, p
2s ≤ .03 (i.e. rs ≤ .16), and moreover no interaction, 
F(2, 42) = .41, p = .67, p
2 = .02 (i.e. r ≈ .14). Planned comparisons confirmed that all 
three groups exhibited very similarly-sized Enjoy-Pos DIRAPs, t(30)s ≤ .37, ps ≥ .72, 
2s 
≤ .005 (i.e. rs ≤ .07). Namely, Enjoy-Pos DIRAP was positive to a large degree for not 
just the control group, t(15) = 3.92, p = .001, 2 = .51 (i.e. r ≈ .71), but also for both the 
pre- and post-practise groups (i.e. respectively, t[15]s = 3.60, 3.56; ps = .003, .003; 2s 
= .46, .46 (i.e. rs ≈ .68, .68). 
Response Latency Analyses of Thought Suppression and Block Order 
As in Study 3, follow-up analyses suggested that the thought suppression 
instructions made their impact on all three of these trial-type DIRAPs by delaying (i.e. 
213 
 
interfering with) mood-consistent IRAP responses more than by mood-inconsistent 
IRAP responses (i.e. rather than by facilitating mood-inconsistent relative to mood-
consistent IRAP responding; for details see Appendix 22). In contrast, however, block 
order operated differently depending upon not just thought suppression, but also upon 
the particular trial-type DIRAP involved. Whereas the pre-practise block order effect on 
Need-Pos DIRAP occurred mainly by inducing faster mood-inconsistent IRAP 
responding, both post-practise block order effects (i.e. on Need-Pos DIRAP and Enjoy-
Neg DIRAP) occurred mainly by interfering with (i.e. slowing) mood-consistent IRAP 
responding. 
6.8.5. The Impact of the Thought Suppression Instructions on trial-type DIRAP Internal 
Reliability 
The thought suppression instructions did not appear to have much if any overall 
impact on the internal reliability of the current standard trial-type DIRAPs
80 except for 
upon Enjoy-Neg DIRAP. Namely, as detailed in Table 6.1, both thought suppression 
groups exhibited similarly good internal reliability as the control group on all of the 
current trial-type DIRAPs except for Enjoy-Neg DIRAP, where they each exhibited an 
almost identically moderate amount less internal reliability than the control group, 
respectively, Zs = 1.25, 1.33, ps = .21, .18 (i.e. rs ≈ .22, .24).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
80 Note that it would have been possible to calculate Spearman-Brown corrected split-half reliabilities for 
each group’s extended trial-type DIRAPs. However, the pre-practise group was instructed to perspective 
switch during the criterion practise blocks but the post-practise and control groups were not, and therefore 
it would have confounded the thought suppression instructions (with time since their delivery) to have 
compared these three groups with respect to the internal reliabilities of their respective extended trial-type 
DIRAPs. 
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Table 6.1 
The Spearman-Brown split-half reliabilities (rsb) of the IRAP trial-type effects for the control group, and 
the pre- and -post thought suppression groups. ‘Compensated DIRAP rsbs’ approximated what rsbs the 
various DIRAPs would have if, with all else equal, they were comprised of the same number of trials as an 
IAT effect (for algorithm see Appendix 11).  
 
 DIRAP rsb Compensated DIRAP rsb 
Control Group   
 
Enjoy-Pos DIRAP
 a .87**** 96**** 
Enjoy-Neg DIRAP
 a .62** .87**** 
Need-Pos DIRAP 
a .47* .78*** 
Need-Neg DIRAP
 b
 .66** .89**** 
Pre-practise Group   
 
Enjoy-Pos DIRAP
 a .77*** .93**** 
Enjoy-Neg DIRAP
 a .23 .54* 
Need-Pos DIRAP 
a .67** .89**** 
Need-Neg DIRAP
 a
 .70*** .90**** 
Post-practise Group   
 Enjoy-Pos DIRAP
 a .66** .89**** 
 Enjoy-Neg DIRAP
 a .20 .50* 
 Need-Pos DIRAP 
a .49* .79*** 
 Need-Neg DIRAP
 a
 .78*** .93**** 
a n = 16; 
b n = 14. 
#
 p  .10, * p  .05; ** p  .01; *** p  .001; **** p  .0001; all ps for rsb one-tailed. 
 
 
6.9. DISCUSSION (STUDY 4) 
Manipulation checks confirmed that the current smokers experienced relatively 
high cognitive load during the IRAP-based thought suppression tasks – with 
approximately 67-87% of the smokers from the pre- and post-practise groups offering 
unsolicited reports that they were unable to avoid adhering less and less to the thought 
suppression instructions as the IRAP progressed. Moreover, approximately 47-60% of 
the thought suppression groups even offered unsolicited reports that they had found the 
thought suppression instructions so difficult to adhere to during the IRAP that they 
ceased attempting to do so well before completion. In addition, further manipulation 
checks indicated that the current smokers were remarkably consistent in deriving the 
perspective of a lifelong non-smoker as being relatively free from the symptoms of 
tobacco addiction; and as being a perspective from which smoking is evaluated as 
neither enjoyable nor needed even during corresponding craving-related moods. Indeed, 
more specifically, whereas over three quarters of the current smokers mentioned 
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deriving anti-smoking scenarios as a means of imagining perspectives from which they 
would not typically feel a need to smoke, only about a third mentioned deriving any 
scenarios on the benefits of abstinence and/or smoking-bans in order to do so.  
Therefore, much like as in Study 3, it appeared as though the current smokers’ 
experience of non-smokers was predominantly stigmatizing, rather than socially 
supportive in ways that are likely to foster abstinence (see Gifford & Humphreys, 2007, 
p. 359). And crucially, this stigmatizing approach to contradiction-based thought 
suppression had limited effectiveness as a means for smokers to temporarily eliminate 
their pro-smoking implicit evaluating on demand. Specifically, this tactic was initially 
successful in eliminating smokers’ positive Need-Neg effects for the first two pairs of 
IRAP blocks after its introduction. However, thereafter it did so only in an oscillating 
manner from block pair to block pair for the duration of the relevant IRAPs. Indeed, 
these thought suppression instructions appeared to have even less of the desired impact 
on smokers’ implicit evaluating of Need-Pos. Namely, after a delay of three or four trial 
block pairs during which the smokers’ Need-Pos effects reduced ironically, sometimes 
even transforming into pro-smoking effects, the smokers’ Need-Pos effects only 
increased as desired during the penultimate IRAP trial block pair measured here, before 
disappearing in the last such trial block pair. 
Worse still, the thought suppression instructions ironically eliminated the 
smokers’ positive (and thus anti-smoking) Enjoy-Neg effects immediately and 
persistently throughout a sequence of approximately 5-6 trial block pairs following their 
introduction. Crucially, this was despite the fact that the thought suppression 
instructions were specifically designed to be irrelevant to the smokers’ enjoyment of 
smoking. Indeed, in one trial block pair, approximately 4-5 trial block pairs after the 
introduction of those instructions, the smokers’ positive Enjoy-Neg effect not only 
reduced to the neighbourhood of zero, but transformed into a negative and thus pro-
smoking Enjoy-Neg effect.  
In summary, therefore, the current thought suppression instructions may have 
initially had the desired impact on the smokers’ implicit evaluating of the Need-Neg 
topic, but this benefit was unstable. And moreover, it was bought at the cost of 
ironically prompting the smokers to implicitly evaluate the Need-Pos and Enjoy-Neg 
trial-types in a consistently less anti-smoking, and indeed sometimes more pro-smoking 
manner than before. However, the smokers’ implicit evaluating of the Enjoy-Pos trial-
type were entirely unaffected by the thought suppression instructions. And as such, 
crucially, it appeared as though the thought suppression instructions primarily cued 
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smokers to (temporarily) derive evaluative perspectives that were compatible with 
smokers’ pre-experimentally established implicit evaluating of Enjoy-Pos, but 
incompatible with their pre-experimentally established implicit evaluating of Need-Neg. 
For example, as a result of trying to imagine that they did not need to smoke 
when feeling negative, it is possible that the current smokers may have temporarily 
reverted to implicitly evaluating smoking during negative craving-related moods as 
being enjoyable for the relief it provides – as is characteristic of the early stages of 
tobacco addiction. Indeed, not only did the current pattern of trial-type effects reflect the 
relatively pro-smoking enjoyment-related implicit evaluating exhibited by 
undergraduate non-smokers in Study 2 (who were at risk of smoking by virtue of being 
undergraduate students). Moreover, just as these non-smokers from Study 2 exhibited 
relatively high internal reliability on all of the current trial-types except Enjoy-Neg, 
likewise so did both of the thought suppression groups – thus indicating that all three 
groups were similarly conflicted in responding to Enjoy-Neg. Furthermore, if the current 
smokers had switched to implicitly evaluating from such perspectives emphasizing 
reward- over relief-focused smoking, this would also explain why having received the 
thought suppression instructions they were less likely to deny, and more likely to affirm 
Need-Pos. On balance, therefore, it appeared as though the thought suppression 
instructions may simply have prompted the current smokers to temporarily revert from 
the need-focused pro-smoking perspectives characteristic of advanced tobacco 
addiction, to the enjoyment-focused pro-smoking perspectives characteristic of the 
earliest stages of tobacco addiction. In fact, this seemed all the more likely from the 
point of view that all of the aforementioned effects of thought suppression on smokers’ 
implicit evaluating of Need-Neg, Need-Pos and Enjoy-Neg occurred more strongly in 
response to the post-practise instructions as compared to the pre-practise instructions.  
Namely, the pre-practise thought suppression instructions reduced the smokers’ 
standard Need-Neg effect by a moderate amount, but the pre-practise instructions did 
not have any overall impact on the smokers’ standard Need-Neg effect (apart from 
undermining its internal reliability). And correspondingly, the most pronounced ironic 
effects of thought suppression on smokers’ implicit evaluating of Need-Pos and Enjoy-
Neg were exhibited by the post-practise group rather than by the pre-practise group. 
Indeed, even with the post-practise group the relevant ironic instructional effects were 
expressed most strongly immediately after instruction, and tended to fade gradually 
over successive IRAP block pairs thereafter. As such, crucially, this pattern of ironic 
effects suggested that the current thought suppression instructions inadvertently 
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encouraged smokers to temporarily derive reward-focused pro-smoking scenarios. 
Therefore, the current thought suppression instructions may not have provoked the kind 
of collateral, delayed rebound effects that we observed in smokers’ implicit evaluating 
during Study 3 as thought suppression waned over time; but they certainly did have 
more immediate ironic effects on smokers’ smoking-related implicit evaluating (of 
Need-Pos and Enjoy-Neg). In fact, as we will now detail, these ironic perspective 
switching processes persisted so long that they were often apparent on the smokers’ 
standard Need-Pos and Enjoy-Neg effects (i.e. which covered a timeframe of at least 15-
20 minutes). 
Although the smokers’ standard Need-Neg and Enjoy-Pos effects were not 
affected by IRAP block order sequence, as intended, their standard Need-Pos and 
Enjoy-Neg effects were complicated by interactions with this variable. In summary, the 
post-practise group exhibited an ironic negative effect on both Enjoy-Neg and Need-Pos 
in the mood-inconsistent-first block order, and by contrast the pre-practise group did so 
during the mood-consistent-first block order; but crucially, all other thought suppressor 
Enjoy-Neg and Need-Pos effects trended similarly positive. Thus, curiously, block order 
appeared to moderate (the impact of thought suppression on) the pre- and post-practise 
Need-Pos effects in opposite directions to each other, and moderated the relevant post-
practise Enjoy-Neg (thought suppression) effect without moderating its pre-practise 
counterpart.  
More specifically, during the post-practise IRAP measurement phase the mood-
inconsistent-first block order appeared to amplify the ironic reductions we observed in 
the smokers’ Enjoy-Neg and Need-Pos effects so much that unlike the consistent-first 
block order it generated pro-smoking (negative) Enjoy-Neg and Need-Pos effects. And 
conversely, the thought suppression instructions transformed the standard pre-practise 
Need-Pos effect from anti-smoking (positive) to pro-smoking (negative) in the mood-
consistent-first IRAP block order, but did not have a persistent enough impact in the 
mood-inconsistent-first block order to change the standard pre-practise Need-Pos effect 
at all. Overall, this implied that block order moderated (the impact of thought 
suppression on) smokers’ pro-smoking implicit evaluating less the longer it had been 
since the relevant thought suppression instructions had been issued. And as such, 
crucially, this confirmed that the current IRAP block order instructional effects were a 
function of the thought suppression instructions, rather than vice versa. 
Granted, it was not possible within the current design to determine what changes 
in perspective were responsible for the pre-practise block order interaction on Need-Pos 
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being in the opposite direction to the two post-practise block order interactions on Need-
Pos and Enjoy-Neg. There were many possible ways in which each smokers’ personal 
scenario might have evolved to produce the current block order interactions. And as 
such, we must acknowledge that it is possible that this localised pattern of block order 
effects may not be replicable, but rather relatively idiosyncratic, given that many of the 
relevant block order cells happened to contain relatively few participants (i.e. the 
relevant three ironic negative effects were respectively based upon cell ns of 9, 8 and 6).  
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the post-practise block order interactions 
were compatible with our tentative account above of how the current thought 
suppression instructions temporarily cued the smokers to reframe their implicit 
evaluating of Enjoy-Neg and Need-Pos in terms of enjoying smoking. Namely, it is 
possible that the more pronounced ironic effects we observed on post-practise Enjoy-
Neg and Need-Pos effects in the mood-inconsistent-first block order as compared to its 
mood-consistent-first counterpart, was due to the latter block order being more 
immediately relevant to that enjoyment-focused strategy – and thus more likely to cue 
smokers to derive it. Indeed, confirming this, follow-up analyses indicated that both of 
the post-practise block order effects resulted from the same response processes as all of 
the post-practise thought suppression effects. Namely, they resulted from the mood-
inconsistent-first condition amplifying the extent to which the thought suppression 
instructions interfered with (i.e. slowed down) smokers’ pre-experimentally established 
implicit evaluating in each case. 
By contrast, the only block order effect to emerge among pre-practise group’s 
IRAP data, was that on their implicit evaluating of Need-Pos, which operated by 
facilitating (i.e. speeding up) smokers’ affirming of Need-Pos (i.e. contrary to their pre-
experimentally established tendency to deny Need-Pos). And thus, it appeared that as 
the (pre-practise) smokers’ tired of adhering to the current thought suppression 
instructions, the mood-consistent-first block order somehow cued the relevant 
enjoyment-focused thought suppression scenarios more persistently among the smokers 
than the mood-inconsistent-first block order. Overall, therefore, as in Study 3, the 
current pattern of IRAP block order effects comported closely with the idea that thought 
suppression instructions interact with IRAP block order according to how relevant and 
thus supportive each block order is to the ongoing impact of those instructions on the 
relevant IRAP trial-type (at any given time).  
In any case, unfortunately, these foregoing block order interactions appeared to 
exacerbate rather than ameliorate the ironic impact of our need-focused thought 
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suppression instructions on smokers implicit evaluating of Enjoy-Neg and Need-Pos. 
Granted, the current thought suppression instructions influenced smokers’ pro-smoking 
implicit evaluating in a manner that was, at least initially, more robust against 
interference from block order, and thus other background variables, than those used in 
Study 3. Namely, block order did not interact with the current thought suppression 
instructions on smokers’ Need-Neg and Enjoy-Pos effects; and moreover, even though it 
did on the smokers’ Need-Pos and Enjoy-Neg effects, the relevant interactions were 
relatively small as compared to the main effect of thought suppression in each case. 
However, even so, the thought suppression instructions only temporarily eliminated the 
smokers’ pro-smoking implicit evaluating of Need-Neg, all while they inadvertently 
provoked the smokers to implicitly evaluate Need-Pos and Enjoy-Neg in a more pro-
smoking manner. Indeed, whatever about temporarily eliminating the smokers’ pro-
smoking implicit evaluating of Need-Neg on demand, certainly at no point did these 
instructions induce the smokers’ to implicitly evaluate Need-Neg in an anti-smoking 
manner. In conclusion, therefore, the focused thought suppression examined here may 
have been more effective in temporarily eliminating implicit evaluating integral to 
tobacco addiction than the relatively ad hoc thought suppression examined in Study 4. 
However, even this more focused thought suppression tactic nevertheless still had 
drawbacks, insofar as it immediately and relatively persistently induced ironic effects on 
secondary aspects of implicit evaluating related to tobacco addiction. 
6.10. GENERAL DISCUSSION: CHAPTER 6 
The research contained within the current chapter provided a first glimpse into 
the dynamics of how thought suppression specifically impacts the intrusive aspects of 
implicit evaluating that it is generally used to contradict. In particular, from the point of 
view that thought suppression may sometimes be useful in temporarily postponing 
(tobacco) cravings, we examined how immediately and persistently effective it would 
be in eliminating implicit evaluating integral to tobacco addiction. In summary, we 
found that the relatively ad hoc approach to thought suppression examined in Study 3 
only very temporarily eliminated implicit evaluating integral to tobacco addiction; and 
moreover not on demand but only after intermittent delays. To illustrate, smokers had 
been engaging in ad hoc thought suppression for approximately 5 minutes before it had 
any impact on their pro-smoking Smoking-Pos effect (i.e. based on the fact that on 
average, it took the thought suppressors about 2.3 minutes to complete each trial block 
pair on the relevant IRAP). And even then, when the smokers’ positive Smoking-Pos 
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effect did eliminate, it was only for at most 2.3 minutes (i.e. one trial block pair), and 
then it reinstated for another 2.3 minutes before finally eliminating again for the last 2.3 
minutes of our (post-practise) IRAP measurements.  
Granted, this popular ad hoc approach brought about pervasive and more 
immediate anti-smoking changes among the three other, secondary aspects of smoking-
related implicit evaluating measured by the unconditional-feelings-IRAP. Crucially, 
however, these secondary effects were likewise also relatively unstable, lasting no more 
than 2.3 minutes at a time; and moreover, thereafter these short-lived effects tended to at 
least temporarily rebound in a pro-smoking direction. Overall, therefore, the ad hoc 
thought suppression instructions examined in Study 3 had a pervasive influence on 
smokers’ implicit evaluating of both pro- and anti-smoking topics, but that influence 
was rather brief, erratic and often counterproductive across successive pairs of IRAP 
trial blocks.  
As such, true to its moniker, the current smokers’ ad hoc approach to thought 
suppression likely involved smokers deliberately contradicting different aspects of their 
smoking-related implicit evaluating at different stages of the unconditional-feelings-
IRAP. Indeed, the fact that the impact of this approach on all four aspects of smokers’ 
implicit evaluating was moderated by IRAP block order, confirmed that it was prone to 
cue-based interference from background variables. Therefore, in Study 4 we sought to 
examine whether a focused approach to thought suppression might be more effective in 
eliminating implicit evaluating integral to tobacco addiction. To test this idea, Study 4 
involved instructing smokers to engage in thought suppression of just that particular 
aspect of implicit evaluating that we had so far found to be most integral to tobacco 
addiction. Namely, smokers were instructed to imagine themselves as lifelong non-
smokers in terms of familiar scenarios in which they would typically not experience any 
need to smoke; and this tactic was designed to specifically contradict their pro-smoking 
implicit evaluating of Need-Neg.  
Crucially, this more focused approach to thought suppression did appear to 
improve matters as compared to how immediately and persistently the ad hoc approach 
examined in Study 3 impacted comparable implicit evaluating. As soon as the smokers 
were instructed to imagine their chosen scenarios, it immediately eliminated their pro-
smoking Need-Neg effects to zero for twice as long as the ad hoc thought suppression 
eventually eliminated smokers’ positive Smoking-Pos effects in Study 3. Namely, it did 
so for up to 4.2 minutes before the original pro-smoking Need-Neg effects began to 
reinstate again (i.e. on average, it took the thought suppressors about 2.1 minutes to 
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complete each trial block pair on the relevant IRAP). Then, following a period of 
reinstatement for up to 2.1 minutes, the smokers’ pro-smoking Need-Neg effect again 
eliminated for up to 2.1 minutes, before finally reinstating again for the last 2.1 minutes 
of our IRAP measurements. In addition, unlike the corresponding effect observed in 
Study 3, smokers’ focused thought suppression of their implicit evaluating of Need-Neg 
was not moderated by IRAP block order – thus indicating that it was relatively robust 
against cue-based interference from background variables.  
Nonetheless, as reviewed earlier, our focused approach to thought suppression 
of tobacco cravings still had drawbacks, insofar as it immediately and relatively 
persistently induced ironic effects on secondary aspects of implicit evaluating related to 
tobacco addiction. By neglecting to contradict or thus reduce smokers’ enjoyment-
focused pro-smoking implicit evaluating of Enjoy-Pos, it appeared as though our 
focused thought suppression instructions inadvertently primed smokers to implicitly 
evaluate other more ambiguous topics from that default enjoyment-focused perspective. 
Namely, at the same time as our focused thought suppression instructions eliminated the 
smokers’ pro-smoking Need-Neg effect, it also made their Need-Pos and Enjoy-Neg 
effects intermittently more pro-smoking.  
Overall, therefore, the current research indicated that focused thought 
suppression may be a more viable means of temporarily eliminating implicit evaluating 
integral to tobacco addiction than the commonly used ad hoc approach examined in 
Study3. However, our findings also indicated that any such benefits come at the cost of 
cueing (and perhaps sensitizing) other aspects of smokers’ pro-smoking implicit 
evaluating. This then, is perhaps why smokers typically engage in ad hoc thought 
suppression as in Study 3. Whenever they initially focus upon suppressing one intrusive 
aspect of smoking-related implicit evaluating smokers may inadvertently provoke 
another aspect of smoking-related implicit evaluating requiring its own thought 
suppression strategy – thus provoking an escalating cycle of increasing cognitive load 
wherein smokers’ thought suppression strategies induce an ever wider range of rebound 
effects, which in turn require smokers to derive ever more thought suppression 
strategies (e.g. Hooper, Saunders & McHugh, 2010; Hooper et al., 2012; also cf. 
Germeroth et al., 2013; Hagger, Leaver, Esser, Leung, Te Pas, Keatley, Chan, & 
Chatzisarantis, 2013; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Heckman, Ditre, & Brandon, 2012; 
Shiffman, West, & Gilbert, 2004; Perkins, 2009; Tiffany & Wray, 2012; Wray et al., 
2013).  
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Of course, further research is needed to fully test this latter model of thought 
suppression. However, at the very least, our findings indicated that smokers should only 
ever use focused thought suppression as briefly as possible when attempting to postpone 
tobacco cravings for whatever reason (e.g. as a means of safeguarding some more 
effective, but more prolonged coping strategy). Otherwise, they risk inadvertently 
experiencing the intrusion of secondary tobacco cravings that they would also need to 
manage in an ever escalating cycle of cognitive load, increasingly divorced from valued 
activities, until they eventually relent and smoke. Indeed, as per our findings in Study 4, 
when smokers’ attempts at focused suppression of their tobacco cravings begin to 
become ad hoc in pursuit of secondary tobacco cravings, this is when their implicit 
evaluating is most likely to rebound in a pro-smoking direction.  
Nonetheless, it is of course possible that smokers’ thought suppression of 
tobacco cravings may be more effective when they are under less of a progressive 
cognitive load than demanded by the current thought suppression protocols. However, 
this seems unlikely to be important for the following reasons. Smokers only seldom 
experience tobacco cravings under low cognitive load; rather, tobacco cravings are 
characteristic of relatively demanding situations that involve being challenged by some 
aspect of negative affect combined with nicotine deprivation (e.g. whether feelings of 
stress, boredom, fatigue or sadness; Carter & Tiffany, 1999a; Heckman et al., 2013; 
Hwang & Yun 2015; McKee et al., 2011; Perkins et al., 2013; Torres & O’Dell, 2015). 
Confirming this, smokers’ explicit self-reports of tobacco cravings are generally very 
poor prospective predictors of their smoking behaviour, or a smoker’s risk of relapse 
during abstinence, unless those explicit cravings are measured during cognitively taxing 
situations occurring during acute nicotine deprivation (see Hagger et al., 2013; 
Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Heckman, Ditre, & Brandon, 2012; O'Connell, Schwartz, 
& Shiffman, 2008; Shiffman, West, & Gilbert, 2004; Shmueli & Prochaska, 2012; see 
also Childs & De Wit, 2010; Conklin & Perkins, 2005; Parrott & Murphy, 2012; 
Perkins, 2009; Perkins et al., 2008; Germeroth et al., 2013; Tiffany & Wray, 2012; 
Wray et al., 2013).  
Indeed, as alluded to earlier, those who are most addicted to tobacco are also 
most likely to use thought suppression as a means of eliminating aversive aspects of 
their ongoing evaluating in lieu of doing so by smoking (see Erskine et al., 2010; 
Erskine et al., 2012; Farris et al., 2015; Lee, An, Levin, & Twohig, 2015; McCallion & 
Zvolensky, 2015; Moss et al., 2015; Toll, Sobell, Wagner, & Sobell, 2001). And 
moreover, abstaining smokers are classically at most risk of relapsing to smoking when 
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they are under cognitive load during stressful situations (see Baker et al., 2004; Brandon 
et al., 2004; Erskine et al., 2015; Farris et al., 2015; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; 
Heckman et al., 2013; McCallion & Zvolensky, 2015; Shiffman & Waters, 2004). Thus, 
during the very times when smokers most often engage in thought suppression of 
tobacco cravings, it seems likely to be least effective in relation to problematic implicit 
evaluating. In fact, emerging research suggests that even in the absence of secondary 
cognitive challenges, smokers are sufficiently cognitively taxed over short periods (i.e. 
less than 5 minutes) engaging in thought suppression of their tobacco cravings for it to 
result in rebound effects in those cravings (e.g. Heckman et al., 2012; Sayers & Sayette, 
2013). On balance, therefore, given that the current smokers were relatively satiated for 
tobacco smoking, if anything our current findings on the limited effectiveness of 
thought suppression as a method of postponing tobacco cravings are optimistic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
224 
 
CHAPTER 7: A First Examination of How Smokers’ Implicit Evaluating is moderated 
by Suppression-oriented Nicotine Abstinence during Acute Stress (Study 5) 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that when smokers engaged in thought suppression 
of implicit evaluating integral to tobacco addiction it tended to have both immediate and 
delayed ironic effects on various aspects of their pro-smoking implicit evaluating. In 
particular, these findings together indicated that thought suppression is by itself unlikely 
to be an effective means for smokers to control or temporarily postpone their tobacco 
cravings even for as little as two minutes at a time. Indeed, if anything, our findings 
arguably constituted a relatively optimistic appraisal of the effectiveness of thought 
suppression for controlling tobacco cravings insofar as both studies were conducted 
with smokers who were relatively satiated for tobacco smoking. Crucially, smokers are 
characteristically most prone to experiencing tobacco cravings during the first few days 
of unaided smoking-cessation, and as a result this is also the period during which 
smokers are likely to struggle most with suppressing their tobacco cravings. Namely, 
the most common strategy used by smokers to manage their heightened cravings during 
the early stages of unaided smoking-cessation is to deliberately suppress them in 
various ways (e.g. by continually deriving counterexamples, by avoiding tempting 
situations, by attempting to distract oneself, by using nicotine replacement therapies 
and/or by eventually relapsing; see Studies 4 & 5; see also Allen, Bade, Hatsukami, & 
Center, 2008; Brown, Lejuez, Kahler, Strong, & Zvolensky, 2005; Erskine et al., 2010; 
Erskine et al., 2015; Farris et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2015; O’Connell et al., 2002; 
O'Connell et al., 2007, p. 79; Moss et al., 2015; Sayers & Sayette, 2013; Toll  et al., 
2001).  
Furthermore, as alluded to in Chapters 5 and 6, the most characteristic reason 
smokers (and theorists) offer for relapse during the early stages of unaided smoking-
cessation is some sort of depletion of one’s ability to deliberately sustain (i.e. motivate) 
thought suppression for long enough until their tobacco cravings subside. Indeed, just as 
smokers’ cravings are peaking during the first few days of unaided smoking-cessation, 
their risk of relapsing is also typically peaking (i.e. followed by dramatic reductions in 
both variables over the next four weeks until they reach a relatively low plateau; Allen 
et al., 2008; Brown, Lejuez, Strong, Kahler, Zvolensky, Carpenter, Niaura, & Price, 
2009, p. 498; Hughes, Keely, & Naud, 2004; Kirshenbaum, Olsen, & Bickel, 2009). 
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Therefore, on the face of it, it appears that the intrusion of cravings into smokers’ 
ongoing evaluating may play a pivotal causal role in tobacco addiction, particularly 
during unaided smoking-cessation (e.g. Allen et al., 2008).  
However, whatever about there being relatively few studies modelling the 
developmental progression of tobacco cravings in terms of smokers’ questionnaire-
based, introspective reports during unaided smoking-cessation (Hughes et al., 2004, p. 
35; Kirshenbaum et al., 2009; MacKillop, Brown, Stojek, Murphy, Sweet, & Niaura, 
2012; Roewer, Wiehler, & Peters, 2015), there are even fewer studies examining how 
smokers’ pro-smoking implicit evaluating changes during this process. This is 
remarkable in itself when one considers that the concept of tobacco cravings refers, by 
definition, to implicit evaluative processes. Indeed, as reviewed at the beginning of this 
thesis, what is perhaps even more remarkable is that, more often than not, what few 
studies have examined this topic resulted in null or anomalous findings. There were 
many reasons why this might have been the case. For example, none of the relevant 
studies examined nicotine deprivation relative to a baseline, but merely between groups 
– thus making it possible that any relevant effects were obscured relative to unknown 
baseline differences. Indeed, all such findings were based exclusively upon implicit 
measures that were unable to distinguish between implicit evaluating addressing 
different smoking-related topics. Therefore, the relevant implicit measures were unable 
to specifically target smokers’ implicit evaluating of topics that were characteristically 
relevant to how they experience unaided nicotine abstinence. As such, it was perhaps 
relatively unlikely that all of the various types of implicit evaluating being measured 
would all co-vary similarly in tandem with unaided nicotine abstinence. In any case, to 
us, the most likely reason why researchers have failed to establish any consistent 
relationship between nicotine deprivation and implicit evaluating is because they did not 
examine how acute stress moderated any such relationship (but for minimal work 
related to attention rather than evaluating per se; see Field, Munafó, & Franken, 2009; 
McCarthy, Gloria, & Curtin, 2009). 
Apart from the fact that our first two studies indicated that smokers’ relief-
focused implicit evaluating of smoking was particularly integral to tobacco addiction, 
smokers’ most commonly stated reason for lapsing during smoking-cessation is to 
obtain relief from negative affect (i.e. whether due to challenging situations or due to 
resisting tobacco cravings; Bernstein, Trafton, Ilgen, & Zvolensky, 2008; Collins et al., 
2011; Cosci, Aldi, & Nardi, 2015; Erskine et al., 2010; Erskine et al., 2012; Farris et al., 
2015; Lee, An, Levin, & Twohig, 2015; McCallion & Zvolensky, 2015; McKay, 
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Franklin, Patapis, & Lynch, 2006; McKee et al 2003; Moss et al., 2015; Shiffman & 
Waters, 2004; Shiffman, Dunbar, Li, Scholl, Tindle, Anderson, & Ferguson, 2014; Toll, 
Sobell, Wagner, & Sobell, 2001; Waters et al., 2009, p. 330). In fact, during the past 
decade or so, a substantial literature has emerged demonstrating that a smokers’ ability 
to tolerate distress in order to satisfy simple short-term task goals is predictive of 
whether they will remain abstinent from smoking (Brown et al., 2002; Brown et al., 
2005; Brown et al., 2009; Kahler et al., 2012; Zvolensky, Farris, Guillot, & Leventhal, 
2014); and also of how distressing they found doing so (Abrantes et al., 2008); of how 
intensely they experienced tobacco cravings (Collins, Nair, & Komaroff, 2011; 
Heckman et al., 2013); the length of their last smoking-cessation attempt (Daughters, 
Lejuez, Kahler, Strong, & Brown, 2005); and even their likelihood of actually attending 
smoking-cessation treatment once enrolled (MacPherson, Stipelman, Duplinsky, Brown, 
& Lejuez, 2009). Indeed, there is also a wide range of evidence indicating that engaging 
in prolonged thought suppression of tobacco cravings may even induce those aspects of 
negative affect that smokers’ typically smoke to get rid of (Brandt, Bakhshaie, Garey, 
Schmidt, Leventhal, & Zvolensky, 2015; Conlkin & Perkins, 2005; Dijkstra & 
Menninga, 2015; Feldner, Leen-Feldner, Zvolensky, & Lejuez, 2006; McKay et al., 
2006; Spring, Cook, Appelhans, Maloney, Richmond, Vaughn, Vanderveen, & 
Hedeker, 2008; Zvolensky et al., 2014). However, much like the prevailing literature on 
tobacco cravings, the literature on distress tolerance has generally not examined what 
(implicit) evaluative processes may be integral to distress tolerance (Hooper et al., 2010, 
2012; Kapson, Leddy, & Haaga, 2012; Kishita et al., McKay et al., 2006; Schloss & 
Haaga, 2011; see also Bernstein et al., 2008; Cosci et al., 2015; Cosci, F., Bertoli, G., & 
Abrams, 2013; McHugh, Daughters, Lejuez, Murray, Hearon, Gorka, & Otto, 2011; 
Sütterlin, Schroijen, Constantinou, Smets, Van den Bergh, & Van Diest, 2013; see also 
Zvolensky et al., 2014).  
In fact, to date, only one study has explored whether smokers’ implicit 
evaluating may play a role in distress tolerance processes (and thus relapse processes) 
during the early stages of smoking-cessation. Encouragingly, this study observed a large 
prospective correlation between smokers’ baseline implicit evaluating of experiential 
avoidance on an approach/avoid IAT, and the length of time in hours that they managed 
to abstain unaided from smoking (Cameron et al., 2013). Indeed, confirming that the 
smokers’ implicit evaluating of experiential avoidance on the IAT was likely a major 
component of their distress tolerance during smoking-cessation, Cameron et al. also 
found a large correlation between this implicit evaluating and one of two traditional 
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measures of distress tolerance. However, Cameron et al.’s study did not measure 
implicit evaluating of distress tolerance in relation to smoking specifically; nor 
smokers’ implicit evaluating of smoking or quitting; much less an experimental 
examination of the impact of acute stress on smokers ongoing implicit evaluating of 
smoking or quitting. 
Therefore, in the current study, we were particularly interested in using an IRAP 
to experimentally examine how unaided smoking-abstinence moderated the baseline-
controlled impact of acute stress on daily smokers’ implicit evaluating. In particular, we 
designed a relapse-IRAP to measure smokers’ implicit evaluating of not just smoking, 
but also the prospect of trying to quit smoking. We did this mainly because many 
theories of health psychology, and indeed of tobacco addiction, assert that one’s 
likelihood of remaining abstinent from unhealthy behaviour is motivationally very 
dependent upon one’s ongoing evaluating of doing so (Abrams et al., 2003; Armitage & 
Connor, 2001; Brandon et al., 2005; Curry et al., 1997; Downey et al., 2001; Norcross 
et al., 2011; Prochaska & Norcross, 2001; Smith, Carter, Chapman, Dunlop, & 
Freeman, 2015; Topa & Moriano, 2010; Uppal, Shahab, Britton, & Ratschen, 2013; 
Wiers et al., 2010). And yet, crucially, to our knowledge, this was the first study to 
examine (smokers’) implicit evaluating of abstinence, much less how any such implicit 
evaluating changed across the early stages of engaging in unaided (suppression-
oriented) abstinence (e.g. see Chassin et al., 2010; Köpetz et al., 2013; Roefs et al., 
2011; Sheeran et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2013; Smith & De Houwer, 2014; Uppal et al., 
2013, p. 432; Wiers & Hoffman, 2010; Webb, Sheeran & Pepper, 2012).  
Given the relatively fleeting malleability effects we observed upon smokers’ 
implicit evaluating in studies 3 and 4, and related concerns about the need to identify 
component processes, we were eager to measure smokers’ implicit evaluating as soon 
after stress induction as possible (McKay et al., 2006; see also Kapson et al., 2012; 
Kazdin, 2007; Schloss & Haaga, 2011). Therefore, in order to achieve this, we 
incorporated the criterion practise block effects into our scoring of the relapse-IRAP 
delivered immediately after stress induction. Moreover, given that this would have been 
the current smokers’ third cycle of the relapse-IRAP within 24 hours, it seemed likely 
that all participants would achieve the relevant IRAP response criterion during their first 
pair of IRAP practise blocks.  
By contrast, however, when it came to analysing the current smokers’ implicit 
evaluating at baseline and under unaided nicotine abstinence prior to stress induction, 
we did so only in terms of standard trial-type DIRAPs – thus, using the IRAP criterion 
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blocks as a kind of contextual buffer. We did this because when uncontrolled, any 
fleeting contextual effects encroaching during the practise phase of an IRAP would, in 
principle, obscure one’s ability to detect the much more gradual, and thus stable, 
influence of nicotine abstinence on the current smokers’ implicit evaluating. Crucially, 
the body metabolises nicotine exponentially ever more gradually over the first few days 
of abstinence, and even in the earliest stages of nicotine abstinence withdrawal 
symptoms do not normally change across the 10-20 minutes it usually takes participants 
to complete an IRAP (e.g. Allen et al., 2008; Hukkanen et al., 2005; MacKillop et al., 
2012; SRNT Subcommittee on Biochemical Verification, 2002).  
In addition, given that daily smokers are most likely to relapse during 
approximately the first 12-48 hours of unaided smoking-cessation we chose to examine 
the impact of acute stress and unaided nicotine abstinence on smokers’ implicit 
evaluating during the first half of this abstinence timeframe, between 14-24 hours of 
abstinence (Allen et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2009, p. 498; Hughes et al., 2004; 
Kirshenbaum et al., 2009; Ussher, Beard, Abikoye, Hajek, & West, 2013). Our primary 
aim in choosing this specific time-period was to maximize the potential for observing 
problematic implicit evaluating (i.e. tobacco cravings), while also minimizing the 
potential for a disproportionate participant drop-out rate in our abstinence group due to 
smoking relapse (i.e. as compared to our control group who were instructed to smoke as 
usual throughout). Thus, having measured all of the current smokers’ implicit 
evaluating at baseline during the afternoon, we did so again approximately 24 hours 
later both before and after exposing them to a succession of validated stress induction 
tasks in the presence of cues for smoking (i.e. their preferred brand of tobacco). 
Crucially, given that smokers metabolize nicotine at a much slower rate during 
sleep than while awake we deemed it important to schedule participants’ baseline and 
follow-up sessions during the mid-to-late afternoon (e.g. Hukkanen, Jacob, & Benowitz, 
2005; SRNT Subcommittee on Biochemical Verification, 2002). Moreover, from the 
outset, we informed all smokers that if they were randomly assigned to abstain from 
smoking that they should do so for at least 14 hours before they attended their chosen 
follow-up session (i.e. 24 hours after their chosen baseline session). Thus, by allowing 
the abstainer group some discretion as to when they initiated their abstinence from 
smoking, we hoped to minimize the potential for any unusual patterns of smoking at 
baseline resulting from the common strategy of smoking more in preparation for 
imminent abstinence (see Allen et al., 2008; Bancroft et al., 2003; O'Connell et al., 
2002). Likewise, this also allowed us to postpone informing the current smokers as to 
229 
 
which experimental group they had been randomly assigned until after they had 
completed the baseline measurement session – thus, further minimizing the potential for 
smokers’ expectations about the following 24 hours to confound baseline measurements 
between groups.  
Also, given that we were keen to model smokers’ characteristic tendency to 
deliberately suppress their tobacco cravings as a means of remaining abstinent, we 
specifically sampled daily smokers who were intolerant of, and thus likely to 
deliberately suppress their tobacco cravings (e.g. whether by smoking, by deliberately 
disputing those cravings, or by distracting oneself, etc.). Namely, daily smokers who 
would eventually like to quit smoking but who were also currently not willing to abstain 
unaided from smoking for even the relevant 14-24 hour period, unless they received a 
relatively substantial monetary payment for doing so (for more details see Method). In 
addition, to verify that the current smokers were all relatively inclined to deliberately 
suppress tobacco cravings throughout the current study, we measured these tendencies 
at each stage of baseline and follow-up using the AIS and also two complementary 
measures of distress tolerance. Then, at the end of the follow-up session we asked all 
abstaining smokers whether they would smoke immediately afterwards – with an 
affirmative answer confirming their status as being reluctant to experience tobacco 
cravings even though they ultimately valued quitting. 
Lastly, we opted to measure reward-focused, rather the relief-focused implicit 
evaluating of smoking for two main reasons. Firstly, we demonstrated in studies 3 and 4 
that smokers were prone to ironic increases in their reward-focused implicit evaluating 
in favour of smoking while attempting to deliberately suppress their relief-focused 
implicit evaluating in favour of smoking. And therefore, insofar as the current acute 
stress induction tasks required the current smokers to manage an increased occurrence 
of relief-focused tobacco cravings, we expected similar rebound effects in their reward-
focused pro-smoking implicit evaluating to occur in response to these tasks – 
particularly during nicotine abstinence, but perhaps also while smoking as usual. 
Moreover, by contrast, Study 4 revealed that smokers are capable of reducing their 
relief-focused implicit evaluating for most of the duration of an IRAP. And therefore, 
secondly, it seemed likely that reward-focused pro-smoking implicit evaluating of 
smokers would ironically be much more prone to rebound effects in response to acute 
stress than their relief-focused implicit evaluating in favour of smoking. Indeed, pilot 
testing with six participants indicated that relief-focused implicit evaluating appeared to 
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be relatively unchanged by the current acute stress induction tasks during unaided 
nicotine abstinence. 
7.2. METHOD 
Participants 
We recruited 30 smokers (18 female) from among the student population of the 
University of Wales, Swansea, on the basis that they had been smoking regularly for at 
least 1 year; typically at a rate of least 10 cigarettes per day; and that they wished to quit 
smoking eventually, but did not plan to quit smoking within the following two weeks. 
These smokers were each randomly assigned without replacement between an 
experimental group tasked with abstaining from smoking (and all nicotine replacement 
products) for at least 14 hours (i.e. the abstainer group), and another experimental group 
tasked with smoking as usual during the same time period (i.e. the control group). All 
participants were recruited with the understanding that if they were randomly assigned 
to the abstainer group they would receive £25 subject to confirmation via a “biological 
breath test” (see below) that they had been abstinent from smoking during their chosen 
14-24 hour period of abstinence. In addition, during recruitment, we also informed 
participants that regardless of whether they abstained or not, they would receive £5 for 
completing a 40 minute baseline measurement protocol, followed by a 60 minute 
outcome measurement protocol approximately 24 hours later (i.e. to encourage 
participants to return at follow-up, and to accurately disclose whether they had 
consumed nicotine-based products or not). Furthermore, we offered all potential 
participants the chance to win an additional £10 if they scored in the top 33% percentile 
on a “challenging test of attention” during the second experimental session which, 
unbeknownst to the current smokers, was designed to induce psychological stress. 
Crucially, in line with previous research in the area, this latter incentive was designed to 
enhance the extent to which this test described below, the PASAT-C, experimentally 
induced psychological stress during the second experimental session (e.g. Brown et al., 
2002, p. 181; Daughters et al., 2005, p. 209; Kapson et al., 2012, pp. 1234-1235; 
Schloss & Haaga, 2011; Zvolensky et al., 2014, p. 226). 
We bio-verified all participants’ ongoing smoking-status both at baseline and 
follow-up using the Bedfont Micro+ Smokerlyzer carbon monoxide monitor whereby 
smokers are required to hold a deep breath for 15 seconds before fully exhaling into this 
device. Crucially, the half-life of expired-CO was optimal to detect whether smokers’ 
had been abstinent from smoking for periods of between 14-24 hours; indeed, by 
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contrast all other biological metabolites of smoking exhibit relatively prolonged half-
lives that prevent them from verifying such a short period of abstinence (see SRNT 
Subcommittee on Biochemical Verification, 2002; Hukkanen et al., 2005). In line with 
the Micro+ Smokerlyzer operating manual and indeed subsequent research 
recommendations from the literature, we required all smokers to have an expired CO 
reading of at least 8 parts per million (ppm) at baseline, the control group to have a 
minimum reading of 8ppm at a similar time the following day from baseline; and 
crucially, for the abstainers to have a maximum reading of 6ppm at a similar time the 
following day from baseline (Brown et al., 2002; Godtfredsen, Prescott, Vestbo, & 
Osler, 2006, pp. 1519-1521; Leitch, Harkawat, Askew, Masel, & Hendrick, 2005; 
Perkins, Karelitz, & Jao, 2013; SRNT Subcommittee on Biochemical Verification, 
2002, pp. 151-152). No participants were excluded from the current study on this basis.  
However, all participants were exposed to a brief pipeline procedure at baseline 
misinforming them that the Micro+ Smokerlyzer could detect whether they had used any 
nicotine-based products during the preceding 14-24 hours (i.e. contrary to what we told 
participants CO monitors are not capable of detecting nicotine consumption except by 
means of smoking). On this basis, one abstainer voluntarily admitted to using nicotine 
replacement products during their chosen period of abstinence, and so his data was 
excluded from further analyses. In addition, one other smoker were excluded for 
withdrawing their participation during the follow-up session in order to smoke without 
further delay.  
On average, the remaining 28 smokers (18 females) provided a baseline expired 
CO sample of 12.5ppm (SD = 4.08, range = 8-24), the control group provided a follow-
up expired CO sample of 12.1ppm (SD = 3.5, range = 8-18), and the abstainer group 
provided a follow-up expired CO sample of 3.07ppm (SD = .80, range = 2-4). In 
addition, at baseline, the smokers were moderately willing to quit smoking on the 11-
point Readiness to Quit Ladder (M = 4.8; SD = 1.03; range = 3-7; see Abrams et al., 
2003, pp. 31-33; see also Wong & Cappella, 2009); were aged 24.8 years (SD = 8.6; 
range = 19-50); had been smoking for 9.3 years (SD = 8.2; range = 1-36); smoked 16.4 
cigarettes per day (CPD; SD = 4.8; range = 10-28); registered on the HONC as being 
moderately psychologically dependent on smoking (M = 6.7; SD = 3.1; range = 0-10; 
cf. Wellman, Di Franza, Pbert, et al., 2005; Wellman, Savageau, et al. 2006); and were 
moderately inclined to smoke as a means of experiential avoidance (M = 45.4; SD = 
10.3; range = 23-64; see Farris et al., 2015). 
 
232 
 
Apparatus 
Mood Induction and Distress Tolerance Tasks 
All participants were required to complete two mood induction tasks in between 
the two IRAP sessions implemented as part of the follow-up protocol (see Procedure). 
The first mood induction task, adapted from Samson and Rachman (1989), Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, & Luciano (2004), and Conklin and Perkins (2005) 
was primarily designed to induce sad mood states. Like previous versions of this task, 
the current version required participants to listen to a piece of sad music, Albinoni's 
"Adagio in G Minor", for seven minutes while simultaneously watching a series of 
pictorial slides from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, 1988) 
chosen to be congruent with the negative mood engendered by Alblnoni's Adagio in G 
Minor.  
In addition, in order to amplify the extent to which this music and video induced 
sad moods in smokers we also required participants to complete a thought-listing 
procedure at the same time (e.g. see Barnes-Holmes et al., 2004; Cahill et al., 2007). 
Apart from the fact that there is longstanding literature attesting to the effectiveness of 
narrative-based techniques as a means of inducing negative moods (e.g. Dasgupta, 
DeSteno, Williams, & Hunsinger, 2009; Hernandez, Vander Wal, & Spring, 2003; 
Kučera & Haviger, 2012; Robinson, Grillon, & Sahakian, 2012; Spring et al., 2008), our 
main reason for incorporating this feature was to better ensure that the current smokers 
would engage with Albinoni's "Adagio in G Minor" in the sad manner we intended. In 
particular, the thought-listing component of our musical mood-induction task involved 
instructing the current smokers “to reflect during the music upon events and things in 
your life that have made you feel sad, frustrated, anxious, worried or even angry to the 
point that you would need to smoke a cigarette”; and to continually write those 
reflections down on paper one at a time as soon as they occurred (see Appendix 23 for 
further details). In addition, as a supplementary manipulation check, we also required 
participants to immediately rate how positively or negatively they felt about each of 
these reflections using a 7-point semantic differential ranging from -3 labelled Negative 
Feeling, to 0 labelled Neutral, and on to +3 labelled Positive Feeling. 
The second mood induction procedure, called the PASAT-C (Lejuez, Kahler, & 
Brown, 2003), a modified version of the Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task (PASAT; 
Gronwall, 1977), was specifically developed to experimentally simulate acute 
psychological stress in laboratory conditions. Like the musical mood induction 
procedure described above, the PASAT-C also incorporated its own questionnaire-
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based manipulation checks designed to measure participants’ levels of psychological 
stress both immediately before and two-thirds of the way through this task. Namely, 
participants were required to rate in turn how much they currently felt anxious, irritable, 
distracted, happy, uncomfortable, and frustrated using six respective visual analogue 
scales ranging from 0 labelled “None” to 100 labelled “Extreme” (for more details see 
Appendix 24; Brown et al., 2002; MacPherson et al., 2009).  
Crucially, in addition to providing an effective means of simulating acute 
psychological stress (e.g. Lejuez, Kahler, Brown, 2001; Feldner et al., 2006), smokers’ 
responses to the PASAT-C also appear to be predictive of various clinically important 
features of their addiction to tobacco. For example, the length of time that smokers’ 
persist with the PASAT-C is predictive of their ability to remain abstinent from 
smoking for at least 24 hours (Brown et al., 2002; Brown et al., 2005), and also of how 
distressing they found doing so (Abrantes et al., 2008); the length of their last smoking-
cessation attempt (Daughters et al., 2005); and even their likelihood of actually 
attending smoking-cessation treatment once enrolled (MacPherson et al., 2009).  
However, in one study smokers’ persistence with the PASAT-C did not 
prospectively predict a smoker’s risk of relapsing within 28-days of quitting smoking 
unaided, when a shorter less complicated measure of distress tolerance called breath-
holding duration did (Brown et al., 2009). Indeed, this variable, the length of time that 
smokers’ are willing to hold their breath for a researcher timing them, has long been 
known to predict their ability to sustain smoking-cessation (Brown et al., 2002; Hajek, 
1991; Hajek, Belcher, & Stapleton, 1987; and more recently see also Bernstein et al., 
2008; Cosci et al., 2015; Kahler et al., 2012). Therefore, in order to supplement the 
distress tolerance measure provided by smokers’ persistence on the PASAT-C, we also 
measured breath-hold duration within the current study. It is important to bear in mind 
however that the breath-hold task was not intended as means of mood-induction. 
Crucially, asking smokers’ to hold their breath for as long as they are able does not 
typically induce measurable physiological or self-report changes in smokers’ mood. 
Rather smokers’ breath-holding duration appears to be related to how much they 
anticipate physical discomfort from this task and/or their willingness to experience any 
such physical discomfort (e.g. Cosci et al., 2015; Cosci et al., 2013; McHugh et al., 
2011; Sütterlin et al., 2013; see also Zvolensky et al., 2014). 
Questionnaire-based State and Trait Measures 
All participants completed two trait measures of tobacco addiction at baseline; 
namely, the Hooked on Nicotine Checklist (HONC; DiFranza et al., 2002) and the 
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Avoidance and Inflexibility Scale (AIS; see Farris et al., 2015). In addition, we also 
used an updated version of the DBHQ developed across the preceding four studies, to 
conduct exhaustive semi-structured interviews with participants regarding their current 
and historical smoking-status as well as their basic demographics (see Appendix 25). In 
addition, as manipulation checks designed to separate the mood and craving effects of 
nicotine abstinence versus stress induction, participants were also required to complete 
the following measures immediately after each of three IRAP sessions (i.e. one at 
baseline and two at follow-up; see below). The first of these manipulation checks was a 
standardised measure of reward- versus relief-focused tobacco cravings, the brief (10-
item) version of the Questionnaire of Smoking Urges (QSU-brief; Cox, Tiffany, & 
Christen, 2001). The second manipulation check was a 20-item standardised measure of 
positive and negative affect, the state version of the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1988; see also Crawford & Henry, 
2004). In particular, we administered the state version of the PANAS with the 
instruction: “Please indicate to what extent you feel this way right now.” And the third 
of these manipulation checks was a 6-item incentive rating scale designed to measure 
changes in smokers’ motivation to engage in commonly valued activities (see Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2004, p. 98; Clark & Teasdale, 1985).  
An IRAP Measuring Implicit Evaluating of Smoking and Quitting Smoking 
We employed the same version of the IRAP program as in previous chapters, but 
using different label and target stimuli. As before, participants were presented with the 
response options “True” and “False” on every IRAP trial but this time the concept label 
stimuli were “SMOKING makes Me feel” and “Trying NOT to SMOKE makes Me 
feel”, and critically, the positive and negative craving-related mood words previously 
used as target stimuli were modified for compatibility with these label stimuli (i.e. 
especially from a typical smokers’ perspective). Namely, the positive target words were: 
Pleasant, Better, Outgoing, Calm, Comfortable, and Relaxed. And the negative target 
words were: Stressed, Worse, Withdrawn, Unpleasant, Tense, and Irritable. In 
particular, we chose these particular positive target words so that they were apt to both 
smokers’ vernacular aspirations for quitting smoking, and also to their vernacular 
reasons for smoking. And likewise, we chose these negative target words that they were 
apt to both smokers’ vernacular reasons for failing in smoking-cessation, and also to 
their vernacular reasons for disliking smoking (and thus wanting to quit; see Curry, 
Grothaus, & McBride, 1997; Downey, Rosengren, & Donovan, 2001; McCaul, 
Hockemeyer, Johnson, Zetocha, Quinlan, & Glasgow, 2006). 
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The researcher instructed participants before each pro-smoking/anti-quitting 
IRAP practise block to “Respond as if smoking makes you feel good, and as if trying 
not to smoking makes you feel bad”; and before each anti-smoking/pro-quitting practise 
block to “Respond as if smoking makes you feel good, and as if trying not to smoking 
makes you feel bad.” Otherwise, the current IRAP was the same as those used in the 
preceding studies contained in this thesis. And like before, in order to counterbalance 
IRAP trial block order, half of the participants received odd numbered IRAP blocks that 
required a pro-smoking pattern of responding and even numbered blocks that required 
anti-smoking responding; for the remaining participants the opposite applied (odd 
numbered blocks required anti-smoking responding and even numbered blocks pro-
smoking responding). 
Measures of Explicit Evaluating 
We employed four feeling thermometers each requiring participants to mark a 
visual analogue scale ranging from zero labelled “Extremely Cold (Disagree)” to 
ninety-nine labelled “Extremely Warm (Agree)”, in response to a statement 
summarizing one of the IRAP trial-types. The four statements in question were 
“SMOKING makes Me feel GOOD”, “SMOKING makes Me feel BAD”, “Trying NOT 
to SMOKE makes Me feel GOOD”, and “Trying NOT to SMOKE makes Me feel 
BAD”. 
Procedure 
Participants were required to complete two experimental sessions, scheduled 
approximately 24 hours apart. During the initial session lasting approximately 30-40 
minutes, all participants were first required to provide a baseline sample of expired CO; 
to indicate when they had last smoked; and to then complete the current relapse-IRAP 
with a maximum average response latency of 3000ms and a minimum average response 
accuracy of 80%. Thereafter, participants completed the corresponding measures of 
explicit evaluating, before then completing four baseline manipulation checks: the 
QSU-brief; the HONC; the AIS; the PANAS; and a six-item ‘incentive rating scale’ 
designed to measure smokers’ motivation to engage in commonly valued activities.  
Then, the researcher interviewed participants using an updated version of the 
DBHQ in an open-ended fashion to reveal any unanticipated details with relevance to 
the current known-groups sampling agenda. And this was followed by the researcher 
asking the smokers “to stand up, and when ready take a deep breath and hold it for as 
long as possible while I record the length of your attempt with this stopwatch.” Finally, 
at the end of the baseline session, all smokers were informed as to whether they had 
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been randomly assigned to abstain from cigarettes versus smoke as usual during the 14-
24 hours before they attended the relevant follow-up session the next day. Thus, apart 
from during the IRAP practise trials, the interview, and the breath-holding duration task, 
the current smokers completed their baseline tasks alone in a sound-proofed cubicle. 
Crucially, as during recruitment, all abstainers were reminded at the end of the 
baseline session that they were free to smoke until the late evening but that the closer 
they got to midnight while still smoking the higher their chances of failing the CO 
breath-test during their agreed follow-up session the following day. Accordingly, when 
the current smokers returned to complete the follow-up session, the first thing that the 
researcher asked all of them (i.e. not just the abstainers) was how long it had been since 
they had last smoked (or used any other nicotine-based product). Then, the researcher 
measured the concentration of CO in each participant’s follow-up breath sample. Next, 
all participants completed the relapse-IRAP again, followed by the same sequence of 
questionnaire-based measures used at baseline except for the HONC. And this was 
respectively followed by the musical mood induction procedure, the PASAT-C, a third 
implementation of the relapse-IRAP, the corresponding explicit measures, and the same 
three manipulation checks again that were measured before musical mood induction 
(i.e. QSU-brief, the PANAS, and the six-item incentive rating scale).  
Additionally, just before completing this third implementation of the relapse-
IRAP all smokers were asked to show the researcher what tobacco product that they had 
with them. Crucially, all participants were instructed at the end of the baseline session 
to bring their preferred tobacco product with them to the follow-up session, so that 
ostensibly, the researcher could record details of how much nicotine and/or tar were in 
those products to see whether they corresponded to the relevant smokers’ breath CO 
readings. The main purpose of doing this was to serve as a pretext for placing smokers’ 
preferred tobacco product within their field of vision, but out of reach, as a cue for 
smoking while they completed their third implementation of the relapse-IRAP (e.g. 
Carter & Tiffany, 1999a; Collins et al., 2011; Heckman et al., 2013). Moreover, by 
explaining that the relevant nicotine and tar information was needed to individually 
calibrate each smoker’s CO sample cut-off, we also hoped to encourage abstaining 
smokers to disclose if they had used any nicotine replacement products during the 
preceding 14-24 hours. Then, finally, before debriefing, all participants were required to 
complete the breath-holding duration task once more. Much like during baseline, the 
current smokers completed most of their follow-up tasks in a sound-proofed cubicle. 
Crucially, however, the researcher sat in silence with each participant as they completed 
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the PASAT-C in order to heighten their sense of being evaluated, and to thus make it 
more likely that they would find the task stressful as it became progressively more 
unrealistic to adhere to (see Bosnes, Dahl, & Almkvist, 2015; Eastvold, Belanger, & 
Vanderploeg, 2012; Hopko, Hunt, & Armento, 2005; Horwitz & McCaffrey, 2008; 
Sonderegger, A., & Sauer, 2009; Yantz & McCaffrey, 2005). In all the follow-up 
procedure thus took approximately 1 hour to complete. 
Ethical Considerations 
 The present research was approved by the Research Ethics Committee at 
Swansea University. Each participant provided informed consent on their own behalf 
based explicitly on the idea that their participation was on an anonymous basis; and on 
the idea that they could voluntarily withdraw their participation from the study at any 
point in time and without explanation. 
7.3. RESULTS 
7.3.1. Scoring the IRAP Data 
All 28 smokers included in the current analyses maintained a minimum response 
accuracy of 80% and/or a maximum response speed of 3000ms on average across the 
test trials, on all three relapse-IRAPs. Given that the effects of nicotine abstinence are 
typically much more gradual than the 10-20 minutes it typically takes participants to 
complete an IRAP, we therefore scored the resulting data from both of the first two 
relapse-IRAPs using the standard DIRAP-algorithm. By contrast, however, unlike the 
gradual rate at which nicotine leaves the body, the current stress induction tasks were 
designed to bring about relatively immediate and acute changes in tobacco cravings 
much as we observed in Studies 3 and 4. And so, in order to capture the most immediate 
effects of these acute stress induction tasks, we therefore scored the data from the third 
relapse-IRAP using the extended DIRAP-algorithm we introduced earlier (i.e. which was 
designed to incorporate data from IRAP criterion practise blocks).  
7.3.2. Manipulation Checks for Suppression-oriented Abstinence and Acute Stress 
At baseline, the control group and the abstainer group were very similarly, 
moderately inclined to engage in suppression-oriented abstinence from nicotine as per 
their AIS scores, t(26) = -.19, p = .85, 2 = .001, r = .04 (i.e. respectively, Ms = 45.8, 
45.0; SDs = 9.3, 11.4; ranges = 31-64, 23-56). However, as a result of the 16 hours on 
average that the abstainer group had been nicotine abstinent at follow-up their AIS 
scores increased to a large degree relative to the control group, F(1, 26) = 6.13, p = .02, 
p
2 = .19, r ≈ .44; and this finding remained stable across stress induction, F(1, 26) = 
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.07, p = .79, p
2 = .003, r ≈ .05. Specifically, whereas the abstainer group exhibited an 
average AIS score of 45.0 at baseline (SD = 11.4; range = 23-56), they exhibited an 
average AIS score of 48.40 initially at follow-up (SD = 9.9; range = 33-60), and one of 
49.33 shortly after stress induction (SD = 13.1; range = 23-65). And by contrast, the 
control group exhibited an average AIS score of 45.8 at baseline (SD = 9.3; range = 31-
64), a similar average AIS score of 43.69 at follow-up (SD = 9.3; range = 31-63), and 
indeed one of 45.15 shortly after stress induction (SD = 7.8; range = 35-61). 
Likewise, as further evidence that nicotine abstinence reduced the smokers’ 
willingness to experience tobacco cravings, the control group persisted for over two 
thirds as long on average with the PASAT-C as the abstainer group, F(1, 26) = 1.99, p = 
.17, p
2 = .07, r ≈ .27 (i.e. respectively, Ms = 405, 263; SDs = 247, 281; ranges = 4-600, 
3-600). Moreover, whereas seven of the control group completed the full 600 seconds 
required by the PASAT-C, only four of the abstainer group did, and this also constituted 
a moderately-sized statistical effect, 2(1, 28) = 1.20, p = .27, Cramer’s V = .21 (i.e. r ≈ 
.21). Furthermore, at the end of the follow-up session we asked all abstaining smokers 
whether they would smoke immediately afterwards, and all reported that they would 
definitely do so (i.e. indicating a reluctance to experience tobacco cravings even at the 
cost of sacrificing their ultimate desire to quit smoking). However, the log-
transformed81 time that the current smokers were willing to hold their breath for was not 
affected by whether they had been stressed during nicotine abstinence versus while 
smoking as usual, F(1, 26) = .10, p = .75, p
2 = .004, r ≈ .07.  
In addition, all of the current smokers reported large reductions across the first 
two stages of the PASAT-C in the extent to which they experienced happiness, F(1, 26) 
= 11.45, p = .002, p
2 = .32, r ≈ .57; and large increases in the degree to which they 
experienced difficulty concentrating, F(1, 26) = 12.44, p = .002, p
2 = .32, r ≈ .57, 
anxiety, F(1, 26) = 5.93, p = .02, p
2 = .19, r ≈ .43, irritability, F(1, 26) = 16.68, p = 
.0004, p
2 = .39, r ≈ .63, and frustration, F(1, 26) = 18.94, p = .0002, p
2 = .42, r ≈ .65.82 
Crucially, nicotine deprivation did not interact with any of the foregoing changes in 
explicit mood ratings across the PASAT-C, F(1, 26)s ≤ .70, ps ≥ .41, p
2s ≤ .026, rs ≤ 
                                                 
81 Given that response latencies (i.e. as opposed to response latency differences) have a strong tendency 
towards being positively skewed it is standard practice in the distress tolerance literature to log-transform 
breath holding latency as a measure of distress tolerance (e.g. see Bernstein et al., 2008; Brown et al., 
2009; Cosci et al., 2015; Kahler et al., 2012). 
82 By contrast, as intended by the developers of the PASAT-C, we did not observe any changes in the 
current smokers’ ratings of bodily discomfort across this task, F(1, 26) = .85, p = .37, p
2 = .03, r ≈ .18; 
and nor did it interact with nicotine abstinence in this regard, F(1, 26) = .02, p = .88, p
2 = .001, r ≈ .03 
(see Lejuez et al., 2003, p. 291). 
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.16, except moderately so with respect to those referring to feelings of frustration, F(1, 
26) = 2.96, p = .10, p
2 = .10, r ≈ .32. Namely, the PASAT-C had less impact on the 
levels of frustration reported by the abstaining smokers as compared to the control 
group, F(1, 26) = 18.94, p = .0002, p
2 = .42, r ≈ .65. And yet, nonetheless, the PASAT-
C still brought about statistically large increases in the levels of frustration that the 
abstainers, t(12) = -1.77, p = .10, 2 = .18, r = .43, and the control group explicitly 
reported, t(12) = -4.67, p = .0005, 2 = .65, r = .80. Specifically, the PASAT-C 
increased the control group’s reported levels of frustration from an initially low level 
beforehand (i.e. M = 17.5, SD = 18.7; range = 3-60), to a similarly moderate level (i.e. 
M = 54.3, SD = 30.8; range = 3-92). And at the same time, the PASAT-C increased the 
abstainer group’s already high levels of frustration due to unaided abstinence (i.e. M = 
54 versus 69.9, SD = 27.2 versus 30.1; range = 1-81 versus 4-100). In other words, it 
appeared as though abstaining from nicotine at least partially induced a ceiling-effect in 
the current smokers’ reported feelings of frustration, such that the PASAT-C failed to 
increase them any further. Indeed, confirming this, the abstainer group reported a large 
degree more feelings of frustration at first follow-up than the control group, t(26) = 
4.07, p = .0001, 2 = .39, r ≈ .62.  
As further confirmation of this pattern of moods, we also found a large increase 
the smokers’ ratings of negative moods on the PANAS due to nicotine abstinence, F(1, 
26) = 20.37, p = .0001, p
2 = .44, r ≈ .66, which resulted in the abstainers reporting a 
large degree more negative moods relative to the control group at follow-up, t(26) = 
2.18, p = .04, 2 = .15, r ≈ .39; a difference which in turn did not appear to be affected 
by the stress induction, F(1, 26) = .01, p = .91, p
2 = .0001, r ≈ .01. Rather, the stress 
induction tasks appeared to induce a similarly large increase in explicit reports of 
negative mood on the PANAS for both experimental groups, F(1, 26) = 4.68, p = .04, 
p
2 = .16, r ≈ .40.  
In addition, concordantly, we also observed moderate reductions in the current 
smokers’ ratings of positive moods on the PANAS due to nicotine abstinence, F(1, 26) 
= 2.07, p = .16, p
2 = .07, r ≈ .27, which the stress induction task further reduced by a 
similarly large statistical amount for both experimental groups, F(1, 26) = 18.83, p = 
.0002, p
2 = .42, r ≈ .65 (i.e. the relevant interaction effect was null, F(1, 26) = .59, p = 
.45, p
2 = .02, r ≈ .15). Likewise, nicotine abstinence induced large reductions in the 
current smokers’ motivations to engage in commonly valued activities as per their 
responses to the six incentive rating questionnaire scales, F(1, 26) = 5.85, p = .02, p
2 = 
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.18, r ≈ .43; and crucially, this difference remained unchanged across the stress 
induction tasks, F(1, 26) = .91, p = .35, p
2 = .03, r ≈ .18. Lastly, confirming our 
experimental manipulation of nicotine abstinence, the abstainer group also exhibited a 
very large increase in both reward-focused tobacco cravings, F(1, 26) = 32.75, p < 
.0001, p
2 = .56, r ≈ .75, and relief-focused tobacco cravings, F(1, 26) = 14.51, p = 
.0008, p
2 = .36, r ≈ .60, from baseline to just before the stress induction tasks (i.e. 
relative to the control group). By contrast, however, much like the pattern of frustration 
mood ratings we observed above, the stress induction tasks induced a large increase in 
the control group’s reward-focused QSU tobacco cravings without affecting the 
abstainers’ corresponding ratings F(1, 26) = 11.23, p = .003, p
2 = .30, r ≈ .55; and also 
without affecting either group’s relief-focused QSU tobacco cravings any further, F(1, 
26) = .78, p = .39, p
2 = .03, r ≈ .17. 
7.3.3. Baseline Analyses of IRAP Trial-type by Trial Block Order 
The IRAP data were initially entered into a 2x2x2 mixed-repeated measures 
ANOVA, which crossed the between-groups variable IRAP trial block order (i.e. pro- 
versus anti-smoking-first) with the two IRAP trial-type variables. Trial block order did 
not interact with either of the trial-type variables, F(1, 26)s ≤ .31, ps ≥ .58, p
2s ≤ .01, rs 
≤ .11. However, trial block order exerted a moderately sized main effect across the 
baseline IRAP trial-type data such that the trial-type effects obtained from the anti-
smoking-first condition tended to be more positive than those obtained from the pro-
smoking-first condition, F(1, 26) = 2.13, p = .16, p
2 = .08, r ≈ .27. Moreover, as 
illustrated in Figure 7.1, there was also a large interaction between the concept and 
target trial-type variables, F(1, 26) = 19.60, p = .0002, p
2 = .43, r ≈ .66, which qualified 
main effects for both variables, respectively; F(1, 26)s = 8.84, 3.23; ps = .006, .08; p
2s 
= .25, .11; rs ≈ .50, .33.  
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Figure 7.1. Mean trial-type DIRAP scores, with standard error bars, split by IRAP trial block order and both 
IRAP trial-type variables. 
 
Furthermore, planned follow-up analyses revealed that the current smokers 
exhibited large pro-smoking effects on both trial-types dealing with smoking (i.e. 
respectively, t(27)s = 5.25, 2.72; ps < .01; 2s = .51, .22; rs ≈ .71, .46), and also a large 
anti-quitting effect on the Quitting-Neg trial-type, t(27) = 3.50, p = .002, 2 = .31, r = 
.56; but by contrast, overall, they also showed a moderately-sized pro-quitting implicit 
tendency to affirm Quitting-Pos, t(27) = -1.61, p = .12, 2 = .09, r = .30. 
7.3.4. IRAP trial-type by Nicotine Abstinence 
Between-groups Analysis 
We entered the IRAP data into a 2x2x2x2 mixed -repeated measures ANOVA, 
crossing the between-groups variable nicotine abstinence (i.e. the abstainer group versus 
the control group) with three within-subjects factors: the nicotine abstinence time factor 
from the first relapse-IRAP to the second (i.e. spanning the 24-hour time period before 
stress induction), and the two IRAP trial-type variables. This resulted in only one 
interaction between nicotine abstinence and time; namely, a moderately-sized 
interaction with IRAP target-type, F(1, 26) = 2.64, p = .12, p
2 = .09, r ≈ .30 (i.e. all 
other interactions involving these variables were null, F[1, 26]s ≤ .83, ps ≥ .37, p
2s ≤ 
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.03, rs ≤ .18).83 As per Figure 7.2, this interaction implied that nicotine abstinence made 
the current smokers more inclined to affirm smoking, and to discount trying to quit 
smoking, when these topics were phrased in terms of relevant positive feelings. And by 
contrast, this interaction also suggested that nicotine abstinence encouraged the opposite 
pattern across the two IRAP trial-types phrased in terms of corresponding negative 
feelings. However, follow-up analyses revealed that the relevant simple effects were 
both null, F(1, 26)s ≤ .61, ps ≥ .44, p
2s ≤ .02, rs ≤ .15. On balance, therefore, given that 
all other interactions between the experimental groups and time period 1 were null, 
nicotine abstinence appeared to have little if any effect on the smokers’ implicit 
evaluating as measured by the current relapse-IRAP.  
 
 
Figure 7.2. Mean trial-type DIRAP scores, with standard error bars, for the abstainer group versus the 
control group smokers grouped by IRAP target-type and across time period 1. 
                                                 
83 For clarity, we omitted IRAP trial block order from our primary analyses of how nicotine abstinence 
and acute stress impacted smokers’ implicit evaluating. In particular, the current study incorporated only 
the minimum number of participants usually required per IRAP block order condition to make parametric 
statistical comparisons of difference legitimate (i.e. ns = 5-8; see see Lane et al., 2007; pp. 88-90; 
VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007, p. 48). Therefore, whatever about analysing block order effects in terms of 
the two IRAP trial-type variables at baseline with respect to one or two groups (as in the previous 
chapter), there was a geometrically greater chance of observing spurious block order effects had we 
incorporated this variable into our primary analysis of how nicotine abstinence and acute stress impacted 
smokers’ implicit evaluating – and particularly given the unprecedented nature of these primary analyses. 
Thus, to avoid distracting from the central focus of this research with speculations about secondary and 
indeed premature issues involving IRAP block order, we postponed these latter issues for clarification by 
future research. Crucially, the current primary analyses were relatively safe from any such confounds 
insofar as it counterbalanced the block order variable, and also insofar as all of the block order 
interactions we observed in previous chapters were relatively modest in size (i.e. as compared to the 
effects of the primary independent variables they interacted with in each case). 
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7.3.5. IRAP Block Sequence Analyses of Nicotine Abstinence by Acute Stress 
We entered the IRAP data into a 2x2x2x5 mixed-repeated measures ANOVA, 
crossing the between-groups variable nicotine abstinence with three within-subjects 
factors: the two IRAP trial-type variables, and a five level acute stress time factor 
spanning the standard trial-type DIRAPs from the second relapse-IRAP and the four 
block pair trial-type DIRAPs from the third relapse IRAP. This resulted in a moderate-to-
small interaction among all four variables, F(1, 26) = 1.09, p = .37, p
2 = .04, r ≈ .20, 
which qualified a moderately-sized three-way interaction between nicotine abstinence, 
the acute stress time factor and IRAP target-type, F(1, 26) = 2.59, p = .04, p
2 = .09, r ≈ 
.30; and also a two-way interaction between the two former variables, F(1, 26) = 2.45, p 
= .05, p
2 = .09, r ≈ .29. The only remaining interaction involving nicotine abstinence 
and the acute stress time factor was that with IRAP concept-type – and it was null, F(1, 
26) = .31, p = .87, p
2 = .01, r ≈ .11. In broad terms, this indicated that all four trial-type 
DIRAP scores functioned differently to each other with respect to the interaction between 
the nicotine abstinence and the acute stress time factor. To explore the nature of this 
four-way interaction, we therefore conducted a one-way follow-up ANOVA on each 
trial-type DIRAP, crossing nicotine abstinence with the acute stress time factor in each 
case. 
Smoking-Pos by Nicotine Abstinence by the Acute Stress Time Factor 
Nicotine abstinence interacted to a moderate degree with the acute stress time 
factor on Smoking-Pos, F(1, 26) = 2.04, p = .09, p
2 = .07, r ≈ .27, and this qualified a 
large main effect of nicotine abstinence, F(1, 26) = 5.22, p = .03, p
2 = .17, r ≈ .41, and 
by contrast the acute stress time factor had no main effect, F(1, 26) = .07, p = .99, p
2 = 
.003, r ≈ .05. Crucially, as illustrated in Figure 7.3, the main effect for nicotine 
deprivation resulted almost exclusively from the abstainers being a large degree more 
pro-smoking than the controls on the first two block pair Smoking-Pos DIRAPs 
immediately after stress induction (i.e. respectively, t(26)s = 2.63, 2.15; p = .01, .04; 2 
= .21, .15; r ≈ .46, .39). In fact, there was no difference between the abstainers and the 
control group on Smoking-Pos during either the second relapse-IRAP, or the final two 
test block pairs of the third relapse-IRAP, t(26)s ≤ .67, p ≥ .51, 2s ≤ .02, rs ≤ .13.   
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Figure 7.3. Mean Smoking-Pos DIRAP scores, with standard error bars, for the abstainer group versus the 
control group smokers split by the acute stress time factor. 
 
Confirming this, planned follow-up ANOVAs revealed a moderate-to-large 
interaction between nicotine abstinence and acute stress across the standard Smoking-
Pos DIRAPs from the second relapse-IRAP versus the criterion practise Smoking-Pos 
DIRAPs from the third relapse-IRAP, F(1, 26) = 4.03, p = .06, p
2 = .13, r ≈ .37. And 
moreover, this effect appeared to hold from criterion practise to test block pair 1 on the 
third relapse-IRAP, F(1, 26) = .38, p = .54, p
2 = .01, r ≈ .12, before then mostly 
reversing from test block pairs 1 to 2 of the third relapse-IRAP, F(1, 26) = 1.51, p = .23, 
p
2 = .05, r ≈ .23, and stabilising to its original levels from test block pairs 2 to 3 on that 
IRAP, F(1, 26) = .16, p = .69, p
2 = .006, r ≈ .08. Moreover, the foregoing pattern of 
stress induced changes occurred, even though both the abstainers and the control group 
already exhibited a very strongly pro-smoking Smoking-Pos DIRAP during relapse-IRAP 
2, shortly before the relevant stress induction (i.e. respectively, ts = 4.94, 3.15; ps ≤ 
.008; 2s = .64, .45; rs ≈ .80, .67). 
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Figure 7.4. Mean Smoking-Neg DIRAP scores, with standard error bars, for the abstainer group versus the 
control group smokers split by the acute stress time factor. 
 
Smoking-Neg by Nicotine Abstinence by the Acute Stress Time Factor 
Nicotine abstinence interacted to a moderate degree with the acute stress time 
factor on Smoking-Neg, F(1, 26) = 2.37, p = .06, p
2 = .08, r ≈ .29, and this qualified a 
large main effect of nicotine abstinence, F(1, 26) = 5.29, p = .03, p
2 = .17, r ≈ .41, and 
a moderately-sized main effect due to the acute stress time factor, F(1, 26) = 1.76, p = 
.14, p
2 = .06, r ≈ .25. As illustrated in Figure 7.4, planned follow-up ANOVAs revealed 
that the abstainers initially became moderately less pro-smoking on Smoking-Neg as a 
result of the acute stress induction during the criterion practise blocks for relapse-IRAP 
3, F(1, 26) = 1.95, p = .17, p
2 = .07, r ≈ .26. However, shortly thereafter, during the 
first test block pair of relapse-IRAP 3 the abstainer’s Smoking-Neg DIRAP rebounded to 
double that degree in the pro-smoking direction, F(1, 26) = 8.76, p = .007, p
2 = .25, r ≈ 
.50; before then reducing back to near its original levels during test block pair 2, F(1, 
26) = 4.36, p = .05, p
2 = .14, r ≈ .38, and test block pair 3, F(1, 26) = .26, p = .60, p
2 = 
.01, r ≈ .10. 
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Figure 7.5. Mean Quitting-Pos DIRAP scores, with standard error bars, for the abstainer group versus the 
control group smokers split by the acute stress time factor. 
 
Quitting-Pos by Nicotine Abstinence by the Acute Stress Time Factor 
Nicotine abstinence interacted to a moderate degree with the acute stress time 
factor on Quitting-Pos, F(1, 26) = 1.58, p = .18, p
2 = .06, r ≈ .24, and this qualified a 
large main effect of nicotine abstinence, F(1, 26) = 10.38, p = .003, p
2 = .29, r ≈ .53, 
and a moderately-sized main effect due to the acute stress time factor, F(1, 26) = 1.76, p 
= .14, p
2 = .06, r ≈ .25. As illustrated in Figure 7.5, planned follow-up ANOVAs 
revealed that the abstainers initially became moderately more pro-smoking on Quitting-
Pos as a result of the acute stress induction during the criterion practise blocks for 
relapse-IRAP 3, F(1, 26) = 3.32, p = .08, p
2 = .11, r ≈ .34; and that this effect lasted for 
the first test block pair of relapse-IRAP 3, F(1, 26) = .02, p = .89, p
2 = .0009, r ≈ .03, 
before partially reversing during the next test block pair, F(1, 26) = 1.49, p = .23, p
2 = 
.05, r ≈ .23, and then restoring again during the final test block pair, F(1, 26) = 3.45, p = 
.07, p
2 = .12, r ≈ .34.  
Quitting-Neg by Nicotine Abstinence by the Acute Stress Time Factor 
Nicotine abstinence did not interact with the acute stress time factor on Quitting-
Neg, F(1, 26) = .69, p = .60, p
2 = .03, r ≈ .16; and nor was there a main effect of the 
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acute stress time factor, F(1, 26) = .23, p = .92, p
2 = .009, r ≈ .09; but only a borderline 
main effect of nicotine abstinence, F(1, 26) = 1.07, p = .31, p
2 = .04, r ≈ .20 (i.e. note 
that as per our nicotine abstinence analyses above this main effect was due to random 
baseline differences).  
7.3.6. IRAP trial-type analyses of Nicotine Abstinence by Acute Stress while 
Disregarding Block Order84 
We entered the IRAP data into a 2x2x2x2 mixed-repeated measures ANOVA, 
crossing the between-groups variable nicotine abstinence with three within-subjects 
factors: the acute stress time factor disregarding block sequence; and the two IRAP 
trial-type variables. This resulted in only two interactions between nicotine abstinence 
and the acute stress time factor; namely, a moderately-sized interaction with each other, 
F(1, 26) = 2.58, p = .12, p
2 = .09, r ≈ .30, and a smaller one with IRAP target-type, 
F(1, 26) = 1.57, p = .22, p
2 = .06, r ≈ .24, but none with IRAP concept-type, F(1, 26)s 
≤ .29, ps ≥ .59, p
2s ≤ .01, rs ≤ .11. Crucially, as illustrated in Figure 7.6, the three-way 
interaction between nicotine abstinence, time period 2 and IRAP target-type indicated 
that acute stress plus nicotine deprivation stimulated pro-smoking/anti-quitting implicit 
evaluating relatively strongly for the two trial-types phrased positively (i.e. Smoking-
Pos and Quitting-Pos), F(1, 26) = 3.77, p = .06, p
2 = .12, r ≈ .36, but in contrast did not 
have an overall effect on the two trial-types phrased negatively (i.e. Smoking-Neg and 
Quitting-Neg), F(1, 26) = .54, p = .47, p
2 = .02, r ≈ .14. 
 
                                                 
84 Note that, as in studies 3 and 4, we did not include IRAP block order in an analysis with IRAP block 
sequence because the current study did not incorporate enough participants per block order condition to 
make it feasible to analyse stable block order effects at the level of block-pair trial-type DIRAPs. In 
particular, each block-pair trial-type DIRAP incorporated a minimal number of pairs of IRAP response 
latencies (i.e. six), and the current study incorporated only the minimum number of participants per IRAP 
block order condition to make parametric statistical comparisons of difference legitimate (i.e. ns = 7-12; 
see see Lane et al., 2007; pp. 88-90; VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007, p. 48). Indeed, based on the fact that 
we have already observed stable patterns of block order effects at the level of standard trial-type DIRAPs 
during studies one and two, we estimated that the current study would have required at least three times as 
many participants as it did in order to observe stable block order effects at the level of block-pair trial-
type DIRAPs (i.e. assuming that three times as many participants would compensate for the three times as 
many response latencies comprising a standard versus block-pair trial-type DIRAP). 
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Figure 7.6. Mean trial-type DIRAP scores, with standard error bars, for the abstainer group versus the 
control group smokers grouped by IRAP target-type and across acute stress time factor (i.e. disregarding 
IRAP block sequence). 
 
7.3.7. The Impact of Nicotine Abstinence and Acute Stress on trial-type DIRAP Internal 
Reliability 
Baseline trial-type DIRAP Internal Reliability 
The current smokers’ exhibited poor internal reliability on all four IRAP trial-
types from the first relapse-IRAP; and in fact on one trial-type, Smoking-Pos, their 
IRAP effect even exhibited some degree of negative internal reliability, rsb(28) = -.42 
(i.e. compensated rsb = -.59). By contrast, the smokers’ remaining three trial-type effects 
each exhibited almost a complete lack of internal reliability, -.16 ≤ rsbs ≤ -.03 (i.e. -.43 ≤ 
compensated rsbs ≤ -.11). 
Analyses of the Impact of Nicotine Deprivation on trial-type DIRAP Internal reliability 
The internal reliability of the control group’s Smoking-Pos DIRAP, rsb(12) = .74 
(i.e. compensated rsb = .92), and their Quitting-Pos DIRAP, rsb(13) = .75 (i.e. 
compensated rsb = .92), was moderately higher during the second relapse-IRAP as 
compared to at baseline, Zs ≥ 2.76, ps ≤ .005 (i.e. rs ≥ .43).85 By contrast, however, the 
internal reliability of their Smoking-Neg DIRAP, rsb(13) = -.68 (i.e. compensated rsb = -
.89), and their Quitting-Neg DIRAP, rsb(13) = -.60 (i.e. compensated rsb = -.86), were if 
                                                 
85 We calculated these Z-tests based on the uncorrected trial-type DIRAP rsbs. 
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anything more negative during the second relapse-IRAP as compared to baseline (i.e. 
respectively, Zs = 1.98, 1.08, ps = .05, .28; i.e. rs = .32, .17). 
The abstainers, by contrast, exhibited low internal reliability on all but one of the 
four trial-type DIRAPs resulting from the second relapse-IRAP. Namely, they exhibited 
relatively positive internal reliability on Quitting-Neg DIRAP, rsb(15) = .41 (i.e. 
compensated rsb = .74), which was moderately higher than at baseline, Z = 2.18, p = .03 
(i.e. r ≈ .33). And by contrast, the abstainers’ exhibited internal reliability on the 
remaining three trial-type effects that was similar to the baseline internal reliability of 
those trial-type effects, Zs ≤ .71, ps ≥ .48 (i.e. rs ≤ .11). Namely, they exhibited negative 
internal reliability on their Smoking-Pos DIRAP, rsb(15) = -.52 (i.e. compensated rsb = -
.81), and on their Smoking-Neg DIRAP, rsb(15) = -.32 (i.e. compensated rsb = -.65), 
coupled with near-zero internal reliability on their Quitting-Pos DIRAP, rsb(15) = -.08 (i.e. 
compensated rsb = -.26).  
Analyses of the Impact of Nicotine Deprivation and Acute Stress on trial-type DIRAP 
Internal reliability 
During the third relapse-IRAP, following the stress induction tasks, the internal 
reliability of the control group’s Smoking-Pos DIRAP, rsb(13) = -.13 (i.e. compensated rsb 
= -.37), and their Quitting-Pos DIRAP, rsb(12) = .39 (i.e. compensated rsb = .72), were 
both reduced relative to their relatively respective high internal reliabilities during the 
second relapse-IRAP (i.e. respectively, Zs = 2.35, 1.22, ps = .02, .22; i.e. rs = .47, .24). 
Moreover, the internal reliability of their Quitting-Neg DIRAP remained similarly as 
negative during the third relapse-IRAP, rsb(13) = -.31 (i.e. compensated rsb = -.64), as 
during the second, Z = .83, p = .41 (i.e. r = .17). By contrast, however, the internal 
reliability of the control group’s Smoking-Neg DIRAP, rsb(12) = .46 (i.e. compensated rsb 
= .72), was relatively positive having been strongly negative during the second relapse-
IRAP, Z = 2.89, p = .004 (i.e. r = .58). 
The internal reliability abstainers’ Smoking-Pos DIRAP during the third relapse-
IRAP, rsb(15) = .57 (i.e. compensated rsb = .84), improved to a large degree relative to 
during the second relapse-IRAP, Z = 3.0, p = .003 (i.e. r = .55). However, the internal 
reliability of their Smoking-Neg DIRAP, rsb(15) = -.45 (i.e. compensated rsb = -.77) was 
similarly as negative during the third relapse-IRAP as during the second, Z = .37, p = 
.71 (i.e. r = .07). And indeed, their Quitting-Pos DIRAP, rsb(15) = -.78 (i.e. compensated 
rsb = -.93) became more negative during the third relative to the second relapse-IRAP, Z 
= 1.75, p = .08 (i.e. r = .32).  
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7.3.8. Analyses of the Impact of Nicotine Abstinence and Acute Stress on Explicit 
Evaluating of Smoking and Quitting Smoking 
Baseline Analyses 
We initially entered the baseline explicit evaluating data into a 2x2x2 repeated-
measures ANOVA, which crossed nicotine abstinence with the two IRAP trial-type 
topic variables: concept-type and target-type. This resulted in one moderately-sized 
main effect for target-type, F(1, 26) = 3.90, p = .06, p
2 = .13, r ≈ .36, but both other 
main effects, F(1, 26)s ≤ .65, ps ≥ .43, p
2s ≤ .02, rs ≤ .16, and all three interaction 
effects were null, F(1, 26)s ≤ .08, ps ≥ .37, p
2s ≤ .003, rs ≤ .05. Planned one-sample t-
tests revealed that the current smokers were not only strongly inclined explicitly deny 
“SMOKING makes Me feel BAD” and to explicitly affirm “Trying NOT to SMOKE 
makes Me feel BAD”, t(26)s ≥ 3.45, p ≤ .002, 2s ≥ .31, rs ≥ .55, but even more 
strongly inclined to explicitly affirm “SMOKING makes Me feel GOOD” and to 
explicitly deny “Trying NOT to SMOKE makes Me feel GOOD”, t(26)s ≥ 5.66, p < 
.0001, 2s ≥ .54, rs ≥ .74. 
On the Impact of Unaided Nicotine Abstinence on Smokers’ Explicit Evaluating 
We entered the feeling thermometer data into a 2x2x2x2 mixed-repeated 
measures ANOVA, crossing the between-groups variable nicotine abstinence with three 
within-subjects factors: the nicotine abstinence time factor from the first relapse-IRAP 
to the second (i.e. spanning the 24-hour time period before stress induction), and the 
two IRAP trial-type topic variables concept-type and target-type. This resulted in a 
moderately-sized interaction among all four variables, F(1, 26) = 2.20, p = .15, p
2 = 
.08, r = .28, which qualified a similarly-sized interaction among nicotine abstinence, the 
nicotine abstinence time factor and target-type, F(1, 26) = 2.16, p = .15, p
2 = .08, r = 
.28; and, both remaining interactions between the former two variables were null, F(1, 
26)s ≤ .55, ps ≥ .47, p
2s ≤ .02, rs ≤ .14. Follow-up ANOVAs revealed that nicotine 
abstinence only impacted the current smokers’ explicit evaluating of one of the four 
relevant topics; namely it made them less inclined to explicitly affirm “Trying NOT to 
SMOKE makes Me feel BAD”, F(1, 26) = 1.55, p = .22, p
2 = .06, r = .24 (i.e. the 
interaction effects for the three remaining trial-type topics were all null, F(1, 26)s ≤ .70, 
ps ≥ .41, p
2s ≤ .03, rs ≤ .16). 
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On the Impact of Unaided Nicotine Abstinence and Acute Stress on Smokers’ Explicit 
Evaluating 
We entered the IRAP data into a 2x2x2x2 mixed-repeated measure ANOVA, 
crossing the between-groups variable nicotine abstinence with three within-subjects 
factors: the acute stress time factor (i.e. disregarding block sequence), and the two IRAP 
trial-type variables. This resulted in only one three-way interaction between nicotine 
abstinence and the acute stress time factor: namely, a moderately-sized interaction with 
the target-type topic variable, F(1, 26) = 1.68, p = .21, p
2 = .06, r = .25 (i.e. all three 
other interactions involving nicotine abstinence and the acute stress time factor were 
null, F(1, 26)s ≤ .97, ps ≥ .33, p
2s ≤ .036, rs ≤ .19). However, follow-up analyses 
revealed that acute stress under nicotine abstinence had no effect on either the current 
smokers’ explicit evaluating of the positively-phrased Smoking-Pos and Quitting-Pos 
trial-type topics, F(1, 26) = .17, p = .68, p
2 = .0007, r = .08, or upon their explicit 
evaluating of the negatively-phrased Smoking-Neg and Quitting-Neg trial-type topics, 
F(1, 26) = .07, p = .80, p
2 = .002, r = .05. Therefore, on balance, the acute stress 
induction had relatively little impact on the abstainers explicit evaluating relative to the 
control group.  
However, as per a moderately-sized interaction between the acute stress time 
factor and the two trial-type topic variables, F(1, 26) = 2.38, p = .14, p
2 = .08, r = .29, 
the stress induction tasks did differentially affect the current smokers’ explicit 
evaluating of the four relevant topics – and crucially, irrespectively of nicotine 
abstinence. Namely, follow-up F-tests indicated that these tasks moderately increased 
the extent to which the current smokers were inclined to explicitly deny “SMOKING 
makes Me feel BAD”, F(1, 26) = 1.32, p = .26, p
2 = .05, r = .22, explicitly affirm 
“Trying NOT to SMOKE makes Me feel GOOD”, F(1, 26) = 1.61, p = .22, p
2 = .06, r 
= .24. And that by contrast, the acute stress induction did not change the extent to which 
the current smokers were inclined to explicitly affirm “SMOKING makes Me feel 
GOOD”, F(1, 26) = .01, p = .94, p
2 = .0002, r = .02, or the extent to which they were 
inclined to explicitly affirm “Trying NOT to SMOKE makes Me feel BAD”, F(1, 26) = 
.05, p = .83, p
2 = .002, r = .04.  
7.4. DISCUSSION 
We confirmed with multiple manipulation checks that at baseline both 
experimental groups were moderately inclined to cope with their tobacco cravings by 
deliberately suppressing them, and that crucially, after 14-24 hours of unaided nicotine 
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abstinence this inclination actually increased relative to the control group. Indeed, 
further manipulation checks confirmed that just as the abstainers were becoming more 
inclined to cope with their tobacco cravings using suppression-oriented strategies they 
explicitly reported experiencing fewer positive emotions, less motivation to engage in 
commonly valued activities, and more negative moods due to nicotine abstinence. 
Moreover, this pattern worsened further as a result of the stress induction. In particular, 
the stress induction tasks induced large decreases in how much both experimental 
groups reported experiencing happiness, in tandem with how much they reported 
experiencing increases in the extent to which they experienced irritability, frustration – 
and crucially, difficulty concentrating. The latter finding is particularly noteworthy 
given that suppression-oriented strategies for coping with tobacco cravings and/or 
related negative affect depend fundamentally upon one’s ability to maintain 
concentration on the task of doing so. In addition, these early stages of unaided nicotine 
abstinence also appeared to induce substantial increases in the current smokers’ reward-
focused and relief-focused tobacco cravings.  
The stress induction tasks did not, however, increase these latter questionnaire-
based ratings any further among the abstainers. And yet, they did increase the control 
groups’ reward-focused tobacco cravings and feelings of frustration to about the same 
respective levels as induced by nicotine abstinence in the abstainer group. In other 
words, it appeared that while the abstainers reported noticing some changes in their 
mood due to the stress induction tasks, they did not report any changes in their tobacco 
cravings or their levels of frustration. Overall, therefore, it appeared as though 
abstaining from nicotine imposed a ceiling-effect upon the current smokers’ ability to 
notice changes in their smoking-related implicit evaluating (i.e. in the form of tobacco 
cravings), which did not apply to their moods (as much). 
Indeed, confirming this further, we observed no changes in the current smokers’ 
explicit evaluating of the four IRAP trial-type topics examined by the IRAP due to 
acute stress, except for an ironic decrease in the extent to which both groups’ were 
inclined to explicitly affirm that “SMOKING makes Me feel BAD”, F(1, 26) = 1.32, p 
= .26, p
2 = .05, r = .22, and an ironic increase in their tendency to explicitly affirm that 
“Trying NOT to SMOKE makes Me feel GOOD.” Indeed, likewise, the only change 
that we observed in smokers’ explicit evaluating of the four IRAP trial-type topics due 
to nicotine abstinence was an ironic decrease in the extent to which they were inclined 
to affirm “Trying NOT to SMOKE makes Me feel BAD”. In other words, counter 
intuitively, the smokers’ questionnaire-based evaluating implied that unaided nicotine 
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abstinence, and/or the stress induction tasks made them more, not less inclined to quit 
smoking.  
Crucially, however, the current smokers’ implicit evaluating broadly implied the 
opposite of this corresponding explicit evaluating. Firstly, we observed no changes in 
the smokers’ implicit evaluating of any of the four IRAP trial-types due to nicotine 
abstinence. Rather just like at baseline, at the beginning of follow-up both experimental 
groups were strongly inclined to affirm “SMOKING makes Me feel GOOD”; to deny  
“SMOKING makes Me feel BAD”; to affirm “Trying NOT to SMOKE makes Me feel 
BAD”; but also moderately inclined to affirm “Trying NOT to SMOKE makes Me feel 
GOOD”. In other words, the current smokers exhibited highly pro-smoking implicit 
evaluating with respect to the Smoking-Pos, Smoking-Neg, and Quitting-Neg topics, but 
by contrast they also exhibited moderately pro-quitting implicit evaluating of the 
Quitting-Pos topic. On balance, therefore, even though all of the current smokers were 
willing to abstain from smoking for 14-24 hours unaided for monetary compensation, 
their implicit evaluating was ambivalent among these four topics both before and after 
this period of abstinence. Indeed, as per Figure 7.1, just as we observed a pro-quitting 
rebound effect on smokers’ implicit affirming of Quitting-Pos in the pro-smoking-first 
IRAP condition at baseline (which ostensibly instructed a pro-smoking perspective); 
conversely, we also observed an opposite trend in those aspects of the smokers’ pro-
smoking implicit evaluating that were similarly occasional. Namely, we observed a 
trend for the anti-smoking-first IRAP block order (ostensibly instructing an anti-
smoking perspective) to induce similarly-sized pro-smoking rebound effects in their 
implicit denying of Smoking-Neg and implicit affirming of Quitting-Neg – with no such 
trend for the smokers’ relatively strong, consistent and integral tendency to implicitly 
affirm Smoking-Pos.86 
Secondly, although the acute stress induction tasks did not affect smokers’ 
implicit denying of the Quitting-Neg topic, in contrast to our explicit evaluating findings 
above, these tasks induced greater pro-smoking and less pro-quitting implicit evaluating 
on the remaining three trial-types. For example, even though both groups of smokers 
implicitly evaluated Smoking-Pos in a strongly pro-smoking manner before stress 
induction, the stress induction tasks nevertheless brought about a large increase in this 
tendency among the abstainers (i.e. relative to the control group who also received these 
                                                 
86 Granted, we did not obtain a statistical interaction between IRAP trial block order and either of the two 
IRAP trial-type topic variables, but only a main effect of block order. However, on balance, given the 
relatively small sample size employed here per block order experimental cell, we opted here to tentatively 
report the trend of block order effects implied by Figure 7.1 on a trial-type by trial-type basis.  
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tasks). Crucially, however, this stress-induced increase in the abstainer’s implicit 
affirming of Smoking-Pos lasted for only the time-span of approximately two pairs 
IRAP trial blocks. In particular, all but one of the current smokers satisfied the response 
criteria for the third relapse-IRAP within the first pair of practise blocks. And therefore, 
given that this IRAP was delivered immediately after the stress induction tasks, the 
effects we observed on Smoking-Pos across criterion practise and test block 1 of the 
third relapse-IRAP were captured without much if any delay. Thus, if we assume that it 
took participants approximately two minutes to complete each pair of IRAP trial blocks 
(i.e. as in Studies 3 and 4), it appeared as though the abstainers experienced large 
increases in their pro-smoking implicit evaluating of Smoking-Pos for a duration of 4-5 
minutes after they had finished the stress induction tasks. 
Furthermore, we also observed large co-occurring anti-quitting changes in the 
abstainer’s implicit evaluating of Quitting-Pos such that whereas the control group was 
pro-quitting on Quitting-Pos throughout the third relapse-IRAP, by contrast the 
abstainers were anti-quitting on Quitting-Pos during the first two pairs of trial blocks 
captured by this IRAP. In fact, having then temporarily reverted to the same pro-
quitting implicit evaluating of Quitting-Pos during the test block pair 2 of the third 
relapse-IRAP, the abstainers became a large degree less pro-quitting than the controls 
during the final pair of trial blocks captured by this IRAP. Thus, applying similar logic 
as above, acute stress appeared to undermine smoker’s pro-quitting implicit evaluating 
for at least 8-9 minutes after they had finished the relevant stress induction tasks.  
Indeed, as per the current smokers Smoking-Neg effects, we even observed some 
evidence that the stress induction tasks caused abstainers to become ambivalent, and 
indeed implicitly more defensive with regard to negative aspects of their smoking 
throughout the third relapse-IRAP. Namely, although the abstainers were implicitly 
inclined to deny “SMOKING makes Me feel BAD” shortly before stress induction, by 
contrast during the first block pair of the third relapse-IRAP they became implicitly 
indecisive about this, followed by implicitly denying Smoking-Neg in the next trial 
block pair even more strongly than originally. Moreover, during the remaining two trial 
block pairs of the third relapse-IRAP the abstainers continued to implicitly deny 
Smoking-Neg (albeit less so than in the previous trial block) while the control group 
tended to implicitly affirm Smoking-Neg (albeit to a relatively modest degree). Overall, 
therefore, it appeared as though acute stress had an even more prolonged impact in 
undermining smokers’ pro-quitting implicit evaluating during unaided abstinence, than 
it had in promoting increased pro-smoking implicit evaluating integral to tobacco 
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addiction. Moreover, the acute stress tasks did not appear to have any impact on 
smokers’ implicit evaluating of any of the four relevant trial-type topics when they had 
been smoking as usual beforehand. 
And yet, crucially, most of the foregoing nuances were almost entirely obscured 
when we analysed the smokers’ IRAP data in terms of trial-type effects averaged across 
all four qualifying pairs of IRAP trial blocks (i.e. as per the extended DIRAP-algorithm). 
In particular, all this latter analysis revealed was that acute stress during unaided 
nicotine abstinence stimulated pro-smoking/anti-quitting implicit evaluating relatively 
strongly for the two trial-types phrased positively (i.e. Smoking-Pos and Quitting-Pos), 
without affecting the corresponding implicit evaluating of those smoking as usual; but 
that in contrast, acute stress during unaided nicotine abstinence had no such effect on 
the two trial-types phrased negatively relative to smoking as usual (i.e. Smoking-Neg 
and Quitting-Neg). 
Nonetheless, by examining the internal reliability of the smokers’ standard 
overall trial-type effects we did find evidence that unaided nicotine abstinence, and 
indeed even just the expectation of unaided nicotine abstinence, appeared to induce 
highly conflicted implicit evaluating of smoking and quitting smoking among these 
smokers throughout the relevant relapse-IRAPs. Specifically, once the control group 
had been made aware that they were not required to abstain from nicotine, during the 
second relapse-IRAP they exhibited relatively high internal reliability throughout their 
pro-smoking implicit affirming of Smoking-Pos (i.e. as in Study 1), and also throughout 
their pro-quitting implicit affirming of Quitting-Pos. By contrast, when all of the current 
smokers were anticipating whether or not they would be randomly assigned to abstain 
from nicotine, they exhibited similar Smoking-Pos and Quitting-Pos but respectively 
with relatively negative and near-zero internal reliabilities. Likewise, during the second 
relapse-IRAP, following 14-24 hours of unaided nicotine abstinence, the abstainer 
group also exhibited similar Smoking-Pos and Quitting-Pos as the control group on the 
second relapse-IRAP, but again, respectively, with relatively negative and near zero 
internal reliabilities. In summary, it therefore appeared as though the current smokers 
were normally highly consistent in their implicit evaluating of Smoking-Pos and 
Quitting-Pos, but that when faced with unaided nicotine abstinence the current smokers 
became highly implicitly indecisive in their evaluating of these two topics. In fact, the 
negative internal reliability of the smokers’ implicit evaluating of Smoking-Pos (both 
during and in anticipation of unaided nicotine abstinence) implied that not only were 
they implicitly indecisive about this topic when faced with nicotine abstinence, but 
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moreover oscillating periodically between affirming versus denying this topic from 
IRAP trial to trial. 
However, unlike the control group’s implicit evaluating of Smoking-Pos and 
Quitting-Pos during the second relapse-IRAP, their implicit evaluating of the 
corresponding negatively-phrased topics (Smoking-Neg and Quitting-Neg) both 
exhibited a large degree of negative internal reliability. And although this oscillating 
implicit indecisiveness lessened somewhat, at baseline under anticipation of the 
possibility of unaided nicotine abstinence, the current smokers’ implicit evaluating of 
both topics still exhibited internal reliability near zero. However, having engaged in 
nicotine abstinence itself, the abstainer group exhibited relatively positive internal 
reliability in their implicit denying of Smoking-Neg, even though their implicit 
affirming of Quitting-Neg exhibited near-zero internal reliability. In summary, 
therefore, it appeared as though the current smokers were generally very conflicted 
about their implicit tendency to deny Smoking-Neg and to affirm Quitting-Neg – except 
during nicotine abstinence when the smokers’ appeared to relatively decisive about their 
pro-smoking tendency to implicitly deny Smoking-Neg. Crucially, this was in contrast to 
their initially internally-consistent tendency to implicitly affirm Smoking-Pos and to 
affirm Quitting-Pos which was undermined by (the prospect of) nicotine abstinence. 
Thus, just as smokers were feeling more overwhelmed by their tobacco cravings, they 
also became more decisive about implicitly defending their need to smoke (i.e. by 
asserting that it does not make them feel bad), even as they became more implicitly 
indecisive about whether smoking makes them feel good.  
Furthermore, as a result of the stress induction tasks, even having smoked as 
usual, the control group’s implicit evaluating of Smoking-Pos lost its initially high 
internal reliability. And yet, by contrast, the control group’s implicit evaluating of 
Quitting-Pos appeared to mostly retain the high internal reliability it exhibited shortly 
before the stress induction tasks. In other words, following the stress induction tasks the 
control group were implicitly indecisive about affirming Smoking-Pos, but still 
implicitly decisive about affirming Quitting-Pos. Crucially, the control group explicitly 
reported substantial increases in their tobacco cravings as a result of the stress induction 
tasks (along with negative affect and decreases in positive affect). And therefore, the 
foregoing differential pattern of internal reliability may have resulted from the control 
group noticing how uncomfortable and distracting their tobacco cravings made them 
feel while completing the stress induction tasks (i.e. making them more implicitly 
257 
 
indecisive about affirming Smoking-Pos and yet still implicitly decisive about affirming 
a desire to quit smoking in terms of Quitting-Pos).  
By contrast, however, the abstainer group implicitly evaluated Smoking-Pos 
with greater internal reliability just as they came to affirm this topic ever more strongly 
as a result of the stress induction tasks. And moreover, at the same time, the internal 
reliability of their implicit evaluating of Quitting-Pos became severely negative (having 
been highly positive) just as they came to implicitly deny this topic as a result of the 
stress induction tasks (i.e. having implicitly affirmed it shortly before stress induction). 
Indeed, similarly, the abstainers also exhibited relatively low internal reliability in their 
implicit affirming of Smoking-Neg and their implicit affirming of Quitting-Neg during 
the final relapse-IRAP.  
In addition, just as the control group’s implicit affirming of Quitting-Neg 
exhibited negative (or near-zero) internal reliability (i.e. as per the second relapse-
IRAP), they also did so shortly after completing the stress induction tasks. Indeed, 
lastly, just as the abstainers attained some degree of internal reliability in their implicit 
evaluating of Smoking-Neg shortly before stress induction as a result of nicotine 
abstinence (i.e. having abstained from nicotine), once the control group had experienced 
the stress induction tasks the internal reliability of their implicit denying of Smoking-
Neg similarly improved (having been near-zero beforehand). 
Overall, therefore, the foregoing differential pattern of internal reliability effects 
confirmed our earlier block sequence analyses of the smokers’ Smoking-Pos, Smoking-
Neg and Quitting-Pos trial-type effects – namely that the stress induction tasks severely 
undermined smokers’ pro-quitting implicit evaluating while simultaneously amplifying 
and stabilising pro-smoking aspects of their implicit evaluating integral to tobacco 
addiction. Crucially, from this point of view, the current findings systematically implied 
that smoker’s usual efforts to engage in suppression-oriented management of their 
tobacco cravings during unaided nicotine abstinence appeared to be highly self-
defeating when most needed – during acute stress. That is, both with respect to reducing 
tobacco cravings, and also with respect to (deliberately) maintaining one’s own 
motivation to continue such efforts (i.e. particularly given that both experimental groups 
reported experiencing greater difficulties concentrating when stressed). Moreover, in 
revealing such things, the current findings also provided a plausible explanation of the 
mystery as to why the literature has failed over a relatively long period of time to obtain 
any consistent effects of nicotine deprivation upon smoking-related implicit cognition – 
namely, because they did not account for the interaction of acute stress with nicotine 
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deprivation; and nor did they account in any way for the strategies that smokers’ used to 
engage in unaided nicotine abstinence. Indeed, it is worth noting, that even though both 
the control group and the abstainers were cued for smoking after the stress induction 
tasks using their favourite brand of tobacco, even then only the abstainers implicit 
evaluating was impacted by the stress induction tasks (i.e. at least for the minimum two 
minute time periods within which we measured that implicit evaluating). 
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CHAPTER 8: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
8.1. An Overview of the Main Findings in the Current Empirical Work 
The present thesis aimed at developing the IRAP to provide a preliminary 
functional model of how implicit evaluating variously motivates tobacco addiction 
depending upon context. In particular, from the outset, we sought to use the IRAP to 
clarify two major issues about tobacco addiction: why smokers continue to smoke even 
when they may explicitly dislike doing so; and also to explore how smoking-related 
implicit evaluating responds to classic formulations of self-control involving deliberate 
suppression of tobacco cravings. Overall, our findings were encouraging from the point 
of view that throughout our research the IRAP consistently achieved an unmatched 
degree of discriminant and criterion validity not just in cross-section, but also 
experimentally. Indeed, as we review further below, the IRAP not only succeeded in 
measuring smoking-related implicit evaluating with an unparalleled degree of precision; 
but moreover, owing to this precision, we were able to explore the IRAP’s internal 
reliability and its block order effects as two potentially important new measures of the 
stability of implicit evaluating related to one’s potential for self-control. Furthermore, 
owing to the relatively high periodicity of the IRAP’s trial block structure, we were also 
able to offer the literature its first short-interval momentary time-course analysis of 
implicit evaluating, in order to determine how immediately, persistently and 
consistently it reacted to various key experimental variables related fleetingly to tobacco 
addiction. 
Our first study, described in Chapter 4, was primarily about demonstrating that 
the IRAP is more effective than the IAT as a means of investigating tobacco addiction. 
It involved developing a smoking-related IAT with stimuli that were specifically chosen 
on a known-groups basis to minimise the range of extraneous smoking-related implicit 
evaluating normally resulting from the relativity of its tasks. To our knowledge, this was 
the first time that anyone has specifically designed an IAT to maximise its experimental 
determinacy, and thus criterion validity, by minimising the degree to which it cued 
extraneous implicit evaluating. As reviewed earlier, our primary aim in doing so was to 
set a gold-standard benchmark against which to compare the precision and criterion 
validity afforded by an equivalent IRAP. And indeed, confirming the overarching 
rationale we developed across Chapters 1-3, the relevant IAT succeeded in providing an 
uncommonly high-quality benchmark against which to compare the criterion validity of 
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any smoking-related IRAP. In fact, it outperformed its predecessors in terms of 
correlating with all of the cross-sectional tobacco addiction criteria that we employed.  
Moreover, in all cases, the size of the relevant criterion correlations were either 
unprecedented, or else at the upper end of those previously achieved in the domain. It is 
therefore all the more impressive that the equivalent smoking-related IRAP performed 
consistently better than the IAT both in terms of diagnosing smoking-status, and in 
terms of the correlations it achieved with all of the five continuous tobacco addiction 
criteria we measured. In addition, unlike the IAT, this IRAP succeeded in 
discriminating particular types of pro- and anti-smoking implicit evaluating as being 
developmentally integral versus collateral to tobacco addiction across time (i.e. years 
smoking). Thus, crucially, Study 1 demonstrated that even when we focused on implicit 
evaluating topics specifically designed to favour the IAT, the IRAP still outperformed it 
in terms of both discriminant and criterion validity.  
Accordingly, we focused our second study upon developing an IRAP to 
precisely distinguish between two theoretically important sub-types of smokers’ typical 
reasons for smoking; namely reward- versus relief-focused reasons for smoking. This 
seemed particularly appropriate given that the IRAP we used in Study 1 indicated that 
smokers’ implicit evaluating of their typical reasons for smoking were broadly integral 
to tobacco addiction; and that in contrast, their implicit evaluating of typical reasons 
against smoking, and of public restrictions on their smoking, were relatively collateral 
to tobacco addiction. Indeed, confirming the more precise distinctions we incorporated 
into the IRAP in Study 2, its trial-type effects replicated and indeed systematically 
extended the discriminant and criterion validity achieved by the IRAP we used in Study 
1. In fact, as far as we are aware, the relief-focused Need-Neg trial-type effect we 
measured in study two correlated with continuous tobacco addiction criteria at a level 
well above anything previously observed in the literature on smoking-related implicit 
cognition – and what is more, it did so consistently across all five such criteria we 
measured. 
Indeed, owing to the mood-conditional phrasing of the trial-type topics we 
measured in Study 2, we were able to clarify that tobacco addiction is alternately 
motivated by both reward- and relief-focused implicit evaluative proceses in different 
respective mood-contexts – and in a manner which varies according to one’s stage of 
tobacco addiction. This was an important finding from the point of view that most 
dominant (implicit) theories of tobacco addiction are at impasse with each other in 
terms of arguing about whether tobacco addiction is driven (in absolute terms) by 
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reward- versus relief-focused (implicit) evaluating (e.g. see Conklin et al., 2004; Everitt 
& Robbins, 2005; Farris et al., 2015; Robinson & Berridge, 2008; Stacy & Wiers, 2010; 
Tibboel et al., 2011; Tibboel et al., in press). And crucially, as such, our IRAP findings 
offered a plausible means of reconciling multiple contradictory points of view from 
across the tobacco addiction literature (i.e. in broadly the same way as recommended for 
the literature on cognitive neuroscience by Vahey & Whelan, 2015). 
More specifically, the relevant IRAP findings indicated that reward-focused 
implicit evaluating of smoking in celebratory contexts was dominantly pro-smoking 
among a group of non-smokers characteristically at risk of initiating smoking. And that 
by contrast, relief-focused implicit evaluating of smoking in craving-related negative 
mood contexts appeared to be more instrumental in the development of tobacco 
addiction per se, than reward-focused implicit evaluating of smoking in general. Indeed, 
by contrast, our IRAP findings indicated that reward-focused pro-smoking implicit 
evaluating was a secondary motivator of tobacco addiction that only appeared to apply 
in contexts that involved smokers going about routine aspects of their daily business in 
the absence of strong craving-related moods. Interestingly, this pattern of findings 
corroborated the fact that researchers have been relatively unsuccessful in inducing 
tobacco cravings with positive mood inductions (Heckman et al., 2013; Wray, Gass, & 
Tiffany, 2013). And moreover, it also corroborated the fact that smokers tend to 
explicitly cite reward-focused reasons for smoking only when not nicotine deprived 
(Veilleux et al., 2013), and/or in the context of performing mundane daily routines 
(Bancroft et al., 2003; Cook et al., 2004; Copeland et al., 1995; McEwen, West, & 
McRobbie, 2008; Vidrine, Vidrine, Costello, Mazas, Cofta-Woerpel, Mejia, & Wetter, 
2009). Importantly, this pattern of findings is highly consistent with the traditional 
theoretical view that tobacco addiction gradually intensifies as a primary function of 
how much one evaluates smoking as being necessary to regulate negative moods 
resulting from tobacco withdrawal (i.e. rather than as a function of how much one 
evaluates smoking as being emotionally rewarding; see Baker et al., 2004; DiFranza, 
2015; D’Souza, & Markou, 2011, p. 5; McCallion & Zvolensky, 2015). 
Overall, therefore, the findings from studies one and two revealed that smokers' 
implicit evaluating appears to motivate tobacco addiction in a highly systematic manner 
depending on the presence of positive versus negative craving-related moods. And as 
such, the two IRAP’s we used in studies one and two provided a relatively precise 
means of determining how implicit evaluating motivates tobacco addiction. Then, 
having identified what particular aspects of implicit evaluating were most predictive of 
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tobacco addiction (and when), the remaining part of the current research sought to 
develop a preliminary experimental understanding of how the most common strategy 
used by smokers for unaided smoking-cessation typically fails to circumvent those 
aspects of implicit evaluating apparently motivating tobacco addiction. Namely, the 
third and fourth studies contained with the current thesis sought to provide not only a 
first short-interval momentary time-course analysis of how persistently and/or 
consistently thought suppression impacts any (smoking-related) implicit evaluating it 
contradicts, but a first momentary time-course analysis of addiction-related implicit 
evaluating in general. This was important from the point of view that relapse during 
smoking-cessation usually occurs rather precipitously, often within a period of just a 
few minutes (see McKay, Franklin, Patapis, & Lynch, 2006; Shiffman, 2009; see also 
Marhe, Waters, van de Wetering, & Franken, 2013; Waters et al., 2010). 
In summary, our findings from Study 3 indicated that an ad hoc approach to 
thought suppression only very temporarily eliminated implicit evaluating integral to 
tobacco addiction; and moreover not on demand but only after intermittent delays. In 
addition, it also brought about pervasive and more immediate anti-smoking changes 
among the three other, secondary aspects of smoking-related implicit evaluating we 
measured. And therefore, true to its moniker, we found that smokers’ ad hoc approach 
to deliberately suppressing the extent to which they engaged in pro-smoking evaluating 
likely involved deliberately contradicting different aspects of their smoking-related 
implicit evaluating at different stages of the unconditional-feelings-IRAP. Indeed, the 
fact that the impact of this approach on all four aspects of smokers’ implicit evaluating 
was moderated by IRAP block order, confirmed that it was prone to cue-based 
interference from background variables. 
Therefore, in our fourth empirical study, we refined our analysis by exploring 
the widely speculated idea that focused thought suppression of particular aspects of 
one’s tobacco cravings might be more successful than an ad hoc approach to postponing 
and/or controlling any such intrusive pro-smoking implicit evaluating. Crucially, this 
research revealed that focused thought suppression of relief-focused pro-smoking 
implicit evaluating was relatively successful as compared to ad hoc implicit evaluating 
insofar as it immediately, consistently and persistently suppressed the relief-focused 
pro-smoking implicit evaluating it targeted for at least four minutes (i.e. as compared to 
a delayed and intermittent two minutes in Study 3). However, this focused approach to 
thought suppression also had severe drawbacks. Namely, at the same time as it 
eliminated the pro-smoking relief-focused implicit evaluating it targeted, it also 
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immediately and relatively persistently induced ironic (pro-smoking) effects on 
secondary aspects of implicit evaluating related to tobacco addiction.  
By neglecting to contradict or thus reduce smokers’ enjoyment-focused pro-
smoking implicit evaluating of Enjoy-Pos, it appeared as though our focused thought 
suppression instructions inadvertently primed smokers to implicitly evaluate other more 
ambiguous topics from a default reward-focused pro-smoking perspective. Overall, 
therefore, the current research indicated that focused thought suppression may be a 
more viable means of temporarily eliminating particular aspects of implicit evaluating 
integral to tobacco addiction than the more commonly used ad hoc approach examined 
in Study 3. However, these findings also indicated that any such benefits come at the 
cost of cueing (and perhaps sensitizing) other aspects of smokers’ pro-smoking implicit 
evaluating. And crucially, as such, smokers’ attempts to control their tobacco cravings 
via thought suppression appeared to be an aspect of their tobacco addiction, rather than 
a potential cure for it. 
Therefore, in order to explore this idea further, with greater ecological validity, 
our final study sought to examine how smokers’ implicit evaluating of both the pros and 
cons of smoking (and of quitting smoking) changed as a function of classic contexts for 
relapse during suppression-oriented nicotine abstinence. Specifically, we examined how 
smokers’ implicit evaluating of both smoking and quitting smoking changed as a 
function of 14-24 hours of suppression-oriented nicotine abstinence versus smoking as 
usual; and also as a function of acute stress just before the end of this period of 
abstinence versus having smoked as usual. Using this setup we found that unaided 
suppression-oriented nicotine abstinence by itself had little if any impact on smokers’ 
implicit evaluating of smoking or quitting smoking – thus broadly confirming the lack 
of any consistent nicotine deprivation effects in the literature on smoking-related 
implicit evaluating. By contrast, however, acute stress during nicotine abstinence 
appeared to provoke substantial pro-smoking and anti-quitting changes in smokers’ 
implicit evaluating as compared to acute stress while smoking as usual (i.e. which 
appeared to have little or no effect). Thus, crucially, the current findings systematically 
confirmed that smoker’s usual efforts to engage in suppression-oriented management of 
their tobacco cravings during unaided nicotine abstinence appeared to be highly self-
defeating when most needed – during acute stress.  
Indeed, using a similar short-interval momentary analysis as we introduced in 
studies three and four, we found that the impact of acute stress on smokers’ implicit 
evaluating of smoking was particularly pronounced for between four and five minutes 
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after it passed – that is, before the smokers’ pro-smoking implicit evaluating gradually 
diminished to pre-stress levels. Critically, not only did this finding provide additional 
support for the idea that both reward- and relief-focused motivational processes are 
central to tobacco addiction, but moreover it systematically modelled the progression of 
these processes with respect to relapse during smoking-cessation for the first time; and 
indeed, with a degree of temporal precision that was thoroughly unprecedented in the 
literature. 
8.2. On the Potential of the IRAP to Measure Two New Dimensions of Implicit 
Evaluating Stability Related to Self-control 
The literature on implicit cognition has traditionally viewed implicit measures 
that exhibit low internal reliability or trial block order effects, as a sign that they lack 
validity due to extraneous influences (e.g. see Fiedler, Messner & Bleumke, 2006; 
Klauer & Mierke, 2005; Teige-Mocigemba, Klauer, & Sherman, 2010; Levin, Hayes, & 
Waltz, 2010). In essence, this point of view is born from a common ontological and 
epistemological assumption that human cognitive processes are purely based upon 
hypothetical constructs that are immutable. Crucially, however, this position largely 
ignores the possibility that one’s implicit evaluating of a given topic might be cued in 
opposing ways by various, sometimes co-occurring aspects of context. Indeed, in a 
broader sense, it completely ignores the possibility that one’s cognitive processes might 
evolve in any given domain as a function of learning processes (see De Houwer, 
Barnes-Holmes & Moors, 2013). This is a potentially important oversight given that 
tobacco addiction is the epitome of conflicting patterns of (implicit) evaluating that 
often compete within a given context as a function of ongoing deliberation (e.g. as when 
a smoker struggles to deliberately suppress their tobacco cravings during smoking-
cessation). 
Crucially, the stability with which a smoker implicitly evaluates a given trial-
type topic in a pro-smoking manner within a given context (implicit indecisiveness), or 
indeed between contexts (perspective-switching tendency), is likely by definition to 
have an important bearing upon how persistently and/or consistently that smoker would 
be able to deliberately sustain an alternative anti-smoking perspective (i.e. with all other 
variables remaining equal). And in particular, we anticipated that such properties might 
determine how accustomed and thus prepared a smoker was to sustain deliberate self-
control over their tobacco cravings and/or their smoking (i.e. within and/or among 
relevant contexts). As such, a major secondary aim of the current programme of 
265 
 
research was to explore, for the first time, the stability of (smoking-related) trial-type 
effects both on an approximately second-by-second momentary basis as per their 
respective internal reliabilities within a given measurement context; and also as a 
function of the alternative evaluative perspectives cued by the IRAP’s trial block order 
instructions and sequencing (i.e. the latter’s prime function as a methodological variable 
is literally to prioritize one overarching implicit evaluating perspective over its 
alternative across all four coordinated IRAP trial-types during any given IRAP session). 
Overall, our results throughout the current research supported the idea that the 
internal reliability of trial-type effects, and their malleability in response to block order 
cueing, both successfully measured the stability one’s implicit evaluating of a given 
topic from a given evaluative perspective. Namely, across multiple studies we 
confirmed that committed smokers produced IRAP trial-type effects with relatively high 
internal reliability whenever they addressed topics about which smokers 
characteristically lacked ambivalence (such as whether smoking makes them feel good). 
And that by contrast, committed smokers typically produced IRAP trial-type effects 
with low internal reliability whenever they addressed topics about which smokers are 
characteristically ambivalent (such as whether quitting smoking made them feel good). 
Indeed, not only did we confirm various other known-groups patterns of internal 
reliability in cross-section, including with non-smokers, but in our final study we also 
experimentally induced predictable implicit indecisiveness effects in terms of internal 
reliability, both with respect to nicotine deprivation and acute stress. In fact, our acute 
stress induction procedure during nicotine abstinence induced so much implicit 
indecisiveness among smokers’ implicit evaluating of smoking and quitting that they 
consistently exhibited strong negative internal reliability on multiple IRAP trial-types. 
In other words, the relevant smokers were so ambivalent about smoking and/or quitting 
smoking in those cases, that they oscillated periodically on a trial by trial basis between 
being inclined to affirm versus deny each of the relevant trial-type topics. Moreover, 
both groups of smokers in Study 3 who attempted to deliberately evaluate from the 
perspective of a non-smoker exhibited precisely the same differential pattern of internal 
reliability across the four relevant trial-types as non-smokers exhibited on the same 
IRAP during Study 1. 
Likewise, the current programme of research repeatedly confirmed that smokers’ 
and never-smokers’ implicit evaluating were cued by the block order variable in line 
with their known respective histories for persistently adopting pro- versus anti-smoking 
perspectives on various pivotal smoking-related topics. And as such, it appeared that 
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trial-typed IRAP trial block order effects were promising as a means of measuring the 
extent to which a smoker was inclined to persistently switch implicit evaluating 
perspectives on a given trial-type topic due to pro- versus anti-smoking contextual 
priming (i.e. which we termed a smoker’s perspective-switching tendency on a given 
trial-type topic within a given overarching context). For example, owing to their 
characteristic lack of interest in smoking, never-smokers were cued to implicitly 
evaluate in a pro-smoking manner by pro-smoking-first trial block orders, but also 
similarly cued to implicitly evaluate in an anti-smoking manner by anti-smoking-first 
trial block orders. And by contrast, we consistently found that committed smokers were 
relatively disinclined to be cued in an anti-smoking direction by anti-smoking-first trial 
block orders. In fact, not only did the IRAP trial block order variable fail to moderate 
smokers’ implicit evaluating on any topic that they were characteristically accustomed 
to evaluating in an exclusively pro-smoking manner (i.e. including when they were 
instructed to engage in thought suppression during Studies 3 and 4). Moreover, anti-
smoking-first block orders sometimes even ironically provoked stronger pro-smoking 
implicit evaluating on topics about which smokers were characteristically defensive 
about their smoking and/or their ongoing failure to quit smoking (see Studies 2 and 5).  
Overall, therefore, the current findings indicated that the internal reliability of a 
trial-type effect, and the size of a block order effect on a trial-type effect, are both 
promising measures of the stability of one’s implicit evaluating – the former within a 
given context; and the latter between contexts that respectively cue opposing 
perspectives on each relevant trial-type topic. Nonetheless, given that such findings are 
wholly unprecedented in the literature a cautious approach is of course warranted. In 
particular, it would be prudent to conduct experimental research dedicated to analysing 
how trial-type internal reliability, and trial-typed block order effects vary as a function 
of variables well known to affect one’s tendency to switch evaluative perspectives as 
per their overt (smoking-related) behaviour (e.g. using visualisation instructions, and/or 
mood-induction tasks as in our last three studies; also for related findings, that view IAT 
block order effects as confounding see Klauer & Mierke, 2005; Klauer, Schmitz, Teige-
Mocigemba, & Voss, 2010). Indeed, in particular, much more research is required 
before it will be possible to determine how and/or to what extent the stability of one’s 
implicit evaluating restricts one’s ability deliberately cultivate any new (anti-smoking) 
perspectives.  
Accordingly, we recommend further experimental research examining how the 
current provisional measures of implicit evaluating stability relate to particular 
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deliberate self-control strategies, such as thought suppression, on a topic by topic basis. 
Crucially, we anticipate that such research may have important benefits for developing 
techniques to support intentional behavioural change regarding those topics (see below). 
In any case, for the moment, what seems most pertinent here is the fact that no other 
measure of implicit evaluating besides the IRAP is capable of investigating such 
questions – because no other measure is currently able to measure implicit evaluating 
with respect to one topic as distinct from another. 
8.3. On the Additional Construct Validity Provided by the IRAP over Corresponding 
Questionnaire-based Self-report Measures of Evaluating 
One of the primary reasons why researchers have sought to develop measures of 
smoking-related implicit evaluating is, as reviewed in Chapter 1, because of the 
fundamentally limited capacity of standard, rationalistic questionnaire-based measures 
of smoking-related evaluating to disentangle the irrational nature of tobacco addiction 
(see for example Wiers, Houben, Roefs, de Jong, Hofmann, & Stacy, 2010). Confirming 
this rationale, we observed multiple instances of smokers’ implicit evaluating on the 
IRAP directly comporting with criterion variables for tobacco addiction, but nonetheless 
being directly contradicted by corresponding aspects of explicit evaluating of smoking. 
For example, in Study 1 smokers’ pro-smoking-ban explicit evaluations were at odds 
with their strongly anti-ban Ban-Neg DIRAP effects (i.e. as per widespread social pressure 
for pro-ban explicit evaluating; see Chapter 4, Introduction). And this was despite the 
fact that the smokers evaluated smoking favourably on both explicit measures of 
smoking, and also on both Smoking-trial-type DIRAPs. Moreover, by contrast, the 
corresponding IAT was like any other relative measure of implicit evaluating, unable to 
reveal any such (direct) contradictions between implicit versus explicit evaluating 
because of its inability to distinguish implicit evaluating of one topic from another. 
Likewise, in Study 2, we observed a pattern of pro-smoking implicit evaluating 
among non-smokers at risk for smoking (i.e. undergraduate students) that comported 
very precisely with the pattern of reasons that early-career smokers typically give 
(versus not) for initiating smoking. And crucially, by contrast, the relevant non-smokers 
were unequivocally anti-smoking in their responses to all corresponding explicit 
measures – likely as a result of having to confirm that they had not smoked during the 
previous 12 months in order to gain admittance to the study. Moreover, on the basis that 
smokers are not generally stigmatized, but rather are more likely to be socially accepted 
for offering the relevant reward- and/or relief-focused reasons for their smoking, 
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smokers’ implicit versus explicit evaluating did not conflict in this regard (see Chassin 
et al., 2007; Fitz et al., 2015; Vahey et al., 2010). Rather, instead, correlation data 
implied that smokers’ explicit evaluating of smoking in Studies 1 and 2 was largely 
driven by those aspects of implicit evaluating we found to be most integral to tobacco 
addiction.  
Furthermore, in Study 5, the smokers’ questionnaire-based evaluating implied 
that unaided nicotine abstinence, and/or the stress induction tasks made them more, not 
less inclined to quit smoking. Crucially, this was at odds with the fact that every one of 
the smokers who abstained from smoking for 14-24 hours smoked immediately after 
that period expired; and despite the fact that smokers’ pro-smoking/anti-quitting 
implicit evaluating increased in response to acute stress during suppression-oriented 
nicotine abstinence. Indeed, incidentally, this discrepancy between implicit versus 
explicit evaluating tallied very well with the fact that in studies 3 and 4 smokers 
consistently reported imagining scenarios that stigmatized smoking as their primary 
means of relating to smoking from the perspective of a life-long non-smoker. Overall, 
therefore, the current programme of research repeatedly confirmed the IRAP’s ability to 
reveal aspects of smoking-related evaluating that were simply not available to 
corresponding measures of explicit evaluating. And indeed, this is putting aside the fact 
that traditional questionnaires are not equipped to measure one’s implicit indecisiveness 
or perspective-switching tendencies with regard to a given topic.  
8.4. Methodological Insights and Issues Arising from the Current Research 
The current programme of research involved developing multiple refinements of 
existing methods of analysing and interpreting IRAP data. For example, as we have 
already reviewed, the current research revealed the potential of the IRAP to estimate 
implicit indecisiveness and perspective-switching tendencies. Moreover, the current 
research was also the first to analyze trial-type effects in terms of both IRAP concept-
type and target-type – crucially, this provided the first means of systematically 
estimating the extent to which all four trial-type effects operated independently of each 
other (with respect to any relevant experimental variables). By contrast, IRAP research 
to date has typically combined IRAP trial-type scores with little if any stated empirical 
or a priori rationale for doing so (e.g. see Hussey, Thompson, McEnteggart, Barnes-
Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015, pp. 160-162). And as such, the current approach to 
analysing the independence of trial-type effects offered the IRAP literature a more 
objective, systematic and indeed precise means of determining whether or not it is 
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functionally appropriate to combine IRAP trial-type scores in one’s analysis or not. 
Likewise, our analyses of the reliability of IRAP trial-type effects also 
highlighted for the first time, the importance of accounting for the fact that each IRAP 
trial-type effect is typically comprised of far fewer trials than many other measure of 
implicit cognition, such as the IAT, that are well known for exhibiting good internal 
reliability. In particular, by employing the algorithm that we improvised from 
Spearman-Brown’s generalized prediction formula in Appendix 11, it became clear 
from Study 1 onwards that smoking-related IRAP trial-type effects were capable of 
exemplary levels of internal reliability (i.e. conditional upon variables related to implicit 
indecisiveness), that would otherwise have been severely underestimated using existing 
data-analytic techniques in the IRAP literature. 
In addition, studies one and two also highlighted how bootstrapped meditational 
analyses of cross-section data has the potential to be a useful precursor to experimental 
research insofar as it demonstrated an ability to efficiently extract tentative causal 
information about the likely motivational importance of each given type of implicit 
evaluating. Specifically, such analyses proved useful in estimating the extent to which a 
given aspect of implicit evaluating is causally integral versus collateral to a given 
criterion variable – and crucially, this informed what aspects of smoking-related implicit 
evaluating we targeted as part of our subsequent experimental analyses (e.g. our choice 
to target relief- as opposed to reward-focused pro-smoking implicit evaluating in Study 
4). Indeed, from the outset, the bootstrapped analyses we performed in Study 1 were 
instrumental in determining how to proceed with refining the precision with which we 
examined smokers’ implicit reasons for smoking in Study 2 – and ultimately, this 
yielded the unprecedented criterion validity achieved by the relief-focused Need-Neg 
trial-type.  
Furthermore, new distribution-based analytic techniques that were introduced in 
Study 1 for examining the homogeneity of IAT and IRAP effects, indicated that the 
former and but not the latter effects confounded multiple types of implicit evaluating 
not only within and among participants, but also among contexts. And indeed, this was 
despite the fact that the IAT in Study 1 was the first to be specifically designed to 
minimize the evaluative indeterminacy of its scores. For example, we developed a new 
type of chi-squared interval analysis (detailed in Appendix 8) which revealed that the 
smokers’ IAT effects were distributed in a polarized, bimodal fashion around zero such 
that they tended either to favour pro-smoking/anti-smoking-ban IAT trials over anti-
smoking/pro-smoking-ban IAT trials, or vice versa. As such, the IAT appeared to 
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confound not just qualitatively different types of implicit evaluating among participants, 
but also contrasting types; and moreover it did so even among smokers who were 
specifically sampled for pro-smoking evaluating as opposed to anti-smoking evaluating. 
Crucially, by contrast, each of the corresponding IRAP trial-type effects were 
uniformly, and normally distributed across zero, thus indicating that they were 
respectively measuring implicit evaluating homogeneously from participant to 
participant. 
In addition, we also found similarly sized IAT block order effects for smokers as 
for non-smokers – thus suggesting that the smokers’ IAT effects were measuring 
different types of implicit evaluating in the pro- versus anti-smoking-first block order 
conditions (i.e. because otherwise, owing to smokers’ characteristic tendency to 
evaluating in a pro- rather than anti-smoking manner, IAT block order should in 
principle have been able to differentially prime different IAT effects). In other words, 
crucially, the IAT from Study 1 appeared to confound implicit evaluating across 
contexts. And moreover, as already reviewed, all of the corresponding IRAP trial-type 
effects exhibited block order effects that closely conformed with smokers’ and non-
smokers’ respective known-group behavioural histories in relation to smoking. On 
balance, therefore, the distribution-focused analytics we developed as part of Study 1 
showed promise as a first means of estimating just how confounded (or not) a given 
implicit measure is with respect to implicit evaluating. Indeed, at the very least, these 
new analytics proved useful in confirming that the IRAP has greater potential than the 
IAT as a means of systematically guiding research toward a more differentiated 
understanding of tobacco addiction. 
Another potentially important methodological insight provided by the current 
research was its revelation and indeed close replication of the fact that the IRAP practise 
phase appeared to serve as a buffer with respect to fleeting malleability effects (i.e. 
those lasting less than approximately 4-5 minutes). For example, during studies 3 and 4 
we observed that thought suppression effects were often not apparent across the IRAP 
test phase when participants began suppressing just before they attempted to master the 
response latency and accuracy criteria for the relevant IRAPs (i.e. during their 
respective practise phases). Similarly, Study 5 revealed that the largest impact of acute 
stress induction during nicotine abstinence was during the criterion practise blocks of 
the relevant IRAP and diminished quickly thereafter across its test phase.  
Crucially, this research was the first to incorporate an analysis of trial-type 
effects derived from the criterion practise blocks of an IRAP, and as such it has 
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potentially important implications for future IRAP research. In particular, without a 
block-pair analysis of IRAP data that begins during the relevant IRAP’s criterion 
practise blocks, then any such research is unlikely to accurately measure the onset 
and/or persistence of relatively fleeting experimental variables upon implicit evaluating. 
Indeed, by implication, one should require participants to master a given IRAP’s 
response latency and accuracy criteria before using it to examine the progression of 
experimental effects that are likely to have a relatively momentary onset and/or offset. 
Otherwise, the relevant malleability effects may have passed before participants have 
reached the earliest point at which IRAP can measure such effects – namely, its 
criterion practise blocks.87 However, by the same token, if one’s aim is to capture 
relatively stable patterns of implicit evaluating irrespective of fleeting background 
variables, then conversely, it is perhaps best to restrict one’s analysis to IRAP trial-type 
effects computed across the IRAP test phase (e.g. as we did for the first two IRAPs 
presented in Study 5).   
In addition, on a somewhat related point, as part of studies 3 and 4 we also 
introduced a more precise means of determining the processes by which experimental 
treatments impacted one’s IRAP trial-type effects (see Appendices 20-22; for a related 
approach to IAT data analysis see Webb, Sheeran, & Pepper, 2012). For example, in 
both studies 3 and 4 we revealed that smokers’ attempts at deliberately suppressing their 
tobacco cravings were most likely to (temporarily) reduce their propensity for pro-
smoking trial-type effects not by facilitating the anti-smoking/pro-abstinence 
responding recorded during anti-smoking blocks of the IRAP – but rather, by interfering 
with corresponding responses from pro-smoking IRAP trial blocks. As such, crucially, 
these latency-based supplementary analyses provided us with the means to directly 
confirm that smokers’ attempts to suppress their cravings did not operate by affecting 
anti-smoking/pro-abstinence evaluating per se, but rather only by temporarily 
interfering and/or facilitating pro-smoking implicit responses. And this further 
confirmed our primary findings that thought suppression appeared to be an aspect of 
tobacco addiction, rather than an external process capable of ameliorating it. 
Furthermore, perhaps one of the most important methodological issues raised by 
the current thesis was the idea that IRAP trial-type effects are prone to contextually 
                                                 
87 Note that this assumes that the relevant malleability effects are large enough and/or persistent enough 
to be registered across the approximately two-minute period it usually takes participants complete a pair 
of IRAP trial blocks. Nonetheless, alternatively, if one suspects that one is dealing with more fleeting 
effects they do have the option to employ an IRAP implementing less versions of each trial-type – thus 
resulting in IRAP trial blocks having fewer trials. 
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cued changes in the overarching perspectives (i.e. relational networks) within which 
they are embedded. As such, our opening chapters may have established that the IRAP 
is the only measure of implicit evaluating currently able to measure implicit evaluating 
of one topic as distinct from another. However, our systematic analyses of IRAP block 
order effects, and of thought suppression effects also made it clear that IRAP trial-type 
effects are nonetheless prone to confounding by variables external to the IRAP that cue 
changes in the overarching relational networks with which participants respond to those 
trial-types. And therefore, we strongly recommend that researchers conducting IRAP 
research take as much care as practicable to coordinate an IRAP’s four trial-type topics 
in line with whatever overarching evaluative perspective is of interest; and moreover to 
control any variables that might cue different relational networks about the trial-type 
topics they are interested. Perhaps nowhere is this recommendation more pertinent, than 
when measuring implicit evaluating of topics about which participants are theoretically 
likely to exhibit various, context-dependent competing patterns of (implicit) evaluating 
in relation to given trial-type topic – as with addiction.  
Of course, previous IRAP research has repeatedly demonstrated that even 
relatively established IRAP effects are prone to variability depending upon context (e.g. 
Cullen et al., 2008) – crucially, however, the current programme of research was the 
first to directly and experimentally link any such changes to the underlying issue of the 
stability of the relational networks within which a given trial-type effect is embedded. 
In fact, instead of recognising IRAP malleability effects as reflecting changes in the 
relational networks being assessed, the author of one recent set of IRAP studies actually 
dismissed such effects as mere error variance without considering the possibility that 
participants’ evaluative perspectives might vary by context (O’Shea, Watson, & Brown, 
2015). Thus, the current research offers a range of potentially important implications for 
the IRAP literature (indeed for indirectly related work in the evaluative conditioning 
literature, see Dijkstra & Menninga, 2015; Zanon, De Houwer, & Gast, 2011; Zanon, 
De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2014).  
Finally, another important point related to the stability of one’s overarching 
evaluative perspective during an IRAP, is in regard to the long-acknowledged 
possibility that individuals might be able to strategically induce temporary changes in 
the perspectives from which they implicitly evaluated as a means of faking measures of 
implicit evaluating (e.g. De Houwer, 2006, pp. 17-18; Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 
2007, pp. 185-186). In particular, some existing findings do suggest that IRAP effects 
may be particularly prone to deception by strategic shifts in perspective switching when 
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they address relatively unfamiliar topics (e.g. De Houwer, Beckers, & Moors, 2007; 
Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011; Peters & Gawronski, 2011; Smyth et al., 2008; Zanon 
et al., 2014). Granted, the current thought suppression research, along with related 
research from other domains, suggests that deliberate perspective switching is much less 
feasible, or indeed concealable, as a means of faking an IRAP when one is 
characteristically accustomed to evaluating its trial-types in one way rather than the 
other – even when one is ambivalent about that topic (e.g. see Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, 
et al., 2011; Field et al., 2009; McKenna et al., 2007; Röhner, Schröder-Abé, & Schütz. 
2011; Stacy & Wiers, 2010, p. 566-567; Wiers, Houben et al., 2010, p. 480; Wiers, 
Gladwin, et al., 2013, pp. 196-200; Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast et al., 2015; Van 
Dessel, De Houwer, Roets, et al., 2015; Webb et al., 2012). However, owing the relative 
lack of process-based research on the issue (see Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 2007, pp. 
185-186; Sayers & Sayers, 2013; Wiers, Gladwin, et al., 2013, pp. 196-200), on 
balance, it would be prudent for IRAP researchers to be vigilant against any variables 
that might cue extraneous perspective switching motivated by social desirability and/or 
other demand characteristics. 
8.5. Main Implications of the Current Work for Future Research on Tobacco Addiction 
The current programme of research consistently indicated that suppression-
oriented strategies which seek to eliminate tobacco cravings are unlikely to succeed. In 
particular, we found that suppression-oriented methods of nicotine abstinence are self-
defeating because they tend to provoke the very tobacco cravings they seek to eliminate. 
This is important from the point of view that the vast majority of the research that has so 
far examined how best to modify addiction-related (implicit) evaluating has focused 
upon doing so using suppression-oriented tactics. In fact, most cognitive theories view 
(tobacco) addiction as being primarily an issue of not being able to sustain pro-
abstinence/anti-addiction rumination extensively enough to permanently contradict, or 
thus prevent pro-smoking/anti-abstinence implicit evaluating from interjecting to 
motivate addictive behaviour (see concepts such as ego/cognitive depletion, cognitive 
efficiency, and dual processes of cognitive control; Cox, Klinger, & Fadardi, 2015; 
Baumeister & Vonasch, 2015; Friese et al., 2011, p. 337; Hoffman, Vohs & Baumeister, 
2012; Wiers, Houben et al., 2010; Spada et al., 2015; Stacy & Wiers, 2010; Wiers, 
Gladwin et al., 2013; Tiffany, 1990, 2008). In other words, most research in the area has 
to date assumed that one must first eliminate implicit evaluating related to tobacco 
cravings if one is to remain abstinent. Crucially, however, as we will now briefly 
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review, most of this literature is in disarray owing to a variety of experimental 
confounds which the current research sought to begin to resolve (e.g. see Cox et al., 
2015; Sayers & Sayette, 2013; Wiers, Gladwin, et al., 2013). 
 For example, despite the fact that cognitive training has not yet been tested as a 
means of modifying smoking-related IAT effects, it is generally the most popularly 
tested method of modifying (i.e. as opposed to cueing) implicit evaluating both in 
relation to other measures of smoking-related implicit evaluation (see Chapters 1-3; 
Note 7, Appendix 1); and in relation to other IAT-domains more broadly (see Roefs et 
al., 2011; Rooke et al., 2008, p. 1324; Smith et al., 2013, p. 194; Wiers, Gladwin, et al., 
2013; Wiers, Houben et al., 2010; Wiers & Stacy, 2006a). However, rather than 
instructing individuals to deliberatively contradict problematic instances of (implicit) 
evaluating as narrative-based techniques typically do, cognitive training techniques 
generally focus upon training individuals to automatically sustain novel implicit 
evaluating perspectives designed to (implicitly) repress pre-established pro-
addiction/anti-abstinence implicit evaluating (Moss et al., 2013; Stacy & Wiers, 2010; 
Wiers, Gladwin, et al., 2013; Wiers, Houben et al., 2010). Crucially, however, such 
methods have been relatively unsuccessful in reducing the occurrence of established 
aspects of addiction-related implicit evaluating, much less the problem behaviours they 
were supposed to motivate. 
Despite much early promise, based upon the ability of the relevant training 
methods to temporarily reduce pro-addiction implicit evaluating on various implicit 
measures, such effects have often failed to replicate and/or to generalize (see Bowley et 
al., 2013; Kerst & Waters, 2014; Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011; Woud et al., 2013). 
Moreover, on the relatively few occasions where cognitive training appeared to be 
effective in modifying established implicit evaluating and/or criterion behaviours, it was 
usually integrated within a wider package of narrative-based treatment-as-usual (see 
Note 7, Appendix 1; Eberl, Wiers, Pawelczack, Rinck, Becker, & Linden, 2013; Wiers, 
Houben et al., 2010, p. 480; Wiers, Gladwin, et al., 2013, p. 196-200). And by contrast, 
cognitive training has usually failed to generalize in its effects when used in isolation 
(i.e. except trivially to implicit measures that employed similar procedures to those 
implemented by the relevant cognitive training; for reviews see Note 7, Appendix 1; 
Stacy & Wiers, 2010, p. 566-567; Wiers, Houben et al., 2010, p. 480; Wiers, Gladwin, 
et al., 2013, pp. 196-200). Overall, this suggests that the impact of cognitive training is 
very much a function of the (implicit) evaluative perspectives that participants engage in 
relating to this training. 
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Indeed, during recent years, a small number of researchers have repeatedly 
demonstrated that participants respond differently to cognitive training depending upon 
how they relate to and/or are instructed to relate to it (i.e. as per concepts such as 
contingency awareness, cognitive construal and implementation intentions; see Cesario, 
2014; De Houwer, 2014; Hoffman et al., 2010; Hogarth et al., 2006; Hogarth & Duka, 
2006; Loersch & Payne, 2011; Pleyers et al., 2007; Smyth et al., 2008; Van Dessel et 
al., 2014, 2015; Webb et al., 2012). Thus, given that the manner in which participants 
relate to cognitive training has generally not been experimentally controlled in testing, 
there is currently only a relatively rudimentary technical understanding of how 
cognitive training operates with respect to particular types of the implicit evaluating or 
the criterion behaviours they presumably motivate (see Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 
2011). And as such, crucially, the literature remains highly equivocal about whether or 
not cognitive training is feasible as a means of eliminating (tobacco) cravings, and thus 
addiction.  
Indeed, the literature on contradiction-based narrative techniques of modifying 
implicit evaluating suffers from similar, if not worse ambiguities as that on 
contradiction-based cognitive training techniques. Although narrative-based methods 
have on occasion ameliorated implicit evaluating supporting other types of addictions, 
such changes have rarely generalized to changes in the relevant addictive behaviours in 
question (e.g. Thush, Wiers, Moerbeek, Ames, Grenard, Sussman, & Stacy, 2009; for 
reviews see Roefs et al., 2011, pp. 167-184; Rooke et al., 2008, p. 1324). Rather, in 
such cases (as in the smoking-related literature), the relevant narrative techniques were 
usually an unidentified amalgamation of various different treatment strategies in 
addition to those instructing addicted individuals to deliberatively dispute and thus 
suppress any cravings they might experience. Indeed, more broadly again, researchers 
have only just begun to decompose how different types of instructions impact 
established implicit evaluating in any domain, much less in relation to (tobacco) 
addiction specifically (see Smith, De Houwer, & Nosek, 2013; Smith & De Houwer, 
2015). Crucially, without experimentally distinguishing among different types of 
narrative techniques, it will not be possible to systematically determine which 
(combinations of) techniques are most effective in changing particular types of 
(established) implicit evaluating (e.g. see Kazdin, 2007; Gifford & Humphreys, 2007; 
Peterson et al., 2011, pp. 49-57; Roefs et al., 2011; Rooke et al., 2008, p. 1324; Wiers, 
Houben et al., 2010, p. 481). 
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Overall, therefore, by experimentally isolating the most common suppression-
oriented strategies used by smokers during smoking-cessation, the current research 
made an important contribution to the nascent literature on how one might modify 
smoking-related implicit evaluating. In particular, the current findings implied that 
rather than modifying smoking-related implicit evaluating per se, deliberate thought 
suppression merely cues temporary variability in it – and moreover, ultimately, it 
typically does so in a counterproductive fashion (see De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes & 
Moors, 2013). Thus, crucially, future research should pursue alternatives to the 
adversarial, suppression-oriented strategies for managing tobacco cravings which 
currently lie at the heart of many smoking-cessation (and -prevention) treatments. 
Indeed, there may even be strong ethical reasons for pursuing alternatives to 
suppression-oriented self-control strategies (see Kjærsgaard, 2015). For example, apart 
from confirming that deliberate suppression of one’s tobacco cravings is 
counterproductive, the current research consistently found that tobacco addiction is 
implicitly motivated by perceptions that smoking provides relief from craving-related 
negative affect, and/or increases rewarding feelings. And as such, insofar as 
suppression-oriented smoking-cessation tactics predicate smoking-cessation on 
eliminating tobacco cravings from one’s experiences they are also likely to tacitly 
compound the very implicit motivational processes which govern tobacco addiction in 
the first place.  
Certainly, there is now a large questionnaire-based research literature suggesting 
that rather than suppressing and thus stigmatizing cravings as a means of quitting 
smoking, one should learn to deliberately accommodate and thus accept those cravings 
in terms of one’s most overarching reasons for wanting to stop smoking (see Wegner, 
2011; see also Brandt et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2005; Cameron et al., 2013; Erlblich & 
Montgomery, 2012; Erskine et al., 2010, 2015; Farris et al., 2015; Farris, Zvolensky, & 
Schmidt, 2015; Forman et al., 2007; Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 2011, p. 82; Gifford & 
Humphreys, 2007, p. 359; Lee et al., 2015; Levin, Luoma, & Haeger, 2015; McCallion 
& Zvolensky, 2015; Moss et al., 2015; Spada et al., 2015; Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, 
Barnes-Holmes, Bond, & Hayes, 2006, p. 81; Toll et al., 2001; Wiers, Gladwin, et al., 
2013). Indeed, by confirming that tobacco addiction is differentially motivated by 
reward- and relief-focused implicit evaluating depending upon mood-context, the 
current research was in essence the first to confirm that the so-called experiential 
avoidance processes typically targeted by acceptance-based approaches operate 
implicitly (e.g. see Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Cameron et al., 2013; McCallion 
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& Zvolensky, 2015; Schloss & Haaga, 2011). Overall, therefore, future research on 
smoking-cessation should prioritize examining the potential of acceptance-based 
techniques for motivationally decoupling one’s smoking from any experientially-
avoidant implicit evaluating driving it addictively. However, before doing so we 
recommend that like Carpenter et al. (2012), researchers first establish how well 
baseline IRAP trial-type scores targeting smoking-related psychological avoidance are 
able to prospectively predict relapse during smoking cessation – in particular, doing so 
would provide preliminary causal evidence as to whether the research involving 
resource-intensive acceptance-based treatments is warranted. 
8.6. Final Conclusions 
Overall, the current programme of research consistently supported the IRAP as a 
useful means of quantifying tobacco addiction in terms of implicit evaluating. In 
particular, by revealing motivational distinctions that were simply not available using 
other existing measures of implicit cognition, the IRAP’s experimental precision 
allowed us to identify aspects of implicit evaluating with correspondingly 
unprecedented levels of criterion validity in relation to tobacco addiction. In particular, 
our findings confirmed that the more precisely one coordinates the phrasing of IRAP 
trial-type topics with well known conditional aspects of relevant criterion variables (e.g. 
as per the heuristic descriptions available from prevailing cognitive theory) the more 
one is likely to obtain criterion validity with any resulting trial-type effects. Thus, 
together our findings provided a preliminary functional model of tobacco addiction 
wherein implicit evaluating motivates smoking in complex, coordinated and mood-
dependent networks which collectively insist that one should regulate one’s ongoing 
emotional experiences – particularly negative craving-related affect – by smoking. 
Moreover, in a related vein, the current research also provided an experimental analysis 
of smokers’ most popular, and also least successful, method of managing their tobacco 
cravings. Not only did this research systematically confirm the self-defeating nature of 
the suppression-oriented tactics that smokers (and therapists) typically use as a means of 
smoking-cessation. Moreover, it implicated such dynamics as being an important facet 
of tobacco addiction itself, and thus recommended research on acceptance-based tactics 
as an alternative means of motivating smoking-cessation. Indeed, perhaps most 
importantly, regardless of how one might best treat it, the current research was 
successful in quantifying tobacco addiction in such a way as to begin clarifying the 
motivational problem(s) that its treatments must ultimately tackle – and crucially, 
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without the IRAP this type of process-based analysis of implicit evaluating would 
simply not have been possible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
279 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abraham, C., Connor, M., Jones, F., & O’Conner, D. (2008). Health Psychology. 
London, UK: Hodder Education. 
Abrams, D. B., Niaura, R., Brown, R., Emmons, K., Goldstein, M., & Monti, P. (2003). 
The tobacco dependence treatment handbook: A guide to best practices. 
London, UK: The Guildford Press.  
Abrantes, A. M., Strong, D. R., Lejuez, C. W., Kahler, C. W., Carpenter, L. L., Price, L. 
H., Niaura, R., & Brown, R. A. (2008). The role of negative affect in risk for early 
lapse among low distress tolerance smokers. Addictive Behaviors, 33(11), 1394-
1401. 
Acton, J. E. E. (1922/2007). The history of freedom and other essays. New York, NY: 
Cosimo Inc. 
Agosta, S., Mega, A., & Sartori, G. (2010). Detrimental effects of using negative 
sentences in the autobiographical IAT. Acta Psychologica, 136, 269-275. 
Agosta, S., Ghirardi, V., Zogmaister, C., Castiello, U., & Sartori, G. (2011). Detecting 
fakers of the autobiographical IAT. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25, 299–306. 
Agosta, S., & Sartori, G. (2013). The autobiographical IAT: A review. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 4 (article 519), 1-12. 
Ajzen, I. (1988). Attitudes, personality, and behavior. Chicago: Dorsey Press. 
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (2000). Attitudes and the attitude-behavior relation: Reasoned 
and automatic processes. European Review of Social Psychology, 11, 1-33. 
Aldao, A. (2013). The future of emotion regulation research capturing context. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(2), 155-172. 
Aldao, A., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2012). When are adaptive strategies most predictive 
of psychopathology? Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 121(1), 276-281. 
Alexopoulos, T., Fiedler, K., & Freitag, P. (2012). The impact of open and closed 
mindsets on evaluative priming. Cognition & Emotion, 26, 978-994. 
Algom, D., Chajut, E., & Lev, S. (2004). A rational look at the emotional Stroop 
phenomenon: A generic slowdown, not a Stroop effect. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 133, 323-338. 
Allen, S. S., Bade, T., Hatsukami, D., & Center, B. (2008). Craving, withdrawal, and 
smoking urges on days immediately prior to smoking relapse. Nicotine & Tobacco 
Research, 10(1), 35-45. 
280 
 
American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders (4th Ed: DSM-IV). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Association.  
Andrews, J. A., Hampson, S. E., Greenwald, A. G., Gordon, J., & Widdop, C. (2010). 
Using the Implicit Association Test to assess children’s implicit attitudes toward 
smoking. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 40, 2387-2406. 
Ariely, D. (2008). Predictably irrational. New York, NY: Harper-Collins Publishing. 
Armitage, C. J., & Connor, M. (2001). Efficacy of the theory of planned behavior: A 
meta-analytic review. British Journal of Social Psychology, 40, 471-499. 
Asendorpf, J. B., Banse, R., & Mücke, D. (2002). Double dissociation between implicit 
and explicit personality self-concept: The case of shy behavior. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 380-393. 
Ataya, A., Adams, S., Mullings, E., Cooper, R., Attwood, A., & Munafó, M. (2012a). 
Internal reliability of measures of substance-related cognitive bias. Drug and 
Alcohol Dependence, 121, 148-151. 
Ataya, A., Adams, S., Mullings, E., Cooper, R., Attwood, A., & Munafó, M. (2012b). 
Methodological considerations in cognitive bias research: The next steps. Drug 
and Alcohol Dependence, 124, 191-192. 
Augustinos, M., Walker, I., & Donaghue, N. (2006). Social cognition: An integrated 
introduction (2nd ed.). London, UK: Sage. 
Back, M., Schmukle, S. C., Egloff, B., & Gutenberg, J. (2005). Measuring task 
switching ability in the Implicit Association Test. Experimental Psychology, 52, 
167–179. 
Bacchetti, P. (2013). Small sample size is not the real problem. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 14(8), 585-585. 
Baer, J., Kaufman, J. C., Baumeister, R. F. (Eds.) (2008). Are we free? Psychology and 
free will. UK: Oxford University Press. 
Baker, T. B., Piper, M. E., McCarthy, D. E., Majeskie, M. R., & Fiore, M. C. (2004). 
Addiction motivation reformulated: An affective processing model of negative 
reinforcement. Psychological Review, 111(1), 33. 
Balaguer, M. (2012). Free will as an open scientific problem. London, UK: A Bradford 
Book. 
Baldwin, A. S., Rothman, A. J., Hertel, A. W., Linde, J. A., Jeffrey, R. W., Finch, G. A., 
& Lando, H. A. (2006). Specifying the determinants of the initiation and 
281 
 
maintenance of behavior change: An examination of self-efficacy, satisfaction 
and smoking-cessation. Health Psychology, 25, 626-634. 
Balota, D. M., & Yap, M. J. (2011). Moving beyond the mean in studies of mental 
chronometry: The power of response time distributional analyses. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 160-166. 
Bancroft, A., Wiltshire, S., Parry, O., & Amos, A. (2003). “It’s like an addiction first 
thing… afterwards it's like a habit”: daily smoking behaviour among people 
living in areas of deprivation. Social Science & Medicine, 56(6), 1261-1267. 
Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. General Learning Press. 
Bar-Anan, Y. (2010). Strategic modification of the evaluative priming effect does not 
reduce its sensitivity to uncontrolled evaluations. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 46, 1101–1104. 
Bar-Anan, Y., & Nosek, B. A. (2012). Reporting intentional rating of the primes 
predicts priming effects in the Affective Misattribution Procedure. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 1194-1208. 
Bar-Anan, Y., & Nosek, B. A. (2014a). Misattribution of claims: Comment on Payne et 
al., 2013. Published on the Open Science Framework website on the 14th April 
2014. Retrieved on June 2nd 2014 from https://osf.io/sk5hr. 
Bar-Anan, Y., & Nosek, B. A. (2014b). A comparative investigation of seven indirect 
attitude measures. Behavioral Research Methods, 46(3), 668-688. 
Bar-Anan, Y., Nosek, B. A., & Vianello, M. (2009). The Sorting Paired Features Task: 
A measure of association strengths. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
39, 193-205. 
Bargh, J. A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, intention, 
efficiency, and control in social cognition. In Wyer R. S., Srull T. K. (eds.), 
Handbook of social cognition: Vol. 1 Basic processes, pp. 1–40. Hove: 
Lawrence Erlbaun Associates Publishers.  
Bargh, J. A., & Ferguson, M. J. (2000). Beyond behaviorism: On the automaticity of 
higher mental processes. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 925-945.  
Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. H., & van 
Iizendoorn, M. H. (2007). Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and non-
anxious individuals: A meta-analytic study. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 1–24.  
Barnes-Holmes, D. (2003). For the radical behaviorist biological events are not 
biological and public events are not public. Behavior and Philosophy, 31, 145-
150. 
282 
 
Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Power, P., Hayden, E., Milne, R., & Stewart, I. 
(2006). Do you really know what you believe? Developing the implicit 
relational assessment procedure (IRAP) as a direct measure of implicit beliefs. 
The Irish Psychologist, 32, 169-177. 
Barnes-Holmes, Y., Barnes-Holmes, D., Smeets, P. M., & Luciano, C. (2004). A 
derived transfer of mood functions through equivalence relations. The 
Psychological Record, 54(1), 95-113. 
Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Stewart, I., & Boles, S. (2010). A sketch of the 
implicit relational assessment procedure (IRAP) and the relational elaboration 
and coherence (REC) model. The Psychological Record, 60, 527-542. 
Barnes-Holmes, D., Hayes, S. C., & Dymond, S. (2001). Self and self-directed rules. In 
S. C. Hayes, D. BarnesHolmes, & B. Roche (Eds.), Relational Frame Theory: A 
post Skinnerian account of human language and cognition (pp. 119140). New 
York: Plenum. 
Barnes-Holmes, D., Murphy, A., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2010). The Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP): Exploring the impact of private 
versus public contexts and the response latency criterion on pro-white and anti-
black stereotyping among white Irish individuals. The Psychological Record, 
60, 57-66.  
Barnes-Holmes, D., Murtagh, L., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2010). Using the 
Implicit Association Test and the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure to 
measure attitudes towards meat and vegetables in vegetarians and meat-eaters. 
The Psychological Record, 60, 287-306. 
Barnes-Holmes, D., Staunton, C., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Whelan, R., Stewart, I., 
Commins, S., et al., (2004). Interfacing Relational Frame Theory with cognitive 
neuroscience: Semantic priming, the Implicit Association Test, and event related 
potentials. The International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 
4, 215-240. 
Barnes-Holmes, D., Waldron, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2009). Testing the 
validity of the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) and the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT): Measuring attitudes towards Dublin and 
country life in Ireland. The Psychological Record, 59, 389-406. 
Barrett, L. (2006a). Are emotions natural kinds? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 
1, 28–58. 
283 
 
Barrett, L. (2006b). Solving the emotion paradox: categorization and the experience of 
emotion. Personality & Social Psychology Review, 10, 20-46. 
Basset, J., & Dabs, J. (2005). A portable version of the go/no-go association task 
(GNAT). Behavior Research Methods, 37, 506-512. 
Baumeister, R.F., Heatherton, T.F., & Tice, D.M. (1994). Losing control: How and why 
people fail at self-regulation. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Baumeister, R. F., & Vonasch, A. J. (2015). Uses of self-regulation to facilitate and 
restrain addictive behavior. Addictive Behaviors, 44, 3-8. 
Becker, S., Folk, C., & Remington, R. (2013). Attentional capture does not depend on 
feature similarity, but on target-nontarget relations. Psychological Science, 24, 
634-647. 
Bem, D. J. (1967). Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance 
phenomena. Psychological Review, 74, 183-200. 
Bem, D. J. (1973). Self-perception theory. Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, 6, 1-62. 
Benthin, A., Slovic, P., Moran, P., Sverson, H., Mertz, C., & Gerrard, M. (1995). 
Adolescent health-threatening and health-enhancing behaviours: A study of 
word association and imagery. Journal of Adolesecent Health, 17, 143-152. 
Berridge, K. C., & Robinson, T. E. (2006). Automatic processes in addiction: A 
commentary. In R. W. Wiers & A. W. Stacy (Eds.), Handbook of implicit 
cognition and addiction (pp. 477-483). London, UK: Sage Publications. 
Berridge, K. C., & Robinson, T. E. (2011). Drug addiction as incentive salience. In J. 
Poland, & G. Graham (Eds.), Addiction and Responsibility (pp. 47-57). Mit 
Press. 
Bernstein, A., Trafton, J., Ilgen, M., & Zvolensky, M. J. (2008). An evaluation of the 
role of smoking context on a biobehavioral index of distress tolerance. Addictive 
Behaviors, 33(11), 1409-1415. 
Biglan, A., & Hayes, S. C. (1996). Should the behavioral sciences become more 
pragmatic? The case for functional contextualism in research on human 
behavior. Applied and Preventative Psychology, 5, 47-57. 
Bilalić, M., McLeod, P., & Gobet, F. (2008). Inflexibility of experts – reality or myth?: 
Quantifying the einstellung effect in chess masters.  Cognitive Psychology, 56, 
73-102. 
Blair I. 2002. The malleability of automatic stereotypes and prejudice. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 6, 242–61. 
284 
 
Blair, I., Ma, J., & Lenton, A. (2001). Imagining stereotypes away: The moderation of 
implicit stereotypes through mental imagery. Journal of Personality & Social 
Psychology, 81, 828-841. 
Blaison, C., Imhoff, R., Huhnel, I., Hess U., & Banse, R. (2012). The Affect 
Misattribution Procedure: hot or not? Emotion, 12, 403-412. 
Blanton, H., & Jaccard, J. (2006). Arbitrary metrics in psychology. American 
Psychologist, 61, 27-41. 
Blanton, H., Jaccard, J., Klick, J., Mellers, B., Mitchell, G., & Tetlock, P. E. (2009). 
Strong claims and weak evidence: Reassessing the predictive validity of the 
IAT. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94, 567-582. 
Bloom, E. L., Matsko, S. V., & Cimino, C. R. (2014). The relationship between 
cigarette smoking and impulsivity: A review of personality, behavioral, and 
neurobiological assessment. Addiction Research & Theory, 22(5), 386-397. 
Bluemke, M., & Fiedler, K. (2009). Base rate effects on the IAT. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 18, 1029-1038. 
Bluemke, M., & Friese, M. (2008). Reliability and validity of the Single-Target IAT 
(ST-IAT): Assessing automatic affect towards multiple attitude objects. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 38, 977-997. 
Bonanno, G. A., & Burton, C. L. (2013). Regulatory flexibility an individual differences 
perspective on coping and emotion regulation. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 8(6), 591-612. 
Bonanno, G. A., Papa, A., Lalande, K., Westphal, M., & Coifman, K. (2004). The 
importance of being flexible the ability to both enhance and suppress emotional 
expression predicts long-term adjustment. Psychological Science, 15(7), 482-487. 
Bordieri, M., Kellum, K., & Wilson, K. G. (2013). Stop making sense: Exploring basic 
properties and clinical applications of coherence. Doctoral Dissertation: 
University of Mississippi.   
Bordieri, M. J., Kellum, K. K., Wilson, K. G., & Whiteman, K. C. (in press). Basic 
Properties of Coherence: Testing a Core Assumption of Relational Frame 
Theory. The Psychological Record, 1-16. 
Borland, R., Partos, T., & Cummings, K. (2012). Systematic biases in cross-sectional 
community studies may underestimate the effectiveness of stop-smoking 
medications. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 14, 1483-1487. 
285 
 
Borland, R., Partos, T., & Cummings, K. (2013). Recall bias does impact on 
retrospective reports of quit attempts: Response to Messer and Pierce. Nicotine 
& Tobacco Research, 15, 754-755. 
Borland, R., Partos, T. R., Yong, H. H., Cummings, K. M., & Hyland, A. (2012). How 
much unsuccessful quitting activity is going on among adult smokers? Data from 
the International Tobacco Control Four Country cohort survey. Addiction, 107(3), 
673-682. 
Bosnes, O., Dahl, O. P., & Almkvist, O. (2015). Including a subject‐paced trial may 
make the PASAT more acceptable for MS patients. Acta Neurologica 
Scandinavica, 4, 219-225. 
Bowley, C., Faricy, C., Hegarty, B., Johnstone, S. J., Smith, J. L., Kelly, P. J., & 
Rushby, J. A. (2013). The effects of inhibitory control training on alcohol 
consumption, implicit alcohol-related cognitions and brain electrical 
activity.International Journal of Psychophysiology, 89(3), 342-348. 
Boyle, M. (2002). Schizophrenia: A scientific delusion? (2nd Ed.). East Sussex, UK: 
Routledge. 
Bradley, B., Field, M., Healy, H., & Mogg, K. (2004). Attentional and evaluative biases 
for smoking cues in nicotine dependence: Component processes of biases in 
visual orienting. Behavioral Pharmacology, 15, 29-36. 
Bradley, B., Field, M., Healy, H., & Mogg, K. (2008). Do the affective properties of 
smoking-related cues influence attentional and approach biases in cigarette 
smokers? Journal of Psychopharmacology, 22, 737-745. 
Brandon, T. H., & Baker, T. B. (1991). The Smoking Consequences Questionnaire: The 
subjective expected utility of smoking in college students. Psychological 
Assessment: A Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 3, 484–491. 
Brandon, T. H., Herzog, T. A., Irvin, J. E., & Gwaltney, C. J. (2004). Cognitive and 
social learning models of drug dependence: Implications for the assessment of 
tobacco dependence in adolescents. Addiction, 99 (Suppl. 1), 51–77. 
Brandon, T. H., Herzog, T. A., Juliano, L. M., Irvin, J. E., Lazev, A. B., & Simmons, V. 
N. (2003). Pretreatment task persistence predicts smoking cessation outcome. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 112(3), 448-456. 
Brandon, T. H., Juliano, L. M., & Copeland, A. L. (1999). Expectancies in tobacco 
smoking. In I. Kirsch (Ed.), How expectancies shape experience. Washington, 
DC: American Psychological Association. 
286 
 
Brandon, T. H., Wetter, D. W., & Baker, T. B. (1996). Affect, expectancies, urges, and 
smoking: Do they conform to models of drug motivation and relapse? 
Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 4, 29–36. 
Brandt, C. P., Bakhshaie, J., Garey, L., Schmidt, N. B., Leventhal, A. M., & Zvolensky, 
M. J. (2015). The moderating role of smoking amount per day on the relations 
between anxiety sensitivity, smoking dependence, and cognitive–affective aspects 
of smoking among treatment seeking smokers. Addictive Behaviors Reports, 1, 26-
33. 
Briñol, P., Petty, R. E., & McCaslin, M. J. (2009). Changing attitudes on implicit versus 
explicit measures: What is the difference? In R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. 
Brinol  (Eds.), Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit measures (pp.  361-390). 
New York, NY: Taylor & Francis Group. 
Brown, W. (1910). Some experimental results in the correlation of mental abilities. 
British Journal of Psychology, 3, 296–322. 
Brown, R. A., Lejuez, C. W., Kahler, C. W., Strong, D. R., & Zvolensky, M. J. (2005). 
Distress tolerance and early smoking lapse. Clinical psychology review, 25(6), 713-
733. 
Brown, R. A., Lejuez, C. W., Kahler, C. W., & Strong, D. R. (2002). Distress tolerance 
and duration of past smoking cessation attempts. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 111(1), 180-185. 
Brown, R. A., Lejuez, C. W., Strong, D. R., Kahler, C. W., Zvolensky, M. J., Carpenter, 
L. L., Niaura, R. & Price, L. H. (2009). A prospective examination of distress 
tolerance and early smoking lapse in adult self-quitters. Nicotine & Tobacco 
Research, 11, 493-502. 
Bruce, G., & Jones, B. T. (2006). Methods, measures, and findings of attentinal bias in 
substance use, abuse, and dependence. In R. W. Wiers & A. W. Stacy (Eds.), 
Handbook of implicit cognition and addiction (pp.135-149). London, UK: Sage 
Publications. 
Buhlmann, U., Teachman, B., & Kathmann, N. (2011). Evaluating implicit 
attractiveness beliefs in body dysmorphic disorder using the Go/No-go 
Association Task. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 
42, 192-197. 
Cahill, J., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Barnes-Holmes, D., Rodriguez-Valverde, M., Luciano, 
C., & Smeets, P. M. (2007). The derived transfer and reversal of mood functions 
through equivalence relations: II. The Psychological Record, 57(3), 373-389. 
287 
 
Cai, H., Sriram, N., Greenwald, A. G., & McFarland, S. G. (2004). The Implicit 
Association Tests D measure can minimize a cognitive skill confound: comment 
on McFarland and Crouch (2002). Social Cognition, 22, 673-684. 
Cameron, C. D., Brown-Iannuzzi, J. L., & Payne, B. K. (2012). Sequential priming 
measures of social cognition: A meta-analysis of associations with behaviour 
and explicit attitudes. Personality & Social Psychology Review, 16, 330-350. 
Cameron, A., Reed, K. P., & Ninnemann, A. (2013). Reactivity to negative affect in 
smokers: The role of implicit associations and distress tolerance in smoking 
cessation. Addictive Behaviors, 38(12), 2905-2912. 
Cano, M., Lam, C., Adams, C., Correa-Fernández, V., Stewart, D., McClure, J., 
Cinciripini, P., & Wetter, D. (2014). Positive smoking outcome expectancies 
mediate the association between negative affect and smoking urge among 
women during a quit attempt. Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 
22, 332-340. 
Carpenter, K. M., Martinez, D., Vadhan, N. P., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Nunes, E. V. 
(2012). Measures of attentional bias and relational responding are associated 
with behavioral treatment outcome for cocaine dependence. The American 
Journal of Drug and Alcohol abuse, 38(2), 146-154. 
Carr, J. (2009). Changing Irish norms: the smoking ban. Socheolas: Limerick Student 
Journal of Sociology, 1, 1-19. 
Carter, B. L., Lam, C. Y., Robinson, J. D., Paris, M. M., Waters, A. J., Wetter, D. W., & 
Cinciripini, P. M. (2008). Real-time craving and mood assessments before and 
after smoking. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 10, 1165–1169. 
Carter, B. L., & Tiffany, S. T. (1999a). Meta-analysis of cue reactivity in addiction 
research. Addiction, 94, 327-340. 
Carter, B. L., & Tiffany, S. T. (1999b). Cue-reactivity and the future of addiction. 
Addiction, 94, 349-351 
Catania, A. C. (1998). Learning (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2002). Cigarette smoking among adults – 
United States, 2001. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 51, 642-645. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2008). Cigarette smoking among adults – 
United States, 2007. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 57, 1221-1226. 
Cesario, J. (2014). Priming, replication, and the hardest science. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 9, 40-48. 
288 
 
Chan, E., Ybarra, O., & Schwarz, N. (2006). Reversing the affective congruency effect: 
The role of target word frequency of occurrence. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 42, 365–372. 
Chapman, S., & McKenzie, R. (2010). The global research neglect of unassisted 
smoking cessation: Causes and consequences. PLoS Medicine, 7, e1000216. 
Chapman, S., & McKenzie, R. (2013). There’s nothing that succeeds like failure: 
Discerning the woods from the trees in smoking cessation debates. Nicotine & 
Tobacco Research, 15, 750-751.  
Chassin, L., Presson, C., Rose, J., & Sherman, S. (2007). What is addiction? Age-
related differences in the meaning of addiction. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 
87, 30-38. 
Chassin, L., Presson, C., Rose, J., Sherman, S., & Prost, J. (2002). Parental smoking 
cessation and adolescent smoking. Journal of Pediatric Psychology, 27, 485-
496. 
Chassin, L., Presson, C., Sherman, S., Seo, D., & Macy, J. T. (2010). Implicit and 
explicit attitudes predict smoking cessation: Moderating effects of experienced 
failure to control smoking and plans to quit. Psychology of Addictive Behavior, 
24, 670-679.  
Chawla, N., & Ostafin, B. (2007). Experiential avoidance as a functional dimensional 
approach to psychopathology: An empirical review. Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 63(9), 871-890.  
Chen, M., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). Consequences of automatic evaluation: Immediate 
behavioural dispositions to approach or avoid the stimulus. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 215-224. 
Chiesa, M. (1974/1994). Radical Behaviorism: The Philosophy and the Science. 
Reprinted by Authors Cooperative (1994): Boston, Massachusetts. 
Childs, E., & De Wit, H. (2010). Effects of acute psychosocial stress on cigarette 
craving and smoking. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 12, 449-453. 
Cisler, J. M., Bacon, A. K., & Williams, N. L. (2009). Phenomenological characteristics 
of attentional biases towards threat: a critical review. Cognitive Therapy 
Research, 33, 221–234. 
Cisler, J. M., & Koster, E. H. W. (2010). Mechanisms of attentional biases towards 
threat in anxiety disorders: An integrative review. Clinical Psychology Review, 
30, 203-216. 
Clancy, L. (2007). Ireland's workplace smoking ban. Breathe, 3, 237-244. 
289 
 
Clark, D. M., & Teasdale, J. D. (1985). Constraints on the effects of mood on 
memory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48(6), 1595-1608. 
Cochran, W. G. (1954). Some methods for strengthening the common 2 tests. 
Biometrics, 10, 417–451. 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (2nd ed.). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Coifman, K. G., Bonanno, G. A., Ray, R. D., & Gross, J. J. (2007). Does repressive 
coping promote resilience? Affective-autonomic response discrepancy during 
bereavement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(4), 745. 
Cook, D. A., & Beckman, T. J. (2006). Current concepts in validity and reliability for 
psychometric instruments: Theory and application. The American Journal of 
Medicine, 119, 166.e7-166.e16.  
Cooper, J., & Carlsmith, K. M. (2001). Cognitive dissonance. In N. J. Smelser and P. B. 
Baltes (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Human Behavior. London, UK: Elsevier Inc. 
Collins, B. N., Nair, U. S., & Komaroff, E. (2011). Smoking cue reactivity across 
massed extinction trials: Negative affect and gender effects. Addictive 
Behaviors, 36(4), 308-314. 
Conklin, C. A., Clayton, R. R., Tiffany, S. T., & Shiffman, S. (2004). Introduction to 
concepts and measurement of the emergence of tobacco dependence: The 
tobacco etiology research network. Addiction, 99 (Suppl. 1), 1-4. 
Conklin, C. A., & Perkins, K. A. (2005). Subjective and reinforcing effects of smoking 
during negative mood induction. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 114(1), 153-
164. 
Connor, M., & Sparks, P. (2002). Ambivalence and Attitudes. European Review of 
Social Psychology, 12, 37-70. 
Conrey, F. R., Sherman, J. W., Gawronski, B., Hugenberg, K., & Groom, C. J. (2005). 
Separating multiple processes in implicit social cognition: The QUAD model of 
implicit task performance. Journal of personality and social psychology, 89(4), 
469. 
Cook, J. W., Spring, B., McChargue, D., & Hedeker, D. (2004). Hedonic capacity, 
cigarette craving, and diminished positive mood. Nicotine & tobacco 
research, 6(1), 39-47. 
Copeland, A., Brandon, T., & Quinn, E. (1995). The smoking consequences 
questionnaire adult: Measurement of smoking outcome expectancies in adults. 
Psychological Assessment, 7, 484-494. 
290 
 
Cosci, F., Aldi, G. A., & Nardi, A. E. (2015). Does smoking abstinence influence 
distress tolerance? An experimental study comparing the response to a breath-
holding test of smokers under tobacco withdrawal and under nicotine replacement 
therapy. Psychiatry Research, 229(1), 89-93. 
Cosci, F., Bertoli, G., & Abrams, K. (2013). Effects of nicotine withdrawal on 
panic‐like response to breath holding: A placebo‐controlled, double‐blind, 
crossover patch study. Depression and anxiety, 30(12), 1217-1221. 
Cousijn, J., Goudriaan, A. E., & Wiers, R. W. (2011). Reaching out toward cannabis: 
Approach-bias in heavy cannabis users predicts changes in cannabis use. 
Addiction, 106, 1667-1674. 
Cox, W. M., Fadardi, J. S., & Pothos, E. M. (2006). The addiction-Stroop test: 
Theoretical considerations and procedural recommendations. Psychological 
Bulletin, 132, 443–476. 
Cox, W. M., Klinger, E., & Fadardi, J. S. (2015). The motivational basis of cognitive 
determinants of addictive behaviors. Addictive Behaviors, 44, 16-22. 
Cox, L. S., Tiffany, S. T., & Christen, A. G. (2001). Evaluation of the brief 
questionnaire of smoking urges (QSU-brief) in laboratory and clinical settings. 
Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 3, 7–16. 
Cox, L. S., Tiffany, S. T., & Christen, A. G. (2001). Evaluation of the Brief 
Questionnaire of Smoking Urges (QSU-Brief) in laboratory and clinical 
settings. Nicotine and Tobacco Research 3(1), 7–16. 
Crawford, J. R., & Henry, J. D. (2004). The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS): Construct validity, measurement properties and normative data in a large 
non-clinical sample. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 43(3), 245-265. 
Crisp, R., & Turner, R. (2010). Essential social psychology (2nd ed.). London, UK: Sage 
Publications Ltd. 
Cronbach, L.J. (1990). Essentials of psychological testing (5th ed.). New York: Harper 
& Row. 
Croyle, R. T., & Backinger, C. L. (2008). Psychosocial processes underlying smoking: 
Still more to learn.  Health Psychology, 27, S185-S186. 
Cullen, C., Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2010). The Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) and the malleability of ageist 
attitudes. The Psychological Record, 59(4), 591-620.. 
Cumming, G. (2013). The new statistics why and how. Psychological Science, 25, 7-29. 
291 
 
Currie, L. M., & Clancy, L. (2011). The road to smoke‐free legislation in Ireland. 
Addiction, 106(1), 15-24. 
Curry, S. J., Grothaus, L., & McBride, C. (1997). Reasons for quitting: intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation for smoking cessation in a population-based sample of 
smokers. Addictive behaviors, 22(6), 727-739. 
Cvencek, D., Greenwald, A. G., Brown, A. S., Gray, N. S., & Snowden, R. J. (2010). 
Faking of the implicit association test is statistically detectable and partly 
correctable. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 32, 302-314. 
Dal Cin, S., Gibson, B., Zanna, M. P., Shumate, R., & Fong, G. T. (2007). Smoking in 
movies, implicit associations of smoking with the self, and intentions to 
smoke. Psychological Science, 18(7), 559-563. 
Dane, E. (2011). Reconsidering the trade-off between expertise and flexibility: A 
cognitive-entrenchment perspective. Academy of Management Review, 35, 579-
603. 
Dasgupta, N., DeSteno, D., Williams, L. A., & Hunsinger, M. (2009). Fanning the 
flames of prejudice: The influence of specific incidental emotions on implicit 
prejudice. Emotion, 9(4), 585-591. 
Dasgupta, N., Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). The first ontological 
challenge to the IAT: Attitude or mere familiarity? Psychological Inquiry, 14, 
238–243. 
Daughters, S. B., Lejuez, C. W., Kahler, C. W., Strong, D. R., & Brown, R. A. (2005). 
Psychological distress tolerance and duration of most recent abstinence attempt 
among residential treatment-seeking substance abusers. Psychology of Addictive 
Behaviors, 19(2), 208-211. 
Dawkins, L. (2013). Why is it so hard to quit smoking? The Psychologist, 26, 332-335.  
Dawkins, L., Powell, J. H., Pickering, A., Powell, J., & West, R. (2009). Patterns of 
change in withdrawal symptoms, desire to smoke, reward motivation and response 
inhibition across 3 months of smoking abstinence. Addiction, 104(5), 850-858. 
Dawson, D. L., Barnes-Holmes, D., Gresswell, D. M., Hart, A. J., & Gore, N. J. (2009). 
Assessing the implicit beliefs of sexual offenders using the implicit relational 
assessment procedure a first Study. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and 
Treatment, 21(1), 57-75. 
Debey, E., Ridderinkhof, R. K., De Houwer, J., De Schryver, M., & Verschuere, B. 
(2015). Suppressing the truth as a mechanism of deception: Delta plots reveal the 
role of response inhibition in lying. Consciousness and Cognition, 37, 148-159. 
292 
 
Degner, J. (2009). On the (un-)controllability of affective priming: Strategic 
manipulation is feasible but can possibly be prevented. Cognition & Emotion, 
23, 327-354. 
De Houwer, J. (2001). A structural and process analysis of the Implicit Association 
Test. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 443-451.  
De Houwer, J. (2003). On the role of stimulus-response and stimulus-stimulus 
compatibility in the Stroop effect. Memory & Cognition, 31, 353-359.  
De Houwer, J. (2003b). The extrinsic affective Simon task. Experimental Psychology, 
50, 77-85. 
De Houwer, J. (2006). What are implicit measures and why are we using them? In R. 
W. Wiers & A. W. Stacy (Eds.), The handbook of implicit cognition and 
addiction (pp. 11-28). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishers. 
De Houwer, J. (2009). Comparing measures of attitudes at the functional and procedural 
level: Analysis and implications. In R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, & P. Brinol  (Eds.), 
Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit measures (pp.  361-390). New York, 
NY: Taylor & Francis Group. 
De Houwer, J. (2011). Why the cognitive approach in psychology would profit from a 
functional approach and vice versa. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(2), 
202-209. 
De Houwer, J. (2014). A propositional perspective on context effects in human 
associative learning. Behavioural Processes, 104, 20-25. 
De Houwer, J., Barnes‐Holmes, Y., & Barnes‐Holmes, D. (2015). Riding the waves: A 
functional‐cognitive perspective on the relations among behaviour therapy, 
cognitive behaviour therapy and acceptance and commitment therapy. International 
Journal of Psychology. Accessed August 19th 2015 from 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ijop.12176/epdf.  
De Houwer, J., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Moors, A. (2013). What is learning? On the 
nature and merits of a functional definition of learning. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 20, 631-642. 
De Houwer, J., Beckers, T., & Moors, A. (2007). Novel attitudes can be faked on the 
Implicit Association Test. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43(6), 
972-978. 
De Houwer, J., Crombez, G., Baeyens, F., & Hermans, D. (2001).  On the generality of 
the affective Simon effect. Cognition and Emotion, 15, 189-206. 
293 
 
De Houwer, J., Custers, & De Clercq, A. (2006). Do smokers have a negative implicit 
attitude towards smoking? Cognition and Emotion, 20, 1274-1284. 
De Houwer, J., & De Bruycker, E. (2007a). The identification-EAST as a valid measure 
of implicit attitudes toward alcohol-related stimuli. Journal of Behavior Therapy 
and Experimental Psychiatry, 38, 133-143. 
De Houwer, J., & De Bruycker, E. (2007b). The implicit association test outperforms 
the extrinsic affective Simon task as an implicit measure of inter-individual 
differences in attitudes. British Journal of Social Psychology, 46, 401-421. 
De Houwer, J., Fiedler, K., & Moors, A. (2011). Strengths and Limitations of 
Theoretical Explanations in Psychology Introduction to the Special 
Section.Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(2), 161-162. 
De Houwer, J., Gawronski, B., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2013). A functional-cognitive 
framework for attitude research. European Review of Social Psychology, 24(1), 
252-287. 
De Houwer, J., & Moors, A. (2007). How to define and examine the implicitness of 
implicit measures. In B. Wittenbrink & N. Schwarz (Eds.). Implicit measures of 
attitudes: Procedures and controversies. Guilford Press. 
De Houwer, J., & Moors, A. (2012). How to define and examine implicit processes? In 
R. Proctor & J. Capaldi (Eds.). Psychology of science: Implicit and explicit 
processes. Oxford University Press. 
De Houwer, J., Teige-Mocigemba, S., Spruyt, A., & Moors, A. (2009a). Implicit 
measures: A normative analysis and review. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 347–-
368.  
De Houwer, J., Teige-Mocigemba, S., Spruyt, A., & Moors, A. (2009b). Theoretical 
claims necessitate basic research: Reply to Gawronski, Lebel, Peters, and Banse 
(2009) and Nosek and Greenwald (2009). Psychological Bulletin, 135, 377–379.  
De Houwer, J., & Smith, C. (2013). Go with your gut! Effects in the affect 
misattribution procedure become stronger when participants are encouraged to 
rely on their gut feelings. Social Psychology, 44, 299-302. 
de Jonge, L. V. H., & Gormley, M. (2005). Responses to positive and negative 
smoking-related images: effects of current smoking status and degree of 
smoking addiction. Addictive Behaviors, 30(8), 1587-1591. 
de Leeuw, R. N. H., Engels, R. C. M. A., Vermulst, E. A. A., & Scholte, R. H. J. 
(2008). Do smoking attitudes predict behavior? A longitudinal study on the bi-
294 
 
directional relations between adolescents smoking attitudes and behaviours. 
Addiction, 103, 1713-1721. 
Deutsch, R., & Gawronski, B. (2009). When the method makes a difference: 
Antagonistic Effects on “automatic evaluations” as a function of task 
characteristics of the measure. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 
101-114. 
Deutsch, R., Gawronski, B., & Strack, F. (2006). At the boundaries of automaticity: 
Negation as reflective operation. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 91(3), 385-405. 
Deutsch, R., & Strack, F. (2010). Building blocks of social behavior: Reflective and 
impulsive processes. In B. Gawronski, & B. K. Payne (Eds.), Handbook of 
implicit social cognition: Measurement, theory, and applications (pp. 62-80). 
New York, NY: Guilford Press.  
Dewitte, M., & De Houwer, J. (2008). Proximity and distance goals in adult attachment. 
European Journal of Personality, 22, 675-694. 
DiFranza, J. (2009). A new approach to the diagnosis of tobacco addiction. Addiction, 
105, 381-382. 
DiFranza, J. (2010). Thwarting science by protecting the received wisdom on tobacco 
addiction from the scientific method. Harm Reduction Journal, 7, 1-12. 
DiFranza, J. R. (2015). A 2015 Update on The Natural History and Diagnosis of 
Nicotine Addiction. Current Pediatric Reviews, 11(1), 43-55. 
DiFranza, J., Savageau, J. A., Fletcher, K., Ockene, J., Rigotti, N., McNeill, A., 
Coleman, M., & Wood, C. (2002). The loss of autonomy over nicotine use in 
adolescents: The DANDY (development and assessment of nicotine use in 
youths) study. Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med., 156, 397-403. 
DiFranza, J., Ursprung, W. W. S., & Biller, L. (2012). The developmental sequence of 
tobacco withdrawal symptoms of wanting, craving and needing. Pharmacology, 
Biochemistry, and Behavior, 100, 494-497. 
DiFranza, J., Ursprung, W. W. S., & Carson, A. (2010). New insights into the 
compulsion to use tobacco from an adolescent case-series. Journal of 
Adolescence, 33, 209-214. 
DiFranza, J., Ursprung, W. W. S., Lauzon, B., Bancej, C., Wellman, R. J., Ziedonis, D., 
et al., (2010). A systematic review of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
diagnostic criteria for nicotine dependence. Addictive Behaviors, 35, 373-382.  
295 
 
DiFranza, J., Wellman, R., Mermelstein, R., Pbert, L., Klein, J., Sargent, J., et al. 
(2011). The natural history and diagnosis of nicotine addiction. Current 
Pediatric Reviews, 7, 88-96. 
Dijkstra, A., & Menninga, K. (2015). Experimentally induced states of mind determine 
abstinent smokers' level of craving in reaction to smoking-cues. Addictive 
Behaviors Reports, 1, 81-88. 
Dols, M., van den Hout, M., Kindt, M., & Willems, B. (2002). The urge to smoke 
depends on the expectation of smoking. Addiction, 97, 87-93.  
Donny, E. C., & Dierker, L. C. (2007). The absence of DSM-IV nicotine dependence in 
moderate-to-heavy daily smokers. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 89, 93-96. 
Donovan, D. M., & Marlatt, G. A. (Eds.) (2005). Assessment of addictive behaviors (2nd 
ed.). London, UK: The Guildford Press. 
Dougherty, K. M., & Johnston, J. M. (1996). Overlearning, fluency and automaticity. 
Behavior Analysis, 19, 289-292. 
Downey, L., Rosengren, D. B., & Donovan, D. M. (2001). Sources of motivation for 
abstinence: A replication analysis of the Reasons for Quitting 
Questionnaire. Addictive Behaviors, 26(1), 79-89. 
Drew, T., Võ, M. L. H., & Wolfe, J. M. (2013). The invisible gorilla strikes again 
sustained inattentional blindness in expert observers. Psychological Science, 24, 
1848-1853. 
Driver, J. (2001). A selective review of selective attention research from the past 
century. British Journal of Psychology, 92, 53-78. 
Droungas, A., Ehrman, R., Childress, A., & O’Brien, C. (1995). Effect of smoking cues 
and cigarette availability on craving and smoking behavior. Addictive Behaviors, 
20, 657-673. 
Drummond, D. C. (2000). What does cue-reactivity have to offer clinical research? 
Addiction, 95 (Suppl. 2), S129-S144. 
Drummond, S., Tiffany, S. T. ,Glautier, S., & Remington, B. (1995). Cue exposure in 
understanding and treating addictive behaviours. In Drummond, D. C., Tiffany, 
S. T., Glautier, S. & Remington, B. (Eds), Addictive behaviours: Cue exposure 
theory and practice (pp. 1-17). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. 
D’Souza, M. S., & Markou, A. (2011). Neuronal mechanisms underlying development 
of nicotine dependence: implications for novel smoking-cessation 
treatments. Addiction Science & Clinical Practice, 6(1), 4-16. 
296 
 
Dunbar, M. S., Scharf, D., Kirchner, T., & Shiffman, S. (2010). Do smokers crave 
cigarettes in some smoking situations more than others? Situational correlates of 
craving when smoking. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 12, 226–234. 
Dunning, D. (2013). The paradox of knowing. The Psychologist, 26, 414-417. 
Eastvold, A. D., Belanger, H. G., & Vanderploeg, R. D. (2012). Does a third party 
observer affect neuropsychological test performance? It depends. The Clinical 
Neuropsychologist, 26(3), 520-541. 
Edwards, G. (2012). The evil genius of the habit: DSM-5 seen in historical context. 
Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs, 73, 699-701. 
Eagley, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Orlando, FL: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Earp, B. D., Dill, B., Harris, J., Ackerman, J., & Bargh, J. A. (2011). Incidental 
exposure to no-smoking signs primes craving for cigarettes: an ironic effect of 
unconscious semantic processing. Yale Review of Undergraduate Research in 
Psychology, 2(1), 12-23.  
Earp, B. D., Dill, B., Harris, J. L., Ackerman, J. M., & Bargh J. A. (2013). No sign of 
quitting: Incidental exposure to no-smoking signs ironically boosts cigarette-
approach tendencies in smokers. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 43, 
2158-2162. 
Eberl, C., Wiers, R. W., Pawelczack, S., Rinck, M., Becker, E. S., & Lindenmeyer, J. 
(2013). Approach bias modification in alcohol dependence: Do clinical effects 
replicate and for whom does it work best? Developmental cognitive 
neuroscience, 4, 38-51. 
Eich, E. (2014). Business not as usual. Psychological Science, 25, 3-6. 
Eitam, B., Yeshurun, Y., and Hassan, K. (2013). Blinded by irrelevance: Pure 
irrelevance induced blindness. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 39, 611-615. 
Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2006). The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic Why the 
adjustments are insufficient. Psychological Science, 17(4), 311-318. 
Erblich, J., & Montgomery, G. (2012). Cue-induced cigarette cravings and smoking 
cessation: The role of expectancies. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 14, 809-815. 
Erskine, J. A., Georgiou, G. J., & Kvavilashvili, L. (2010). I suppress, therefore I 
smoke: Effects of thought suppression on smoking behavior. Psychological 
Science, 21, 1225-1230. 
297 
 
Erskine, J. A., Rawaf, D., Grice, S., & Ussher, M. (2015). Effect of suppressing 
thoughts of desire to smoke on ratings of desire to smoke and tobacco withdrawal 
symptoms. SAGE Open, 5, 1-8. 
Erskine, J. A., Ussher, M., Cropley, M., Elgindi, A., Zaman, M., & Corlett, B. (2012). 
Effect of thought suppression on desire to smoke and tobacco withdrawal 
symptoms. Psychopharmacology, 219(1), 205-211. 
Etter, J., & Hughes, J. R. (2006). A comparison of the psychometric properties of three 
cigarette withdrawal scales. Addiction, 101, 362–372. 
Eurobarometer (2006). Attitudes of Europeans towards tobacco. Downloaded on March 
25th 2013 from 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_information/documents/ebs/239_en.pdf.  
Eurobarometer (2012). Attitudes of Europeans towards tobacco. Downloaded on March 
25th 2013 from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_385_en.pdf.  
Evans, J., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013a). Dual-process theories of higher cognition: 
Advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 223-241. 
Evans, J., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013b). Theory and meta-theory in the study of dual-
processing: Reply to comments. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 263-
271. 
Everitt, B. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2005). Neural systems of reinforcement for drug 
addiction: From actions to habits to compulsion. Nature Neuroscience, 8, 1481-
1489. 
Fahy, D., Trench, B., & Clancy, L. (2012). Communicating contentious health policy 
lessons from Ireland’s workplace smoking ban. Health Promotion Practice, 13, 
331-338. 
Fagerstrom, K. O. (1978) Measuring degree of physical dependency to tobacco smoking 
with reference to individualization of treatment. Addictive Behaviors, 3, 235-
241. 
Fallon, B. M. (1998). To smoke or not to smoke: The role of schematic information 
processing. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 22, 517-530. 
Farris, S. G., Zvolensky, M. J., DiBello, A. M., & Schmidt, N. B. (2015, February 2). 
Validation of the Avoidance and Inflexibility Scale (AIS) among treatment-
seeking smokers. Psychological Assessment. Advance online publication. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pas0000059 
298 
 
Farris, S. G., Zvolensky, M. J., & Schmidt, N. B. (2015). Smoking-specific experiential 
avoidance cognition: Explanatory relevance to pre-and post-cessation nicotine 
withdrawal, craving, and negative affect. Addictive behaviors, 44, 58-64. 
Fawcett, T. (2006). An introduction to ROC analysis. Pattern Recognition Letters, 27, 
861-874.  
Fazio, R. H. (2001). On the automatic activation of associated evaluations: An 
overview. Cognition and Emotion, 15, 115-141. 
Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cognition research: 
Their meaning and use. Annual Review of Psychology,54, 297-327.    
Fazio, R. H., Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Powell, M. C., & Kardes, F. R. (1986). On the 
automatic activation of attitudes. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 
50, 229-238. 
Fazio, R. H., Zanna, M. P., & Cooper, J. (1977). Dissonance and self-perception: An 
integrative view of each theory's proper domain of application. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 13, 464-479. 
Feldman-Barrett, L., Lindquist, K., Bliss-Moreau, E., Duncan, S., Gendron, M., Mize, 
J., & Brennan, L. (2007). Of mice and men: Natural kinds of emotions in the 
mammalian brain? A response to Panksepp and Izard. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 2, 297-311. 
Feldman-Barrett, L., Lindquist, K., & Gendron, M. (2007). Language as context for the 
perception of emotion. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 327-332.  
Feldman-Barrett, L., Mesquita, B., & Gendron, M. (2011). Context in emotion 
perception. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 286-290.  
Feldner, M. T., Leen-Feldner, E. W., Zvolensky, M. J., & Lejuez, C. W. (2006). 
Examining the association between rumination, negative affectivity, and negative 
affect induced by a paced auditory serial addition task. Journal of Behavior 
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 37(3), 171-187. 
Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
Ferguson, M. J., & Bargh, J. A. (2004). Liking is for doing: The effects of goal pursuit 
on automatic evaluation. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 87, 557-
572. 
Fiedler, K. (2003). The hidden vicissitudes of the priming paradigm in evaluative 
judgment research. In J. Musch, & K. Klauer (Ed.), The psychology of 
299 
 
evaluation: Affective processes in cognition and emotion (pp. 109-137). 
Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers. 
Fiedler, K. (2011). Voodoo correlations are everywhere: Not only in neuroscience. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(2), 163-171. 
Fiedler, K. (2015). Functional research and cognitive‐process research in behavioural 
science: An unequal but firmly connected pair. International Journal of 
Psychology. Accessed from 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ijop.12163/abstract.  
Fiedler, K., & Bluemke, M. (2005). Faking the IAT: Aided and unaided response 
control on the Implicit Association Test. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 
27, 307-316. 
Fiedler, K., Messner, C., & Bleumke, M. (2006). Unresolved problems with the “I”, the 
“A”, and the “T”: A logical and psychometric critique of the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT). European Review of Social Psychology, 17, 74-147. 
Field, A. (2009). Discovering statistics using SPSS (3rd ed.). London, UK: Sage 
Publishing. 
Field, A. (2013). Discovering statistics using IBM SPSS statistics (4th ed.). London, UK: 
Sage Publications Ltd.  
Field, M. (2010). Can’t take my eyes off you. The Psychologist, 23, 636-639. 
Field, A., Caren, R., Fernie, G., & De Houwer, J. (2011). Alcohol approach tendencies 
in heavy drinkers: Comparisons of effects in a relevant stimulus-response 
compatibility task and an approach/avoidance Simon task. Psychology of 
Addictive Behaviors, 25, 697-701.  
Field, M., & Cox, W. M. (2008). Attentional bias in addictive behaviors: A review of its 
development, causes, and consequences. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 97, 1–
20. 
Field, M., & Duka, T. (2001). Smoking expectancy mediates the conditioned responses 
to arbitrary smoking cues. Behavioral Pharmacology, 12, 183-194. 
Field, M., Duka, T., Tyler, E., & Schoenmakers, T. (2009). Attentional bias 
modification in tobacco smokers. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 11, 812–822. 
Field, A. P., & Gillett, R. (2010). How to do a meta‐analysis. British Journal of 
Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 63(3), 665-694. 
Field, M., Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. P. (2005). Alcohol increases cognitive biases for 
smoking cues in smokers. Psychopharmacology, 180, 63-72. 
300 
 
Field, M., Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. P. (2006). Attention to drug-related cues in drug 
abuse and addiction: Component processes. In R. W. Wiers & A. W. Stacy 
(Eds.), Handbook of implicit cognition and addiction (pp.151-163). London, 
UK: Sage Publications. 
Field, M., Munafó, M. R., & Franken, I. H. A. (2009). A meta-analytic investigation of 
the relationship between attentional bias and subjective craving in substance 
abuse. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 589-607. 
Field, M., Rush, M., Cole, J., & Goudie, A. (2007). The smoking Stroop effect and 
delay discounting in smokers: Effects of environmental smoking cues. Journal 
of Psychopharmacology, 21 603-610. 
Fiore, M. C., Jaén, C. R., Baker, T. B., Bailey, W. C., Benowitz, N. L., Curry, S. J., et 
al., (2008). Treating tobacco use and dependence: 2008 update (Clinical 
practice Guideline, AHRQ Publication No. 08-0050-1). Rockville, MD: US 
Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service. 
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior. Reading: 
Addison-Wesley. 
Fitz, C. C., Kaufman, A., & Moore, P. J. (2015). Lay theories of smoking and young 
adult nonsmokers’ and smokers’ smoking expectations. Journal of Health 
Psychology, 20(4), 438-445. 
Fodor, J. (2001). The mind does not work that way. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A 
critical analysis. Cognition, 28, 3–71. 
Fong, G. T., Hammond, D., Laux, F. L., Zanna, M. P., Cummnings, K. M., Borland, R., 
& Ross, H. (2004). The near-universal experience of regret among smokers in 
four countries: Findings from the international tobacco control policy evaluation 
survey. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 6 (Suppl. 3), S341-S351. 
Fong, G. T., Hyland, A., Boreland, R., Hammond, D, et al. (2006). 
Reductions in tobacco smoke pollution and increases in support for smoke-free 
public places following the implementation of comprehensive smoke-free 
workplace legislation the Republic of Ireland: findings from the ITC Ireland/UK 
survery. Tobacco Control, 15, 51-58.  
Forman, M. E., Hoffman, K. L., McGrath, K. B., Herbert, J. D., Brandsma, L. L., & 
Lowe, M, R. (2007). A comparison of acceptance- and control-based strategies 
for coping with food cravings: An analog study. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 45, 2372-2386. 
301 
 
Fox, E., Russo, R., Bowles, R., & Dutton, K. (2001). Do threatening stimuli draw or 
hold visual attention in subclinical anxiety. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 130, 681-700. 
Francis, G. (2012). The psychology of replication and replication in psychology. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(6), 585-594. 
Franken, I. H. A. (2003). Drug craving and addiction: Integrating psychological and 
neuropharmacological approaches. Progress in neuropsychopharmacology and 
biological psychiatry, 27, 563-579. 
Freng, S., & Kehn, A. (2013). Determining true and false witnessed events: Can an 
eyewitness-Implicit Association Test distinguish between the seen and unseen? 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 20, 761-780. 
Freud, S. (1901/1914). The psychopathology of everyday life (A. A. Brill, Trans.). New 
York: Macmillan.  
Friese, M., & Fiedler, K. (2010). Being on the lookout for validity: Comment on Sriram 
and Greenwald (2009). Experimental Psychology, 57, 228-232. 
Friese, M., Hofmann, W., & Wiers, R. W. (2011). On taming horses and strengthening 
riders: Recent developments in research on interventions to improve self-control in 
health behaviors. Self and Identity, 10(3), 336-351. 
Frings, C., Englert, J., Wentura, D., & Bermeitinger, C. (2010). Decomposing the 
emotional Stroop effect. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63, 
42-49. 
Fujita, K. (2011). On conceptualizing self-control as more than the effortful inhibition 
of impulses. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15, 352-366. 
Furnham, A., & Boo, H. C. (2011). A literature review of the anchoring effect. The 
Journal of Socio-Economics, 40, 35-42. 
Garcia-Marques, L. & Ferreira, M. B. (2011). Friends and foes of theory construction in 
psychological science: Vague dichotomies, unified theories of cognition, and the 
new experimentalism. Psychological Science, 6, 192-201.  
Gast, A., De Houwer, J., & De Schryver, M. (2012). Evaluative  conditioning  can  be  
modulated  by  memory  of  the  CS–US pairings  at  the  time  of  testing. 
Learning and Motivation, 43, 116-126. 
Gast, A., & Rothermund, K. (2010). When old and frail is not the same: Dissociating 
category and stimulus effects in four implicit attitude measurement methods. 
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63, 479-498. 
302 
 
Gawronski, B. (2012). Back to the future of dissonance theory: Cognitive consistency as 
a core motive. Social Cognition, 30, 652-668. 
Gawronski, B., & Creighton, L. A. (2013). Dual-process theories. In D. E. Carlston 
(Ed.), The Oxford handbook of social cognition (pp. 282-312). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Gawronski, B., Cunningham, W. A., LeBel, E. P., & Deutsch, R. (2010). Attentional 
influences on affective priming: Does categorisation influence spontaneous 
evaluations of multiply categorisable objects? Cognition & Emotion, 24, 1008-
1025. 
Gawronski, B., & De Houwer, J. (2014). Implicit measures in social and personality 
psychology. In H. T. Reis, & C. M. Judd (Eds.), Handbook of research methods 
in social and personality psychology (2nd ed.) (pp. 283-310). New York, USA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gawronski, B., Deutsch, R., LeBel, E. P., & Peters, K. R. (2008). Response interference 
as a mechanism underlying implicit measures: Some traps and gaps in the 
assessment of mental associations with experimental paradigms. European 
Journal of Psychological Assessment, 24, 218–225. 
Gawronski, B., Deutsch, R., Mbirkou, S., Seibt, B., & Strack, F. (2008). When “just say 
no” is not enough: Affirmation versus negation training and the reduction of 
automatic stereotype activation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(2), 
370-377. 
Gawronski, B., LeBel, E. P., & Peters, K. R. (2007). What do implicit measures tell us?: 
Scrutinizing the validity of three common assumptions. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 2(2), 181-193. 
Gawronski, B., & Payne, B. K. (2010). Handbook of implicit social cognition: 
Measurement, theory, and applications. New York: The Guilford Press.  
Gawronski, B., & Ye, Y. (2014). Prevention of intention invention in the affect 
misattribution procedure. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 6, 101-
108. 
Geraerts, E., Merckelbach, H., Jelicic, M., & Smeets, E. (2006). Long term 
consequences of suppression of intrusive anxious thoughts and repressive 
coping. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44(10), 1451-1460. 
Germeroth, L. J., Wray, J. M., Gass, J. C., & Tiffany, S. T. (2013). Diagnostic utility of 
craving in predicting nicotine dependence: impact of craving content and item 
stability. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 15, 1988-1995. 
303 
 
Gifford, E. V. (2002). Acceptance based treatment for nicotine dependent smokers: 
Altering the regulatory functions of smoking related affect, physiological 
symptoms, and cognition. (Doctoral dissertation), University of Nevada, Reno, 
NV. 
Gifford, E., & Humphreys, K. (2007). The psychological science of addiction. 
Addiction, 102, 352-361. 
Glautier, S. (2004). Measures and models of nicotine dependence: Positive 
reinforcement. Addiction, 99(s1), 30-50. 
Glock, S., Müller, B., & Krolak-Schwerdt, S. (2013). Implicit associations and 
compensatory health beliefs in smokers: Exploring their role for behaviour and 
their change through warning labels. British Journal of Health Psychology, 18, 
814-826. 
Glock, S., Kovacs, C., & Unz, D. (2014). Implicit attitudes toward smoking: How the 
smell of cigarettes influences responses of college-age smokers and non-
smokers. Journal of Health Psychology, 19, 629-641. 
Glock, S., Unz, D., & Kovacs, C. (2012). Beyond fear appeals: Contradicting positive 
smoking outcome expectencies to influence smokers’ implicit attitudes, 
perception, and behavior. Addictive Behaviors, 37, 548-551. 
Godtfredsen, N. S., Prescott, E., Vestbo, J., & Osler, M. (2006). Smoking reduction and 
biomarkers in two longitudinal studies. Addiction, 101(10), 1516-1522. 
Goldman, M. S., Del Boca, F. K. & Darkes, J. (1999). Alcohol expectancy theory: The 
application of cognitive neuroscience. In: Leonard, K. E. & Blane, H. T., (Eds.), 
Psychological Theories of Drinking and Alcoholism (2nd Ed.), pp. 203–246. 
New York: Guilford Press. 
Goldman, M. S., Reich, R. R., & Darkes, J. (2006). Expectancy as a unifying construct 
in alcohol-related cognition. In R. W. Wiers & A. W. Stacy (Eds.), Handbook of 
implicit cognition and addiction (pp. 105-120). London, UK: Sage Publications. 
Gollwitzer, P., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Implementation intentions and goal achievement: 
A meta-analysis of effects and processes. Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology,  38, 69-119. 
Gravetter, F. J., & Forzano, L. B. (2008). Research methods for the behavioral sciences 
(3rd ed.). Belmont, CA, USA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning. 
Greenberg, I., & Altman, J. (1976). Modifying stimulus behavior through stimulus 
control: A case study. Journal of Behavior Therapy & Experimental Psychiatry, 
7, 97-99. 
304 
 
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-
esteem, and stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102, 4–27. 
Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the 
Implicit Association Test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 197-216. 
Greenwald, A., Nosek, B., & Sriram, N. (2006). Consequential validity of the Implicit 
Association Test: Comment on Blanton and Jaccard (2006). American 
Psychologist, 61, 56-61. 
Greenspoon, J. (1955). The reinforcing effect of two spoken sounds on the frequency of 
two responses. American Journal of Psychology, 68, 409-416. 
Greenwald, A., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K., (1998). Measuring individual 
differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology,74, 1464-1480. 
Greenwald, A., Peohlman, T., Uhlman, E., & Banaji, M. (2009). Understanding and 
using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 17-41.  
Gregg, A. (2007). When vying reveals lying: The timed antagonistic response 
alethiometer. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 21, 621-647. 
Gregg, A., Mahadevan, N., Edwards, S. E., & Klymowsky, J. (2014). Detecting lies 
about consumer attitudes using the timed antagonistic response alethiometer. 
Behavior Research Methods, 46, 758-771. 
Grenard, J., Ames, S., Wiers, R., Thush, C., Sussman, S., & Stacy, A. W. (2008). 
Working memory capacity moderates the predictive effects of drug-related 
associations on substance use. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 22, 426-432. 
Gronwall, D. M. A. (1977). Paced Auditory Serial-Addition Task: A measure of 
recovery from concussion. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 44, 367–373. 
Gross, J. J. (2015). Emotion regulation: Current status and future prospects. 
Psychological Inquiry, 26(1), 1-26. 
Gschwender, T., Hofmann, W., & Schmitt, M. (2008). Differential stability: The effects 
of acute and chronic construct accessibility on the temporal stability of the 
Implicit Association Test. Journal of Individual Differences, 29, 70-79. 
Gwaltney, C. J., Metrik, J., Kahler, C. W., & Shiffman, S. (2009). Self-efficacy and 
smoking cessation: A meta-analysis. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 23, 56-
66. 
305 
 
Haas, J. R., & Hayes, S. C. (2006). When knowing you are doing well hinders 
performance: Exploring the interaction between rules and feedback.  Journal of 
Organizational Behavior Management, 26 , 91-111. 
Hagger, M. S., Leaver, E., Esser, K., Leung, C. M., Te Pas, N., Keatley, D. A., Chan, D. 
K., & Chatzisarantis, N. L. (2013). Cue-induced smoking urges deplete cigarette 
smokers’ self-control resources. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 46(3), 394-400. 
Hajek, P. (1991). Individual differences in difficulty quitting smoking. British Journal 
of Addiction, 86, 555–558.  
Hajek, P., Belcher, M., & Stapleton, J. (1987). Breath-holding endurance as a predictor 
of success in smoking cessation. Addictive Behaviors, 12, 285–288. 
Haight, J. R. (2011). Implicit affective responses to smoking cues: A comparison of 
smoking groups and withdrawal states. Unpublished undergraduate/master’s 
dissertation, College of William and Mary, Williamsberg, Virginia, USA. 
Haight, J., Dickter, C. L., & Forestell, C. A. (2012). A comparison of daily and 
occasional smokers’ implicit affective response to smoking cues. Addictive 
Behaviors, 37, 234-239. 
Han, H. A., Czellar, S., Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2010). Malleability of attitudes or 
malleability of the IAT? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 286-
298. 
Han, H. A., Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2006). The influence of experimentally 
created extrapersonal associations on the Implicit Association Test. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 259-272. 
Hanley, J. A., & McNeil, B. J. (1982). The meaning and use of the area under a 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. Radiology, 143, 29-36.  
Harrell, P. T., & Juliano, L. M. (2012). A direct test of the influence of nicotine 
response expectancies on the subjective and cognitive effects of smoking. 
Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 20, 278-286. 
Harmon-Jones, E. (2012). Cognitive dissonance theory. In V.S. Ramachandran (Ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Human Behavior (2nd Ed.). London, UK: Elsevier Inc. 
Harmon-Jones, E., Gable, P., & Price, T. (2013). Does negative affect always narrow 
and positive affect always broaden the mind? Considering the influence of 
motivational intensity on cognitive scope. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 22, 301-307. 
Harris, J., Pierce, J., & Bargh, M. (in press). Priming effect of antismoking PSAs on 
smoking behaviour. A pilot study. Tobacco Control.  
306 
 
Havermans, R. C. (2011). “You Say it's Liking, I Say it's Wanting…”. On the difficulty 
of disentangling food reward in man. Appetite, 57(1), 286-294. 
Havermans, R., Mulkens, S., Nederkoorn, C., & Jansen, A. (2007). The efficacy of cue 
exposure with response prevention in extinguishing drug and alcohol cue 
reactivity. Behavioral Interventions, 22, 121-135.  
Hayes, S. C. (1993). Analytic goals and the varieties of scientific contextualism. In S.C. 
Hayes L.J. Hayes, H.W. Reese, & T.R. Sarbin (Eds.), Varieties of Scientific 
Contextualism (pp. 11-27). Reno, NV: Context Press  
Hayes, A. F. (2009). Beyond Baron and Kenny: Statistical mediation analysis in the 
new millennium. Communication Monographs, 76, 408-420.  
Hayes, A. F. (2012). PROCESS: A versatile computational tool for observed variable 
mediation, moderation, and conditional process modeling [White paper]. 
Retrieved on Nov. 2nd 2012 from 
http://www.afhayes.com/public/process2012.pdf. 
Hayes, A. F. (2013). An introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process 
analysis: A regression-based approach. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Hayes, S. C. (1989). Rule-governed behavior: Cognition, contingencies, and 
instructional control. New York: Plenum Press. 
Hayes, S. C. (1993). Rule governance: Basic behavioral research and applied 
implications. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2, 193-197. 
Hayes, S. C. (2004). Falsification and the protective belt surrounding entity-postulating 
theories. Applied & Preventative Psychology, 11, 35-37. 
Hayes, S. C., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Roche, B. (2001). Relational frame theory: A post-
Skinnerian account of human language and cognition. Springer Science & 
Business Media. 
Hayes, S. C., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Wilson, K. (2012). Contextual behavioral science: 
Creating a science more adequate to the challenge of the human condition. 
Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science, 1, 1-16. 
Hayes, S. C., & Brownstein, A. J. (1986). Mentalism, behavior-behavior relations, and a 
behavior-analytic view of the purposes of science. The Behavior Analyst, 9, 175-
190. 
Hayes, A. F., & Cai, L. (2007). Using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error 
estimators in OLS regression: An introduction and software implementation. 
Behavior Research Methods, 39, 709-722. 
307 
 
Hayes, S. C., Hayes, L. J. & Reese, H. W. (1988). Finding the philosophical core: A 
review of Stephen C. Pepper's ‘World hypotheses: A study in evidence’. Journal 
of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 50, 97-111. 
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K. D., & Wilson, K. G. (2011). Acceptance and commitment 
therapy: The process and practice of mindful change. Guilford Press. 
Hayes, S. C., Wilson, K. G., Gifford, E. V., Follette, V. M., & Strosahl, K. (1996). 
Experiential avoidance and behavioral disorders: A functional dimensional 
approach to diagnosis and treatment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology 64, 1152–68. 
Heatherton, T. F., & Wagner, D. D. (2011). Cognitive neuroscience of self-regulation 
failure. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(3), 132-139. 
Heckman, B. W., Ditre, J. W., & Brandon, T. H. (2012). The restorative effects of 
smoking upon self-control resources: A negative reinforcement pathway. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 121(1), 244-249. 
Heckman, B. W., Kovacs, M. A., Marquinez, N. S., Meltzer, L. R., Tsambarlis, M. E., 
Drobes, D. J., & Brandon, T. H. (2013). Influence of affective manipulations on 
cigarette craving: A meta‐analysis. Addiction, 108(12), 2068-2078. 
Hempel, C.G. (1970). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the 
philosophy of science. New York: Free Press. 
Hernandez, S., Vander Wal, J. S., & Spring, B. (2003). A negative mood induction 
procedure with efficacy across repeated administrations in women.Journal of 
Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 25(1), 49-55. 
Heyman, G. M. (2009). Addiction: A disorder of choice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Hofmann, W., De Houwer, J., Perugini, M., Baeyens, F., & Crombez, G. (2010). 
Evaluative conditioning in humans: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 
390–421. 
Hofmann, W., Vohs, K. D., & Baumeister, R. F. (2012). What people desire, feel 
conflicted about, and try to resist in everyday life. Psychological Science, 23(6), 
582-588. 
Heatherton, T. F., Kozlowski, L. T., Frecker, R. C., & Fagerström, K. (1991). The 
Fagerström test for nicotine dependence. The British Journal of Addiction, 86, 
1119-1127. 
308 
 
Heckman, B. W., Kovacs, M. A., Marquinez, N. S., Meltzer, L. R., Tsambarlis, M. E., 
Drobes, D. J., & Brandon, T. H. (2013). Influence of affective manipulations on 
cigarette craving: a meta‐analysis. Addiction, 108(12), 2068-2078. 
Heintzelman, S. J., Trent, J., King, L. A. (2013). Encounters with objective coherence 
and the experience of meaning in life. Psychological Science, 24, 991-998. 
Hendricks, P. S., & Brandon, T. H. (2005). Smoking expectancy associates among 
college smokers. Addictive Behaviors, 30, 235-245. 
Hendricks, P. S., & Brandon, T. H. (2008). Smokers’ expectancies for smoking versus 
nicotine. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 22, 135-140. 
Hendricks, P.S., Ditre J. W., Drobes D. J., & Brandon, T. H. (2006). The early time 
course of smoking withdrawal effects. Psychopharmacology, 187, 385–396. 
Hendricks, P. S., Prochaska, J. J., Humfleet, G. L., & Hall, S. M. (2008). Evaluating the 
validities of different DSM-IV-based conceptual constructs of tobacco 
dependence. Addiction, 103, 1215-1223. 
Hendricks, P. S., Wood, S. B., Baker, M. R., Delucchi, K. L., & Hall, S. M. (2011). The 
Smoking Abstinence Questionnaire: Measurement of smokers' 
abstinence‐related expectancies. Addiction, 106(4), 716-728. 
Henningfield, J. E., Miyasato, K., & Jasinski, D. R. (1985). Abuse liability and 
pharmacodynamic characteristics of intravenous and inhaled nicotine. Journal of 
Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics, 234(1), 1-12. 
Hermans, D., De Houwer, J., & Eelen, P. (2001). A time course analysis of the affective 
priming effect. Cognition & Emotion, 15, 143-165. 
Hermans, D., Spruyt, A., De Houwer, J., & Eelen, P. (2003). Affective priming with 
subliminally presented pictures. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
57, 97-114. 
Herring, D. R., White, K. R., Jabeen, L. N., Hinojos, M., Terrazas, G., Reyes, S. M., 
Taylor, J. H., & Crites, S. L., Jr. (2013). On the Automatic Activation of 
Attitudes: A Quarter Century of Evaluative Priming Research. Psychological 
Bulletin, 139, 1062-1089. 
Hertel, A. W., Finch, E. A., Kelly, K. M., King, C., Lando, H., Linde, J. A., et al., 
(2008). The impact of expectations and satisfaction on the initiation and 
maintenance of smoking-cessation: An experimental test. Health Psychology, 27 
(Suppl. 1), S197-S206.  
Heyman, G. M. (2009). Addiction: A disorder of choice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
309 
 
Heyman, G. M. (2011). Received wisdom regarding the roles of craving and dopamine 
in addiction: A response to Lewis’s critique of ‘Addiction: A disorder of 
choice.’ Perspectives of Psychological Science, 6, 156-160. 
Heyman, G. M. (2013). Addiction and choice: Theory and new data. Frontiers in 
Psychiatry, 4, 1-5. 
Hickey, P., & Evans, D. S. (2014). Smoking in Ireland 2013: Synopsis of key patterns 
and trends. Dublin, Ireland: The Irish Health Service Executive. 
Hine, D., Marks, A., & O’Neill, G. (2009). Smoking cessation in adults: A dual process 
perspective. Addiction Research and Therapy, 17, 220-229. 
Hofman, W., De Houwer, J., Perugini, M., Baeyans, F., & Crombez, G. (2010). 
Evaluative conditioning in humans: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 
136, 390-421. 
Hofman, W., Gawronski, B., Gschwender, T., Le., H., & Schmidt, M. (2005). A meta-
analysis on the correspondence between the Implicit Association Test and 
explicit self-report measures. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 
1369-1385. 
Hofmann, W., Rauch, W., & Gawronski, B. (2007). And deplete us not into temptation: 
Automatic attitudes, dietary restraint, and self-regulatory resources as 
determinants of eating behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 
497-504. 
Hogarth, L., Dickinson, A., Hutton, S. B., Bamborough, H., & Duka, T. (2006). 
Contingency knowledge is necessary for learned motivated behaviour in humans: 
relevance for addictive behaviour. Addiction, 101(8), 1153-1166. 
Hogarth, L., & Duka, T. (2006). Human nicotine conditioning requires explicit 
contingency knowledge: is addictive behaviour cognitively mediated? 
Psychopharmacology, 184(3-4), 553-566. 
Hogg, R., V., & Tanis, E. A. (1996). Probability and statistical inference. Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Holtgraves T. (2004). Social desirability and self-reports: Testing models of socially 
desirable responding. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30, 161–172. 
Hooper, N., Saunders, J., & McHugh, L. (2010). The derived generalization of thought 
suppression. Learning & Behavior, 38(2), 160-168. 
Hooper, N., Stewart, I., Duffy, C., Freegard, G., & McHugh, L. (2012). Modelling the 
direct and indirect effects of thought suppression on personal choice. Journal of 
Contextual Behavioral Science, 1(1), 73-82. 
310 
 
Hooper, N., Villatte, M., Neofotistou, E., & McHugh, L. (2010). The effects of 
mindfulness versus thought suppression on implicit and explicit measures of 
experiential avoidance. International Journal of Behavioral Consultation and 
Therapy, 6(3), 233-244. 
Hopko, D. R., Hunt, M. K., & Armento, M. E. (2005). Attentional task aptitude and 
performance anxiety. International Journal of Stress Management, 12(4), 389-408. 
Horwitz, J. E., & McCaffrey, R. J. (2008). Effects of a third party observer and anxiety 
on tests of executive function. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 23(4), 409-
417. 
Houben, k., Wiers, R., & Roefs, A. (2006). Reaction time measures of substance-related 
associations. I In R. W. Wiers & A. W. Stacy (Eds.), Handbook of implicit 
cognition and addiction (pp. 91-104). London, UK: Sage Publications. 
Howell, D. C. (2012a). Statistical methods for psychology (8th ed.). Belmont, CA: 
Thomson Wadsworth. 
Howell, D. C. (2012b). Chi-square test - analysis of contingency tables. Retrieved 2nd 
March, 2012, from online supplementary materials for the textbook, Howell, D. 
C., Statistical methods for psychology (8th ed.): 
http://www.uvm.edu/~dhowell/methods8/Supplements/ChiSquareTests.pdf.  
Hu, X., Rosenfeld, J. P., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2012). Combating automatic 
autobiographical associations: The effect of instruction and training in 
strategically concealing information in the autobiographical Implicit Association 
Test. Psychological Science, 23, 1079-1085. 
Hughes, J. R. (2007a). Effects of abstinence from tobacco: Etiology, animal models, 
epidemiology, and significance: A subjective review. Nicotine & Tobacco 
Research, 9, 329-339. 
Hughes, J. R. (2007b). The effects of abstinence from tobacco: Valid symptoms and 
time course. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 9. 315-327. 
Hughes, J. R. (2008). An algorithm for choosing among smoking-cessation treatments. 
Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment, 34, 426-432. 
Hughes, J. R. (in press). Measurements of the effects of abstinence from tobacco. Drug 
and Alcohol Dependence. 
Hughes, S., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2011). On the formation and persistence of implicit 
attitudes: New evidence from the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
(IRAP). The Psychological Record, 61(3), 391-410. 
311 
 
Hughes, S., Barnes-Holmes, D., & De Houwer, J. (2011). The dominance of associative 
theorising in implicit attitude research: Propositional and behavioural 
alternatives. The Psychological Record, 61, 465-496. 
Hughes, S., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Vahey, N. (2012). Holding on to our functional roots 
when exploring new intellectual islands: A voyage through implicit cognition 
research. Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science, 1(1), 17-38. 
Hughes, J. R., Keely, J., & Naud, S. (2004). Shape of the relapse curve and long-term 
abstinence among untreated smokers. Addiction, 99, 29-38. 
Hughes, J. R., Rennard, S. I., Fingar, J. R., et al., (2011). Efficacy of varenicline to 
prompt quit attempts in smokers not planning to quit. Nicotine & Tobacco 
Research, 13, 955-964. 
Hukkanen, J., Jacob, P., & Benowitz, N. L. (2005). Metabolism and disposition kinetics 
of nicotine. Pharmacological Reviews, 57(1), 79-115. 
Huijding, J., & de Jong, P. J. (2006). Automatic associations with the sensory aspects of 
smoking: Positive in habitual smokers but negative in non-smokers. Addictive 
Behaviors, 31, 182-186. 
Huijding, J., de Jong, P. J., Wiers, R.W., & Verkooijen, K. (2005). Implicit and explicit 
attitudes toward smoking in a smoking and nonsmoking setting. Addictive 
Behaviors, 30, 949-961. 
Huntsinger, J. R. (2013). Does emotion directly tune the scope of attention. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 22, 265-270. 
Hussey, I., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2012). The implicit relational assessment procedure 
as a measure of implicit depression and the role of psychological 
flexibility. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 19(4), 573-582. 
Hussey, I., Thompson, M., McEnteggart, C., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Barnes-Holmes, Y. 
(2015). Interpreting and inverting with less cursing: A guide to interpreting 
IRAP data. Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science, 4, 157-162.  
Hwang, J., & Yun, Z. S. (2015). Mechanism of psychological distress-driven smoking 
addiction behavior. Journal of Business Research, 68, 2189-2197. 
Hyman, S. E., Malenka, R. C., & Nestler, E. J. (2006). Neural mechanisms of addiction: 
the role of reward-related learning and memory. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 29, 565-598 
Ito, T. A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). Attitudes as mental and neural states of readiness: 
Using physiological measures to study implicit attitudes. In B. Wittenbrink & N. 
312 
 
Schwarz (Eds.), Implicit measures of attitudes (pp. 125-158). New York: 
Guildford Press. 
IBM Corporation (2012). IBM statistics 20 algorithms. Retrieved 23 October, 2012, 
from 
ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/software/analytics/spss/documentation/statistics/20.0/e
n/client/Manuals/IBM_SPSS_Statistics_Algorithms.pdf.  
Irish Cancer Society (January, 2014). Ipsos MRBI Research commissioned by Irish 
Cancer Society shows a 19% smoking rate while 8 out of 10 want to quit. Retrieved 
August 2015, from http://www.cancer.ie/content/new-research-shows-19-cent-irish-
population-currently-smoke#sthash.ys2bXwK8.5EgiuyNg.dpuf.  
Jajodia, A., & Earleywine, M. (2003). Measuring alcohol expectancies with the implicit 
association test. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 17, 126-133. 
Jarrett, C. (2013). Trivial research. The Psychologist, 26, 393. 
James, W. (1890a). Principles of psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Holt.  
James, W. (1890b). Habit. In W. James, Psychology (Briefer course) (pp. 134-150). 
NY, US: Henry Holt and Company. 
Johnston, W. A., & Dark, V. J. (1986). Selective attention. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 37, 43-75. 
Jones, E. E., & Harris, V. A. (1967). The attribution of attitudes. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 3, 1–24.  
Jones, E. E., & Nisbett, R. E. (1971). The actor and the observer: Divergent perceptions 
of the causes of behavior. New York: General Learning Press. 
Kahler, C. W., Daughters, S. B., Leventhal, A. M., Gwaltney, C. J.,  & Palfai T. P. 
(2007). Implicit associations between smoking and social consequences among 
smokers in cessation treatment. Behavior Research and Therapy, 45, 2066-2077. 
Kahler, C. W., McHugh, R. K., Metrik, J., Spillane, N. S., & Rohsenow, D. J. (2012). 
Breath holding duration and self-reported smoking abstinence intolerance as 
predictors of smoking lapse behavior in a laboratory analog task. Nicotine & 
Tobacco Research, 15, 1151-1154. 
Kahler, C. W., Spillane, N. S., Metrik, J. (2010). Alcohol use and initial smoking lapses 
among heavy drinkers in smoking cessation treatment. Nicotine & Tobacco 
Research, 12, 781-785. 
Kahneman, D. (1973). Attention and effort. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.  
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and 
Geroux. 
313 
 
Kahneman, D. (2012, Sept. 26th). A proposal to deal with questions about priming 
effects. Retrieved from 
http://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/7.6716.1349271308!/suppinfoFile/Kahnema
n%20Letter.pdf.  
Kapson, H. S., Leddy, M. A., & Haaga, D. A. (2012). Specificity of effects of cognitive 
behavior therapy on coping, acceptance, and distress tolerance in a randomized 
controlled trial for smoking cessation. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 68(12), 
1231-1240. 
Karpinski, A., & Steinman, R. B. (2006). The Single Category Implicit Association Test 
as a measure of implicit social cognition. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 91, 16–32. 
Kashdan, T. B., Barrios, V., Forsyth, J. P., & Steger, M. F. (2006). Experiential 
avoidance as a generalized psychological vulnerability: Comparisons with coping 
and emotion regulation strategies. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44(9), 1301-
1320. 
Kassam, K. S., & Mendes, W. B. (2013). The effects of measuring emotion: 
Physiological reactions to emotional situations depend on whether someone is 
asking. PLoS ONE, 8, e64959. 
Kazdin, A. E. (2007). Mediators and mechanisms of change in psychotherapy 
research. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 3, 1-27. 
Kelly, J., Barrett, S., Pihl, R., & Dagher, A. (2004). Level of abstinence mediates heart-
rate response to cue-elicited craving in smokers. McGill Journal of Medicine, 8, 
50-57. 
Kelly, A., Masterman, P., & Marlatt, G. (2006). Adolescent tobacco-related associative 
memory: A cross-sectional and contextual analysis. Nicotine & Tobacco 
Research, 8, 49-55. 
Kendrick, R. V., & Olson, M. A. (2012). When feeling right leads to being right in the 
reporting of implicitly-formed attitudes, or how I learned to stop worrying and 
trust my gut. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 1316-1321. 
Kerst, W. F., & Waters, A. J. (2014). Attentional retraining administered in the field 
reduces smokers’ attentional bias and craving. Health Psychology, 33, 1232-1240. 
Kihlstrom, J.F.  (2008). The automaticity juggernaut.  In J. Baer, J.C. Kaufman, & R.F. 
Baumeister (Eds.), Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will (pp. 155-180).  New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
314 
 
Kirkman, T.W. (1996). Statistics to use. Retrieved 2nd March, 2012, from College of 
St. Benedict’s and St. John’s University, Physics department website:  
http://www.physics.csbsju.edu/stats/contingency.problem.html. 
King, L. (1982). Medical thinking: A historical preface. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Kirchner, T. R., & Sayette, M. A. (2007). Effects of smoking abstinence and alcohol 
consumption on smoking-related outcome expectancies in heavy smokers and 
tobacco chippers. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 9, 365-376. 
Kirshenbaum, A. P., Olsen, D. M., & Bickel, W. K. (2009). A quantitative review of the 
ubiquitous relapse curve. Journal of substance abuse treatment,36(1), 8-17. 
Kjærsgaard, T. (2015). Enhancing motivation by use of prescription stimulants: The 
ethics of motivation enhancement. AJOB Neuroscience, 6(1), 4-10. 
Klauer, K. C., & Mierke, J. (2005). Task-set inertia, attitude accessibility, and 
compatibility-order effects: New evidence for a task-set switching account of the 
IAT effect. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 208-217. 
Klauer, K. C., & Musch, J. (2003). Affective priming: Findings and theories. In J. 
Musch & K. C. Klauer (Eds.), The psychology of evaluation: Affective processes 
in cognition and emotion (pp. 7–50). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Klauer, K.C., Rossnagel, C., & Musch, J. (1997). List-context effects in evaluative 
priming. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 23, 246– 255. 
Klauer, K. C., Schmitz, F., Teige-Mocigemba, S., & Voss, A. (2010). Understanding the 
role of executive control in the Implicit Association Test: Why flexible people 
have small IAT effects. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 63(3), 595-619. 
Klauer, K. C., & Teige-Mocigemba, S. (2007). Controllability and resource dependence 
in automatic evaluation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 648–
655. 
Klein, A., Becker, E., & Rinck, M. (2011). Approach and avoidance tendencies in 
spider fearful children: The approach-avoidance task. Journal of Child and 
Family Studies, 20, 224-231. 
Knudsen, E. I. (2007). Fundamental components of attention. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 30, 57-78. 
Koh, H. K., Alpert, H. R., Judge, C. M., Caughey, R. W., Elqura, L. J., Connolly, G. N., 
& Warren, C. W. (2011). Understanding worldwide youth attitudes towards 
315 
 
smoke-free policies: an analysis of the Global Youth Tobacco Survey. Tobacco 
Control, 20, 219-25. 
Koob, G. F., & Le Moal, M. (2008). Addiction and the brain anti-reward system. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 29-53. 
Koole, S. L., Webb, T. L., & Sheeran, P. L. (2015). Implicit emotion regulation: Feeling 
better without knowing why. Current Opinion in Psychology, 3, 6-10. 
Köpetz, C. E., Lejuez, C. W., Wiers, R. W., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2013). Motivation 
and self-regulation in addiction: A call for convergence. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 8, 3-24. 
Krank, M. D., Ames, S. L., Grenard, J. L., Schoenfeld, T., & Stacy, A. W. (2010). 
Paradoxical effects of alcohol information on alcohol outcome 
expectancies. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 34(7), 1193-
1200. 
Krank, M., Wall, A., Stewart, S., Wiers, R., & Goldman, M. (2005). Context effects on 
alcohol cognitions. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 29, 196-
206. 
Krause, S., Back, M. D., Egloff, B., & Schmuckle, S. C. (2011). Reliability of implicit 
self-esteem measures revisited. European Journal of Personality, 25, 239-251. 
Krieglmeyer, R., & Deutsch, R. (2010). Comparing measures of approach-avoidance 
behaviour: The manikin task vs. two versions of the joystick task. Cognition and 
Emotion, 24, 810-828. 
Kučera, D., & Haviger, J. (2012). Using mood induction procedures in psychological 
research. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 69, 31-40. 
Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3rd Ed.). Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press  
Kuhn, T. (1970a). In Lakatos, I., & Musgrave, A. (Eds.) (1970). Criticism and the 
Growth of Knowledge (p. 1-24). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kuhn, T. (1970b). In Lakatos, I., & Musgrave, A. (Eds.). (1970). Criticism and the 
Growth of Knowledge (p. 231-279). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lai, C. K., Marini, M., Lehr, S. A., Cerruti, C., Shin, J. E., Joy-Gaba, J. A., Ho, A. K., 
Teachman, B. A., Wojcik, S. P., Koleva, S. P., Frazier, R. S., Heiphetz, L., 
Chen, E. E., Turner, R. N., Haidt, J., Kesebir, S., Hawkins, C. B., Schaefer, H. 
S., Rubichi, S., Sartori, G., Dial, C. M., Sriram, N., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. 
A. (2014). Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences: I. A Comparative Investigation 
of 17 Interventions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 143, 1765-1785. 
316 
 
Lally, P., & Gardner, B. (2013). Promoting habit formation. Health Psychology Review, 
7 (Suppl.1), S137-S158.  
Lancaster, T., & Stead, L. F. (2005). Self-help interventions for smoking cessation. 
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, 2012(3), Article CD001118. 
Retrieved March 7th 2011 from 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD001118.pub2/abstract. 
Lane, K. A., Banaji, M. R., Nosek, B. A., & Greenwald, A. G. (2007). Understanding 
and Using the Implicit Association Test: IV What We Know (So Far) about the 
Method. In B. Wittenbrink, & N. Schwarz (Eds.), Implicit measures of attitudes 
(pp. 59-101). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Larsen, H., Kong, G., Becker, D., Cousijn, J., Boendermaker, W., Cavello, D., 
Krishnan-Sarin, S., & Wiers, R. (2014). Implicit motivational processes 
underlying smoking in American and Dutch adolescents. Frontiers in 
Psychiatry, 5, 1-9. doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2014.00051 
LeBel, E. P., & Paunonen, S. V. (2011). Sexy but often unreliable: The impact of 
unreliability on the replicability of experimental findings with implicit measures. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 570-583. 
Lee, E. B., An, W., Levin, M. E., & Twohig, M. P. (2015). An initial meta-analysis of 
acceptance and commitment therapy for treating substance use disorders. Drug 
and Alcohol Dependence, 155, 1-7. 
Legault, L., Gutsell, J. N., & Inzlicht, M. (2011). Ironic effects of antiprejudice 
messages: How motivational interventions can reduce (but also increase) 
prejudice. Psychological Science, 22, 1472-1477. 
Leigh, B., & Stacy, A. (1991). On the scope of alcohol expectancy research: Remaining 
issues of measurement and meaning. Psychological Bulletin, 110, 147-154. 
Leigh, B., & Stacy, A. (1998). Individual differences in memory associations involving 
the positive and negative outcomes of alcohol use. Psychology of Addictive 
Behaviors, 12, 39-46. 
Leitch, D. N., Harkawat, R., Askew, J., Masel, P., & Hendrick, D. J. (2005). Relation of 
expired carbon monoxide to smoking history, lapsed time, T L CO measurement 
and passive smoking. Respiratory Medicine, 99(1), 32-38. 
Lejuez, C. W., Kahler, C. W., Brown, R. A. (2001). A modified computer version of the 
Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task (PASAT) as a laboratory-based stressor. The 
Behavior Therapist. 1, 290–293. 
317 
 
Lejuez, C. W., Kahler, C. W., & Brown, R. A. (2003). A modified computer version of 
the paced auditory serial addition task (PASAT) as a laboratory-based stressor: 
Implications for behavioral assessment. Behavior Therapist, 26, 290–292. 
Lelkes, Y., Krosnick, J. A., Marx, D. M., Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (2012). Complete 
anonymity compromises the accuracy of self-reports. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 48, 1291-1299. 
Leung, K. S., & McCusker, C. G. (1999). Accessibility and availability of smoking-
related associations in smokers. Addiction Research, 7, 313-226. 
Leventhal, A. M. (2008). Subliminal processes in tobacco dependence. Dissertation 
abstracts international: B, 68 (7-B), p. 4832. 
Leventhal, A. M., Waters, A. J., Breitmeyer, B. G., Miller, E. K., Tapia, E., & Li, Y. 
(2008). Subliminal processing of smoking-related and affective stimuli in 
tobacco addiction. Experimental and clinical psychopharmacology, 16, 301-312. 
Levin, M. E., Hayes, S. C., & Waltz, T. (2010). Creating an implicit measure of 
cognition more suited to applied research: A test of the Mixed Trial – Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (MT-IRAP). International Journal of 
Behavioral Consultation and Therapy, 6, 245-262. 
Levin, M. E., Hildebrandt, M. J., Lillis, J., & Hayes, S. C. (2012). The impact of 
treatment components suggested by the psychological flexibility model: A meta-
analysis of laboratory-based component studies. Behavior Therapy, 43(4), 741-
756. 
Levin, M. E., Luoma, J. B., & Haeger, J. A. (in press). Decoupling as a mechanism of 
change in mindfulness and acceptance a literature review. Behavior 
Modification. Accessed from 
http://bmo.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/09/07/0145445515603707.abstract.  
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., Seifert, C. M., Schwarz, M., & Cook, J. (2012). 
Misinformation and its correction: Continued influence and successful 
debiasing. Psychological Science, 13, 106-131. 
Lewis, M. D. (2011). Dopamine and the neural “Now”: Essay and review of ‘Addiction: 
A disorder of choice.’ Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 150-155. 
Liefooghe, B., & De Houwer, J. (2015). A functional approach for research on cognitive 
control: Analysing cognitive control tasks and their effects in terms of operant 
conditioning. International Journal of Psychology. Accessed August 19th 2015 
from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ijop.12179/epdf. 
318 
 
Linden, D. (2013). Biological psychiatry: Time for new paradigms. The British Journal 
of Psychiatry, 202, 166-167. 
Lipkus, I. M., Green, J. D., Feaganes, J. R., & Sedikides, C. (2001). The relationship 
between attitudinal ambivalence and desire to quit smoking among college 
smokers. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31, 113-133. 
Littel, M., & Franken, I. (2011). Implicit and explicit selective attention to smoking 
cues in smokers indexed by brain potentials. Journal of Psychopharmacology, 
25, 503-513. 
Litvin, E. B., Kovacs, M. A., Hayes, P. L., & Brandon, T. H. (2012). Responding to 
tobacco craving: Experimental test of acceptance versus suppression. Psychology of 
Addictive Behaviors, 26(4), 830-837. 
Litz, B., Payne, T., & Colletti, G. (1987). Schematic processing of smoking information 
by smokers and never-smokers. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 11, 301-313. 
Lochbuehler, K., Kleinjan, M., & Engels, R. (2013). Does exposure to smoking cues in 
movies affect adolescents’ immediate smoking behavior? Addictive Behaviors, 
38, 2203-2206. 
Loersch, C., & Payne, B. K. (2011). The situated inference model: An integrative 
account of the effects of primes on perception, behavior, and motivation. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 234-252. 
Lonergan, B. J. (2013). Impact of the smoke-free workplace legislation on smoking 
behaviour, risk perception & stigmatisation. (Ph.D. Thesis, University College 
Cork). Retrieved from https://cora.ucc.ie/handle/10468/1493.  
Loscher, D. (2003). What do smokers want? Dublin, Ireland: Office of Tobacco 
Control. 
Lovibond, P. F. (2006). Fear and avoidance: An integrated expectancy model. In M.G. 
Craske, D. Hermans, & D. Vansteenwegen (Eds.), Fear and learning: Basic 
science to clinical application (pp. 117-132). Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association. 
Lowry, R. (2012). Software for computing the significance of the difference between 
the areas under two independent ROC curves. Implemented 2nd March, 2012, at 
http://www.vassarstats.net/roc_comp.html.  
MacKillop, J., Brown, C. L., Stojek, M. K., Murphy, C. M., Sweet, L., & Niaura, R. 
(2012). Behavioral economic analysis of withdrawal- and cue-elicited craving 
for tobacco: An initial investigation. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 14, 1426-
1434. 
319 
 
MacPherson, L., Stipelman, B. A., Duplinsky, M., Brown, R. A., & Lejuez, C. W. 
(2008). Distress tolerance and pre-smoking treatment attrition: Examination of 
moderating relationships. Addictive Behaviors, 33(11), 1385-1393. 
MacPherson, L., Strong, D.R., & Myers, M.G. (2008). Using an item response model to 
examine the nicotine dependence construct as characterized by the HONC and 
the mFTQ among adolescent smokers. Addictive Behaviors, 33, 880-894.  
Macy, J. T., Chassin, L., Presson, C. C., & Sherman, J. W. (2015). Changing implicit 
attitudes toward smoking: results from a web-based approach-avoidance practice 
intervention. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 38, 143-152. 
Malle, B. F. (2004). How the mind explains behavior: Folk explanations, meaning, and 
social interaction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Malle, B. F. (2006). The actor-observer asymmetry in causal attribution: A (surprising) 
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 895-919.  
Malle, B. F. (2011). Time to give up the dogmas of attribution: An alternative theory of 
behavior explanation. In J. M. Olson and M. P. Zanna (eds.), Advances of 
Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 44, pp. 297–352). Burlington: Academic 
Press.  
Malle, B. F., Knobe, J., & Nelson, S. (2007). Actor-observer asymmetries in 
explanations of behavior: New answers to an old question. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 491-514. 
Marks, A., O’Neill, G., & Hine, D. (2008). Role of affect, expectancies, and dual 
processes of cognition in predicting adult cigarette smoking. Australian Journal 
of Psychology, 60, 160-167. 
Marhe, R., Waters, A. J., van de Wetering, B. J., & Franken, I. H. (2013). Implicit and 
explicit drug-related cognitions during detoxification treatment are associated 
with drug relapse: an ecological momentary assessment study. Journal of 
consulting and clinical psychology, 81(1), 1-12. 
McCallion, E. A., & Zvolensky, M. J. (2015). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
(ACT) for smoking cessation: A synthesis. Current Opinion in Psychology, 2, 
47-51. 
McCarthy, D. E., Gloria, R., & Curtin, J. J. (2009). Attention bias in nicotine 
withdrawal and under stress. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 23(1), 77-90. 
McCarthy, D. M., & Thompson, D. M. (2006). Implicit and explicit measures of alcohol 
and smoking cognitions. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 20, 436−444. 
320 
 
McCaul, K. D., Hockemeyer, J. R., Johnson, R. J., Zetocha, K., Quinlan, K., & 
Glasgow, R. E. (2006). Motivation to quit using cigarettes: A review. Addictive 
Behaviors, 31(1), 42-56. 
McEwen, A., West, R., & McRobbie, H. (2008). Motives for smoking and their 
correlates in clients attending Stop Smoking treatment services. Nicotine & 
Tobacco Research, 10(5), 843-850. 
McGreevy, C. A., Bonanno, G. A., & D’Andrea, W. (2015). Variation in the 
physiological costs and benefits of rumination and distraction: The moderating 
effect of habitual thought suppression. Personality and Individual 
Differences,85, 93-97. 
McHugh, R. K., Daughters, S. B., Lejuez, C. W., Murray, H. W., Hearon, B. A., Gorka, 
S. M., & Otto, M. W. (2011). Shared variance among self-report and behavioral 
measures of distress intolerance. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 35(3), 266-275. 
McKay, J. R., Franklin, T. R., Patapis, N., & Lynch, K. G. (2006). Conceptual, 
methodological, and analytical issues in the study of relapse. Clinical Psychology 
Review, 26(2), 109-127. 
McKee, S. A., Wall, A., Hinson, R. E., Goldstein, A., & Bissonnette, M. (2003). Effects 
of an implicit mood prime on the accessibility of smoking expectancies in 
college women. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 17, 219-225. 
McKee, S. A., Sinha, R., Weinberger, A. H., Sofuoglu, M., Harrison, E. L., Lavery, M., 
& Wanzer, J. (2011). Stress decreases the ability to resist smoking and 
potentiates smoking intensity and reward. Journal of psychopharmacology, 
25(4), 490-502. 
McKenna, I. M., Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2007). Testing 
the fake-ability of the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP): The 
first study. International Journal of Psychology and Psychological 
Therapy, 7(2), 253-268. 
McLaren, N. (1998). A critical review of the biopsychosocial model. The Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 32, 86–92. 
McLaren, N. (2006). The myth of the biopsychosocial model. Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 36, 701–703. 
McLaren, N. (2009). Humanizing Psychiatry. Ann Arbor, MI: Loving Healing Press. 
McLaren, N. (2010). Humanizing Psychiatrists. Ann Arbor, MI: Loving Healing Press. 
321 
 
Messer, K., & Pierce, J. (2013). Is the lack of effect of smoking cessation aids in 
population studies explained by recall bias? Comment on the article by Borland 
et al. (2012). Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 15, 752-753. 
Messner, C., & Vosgerau, J. (2010). Cognitive inertia and the Implicit Association Test. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 47, 374-386. 
Mezulis, A. H., Abramson, L. Y., Hyde, J. S., & Hankin, B. L. (2004). Is there a 
universal positivity bias in attributions? A meta-analytic review of individual, 
developmental, and cultural differences in the self-serving attributional bias. 
Psychol Bull., 130, 711-747. 
Mierke, J. & Klauer, K. C. (2003). Method-specific variance in the Implicit Association 
Test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 1180-1192. 
Miller, G. (2010). Mistreating psychology in the decades of the brain. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 5(6), 716-743. 
Mogg, K., Bradley, B., Field, A., & De Houwer, J. (2003). Eye movements to smoking-
related pictures in smokers: Relationship between attentional biases and implicit 
and explicit measures of stimulus valence. Addiction, 98, 825-836. 
Mogg, K., Field, M., & Bradley, B. (2005). Attentional and approach biases for 
smoking cues in smokers: An investigation of competing theoretical views of 
addiction. Psychopharmacology, 180, 333-341. 
Mongan, D., Reynolds, S., Fanagan, S., & Long, J. (2007) Health-related consequences 
of problem alcohol use (Overview 6). Dublin, Ireland: Health Research Board.  
Moore, J.  (2003). Explanation and description in traditional neobehaviorism, cognitive 
psychology, and behavior analysis. In P. Chase & K. Lattal (Eds.), Behavior 
theory and philosophy (pp. 13-39). Dordrecht, NL: Kluwer. 
Moore, J. (2010). What do mental terms mean? The Psychological Record, 60, 699-714. 
Moore, J. (2011). Behaviorism. The Psychological Record, 61, 449-464. 
Moore, J. (2013). Three views of behaviorism. The Psychological Record, 63, 681-691. 
Moors, A., Spruyt, A., & De Houwer, J. (2010). In search of a measures that qualifies as 
implicit: Recommendations based on a decompositional view of automaticity. In 
B. Gawronski, & B. K. Payne (Eds.), Handbook of implicit social cognition: 
Measurement, theory, and applications (pp. 19-37). New York, NY: Guilford 
Press. 
Moss, A. C., Erskine, J. A., Albery, I. P., Allen, J. R., & Georgiou, G. J. (2015). To 
suppress, or not to suppress? That is repression: Controlling intrusive thoughts 
in addictive behaviour. Addictive Behaviors, 44, 65-70. 
322 
 
Murphy, R., Cooper, Z., Hollon, S. D., & Fairburn, C. G. (2009). How do psychological 
treatments work? Investigating mediators of change. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 47(1), 1-5. 
Myers, L. B. (2010). The importance of the repressive coping style: findings from 30 
years of research. Anxiety, Stress & Coping, 23(1), 3-17.  
Myers, M., McCarthy, D., MacPherson, L., & Brown, S. (2003). Constructing a short 
form of the smoking consequences questionnaire with adolescents and young 
adults. Psychological Assessment, 15,163-172. 
Mucha, R. F., Pauli, P., & Weyers, P. (2006). Psychophysiology and implicit cognition 
in drug use: Significance and measurement of motivation for drug use with 
empashsis on startle tests. In R. W. Wiers & A. W. Stacy (Eds.), Handbook of 
Implicit Cognition and Addiction (pp. 201-214). London, UK: Sage 
Publications. 
Mullennix, J. W., Kilbey, M. M., Fisicaro, S. A., Farnsworth, L. M., & Torrento, R. 
(2003). The representation of smoking expectancies by single-word adjectives 
and their relationship to smoking characteristics. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 
5, 681–694. 
Murphy, R., Cooper, Z., Hollon, S. D., & Fairburn, C. G. (2009). How do psychological 
treatments work? Investigating mediators of change. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 47(1), 1-5. 
Najmi, S., Reese, H., Wilhelm, S., Fama, J., Beck, C., & Wegner, D. M. (2010). 
Learning the futility of the thought suppression enterprise in normal experience and 
in obsessive compulsive disorder. Behavioural and Cognitive 
Psychotherapy, 38(01), 1-14. 
Najmi, S., Wegner, D. M., & Nock, M. K. (2007). Thought suppression and self-
injurious thoughts and behaviors. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45(8), 1957-
1965. 
Nestler, S., & Egloff, B. (2010). When scary messages backfire: Influence of 
dispositional cognitive avoidance on the effectiveness of threat communications. 
Journal of Research in Personality, 44, 137-414. 
Niaura, R., Abrams, D., Pedraza, M., Monti, P., & Rohsenow, D. (1992). Smokers 
reactions to interpersonal interaction and presentation of smoking cues. 
Addictive Behaviors, 17, 557-566.  
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. 
Review of General Psychology, 2, 175-180. 
323 
 
Nichols, S. (2011). Experimental philosophy and the problem of free will. Science, 331, 
1401-1403. 
Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007). Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive 
science of folk intuitions. NOUS, 41, 663–685. 
Nichols, A. L., & Maner, J. K. (2008). The good-subject effect: Investigating participant 
demand characteristics. The Journal of General Psychology, 135, 151-165. 
Nicholson, E., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2012). Developing an implicit measure of disgust 
propensity and disgust sensitivity: Examining the role of implicit disgust 
propensity and sensitivity in obsessive-compulsive tendencies. Journal of 
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 43, 922-930. 
Nisbett, R.E., & Wilson, T.D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: verbal reports on 
mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231–59. 
Norcross, J. C., Krebs, P. M., & Prochaska, J. O. (2011). Stages of change. Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 67(2), 143-154. 
Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2001). The go/no-go association task. Social Cognition, 
19, 625-664. 
Nosek, B., Bar-Anan, Y., Sriram, N., & Greenwald, A. (2012). Understanding and 
using the Brief Implicit Association Test: I. Recommended scoring procedures. 
Unpublished manuscript, University of Virginia (retrieved from 
www.BrianNosek.com, June 27th 2012). 
Nosek, B. A., Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (2005). Understanding and using the 
Implicit Association Test: II. Method variables and construct validity. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 166-180. 
Nosek, B. A., Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (2007). The implicit association test at 
age 7: A methodological and conceptual review. In J. A. Bargh (Ed.), Automatic 
processes in social thinking and behaviour (pp. 265-292). New York, NY: 
Psychology Press. 
Nosek, B. A., Hawkins, C. B., & Frazier, R. S. (2011). Implicit social cognition: From 
measurement to mechanisms. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15, 152-159. 
Nosek, B., Smyth, F., Hansen, J., Devos, T., Lindner, N., Ranganath, K., Smith, C., 
Olson, K., Chugh, D., Greenwald, A., Banaji, M. (2007). Pervasiveness and 
correlates of implicit attitudes and stereotypes. European Review of Social 
Psychology, 18, 36-88.  
324 
 
O'Connell, K. A., Gerkovich, M. M., Bott, M. J., Cook, M. R., & Shiffman, S. (2002). 
The effect of anticipatory strategies on the first day of smoking 
cessation. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 16(2), 150-156. 
O'Connell, K. A., Hosein, V. L., & Schwartz, J. E. (2006). Thinking and/or doing as 
strategies for resisting smoking. Research in Nursing & Health, 29(6), 533-542. 
O'Connell, K. A., Hosein, V. L., Schwartz, J. E., & Leibowitz, R. Q. (2007). How does 
coping help people resist lapses during smoking cessation? Health 
Psychology, 26(1), 77-84. 
O'Connell, K. A., Schwartz, J. E., & Shiffman, S. (2008). Do resisted temptations 
during smoking cessation deplete or augment self-control resources? Psychology of 
Addictive Behaviors, 22(4), 486-495. 
O’Connell, K., Shiffman, S., & DeCarlo, L. (2010). Does extinction of responses to 
cigarette cues occur during smoking cessation? Addiction, 106, 410-417. 
O’Connor, R., Fite, P., Nowlin, P., & Colder, C. (2007). Children’s beliefs about 
substance use: An examination of age differences in implicit and explicit 
cognitive precursors of substance use initiation. Psychology of Addictive 
Behaviors, 21, 525-533. 
O’Connor, C., Rees, G., & Joffe, H. (2012). Neuroscience in the public sphere. Neuron, 
74, 221-226. 
Office of Tobacco Control (2004, February). Smoke-free policies: Market research and 
literature review on economic effects on the hospitality sector. Dublin, Ireland: 
Office of Tobacco Control. Retrieved on October 9, 2008, from 
http://www.otc.ie/uploads/Economic%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.  
Office of Tobacco Control (2008a, February). Smoke-free workplaces in Ireland: A 
one-year review. Dublin, Ireland: Office of Tobacco Control. Retrieved on 
October 9, 2008, from http://www.otc.ie/uploads/1_Year_Report_FA.pdf. 
Office of Tobacco Control (2008b, March). Cigarette smoking prevalence: 6-month 
moving average trend ending March 2008. Dublin, Ireland: Office of Tobacco 
Control. Retrieved on February 20, 2009, from 
http://www.otc.ie/fig.asp?image=Mar08charts/fig_2.jpg.  
O’Loughlin, J., DiFranza, J., Tarasuk, J., Meshefedjian, G.,McMillan-Davey, E., 
Paradis, G., Tyndale, R. F.,Clarke, P., & Hanley, J. (2002). Assessment of 
nicotine dependence symptoms in adolescents: A comparison of five indicators. 
Tobacco Control, 11, 354-360. 
325 
 
Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2001). Implicit attitude formation through classical 
conditioning. Psychological Science, 12, 413-417. 
Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2003). Relations between implicit measures of prejudice: 
What are we measuring? Psychological Science, 14, 636-639. 
Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2004). Reducing the Influence of extrapersonal 
associations on the Implicit Association Test: Personalizing the IAT. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 653-667.  
Olson, M. A., & Fazio, R. H. (2006). Reducing automatically-activated racial prejudice 
through implicit evaluative conditioning. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 32, 421-433. 
O’Reilly, A., Roche, B., Ruiz, M., Ryan, A., & Campion, G. (2013). A Function 
Acquisition Speed Test for equivalence relations (FASTER). The Psychological 
Record, 63, 707-724. 
O’Reilly, A., Roche, B., Ruiz, M. R., Tyndall, I. & Gavin, A. (2012). The Function 
Acquisition Speed Test (FAST): A behavior-analytic implicit test for assessing 
stimulus relations. The Psychological Record, 62, 507-528. 
Orbell, S., & Sheeran, P. (1998). ‘Inclined abstainers ’: A problem for predicting health-
related behaviour. British Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 151-165. 
Osborne, J. W. (2003).  Effect sizes and the disattenuation of correlation and regression 
coefficients: lessons from educational psychology. Practical Assessment, 
Research & Evaluation, 8(11). Retrieved October 20, 2014 from 
http://PAREonline.net/getvn.asp?v=8&n=11. 
O'Shea, B., Watson, D. G., & Brown, G. D. (in press). Measuring implicit attitudes: a 
positive framing bias flaw in the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
(IRAP). Psychological Assessment. Accessed from 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/67443/1/WRAP_9871443-ps-270415-
positive_framing_bias_accepted.pdf.  
Oswald, F. L., Mitchell, G., Blanton, H., & Jaccard, J. (2013). Predicting ethnic and 
racial discrimination: A meta-analysis of IAT criterion studies. Journal of 
Pesonality and Social Psychology, 105, 171-192. 
O’Toole, C., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Smyth, S. (2007). A derived transfer of functions 
and the Implicit Association Test. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of 
Behavior, 88, 263-283. 
326 
 
O’Toole, C., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2009). Three chronometric indices of relational 
responding as predictors of performance on a brief intelligence test: the 
importance of relational flexibility. Psychological Record, 59, 119-132.  
Palfai, T. P. (2002). Positive outcome expectancies and smoking behavior: The role of 
expectancy accessibility. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 26, 317-333. 
Palfai, T. P., & Ostafin, B. D. (2003). Alcohol-related motivational tendencies in 
hazardous drinkers: Assessing implicit response tendencies using the modified 
IAT. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 1149-1162. 
Palfai, T. P., & Wood, M. D. (2001). Positive alcohol expectancies and drinking 
behaviours: The influence of expectancy strength and memory accessibility. 
Psychology of Addictive Behavior, 15, 60-67. 
Pallant, J. (2010). SPSS survival manual (4th ed.). New York, NY: Allen & Unwin. 
Parrott, A. C., & Murphy, R. S. (2012). Explaining the stress‐inducing effects of 
nicotine to cigarette smokers. Human Psychopharmacology: Clinical and 
Experimental, 27(2), 150-155. 
Paulhus, D.L. (1989). Socially desirable responding. In D.M. Buss and N. Cantor 
(Eds.), Personality Psychology: Recent trends and emerging directions. N.Y.: 
Springer-Verlag. 
Payne, B. K., Brown-Iannuzzi, J., Burkley, M., Arbuckle, N. L., Cooley, E., Cameron, 
C. D., Lundberg, K. B. (2013). Intention invention and the affect misattribution 
procedure: Reply to Bar-Anan and Nosek (2012). Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 39, 375-386. 
Payne, B. K., Buckley, M., & Stokes, M. B. (2008). Why do implicit and explicit 
attitude tests diverge?: The role of structural fit. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 94 16-31. 
Payne, B. K., Cheng, C. M., Govorun, O., & Stewart, B. D. (2005). An inkblot for 
attitudes: Affect misattribution as implicit measurement. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 89, 277–293. 
Payne, B. K., & Gawronski, B. (2010). A history of implicit social cognition: Where is 
it coming from? Where is it now? Where is it going? In B. Gawronski, & B. K. 
Payne (Eds.), Handbook of implicit social cognition: Measurement, theory, and 
applications (pp. 1-19). New York, NY: Guilford Press.  
Payne, B. K., Govorun, O., & Arbuckle, N. L. (2008). Automatic attitudes and alcohol: 
Does implicit liking predict drinking? Cognition & Emotion, 22, 238-271. 
327 
 
Payne, B. K., McClernon, F. J., & Dobbins, I. G. (2007). Automatic affective responses 
to smoking cues. Experimental & Clinical Psychopharmacology, 15, 400-409. 
Payne, T., Schare, M., Levis, D., & Colletti, G. (1991). Exposure to smoking-relevant 
cues: Effects on desire to smoke and topographical components of smoking 
behavior. Addictive Behaviors, 16, 467-479.  
Payne, T., Smith, P., Sturges, L., & Holleran, S. (1996). Reactivity to smoking cues: 
Mediating roles of nicotine dependence and duration of deprivation. Addictive 
Behaviors, 21, 139-154. 
Penke, L., Eichsteadt, J., & Asendorpf, J. (2006). Single attribute implicit association 
tests (SA-IAT) for the assessment of unipolar constructs: The case of 
sociosexuality. Experimental Psychology, 53, 283-291.  
Pepper, S. C. (1942). World hypotheses: A study in evidence. Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press. 
Perkins, K. A. (2009). Does smoking cue-induced craving tell us anything important 
about nicotine dependence? Addiction, 104, 1610-1616. 
Perkins, K. A., Ciccocioppo, M., Conklin, C. A., Milanak, M. E., Grottenthaler, A., & 
Sayette, M. A. (2008). Mood influences on acute smoking responses are 
independent of nicotine intake and dose expectancy. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 117(1), 79-93. 
Perkins, K., Epstein, L., Grobe, J., & Fonte, C. (1994). Tobacco abstinence, smoking 
cues, and the reinforcing value of smoking. Pharmacology, Biochemistry and 
Behavior, 47, 107-112.  
Perkins, K., Grobe, J., & Fonte, C. (1997). Influence of acute smoking exposure on the 
subsequent reinforcing value of smoking. Experimental and Clinical 
Psychopharmacology, 5, 277-285. 
Perkins, K. A., Karelitz, J. L., Giedgowd, G. E., & Conklin, C. A. (2013). Negative 
mood effects on craving to smoke in women versus men. Addictive 
Behaviors, 38(2), 1527-1531. 
Perkins, K. A., Karelitz, J. L., & Jao, N. C. (2013). Optimal carbon monoxide criteria to 
confirm 24-hr smoking abstinence. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 15(5), 978-982. 
Perugini, M. (2005). Predictive models of implicit and explicit attitudes. British Journal 
of Social Psychology, 44, 29-45.  
Perugini, M., & Gallucci, M. (2006). Order Analysis in Counterbalanced Measures and 
Experimental Designs. Unpublished manuscript.  
328 
 
Perugini, M., Richetin, J., & Zogmaister, C. (2010). Prediction of behaviour. In B. 
Gawronski, & B. K. Payne (Eds.), Handbook of implicit social cognition: 
Measurement, theory, and applications (pp. 255-278). New York, NY: Guilford 
Press. 
Peters, K. R., & Gawronski, B. (2011). Are we puppets on a string? Comparing the 
impact of contingency and validity on implicit and explicit evaluations. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37(4), 557-569. 
Peterson, S. E., & Posner, M. I. (2012). The attention system of the human brain: 20 
years after. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 35, 73-89. 
Peterson, A. L., Vander Weg, M. W., & Jaén, C. R. (2011). Nicotine and tobacco 
dependence. Göttingen, Germany: Hogrefe. 
Petty, R. E., & Krosnick, J. A. (1995). Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Pfizer Ireland. (2009, February). The voice of young people: a report on teenagers' 
attitudes to smoking. Dublin, Ireland: Way2Go project, Pfizer Ireland. Retrieved 
on March 3, 2010, from 
http://www.pfizer.ie/UserFiles/File/Smoking_Report/2009_Smoking_Report_fin
al.pdf.  
Piasecki, T. M., Piper, M. E., & Baker, T. B. (2010). Tobacco dependence: Insights 
from investigations of self-reported motives. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 19, 395-401. 
Piper, M. E., McCarthy. D. E., & Baker, T. B. (2006). Assessing tobacco dependence: a 
guide to measure evaluation and selection. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 8, 
339–351. 
Pleyers, G., Corneille, O., Luminet, O., & Yzerbyt, V. (2007). Aware and (dis)liking: 
Item-based analyses reveal that valence acquisition via evaluative conditioning 
emerges only when there is contingency awareness. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning Memory Cognition, 33, 130–144. 
Poldrack, R. A. (2006). Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data? 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 59-63. 
Power, P., Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2010). The Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) as a measure of implicit relative 
preferences: A first study. The Psychological Record, 59, 621-640.  
329 
 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating 
indirect effects in simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, 
Instruments, and Computers, 36, 717-731.  
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for 
assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior 
Research Methods, 40, 879-891.  
Preacher, K. J., & Kelley, K. (2011). Effect size measures for mediation models: 
Quantitative strategies for communicating indirect effects. Psychological 
Methods, 16, 93-115. 
Piasecki, T. M., Piper, M. E., & Baker, T. B. (2010). Tobacco Dependence Insights 
from Investigations of Self-Reported Motives. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 19(6), 395-401. 
Pillitteri, J. L., Kozlowski, L. T., Sweeney, C. T., & Heatherton, T. F. (1997). Individual 
differences in the subjective effects of the first cigarette of the day: a self-report 
method for studying tolerance. Experimental and Clinical 
Psychopharmacology, 5(1), 83-90. 
Piontek, D., Buehler, A., Rudolph, U., Metz, K., Kroeger, C., Gradl, S., Floeter, S., & 
Donath, C. (2008). Social contexts in adolescent smoking: Does school policy 
matter? Health Education Research, 23(6), 1029-1038. 
Proctor, R., & Capaldi, J. (Eds.) (2012). Psychology of science: Implicit and explicit 
processes. Oxford University Press. 
Prochaska, J. O., & Norcross, J. C. (2001). Stages of change. Psychotherapy: Theory, 
Research, Practice, Training, 38(4), 443. 
Prokhorov, A. V., de Moor, C., Pallonen, U. E., Hudmon, K. S., Koehly, L., & Hu, S. 
(2000). Validation of the modified Fagerstro¨m tolerance questionnaire with 
salivary cotinine in adolescents. Addictive Behaviors, 25, 429–433. 
Prokhorov, A. V., Koehly, L. M., Pallonen, U. E., & Hudmon, K. S. (1998). Adolescent 
nicotine dependence measured by the modified Fagerstro¨m tolerance 
questionnaire at two time points. Journal of Child and Adolescent Substance 
Abuse, 7, 35–47. 
Prokhorov, A. V., Pallonen, U. E., Fava, J. L., Ding, L., & Niaura, R. (1996). Measuring 
nicotine dependence among high-risk adolescent smokers. Addictive Behaviors, 
21, 117–127. 
Quine, W. V. (1951). Two dogmas of empiricism. The Philosophical Review, 60,  20–
43. 
330 
 
Quinlan, P. T. (2013). Misuse of power: In defence of small-scale science. Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience, 14(8), 585-585. 
Read, J. P., Wood, M. D., Leiuez, C. W., Palfai, T. P., & Slack, M. (2004). Gender, 
alcohol consumption, and differing alcohol expectancy dimensions in college 
drinkers. Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 12, 298-308. 
Reinecke, A., Becker, E., & Rinck, M. (2010). Three indirect tasks assessing implicit 
threat associations and behavioral response tendencies: Test-retest reliability and 
validity. Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 218, 4-11. 
Rensink, R., O’Regan, J., & Clark, J. (1997). To see or not to see: The need for 
attention to perceive changes in scenes. Psychological Science, 8, 368-373.  
Remue, J., Hughes, S., De Houwer, J., & De Raedt, R. (2014). To be or want to be: 
disentangling the role of actual versus ideal self in implicit self-esteem.  PLoS 
ONE 9(9): e108837. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108837.  
Rhodes, N., Roskos-Ewoldsen, D. R.., Edison, A., & Bradford, M. B. (2008). Attitude 
and norm accessibility affect processing of anti-smoking messages. Health 
Psychology, 27,  S224-232. 
Rice M. E., & Harris, G. T. (2005). Comparing effect sizes in follow-up studies: ROC 
Area, Cohen's d, and r. Law and Human Behavior, 29, 615-620. 
Richetin, J., Perugini, M., Adjali, I., & Hurling, R. (2007). The moderator role of 
intuitive versus deliberative decision making for the predictive validity of 
implicit and explicit measures. European Journal of Personality, 21, 529-546. 
Richetin, J., Perugini, M., Prestwich, A., & O’Gorman, R. (2007). The IAT as a 
predictor of spontaneous food choice: The case of fruits versus snacks. Internal 
Journal of Psychology, 42, 166-173. 
Rinck, M., & Becker, E. S. (2007). Approach and avoidance in fear of spiders. Journal 
of Behavioral Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 38, 105-120. 
Ritzert, T. R., Forsyth, J. P., Berghoff, C. R., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Nicholson, E. 
(2015). The impact of a cognitive defusion intervention on behavioral and 
psychological flexibility: An experimental evaluation in a spider fearful non-
clinical sample. Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science, 4, 112-120. 
Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (1993). The neural basis of drug craving: An 
incentive-sensitization theory of addiction. Brain Research Review, 18, 247-291. 
Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (2003). Addiction. Annual Review of Psychology, 
54, 25-53. 
331 
 
Robinson, T. E., & Berridge, K. C. (2008). The incentive sensitization theory of 
addiction: some current issues. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
B (Biological Sciences), 363, 3137-3146. 
Robinson, M. D., Meier, B. P., Zetocha, K. J., & McCaul, K. D. (2005). Smoking and 
the Implicit Association Test: When the contrast category determines the 
theoretical conclusions. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 27, 201-212. 
Robinson, O., Grillon, C., & Sahakian, B. (2012). The mood induction task: A 
standardized, computerized laboratory procedure for altering mood state in 
humans. Protocol Exchange, 1-17. 
Robusto, E., Cristante, F., & Vianello, M. (2008). Assessing the impact of replication 
on implicit association test effect by means of the extended logistic model for the 
assessment of change. Behavior Research Methods, 40(4), 954-960. 
Roddy, S., Stewart, I., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2010). Anti-fat, pro-slim, or both? Using 
two reaction-time based measures to assess implicit attitudes to the slim and 
overweight. Journal of Health Psychology, 15(3), 416-425.  
Roediger III, H. L. (2003). Reconsidering implicit memory. In Bowers, J. S., & 
Marsolek, C. J. (Eds.), Rethinking implicit memory. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press.  
Roediger III, H. L., Guynn, M. J., & Jones, T. (1994). Implicit memory: A tutorial 
review. Proceedings of the XXVth International Congress of Psychology, 
Brussels, 2, 67-95.  Retrieved March 27th, 2013, from http://e-
book.lib.sjtu.edu.cn/iupsys/Proc/Bruss2/bpv2ch04.htm#b9304.  
Roefs, A., Huijding, J., Smulders, F. T., MacLeod, C. M., de Jong, P. J., Wiers, R. W., 
& Jansen, A. T. (2011). Implicit measures of association in psychopathological 
research. Psychological Bulletin, 137, 149-193. 
Roewer, I., Wiehler, A., & Peters, J. (2015). Nicotine deprivation, temporal discounting 
and choice consistency in heavy smokers. Journal of the experimental analysis of 
behavior, 103(1), 62-76. 
Rogers, R. W. (1983). Cognitive and physiological processes in fear appeals and 
attitude change: A revised theory of protection motivation. In J. T. Cacioppo & 
R. E. Petty (Eds.), Social Psychophysiology (pp. 153−176). New York: 
Guildford Press. 
Rohr, M., Degner, J., & Wentura, D. (2015). The “emotion misattribution” procedure: 
Processing beyond good and bad under masked and unmasked presentation 
conditions. Cognition and Emotion, 29(2), 196-219. 
332 
 
Röhner, J., Schröder-Abé, M., & Schütz, A. (2011). Exaggeration is harder than 
understatement, but practice makes perfect! Experimental psychology, 58, 464-
472. 
Röhner, J., Schröder-Abé, M., & Schütz, A. (2013). What do fakers actually do to fake 
the IAT? An investigation of faking strategies under different faking conditions. 
Journal of Research in Personality, 47, 330-338. 
Rooke, S. E., Hine, D. W., & Thorsteinsson, E. B. (2008). Implicit cognition and 
substance use: A meta-analysis. Addictive Behaviors, 33, 1314-1328. 
Rose, A. K., Field, M., Franken, I. H. A, & Munafo, M. R.. (2013). Cue reactivity. In P. 
Miller (Ed.), Principles of addiction: Comprehensive addictive behaviors and 
disorders (pp. 413-424). San Diego, Academic Press. 
Rosen, G., & Davison, G. (2003). Psychology should list empirically supported 
principles of change (ESPs) and not credential trademarked therapies or other 
treatment packages. Behavior Modification, 27, 300-312. 
Rosenthal, R., & DiMatteo, M. R. (2001). Meta-analysis: Recent developments in 
quantitative methods for literature reviews. Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 
59-82. 
Rosnow, R. L., Rosenthal, R., & Rubin, D. B. (2000). Contrasts and correlations in 
effect- size estimation. Psychological Science, 11, 446-453. 
Rothermund, K., Teige-Mocigemba, S., Gast, A., & Wentura, D. (2009). Minimizing 
the influence of recoding in the Implicit Association Test: The Recoding-Free 
Implicit Association Test (IAT-RF). Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 62, 84-98. 
Rothermund, K., & Wentura, D. (2010). It’s brief but is it better? An evaluation of the 
brief implicit association test. Experimental Psychology, 57, 233-237. 
Rydell, R. J., & Gawronski, B. (2009). I like you, I like you not: Understanding the 
formation of context-dependent automatic attitudes. Cognition & Emotion, 23, 
1118-1152. 
Rydell, R. J., Sherman, S. J., Boucher, K. L., & Macy, J. T. (2012). The role of 
motivational and persuasive message factors in changing implicit attitudes 
toward smoking. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 34, 1-7. 
Rudman, L. A., Phelan, J. E., & Heppen, J. B. (2008). Developmental sources of 
implicit attitudes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 1700-1713. 
Rugg, G., & D’Agnese, J. (2013). Blind spot: Why we fail to see the solution right in 
front of us. NY: Harper Collins Publishers. 
333 
 
Rust, J., & Golombok, S. (2007). Modern psychometrics: science of psychological 
assessment (2nd Ed). London, UK: Routledge. 
Salkovskis, P. M., & Reynolds, M. (1994). Thought suppression and smoking 
cessation. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32(2), 193-201. 
Samson, D., & Rachman, S. (1989). The effect of induced mood on fear reduction. 
British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 28, 227-238. 
Sarkissian, H., Chetterjee, A., De Brigard, F., Knobe, J., Nichols, S., & Sirker, S. 
(2010). Is belief in free will a cultural universal? Mind & Language, 25, 346–
358. 
Sartori, G., Agosta, S., Zogmaister, C., Ferrara, S. D., & Castiello, U. (2008). How to 
accurately detect autobiographical events. Psychological Science, 19, 772–780.  
Sayers, W. M., & Sayette, M. A. (2013). Suppression on your own terms internally 
generated displays of craving suppression predict rebound effects. Psychological 
science, 24(9), 1740-1746. 
Sayette, M. A., Griffin, K. M., & Sayers, W. M. (2010). Counterbalancing in smoking 
cue research: A critical analysis. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 12, 1068-1079. 
Sayette, M. A., & Hufford, M. R. (1997). Effects of smoking urge on generation of 
smoking-related information. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 27, 1395-
1405. 
Sayette, M. A., Loewenstein, G., Griffin, K. M., & Black, J. J. (2008). Exploring the 
cold-to-hot empathy gap in smokers. Psychological Science, 19, 926-932. 
Sayette, M. A., Shiffman, S., Tiffany, S., Niaura, R., & Shadel, W. (2000). The 
measurement of drug craving. Addiction, 95 (Suppl. 2), S189-S210. 
Schloss, H. M., & Haaga, D. A. (2011). Interrelating behavioral measures of distress 
tolerance with self-reported experiential avoidance. Journal of Rational-Emotive & 
Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 29(1), 53-63. 
Sheeran, P., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Bargh, J. A. (2013). Nonconscious processes and 
health. Health Psychology, 32(5), 460-473. 
Shiffman, S. (2009). Ecological momentary assessment (EMA) in studies of substance 
use. Psychological assessment, 21(4), 486-497. 
Shiffman, S., Dunbar, M. S., Li, X., Scholl, S. M., Tindle, H. A., Anderson, S. J., & 
Ferguson, S. G. (2014). Craving in intermittent and daily smokers during ad libitum 
smoking. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 16, 1063-1069. 
Shiffman, S., & Waters, A. J. (2004). Negative affect and smoking lapses: a prospective 
analysis. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 72(2), 192-201. 
334 
 
Schmitz, M., & Wentuura, D. (2012). Evaluative priming of naming and semantic 
categorization responses revisited: A mutual facilitation explanation. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38, 984-1000. 
Schnabel, K., Banse, R., & Asendorpf, J. (2006). Employing automatic approach and 
avoidance tendencies for the assessment of implicit personality self-concept: 
The Implicit Association Procedure (IAP). Experimental Psychology, 53, 69-76. 
Schueller, S. M., Pérez-Stable, E. J., & Muñoz, R. F. (2013). A mood management 
intervention in an internet stop smoking randomized controlled trial does not 
prevent depression a cautionary tale. Clinical Psychological Science, 1, 401-412. 
Schuh, K. J., & Stitzer, M. L. (1995). Desire to smoke during spaced smoking intervals. 
Psychopharmacology, 120, 289 – 295.  
Schuh, K. J., & Stitzer, M. L. (1995). Desire to smoke during spaced smoking intervals. 
Psychopharmacology, 120, 289 – 295.  
Schwartz, B. (2004). The paradox of choice. New York, NY: Harper-Collins Publishers 
Inc. 
Schwarz, N. (1999). Self-reports: How the questions shape the answers. American 
Psychologist, 54, 93–105.  
Schwarz, N. (2008). Attitude measurement. In W. Crano & R. Prislin (Eds.), Attitudes 
and attitude change (pp. 41-60). London: Psychology Press. 
Schwarz, N., & Oyserman, D. (2001). Asking questions about behavior: Cognition, 
communication, and questionnaire construction. American Journal of 
Evaluation, 22, 127–160.  
Scragg, R., Wellman, R. J., Laugesen, M., & DiFranza, J. R. (2008). Diminished 
autonomy over tobacco can occur with the first few cigarettes. Addictive 
Behaviors, 33, 689-698. 
Schmukle, S. C., (2005). Unreliability of the dot probe task. European Journal of 
Personality, 19, 595–605. 
Seidman, D. F. (2010). Smoke-free in 30 days: The pain-free permanent way to quit. 
London, UK: Simon & Schuster. 
Sensibaugh, T. K. (2014). The effects of target valence on thought suppression 
efficacy. PURE Insights, 3(1), Article 11. Accessed August 15th 2015 from: 
http://digitalcommons.wou.edu/pure/vol3/iss1/11.  
Shadel, W. G., Shiffman, S., Niaura, R., Nichter, M., & Abrams, D. B. (2000). Review: 
Current models of nicotine dependence: What is known and what is needed to 
335 
 
advance understanding of tobacco etiology among youth. Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence, 59 (Suppl. 1), S9 - S21. 
Shariff, A., Greene, J., Karremans, J., Luguri, J., Clark, C., Schooler, J., Baumeister, R., 
& Vohs, K. (2014). Free will and punishment: A mechanistic view of human 
nature reduces retribution. Psychological Science, 25, 1563-1570. 
Sheeran, P. (2002). Intention-behavior relations: A conceptual and empirical review. 
European Review of Social Psychology, 12, 1-36. 
Sherman, J. W., Klauer, K. C., & Allen, T. J. (2010). Mathematical modelling of 
implicit social cognition: The machine in the ghost. In B. Gawronski, & B. K. 
Payne (Eds.), Handbook of implicit social cognition: Measurement, theory, and 
applications (pp. 156-175). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Sherman, S. J., Chassin, L., Presson, C., Seo, D., & Macy, J. T. (2009). The 
intergenerational transmission of implicit and explicit attitudes toward smoking: 
Predicting adolescent smoking initiation. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 45, 313-319.  
Sherman, S. J., Rose, J. S., Koch, K., Presson, C. C., & Chassin, L. (2003). Implicit and 
explicit attitudes toward cigarette smoking: The effects of context and 
motivation. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 22, 13-39. 
Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information 
processing: II. Perceptual learning, automatic attending, and a general theory. 
Psychological Review, 84, 127-190.  
Shiffman, S., & Waters, A. J. (2004). Negative affect and smoking lapses: a prospective 
analysis. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 72(2), 192-201. 
Shiffman, S., West, R. J., & Gilbert, D. G. (2004). Recommendation for the assessment 
of tobacco craving and withdrawal in smoking-cessation trials. Nicotine & 
Tobacco Research, 6, 599-614. 
Shmueli, D., & Prochaska, J. J. (2012). A test of positive affect induction for countering 
self-control depletion in cigarette smokers. Psychology of Addictive 
Behaviors, 26(1), 157-161. 
Shomstein, S., & Johnson, J. (2013). Shaping attention with reward: Effects of reward 
on space- and object-based selection. Psychological Science, 24. 2369-2378. 
Shoukri, M. M., Asyali, M. H., & Donner, A. (2004). Sample size requirements for the 
design of reliability study: review and new results. Statistical Methods in 
Medical Research, 13(4), 251-271. 
Skinner, B. F. (1981). Selection by consequences. Science, 213, 501-504. 
336 
 
Sidman, M. (1960). Tactics of scientific research. Boston, MA: Authors Cooperative 
Inc. 
Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organisms: An experimental analysis. New York: 
Appleton-Century.  
Skinner, B. F. (1945). The operational analysis of psychological terms. Psychological 
Review, 52, 270–277, 291–294. 
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York, NY: The Free Press. 
Skinner, B.F. (1974). About Behaviorism. New York: Knopf. 
Skinner, B. F. (1989). The origins of cognitive thought. American Psychologist, 44, 13-
18. 
Smith, A. L., Carter, S. M., Chapman, S., Dunlop, S. M., & Freeman, B. (2015). Why 
do smokers try to quit without medication or counselling? A qualitative study with 
ex-smokers. BMJ Open, 5(4), e007301. 
Smith, C. T., De Houwer, J., & Nosek, B. (2013). Consider the source: Persuasion of 
implicit evaluations is moderated by source credibility. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 39, 193-205. 
Smith, C. T., & Nosek, B. A. (2012). Ambivalence and implicit-explicit discrepancy are 
not the same construct. Available at SSRN 2137855. 
Smith, C. T., & De Houwer, J. (2014). The impact of persuasive messages on IAT 
performance is moderated by source attractiveness and likeability. Social 
Psychology, 437-448. 
Smyth, S., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Barnes-Holmes, Y. (2008). Acquired equivalence in 
human discrimination learning: The role of propositional knowledge. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 34(1), 167-177. 
Sonderegger, A., & Sauer, J. (2009). The influence of laboratory set-up in usability 
tests: effects on user performance, subjective ratings and physiological 
measures. Ergonomics, 52(11), 1350-1361. 
Spada, M. M., Albery, I. P., & Moss, A. C. (2015). Contemporary perspectives on 
cognition in addictive behaviors. Addictive Behaviors, 44, 1-2. 
Spearman, C., C. (1910). Correlation calculated from faulty data. British Journal of 
Psychology, 3, 271–295. 
Spring, B., Cook, J. W., Appelhans, B., Maloney, A., Richmond, M., Vaughn, J., 
Vanderveen, J., & Hedeker, D. (2008). Nicotine effects on affective response in 
depression-prone smokers. Psychopharmacology, 196(3), 461-471. 
337 
 
Spiegelhalder, K., Jähne, A., Kyle, S., Beil, M., Doll, C., Feige B., & Riemann, D. 
(2011). Is smoking-related attention bias a useful marker for treatment effects? 
Behavioral Medicine, 37, 26-34. 
Spruyt, A., Hermans, D., De Houwer, J., Vandromme, H., & Eelen, P. (2007). On the 
nature of the affective priming effect: Effects of stimulus onset asynchrony and 
congruency proportion in naming and evaluative categorization. Memory & 
Cognition, 35, 95-106. 
Spruyt, A., Klauer, K., Gast, A., Schryver, M., & De Houwer, J. (2014). Feature-
specific attention allocation modulates the generalization of recently acquired 
likes and dislikes. Experimental Psychology, 61, 85-98. 
Sririam, N., & Greenwald, A. (2009). The brief implicit association test. Experimental 
Psychology, 56, 283-294. 
Sriram, N., Nosek, B. A., & Greenwald, A. G. (2007). Scale invariant contrasts of 
response latency distributions. Unpublished manuscript, the University of 
Virginia. 
SRNT Subcommittee on Biochemical Verification (2002). Biochemical verification of 
tobacco use and cessation. Nicotine and Tobacco Research, 4(2), 149-159. 
Stacy, A. (1995). Memory association and ambigious cues in models of alcohol and 
marijuana use. Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 3, 183-194.   
Stacy, A. (1997). Memory activation and expectancy as prospective predictors of 
alcohol and marijuana use. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 106, 61-73. 
Stacy, A., Ames, S., & Grenard, J. (2006). Word association tests of associative 
memory and implicit processes: Theoretical and assessment issues. In R. W. 
Wiers & A. W. Stacy (Eds.), Handbook of implicit cognition and addiction (pp. 
75-90). London, UK: Sage Publications. 
Stacy, A., Bentler, P., & Flay, B. (1994). Attitudes and health behaviour in diverse 
populations: Drunk driving, alcohol use, binge eating, marijuana use, and 
cigarette use. Health Psychology, 13, 73-85. 
Stacy, A., Leigh, B., Weingardt, K. (1994). Memory accessibility and association of 
alcohol use and its positive outcomes. Experimental and Clinical 
Psychopharmacology, 2, 269-282. 
Stacy, A. W., & Wiers, R. W. (2006). Common themes and new directions in implicit 
cognition and addiction. In R. W. Wiers & A. W. Stacy (Eds.), Handbook of 
implicit cognition and addiction (pp. 497-505). London, UK: Sage Publications. 
338 
 
Stacy, A. W., & Wiers, R. W. (2010). Implicit cognition and addiction: A tool for 
explaining paradoxical behavior. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 6, 551-
575. 
Stanovich, K. E., West, R. F., & Toplak, M. E. (2013). Myside bias, rational thinking, 
and intelligence. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22, 259-264. 
Stead, L. F., Perera, R., Bullen, C., Mant, D., Hartmann-Boyce, J., Cahill, K., & 
Lancaster, T. (2012). Can nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) help people quit 
smoking? Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, 11. DOI: 
10.1002/14651858.CD000146.pub4 
Steele, D., & Hayes, S. C. (1991). Stimulus equivalence and arbitrary applicable 
relational responding. Journal of Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 56, 519-
555. 
Steiger, J. H. (2004). Beyond the F test: Effect size confidence intervals and tests of 
close fit in the analysis of variance and contrast analysis. Psychological 
Methods, 9, 164-182. 
Stewart, I. (2015). The fruits of a functional approach for psychological science. 
International Journal of Psychology. Accessed from 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ijop.12184/abstract.  
Stewart, I., Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Bond, F. W., & Hayes, S. C. 
(2006). Relational Frame Theory and Industrial/Organizational Psychology. In 
S. C. Hayes, F. W. Bond, D. Barnes-Holmes, & J. Austin (Eds.), Acceptance 
and Mindfulness at Work: Applying Acceptance and Commitment Therapy and 
Relational Frame Theory to Organizational Behavior Management (pp. 55-90). 
Binghamton, NY: The Haworth Press. 
Stieger, S., Göritz, A., Hergovich, A., & Voracek, M. (2011). Intentional faking of the 
single category implicit association test and the implicit association test. 
Psychological Reports, 109, 219-230. 
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reaction. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 18, 643–662. 
Strosahl, K., Wilson, K.G., Bissett, R.T., Polusny, M.A., Dykstra, T.A., Batten, S.V., et 
al. (2004). Measuring experiential avoidance: A preliminary test of a working 
model. The Psychological Record, 54, 553–578. 
Stuber, J., Galea, S., & Link, B. G. (2008). Smoking and the emergence of a stigmatized 
social status. Social Science & Medicine, 67, 420–430. 
339 
 
Suls, J., & Wheeler, L. (Eds.). (2013). Handbook of social comparison: Theory and 
research. Springer Science & Business Media. 
Sütterlin, S., Schroijen, M., Constantinou, E., Smets, E., Van den Bergh, O., & Van 
Diest, I. (2013). Breath holding duration as a measure of distress tolerance: 
Examining its relation to measures of executive control. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 
483. http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00483. 
Swanson, J. E., Rudman, L. A., & Greenwald, A. G. (2001). Using the Implicit 
Association Test to investigate attitude-behavior consistency for stigmatised 
behaviour. Cognition and Emotion, 15, 207-230. 
Teachman, B. (2007). Evaluating implicit spider fear associations using the Go/No-go 
Association Task. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 
38, 156-167. 
Teige-Mocigemba, S., & Klauer, K. C. (2008). ‘Automatic’ evaluation? Strategic 
effects on affective priming. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 
1414-1417. 
Teige-Mocigemba, S., & Klauer, K. C. (2013). On the controllability of evaluative-
priming effects: Some limits that are none. Cognition & Emotion, 27, 632-657. 
Teige-Mocigemba, S., Klauer, K. C., & Rothermund, K. (2008). Minimizing method-
specific variance in the IAT; A single block IAT. European Journal of 
Psychological Assessment, 24, 237-245. 
Teige-Mocigemba, S., Klauer, K. C., & Sherman, J. W. (2010). A practical guide to 
implicit association tests and related tasks. In B. Gawronski, & B. K. Payne 
(Eds.), Handbook of implicit social cognition: Measurement, theory, and 
applications (pp. 117-139). New York, NY: Guilford Press.  
Thewissen, R., Havermans, R. C., Geschwind, N., van den Hout, M., & Jansen, A. 
(2007). Pavlovian conditioning of an approach bias in low-dependent smokers. 
Psychopharmacology, 194, 33-39. 
Thomas, Y., Schnur, P., & Iguchi, M. (2007). Editorial: Behavioral and economic 
perspectives in drug abuse research. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 90S, S1-S3. 
Thush, C., & Wiers, R. W. (2007). Explicit and implicit alcohol-related cognitions and 
the prediction of future drinking in adolescents. Addictive Behaviors, 32, 1367-
1383. 
Thush, C., Wiers, R. W., Moerbeek, M., Ames, S. L., Grenard, J. L., Sussman, S., & 
Stacy, A. W. (2009). Influence of motivational interviewing on explicit and implicit 
340 
 
alcohol-related cognition and alcohol use in at-risk adolescents. Psychology of 
Addictive Behaviors, 23(1), 146-151. 
Tibboel, H., De Houwer, J., Spruyt, A., Field, M., Kemps, E., & Crombez, G. (2011). 
Testing the validity of implicit measures of wanting and liking. Journal of 
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 42, 284-292. 
Tibboel, H., De Houwer, J., & Van Bockstaele, B. (in press). Implicit measures of 
“wanting” and “liking” in humans. Neuroscience & Biobehavioural Reviews. 
Accessed on October 1st 2015 from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282245165_Implicit_measures_of_wa
nting_and_liking_in_humans.  
Tiffany, S. T. (1990). A cognitive model of drug urges and drug use behavior: Role of 
automatic and non-automatic processes. Psychological Review, 97, 147-168. 
Tiffany, S. T. (2008). Modern science and tobacco research. Health Psychology, 27, 
S187-S188. 
Tiffany, S. T., Conklin, C. A., Shiffman, S. & Clayton, R. R. (2004). What can 
dependence theories tell us about the emergence of tobacco dependence? 
Addiction, 99 (Suppl. 1), 78–86. 
Tiffany, S. T., & Drobes, D. J. (1991). The development and initial validation of a 
questionnaire on smoking urges. British Journal of Addiction, 86, 1467-1476. 
Tiffany, S. T., & Wray, J. M. (2012). The clinical significance of drug craving. Annals 
of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1248(1), 1-17. 
Tobacco Free Policy Review Group (2000). Towards a tobacco free society: report of 
the Tobacco Free Policy Review Group. Government Publication. Stationery 
Office, Dublin. 
Toll, B. A., Salovey, P., O’Malley, S., Mazure, C. M., Latimer, A., & McKee, S. A. 
(2008). Message framing for smoking cessation: The interaction of risk 
perceptions and gender. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 10, 195-200. 
Toll, B. A., Schepis, T. S., O’Malley, S. S., McKee, S. A., & Krishnan-Sarin, S. (2007). 
Subjective reactivity to the first cigarette of the day as a predictor of smoking 
relapse: A preliminary study. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 89(2), 302-305. 
Toll, B. A., Sobell, M. B., Wagner, E. F., & Sobell, L. C. (2001). The relationship 
between thought suppression and smoking cessation. Addictive Behaviors, 26(4), 
509-515. 
Tønnesen, P. (2009). Smoking cessation: How compelling is the evidence? A review. 
Health Policy, 91, S15-S25. 
341 
 
Topa, G., & Moriano, J. A. (2010). Theory of planned behavior and smoking: meta-
analysis and SeM model. Substance Abuse and Rehabilitation, 1, 23-33. 
Törneke, N. (2010). Learning RFT: An introduction to relational frame theory and its 
clinical application. New Harbinger Publications.  
Törneke, N., Luciano, C., & Valdivia-Salas, S. (2008). Rule governed behavior and 
psychological problems. International Journal of Psychology and Psychological 
Therapy, 8, 141-156. 
Torres, O. V., & O'Dell, L. E. (in press). Stress is a principal factor that promotes 
tobacco use in females. Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological 
Psychiatry. Accessed from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278584615000718.  
Trafimow, D., & Marks, M. (2015). Editorial. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 37, 
1-2. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of 
choice. Science, 211, 453–458. 
Uppal, N., Shahab, L., Britton, J., & Ratschen, E. (2013). The forgotten smoker: A 
qualitative study of attitudes towards smoking, quitting, and tobacco control 
policies among continuing smokers. BMC Public Health, 13(1), 432-441. 
Ursprung, A., DiFranza, S. M., Costa, A. D., DiFranza, J. R. (2009). Might expectations 
explain early self-reported symptoms of nicotine dependence? Addictive 
Behaviors, 34,  227-231. 
Ursprung, W.W. S. A., & DiFranza, J. R. (2010). The loss of autonomy over smoking in 
relation to lifetime cigarette consumption. Addictive Behaviors, 35, 14-18. 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2012). Ending the tobacco epidemic: 
Progress toward a healthier nation. USA, Washington: U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health. 
Downloaded on March 12th 2013 from 
http://www.hhs.gov/ash/initiatives/tobacco. 
Ussher, M., Beard, E., Abikoye, G., Hajek, P., & West, R. (2013). Urge to smoke over 
52 weeks of abstinence. Psychopharmacology, 226(1), 83-89. 
Uziel, L. (2010). Rethinking social desirability scales: from impression management to 
interpersonally orientated self-control. Perspectives of Psychological Science, 
5(3), 243-262. 
Vahey, N., Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2009). A first test of 
the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) as a measure of self-
342 
 
esteem: Irish prisoner groups and university students. The Psychological Record, 
59, 371–388. 
Vahey, N., Boles, S., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2010). Measuring adolescents’ smoking-
related social identity preferences with the implicit relational assessment 
procedure (IRAP) for the first time: A starting point that explains later IRAP 
evolutions. International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 10, 
453-474. 
Vahey, N. A., Nicholson, E., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2015). A meta-analysis of criterion 
effects for the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) in the clinical 
domain. Journal of behavior therapy and experimental psychiatry, 48, 59-65. 
Vahey, N., & Whelan, R. (2015). The functional‐cognitive framework as a tool for 
accelerating progress in cognitive neuroscience: On the benefits of bridging rather 
than reducing levels of analyses. International Journal of Psychology. Accessed 
August 19th 2015 from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ijop.12183/epdf.  
Vandenbosch, K., & De Houwer, J. (2011). Failures to induce implicit evaluations by 
means of approach-avoidance training. Cognition & Emotion, 25, 1311-1330. 
Van den Bussche, E., Van den Noortgate, W., & Reynvoet, B. (2009). Mechanisms of 
masked priming: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 452-477. 
Van Dessel, P., De Houwer, J., Gast, A., & Smith, C. (2015). Instruction-based 
approach-avoidance effects: Changing stimulus evaluation via the mere 
instruction to approach or avoid stimuli. Experimental Psychology, 62, 161-169. 
Van Dessel, P., De Houwer, J., Roets, A., & Gast, A. (in press). Failures to Change 
Stimulus Evaluations by means of Subliminal Approach and Avoidance 
Training. Accessed on 1st October 2015 from 
http://www.liplab.ugent.be/pdf/VanDesselJPSP2015.pdf. 
Van Dijk, S. (2009). The dialectical behavior therapy skills workbook for bipolar 
disorder: Using DBT to regain control of your emotions and your life. New 
Harbinger Publications. 
Van Gucht, D., Van Den Bergh, O., Beckers, T., & Vansteenwegen, D. (2010).  
Smoking behavior in context: Where and when do people smoke?  Journal of 
Behavior Therapy & Experimental Psychiatry, 41, 172-177. 
VanVoorhis, C. R. W., & Morgan, B. L. (2007). Understanding power and rules of 
thumb for determining sample sizes. Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for 
Psychology, 3(2), 43-50. 
343 
 
Veilleux, J. C., Conrad, M., & Kassel, J. D. (2013). Cue-induced cigarette craving and 
mixed emotions: A role for positive affect in the craving process. Addictive 
Behaviors, 38(4), 1881-1889. 
Verplanck, W. S. (1955). The control of the content of conversation: Reinforcement 
statements of opinion. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51, 
668-676. 
Verplanken, B., & Aarts, H. (1999). Habit, attitude, and planned behaviour: Is habit an 
empty construct or an interesting case of goal-directed automaticity? European 
Review of Social Psychology, 10, 101-134. 
Verschuere, B., Prati, V., & De Houwer, J. (2009). Cheating the lie detector faking in 
the autobiographical Implicit Association Test. Psychological Science, 20, 410-
413. 
Verschuere, B., Spruyt, A., Meijer, E. H., & Otgaar, H. (2011). The ease of 
lying. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(3), 908-911. 
Vidrine, J. I., Vidrine, D. J., Costello, T. J., Mazas, C., Cofta-Woerpel, L., Mejia, L. M., 
& Wetter, D. W. (2009). The Smoking Consequences Questionnaire: Factor 
structure and predictive validity among Spanish-speaking Latino smokers in the 
United States. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 11, 1280-1288. 
Viney, L. (1969). Self: The history of a concept. Journal of the History of the 
Behavioral Sciences, 5, 349–359. 
Vogt, J., De Houwer, J., Crombez, G., & Van Damme, S. (2013). Competing for 
attentional priority: Temporary goals versus threats. Emotion, 13, 587-598. 
Volkow, N. D., Fowler, J. S., & Wang, G. J. (2004). The addicted human brain viewed 
in the light of imaging studies: Brain circuits and treatment strategies. 
Neuropharmacology, 47, 3-13. 
Wagenmakers, E. J., Wetzels, R., Borsboom, D., & Van Der Maas, H. L. (2011). Why 
psychologists must change the way they analyze their data: the case of psi: 
comment on Bem (2011). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 
426-432. 
Wainer, H., & Thissen, D. (2001). True score theory: The traditional method. In D. 
Thissen and H. Wainer, (Eds.), Test Scoring. Mahwah, NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Walsh, R. A. (2008). Over-the-counter nicotine replacement therapy: A methodological 
review of the evidence supporting its effectiveness. Drug & Alcohol Review, 27, 
529-547. 
344 
 
Wang, Y. J., & Minor, M. S. (2008). Validity, reliability, and applicability of 
psychophysiological techniques in marketing research. Psychology & 
Marketing, 25, 197-232. 
Waters, A. J., Carter, B. L., Robinson, J. D., Wetter, D. W., Lam, C. Y., & Cinciripini, 
P. M. (2007). Implicit attitudes to smoking are associated with craving and 
dependence. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 91, 178-186. 
Waters, A. J., Miller, E. K., & Li, Y. (2010). Administering the Implicit Association 
Test in an ecological momentary assessment study. Psychological Reports, 106, 
31-43.  
Waters, A. J., Reitzel, L. R., Cinciripini, P., Li, Y., Marcus, M. T., Vidrine, J. I., & 
Wetter, D. W. (2009). Associations between mindfulness and implicit cognition 
and self-reported affect. Substance Abuse, 30(4), 328-337. 
Waters, A. J., & Sayette, M. A. (2006). Implicit cognition and tobacco addiction. In R. 
W. Wiers & A. W. Stacy (Eds.), Handbook of implicit cognition and addiction 
(pp. 309-338). London, UK: Sage Publications. 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988b). Development and validation of brief 
measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS Scales. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 1063–1070. 
Watson, P., de Wit, S. Cousijn, J., Hommel, B., & Wiers, R. (2013). Motivational 
mechanisms underlying approach bias to cigarettes. Journal of Experimental 
Psychopathology, 4, 250-262.  
Watson, P., de Wit, S. Hommel, B., & Wiers, R. (2012). Motivational mechanisms and 
outcome expectancies underlying the approach bias toward addictive substances. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 1-12.  doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00440. 
Webb, T. L., Miles, E., & Sheeran, P. (2012). Dealing with feeling: A meta-analysis of 
the effectiveness of strategies derived from the process model of emotion 
regulation. Psychological Bulletin, 138(4), 775-808. 
Webb, N. M., Shavelson, R. J., & Haertel, E. H. (2007). Reliability coefficients and 
generalizability theory. In C. R. Rao, & S., Sinharay, (Eds.), Handbook of 
Statistics 26: Psychometrics. Radarweg, Netherlands: Elsevier. 
Webb, T., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Does changing behavioral intentions engender 
behavior change? A meta-analysis of experimental evidence. Psychological 
Bulletin, 132, 249-268. 
 Webb, T. L., Sheeran, P., & Luszczynska, A. (2009). Planning to break unwanted 
habits: Habit 
change. British Journal of Social Psychology, 48
Webb, T. L., Sheeran, P., & Pepper, J. (2012). Gaining control over responses to 
implicit attitude tests: Implementation intentions e
attitude‐incongruent trials.
Wegner, D. M. (2011). Setting free the bears: Escape from thought 
suppression. American Psychologist
Wegner, D. M., & Erber, R. (199
thoughts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Wegner, D. M., Schneider, D. J., Carter, S. R., & White, T. L. (1987). Paradoxical 
effects of thought suppression.
Psychology, 53(1), 5
Wellman, R. J., DiFranza, J. R., Pbert, L., Fletcher, K. E., Flint, A., Young, M. H., & 
Draker, S. (2006). A comparison of the psychometric properties of the hooked 
on nicotine checklist and the modified Fagerstro¨m tolerance
Addictive Behaviors, 31,
Wellman RJ, DiFranza JR, Savageau JA, Godiwala S, Friedman K, Hazelton J.
Measuring adults’ loss of autonomy over nicotine use: The Hooked on Nicotine 
Checklist. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 7
Wellman, R. J., Savageau, J. A., Godiwala, S., Savageau, N., Friedman, K., Hazelton, 
J., DiFranza, J. R. (2006). A comparison of the Hooked on Nicotine Checklist 
and the Fagerström Test of Nicotine Dependence. 
Research, 8, 575
Wentura, D., & Degner, J. (2010). A practical guide to sequential priming and related 
tasks. In B. Gawronski, & B. K. Payne (Eds.), 
cognition: Measurement, theory, and applications
Guilford Press.
Wenzlaff, R. M., & Wegner, D. M. (2000). Thought suppression.
psychology, 51(1), 59
Werner, B., & Rothermund, K. (2013). Attention please: No affective priming effects in 
a valent/neutral
West, R. (2001). Theories of addiction. 
West R. (2004). Assessment of dependence and motivation to stop smoking. 
Medical Journal,
345 
strength moderates implementation intention effects on behavior 
, 507-523.
ngender fast responses on 
 British Journal of Social Psychology
, 66(8), 671-680. 
2). The hyperaccessibility of suppressed 
, 63(6), 903
 Journal of Personality and S
-13. 
 486-495. 
, 157-161.  
Nicotine & Tobacco 
–580. 
Handbook of implicit social 
 (pp. 95-
 
-91. 
-categorisation task. Cognition & Emotion, 27, 
Addiction, 96, 3-13. 
 328, 338-339.  
 
, 51(1), 13-32. 
-912. 
ocial 
 questionnaire. 
 
116). New York, NY: 
 Annual review of 
119-132. 
British 
346 
 
West, R. (2006). Theory of addiction. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. 
Wetter, D. W., Kenford, S. L., Smith, S. S., Fiore, M. C., Jorenby, D. E., & Baker, T. B. 
(1999). Gender differences in smoking cessation. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 67(4), 555-562. 
Whelan, R. (2008). Effective analysis of reaction time data. The Psychological Record, 
58, 475-482. 
Whelan, R., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2010). Consequence valuing as operation and 
process: A parsimonious analysis of motivation. The Psychological Record, 60, 
337-354. 
Whelan, R., & Garavan, H. (2014). When optimism hurts: Inflated predictions of 
psychiatric neuroimaging. Biological Psychiatry, 75, 746-748. 
Whelan, R., Conrod, P. J., Poline, J. B., Lourdusamy, A., Banaschewski, T., Barker, G. 
J., et al. (2012). Adolescent impulsivity phenotypes characterized by distinct brain 
networks. Nature Neuroscience, 15(6), 920-925. 
Wiers, R. W., Boelema, S. R., Nikolaou, K., & Gladwin, T. E. (2015). On the 
development of implicit and control processes in relation to substance use in 
adolescence. Current addiction reports, 2(2), 141-155. 
Wiers, R. W., & de Jong, P. J. (2007). Implicit and explicit alcohol, smoking and drug-
related cognitions and emotions. In J. Z. Arlsdale (Ed.), Advances in Social 
Psychological Research (pp. 1-35). New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers 
Inc. 
Wiers, R. W., Eberl, C., Rinck, M., Becker, E. S., & Lindenmeyer, J. (2011). Retraining 
automatic action tendencies changes alcoholic patiants’ approach bias for 
alcohol and improves treatment outcome. Psychological Science, 22, 490-497. 
Wiers, R., Gladwin, T., Hofmann, W., Salemink, E., & Ridderinkhof, K. (2013). 
Cognitive bias modification and cognitive control training in addiction and 
related psychopathology: Mechanisms, clinical perspectives, and ways forward. 
Clinical Psychological Science, 1, 192-212. 
Wiers, R. W., & Hofmann, W. (2010). Implicit cognition and health psychology: 
changing perspective and new interventions. The European Health Psychologist, 
12, 4-6. 
Wiers, R. W., Houben, K., Roefs, A., de Jong, P., Hofmann, W., & Stacy, A. W. (2010). 
Implicit cognition in health psychology: Why common sense goes out the 
window. In B. Gawronski, & B. K. Payne (Eds.), Handbook of implicit social 
347 
 
cognition: Measurement, theory, and applications (pp. 463-488). New York, 
NY: Guilford Press. 
Wiers, C. E., Kuhn, S., Jovadi, A., Korucuoglu, O., Wiers, R. W., Walter, H., Gallinat, 
J., & Bermpohl, F. (2013). Automatic approach bias towards smoking cues is 
present in smokers but not in ex-smokers. Psychopharmacology, 229, 187-197. 
Wiers, R. W., Rinck, M., Kordts, R., Houben, K., & Strack, F. (2010). Retraining 
automatic action-tendencies to approach alcohol in hazardous drinkers. 
Addiction, 105, 279-287. 
Wiers, R. W., & Stacy, A. W. (2006a). Handbook of implicit cognition and addiction. 
London, UK: Sage Publications. 
Wiers, R. W., & Stacy, A. W. (2006b). Implicit cognition and addiction. In R. W. 
Wiers, & R. W. Stacy (Eds.), Handbook of implicit cognition and addiction (pp. 
1-8). London, UK: Sage Publications. 
Wiers, R. W., van Woerden, N., Smulders, F. T. Y., & de Jong, P. J. (2002). Implicit 
and explicit alcohol-related cognitions in heavy and light drinkers. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 111, 648-658. 
Wikström, J., Lundh, L., & Westerlund, J. (2003). Stroop effects for masked threat 
words: Pre-attentive bias or selective awareness? Cognition & Emotion, 17, 827-
842. 
Wigboldus, D. H. J., Holland, R. W., & van Knippenberg, A. (2004). Single target 
implicit associations. Unpublished manuscript. 
Williams, B. J., & Kaufmann, L. M. (2012). Reliability of the go/no-go association task. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 879- 891. 
Williams, J. M. G., Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (1996). The emotional Stroop task 
and psychopathology. Psychological Bulletin, 120, 3–2. 
Wilson, T. D. (2009). Know thyself. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 384–
389. 
Wilson, S. J., Creswell, K. G., Sayette, M. A., & Fiez, J. A. (2013). Ambivalence about 
smoking and cue-elicited neural activity in quitting-motivated smokers faced 
with an opportunity to smoke. Addictive Behaviors, 38, 1541–1549. 
Wilson, K. G., & DuFrene, T. (2009). Mindfulness for two: An acceptance and 
commitment therapy approach to mindfulness in psychotherapy. New Harbinger 
Publications. 
348 
 
Wilson, T. D., & Schooler, J. W. (1991). Thinking too much: Introspection can reduce 
the quality of preferences and decisions. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 60, 181-192. 
Winger, G., Woods, J. H., Galuska, C. M., & Wade-Galuska, T. (2005). Behavioral 
perspectives on the neuroscience of drug addiction. Journal of the Experimental 
Analysis of Behavior, 84, 667-681. 
Wittekind, C., Feist, A., Viertel, B., Moritz, S., & Fritzsche, A. (2015). The approach-
avoidance task as an online intervention in cigarette smoking: A pilot study. 
Journal of Behavior Therapy & Experimental Psychiatry, 46, 115-120. 
Wittenbrink, B. (2007). Measuring attitudes through priming. In B. Wittenbrink & N. 
Schwarz (Eds.), Implicit measures of attitudes (pp. 17-58). New York, NY: 
Guildford Press. 
Wolgast, M., Lundh, L. G., & Viborg, G. (2013). Experiential avoidance as an emotion 
regulatory function: an empirical analysis of experiential avoidance in relation to 
behavioral avoidance, cognitive reappraisal, and response suppression. Cognitive 
behaviour therapy, 42(3), 224-232. 
Wong, N. C., & Cappella, J. N. (2009). Antismoking threat and efficacy appeals: effects 
on smoking cessation intentions for smokers with low and high readiness to 
quit. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 37(1), 1-20. 
Wood, W. (2000). Attitude change: Persuasion and social influence. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 51, 539-570.  
Wood, W., & Neal, D. T. (2007). A new look at habits and the habit-goal interface. 
Psychological Review, 114, 843–863. 
World Health Organization (2011). WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic, 2011: 
Warning about the dangers of tobacco. Retrieved on 25th March 2013 from 
http://www.who.int/tobacco/global_report/2011/en/index.html.   
Woud, M. L., Becker, E. S., & Rinck, M. (2011). Induction of implicit evaluation biases 
by approach–avoidance training: A commentary on Vandenbosch and De 
Houwer (this issue). Cognition & Emotion, 25, 1331-1338. 
Wray, A. M. (2011). The reinforcing effects of making sense: Positive, negative, or 
both? Doctoral Dissertation, University of New Mexico, New Mexico, USA. 
Wray, A. M., Dougher, M. J., Hamilton, D. A., & Guinther, P. M. (2012). Examining 
the reinforcing properties of making sense: A preliminary investigation. The 
Psychological Record, 62, 599-622. 
349 
 
Wray, J. M., Gass, J. C., & Tiffany, S. T. (2013). A systematic review of the 
relationships between craving and smoking cessation. Nicotine & Tobacco 
Research, 15, 1167-1182. 
Wulfert, E., Greenway, D.E., Farkas, P., Hayes, S.C. & Dougher, M.J. (1994). 
Correlation between self-reported rigidity and rule-governed insensitivity to 
operant contingencies.  Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 27, 659-671 
Yantz, C. L., & McCaffrey, R. J. (2005). Effects of a supervisor's observation on 
memory test performance of the examinee: Third party observer effect 
confirmed. Journal of Forensic Neuropsychology, 4(2), 27-38. 
Yarnold, J. K. (1970). The minimum expectation in X2 goodness-of-fit tests and the 
accuracy of approximations for the null distribution. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 65, 864-886. 
Yong, E. (2012). Nobel laureate challenges psychologists to clean up their act: Social-
priming research needs “daisy chain” of replication. Nature News, Oct. 3rd, 
retrieved from http://www.nature.com/news/nobel-laureate-challenges-
psychologists-to-clean-up-their-act-1.11535.   
Zanon, R., De Houwer, J., & Gast, A. (2012). Context effects in evaluative conditioning 
of implicit evaluations. Learning and Motivation, 43(3), 155-165. 
Zanon, R., De Houwer, J., Gast, A., & Smith, C. T. (2014). When does relational 
information influence evaluative conditioning? The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 67(11), 2105-2122.  
Zatoński, W., Przewoźniak, K., Sulkowska, U., West, R., & Wojtyła, A. (2012). 
Tobacco smoking in countries of the European Union. Ann Agric Environ Med., 
19, 181-192. 
Zhao, J., Al-Aidroos, N., & Turk-Browne, N. (2013). Attention is spontaneously biased 
towards regularities. Psychological Science, 24, 667-677. 
Zvolensky, M. J., Farris, S. G., Guillot, C. R., & Leventhal, A. M. (2014). Anxiety 
sensitivity as an amplifier of subjective and behavioral tobacco abstinence 
effects. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 142, 224-230. 
Zwann, R. A., & Truitt, T. P. (2000). Inhibition of smoking-related information in 
smokers and nonsmokers. Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 8, 
192-197. 
 
 
 
350 
 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 Collateral controversies resulting from the topic-indeterminacy of 
most (addiction-related) measures of implicit cognition. 
 
Appendix 2 The demographic and behavioural history questionnaire (DBHQ). 
  
Appendix 3 The DIAT-algorithm. 
 
Appendix 4  The DIRAP-algorithm. 
 
Appendix 5 The accuracy, speed and synchronicity characteristics of the trial 
responses underlying DIATs versus DIRAPs. 
 
Appendix 6 Major rationales for analysing IRAP data in terms of its nested 
stimulus variables. 
 
Appendix 7 The technical rationale of Receiver Operating Characteristic 
(ROC) curve statistics. 
 
Appendix 8 On the distribution of DIATs versus trial-type DIRAPs about zero. 
  
Appendix 9 Plots of smoking-status sensitivity versus specificity for Smoking-
Pos DIRAP and Ban-Neg DIRAP. 
 
Appendix 10 Statistical details for the bootstrapped models of the various Ds in 
terms of years smoking and trait smoking compulsion intensity. 
 
Appendix 11 Compensation algorithm for comparisons of trial-type DIRAP rsbs 
with DIAT rsbs. 
 
Appendix 12 The demographic and behavioural history questionnaire version 2 
(DBHQ-2). 
 
Appendix 13 The Avoidance and Inflexibility Scale (AIS). 
 
Appendix 14 Bootstrapped mediation models of the four IRAP trial-type 
effects in terms of trait tobacco addiction intensity across years 
smoking. 
 
Appendix 15  The ‘extended’ DIRAP-algorithm. 
 
Appendix 16 The instructions for the IRAP-based perspective switching task in 
Study 3. 
 
Appendix 17 The instructions for the questionnaire-based perspective 
switching during relevant questionnaires in Study 3. 
 
Appendix 18 The manipulation check questionnaires for IRAP-based 
perspective swtiching task in Study 3.  
351 
 
 
Appendix 19 The manipulation check questionnaires for questionnaire-based 
perspective swtiching task in Study 3.  
 
Appendix 20  Response latency by thought suppression analyses for Study 3. 
 
Appendix 21 Response latency by thought suppression and block order 
analyses for Study 3. 
 
Appendix 22  Response latency by thought suppression and block order 
analyses for Study 4. 
 
Appendix 23 A thought-listing questionnaire for musical induction of sad 
moods. 
 
Appendix 24 PASAT-C mood induction manipulation check rating scales. 
 
Appendix 25 The Demographic and Behavioural History Questionnaire 
Version 3 (DBHQ-3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
352 
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
Collateral Controversies resulting from the Topic-indeterminacy of most 
(Addiction-related) Measures of Implicit Cognition 
 
Note 1 
Although most evaluative priming procedures instruct participants to respond to 
targets as quickly and as accurately as possible, this of course does not oblige 
participants to do so. Likewise, although most researchers exclude extremely slow 
evaluations when scoring evaluative priming effects (i.e. target responses that had 
statistically outlying latencies within the relevant dataset; see Wentura & Degner, 2010, 
pp. 109-110) this only excludes evaluations that may have involved extreme amounts of 
deliberation. Thus, in practice evaluative priming effects still include many target 
responses that are slow enough to have involved the complexities of deliberation (i.e. a 
recent meta-analysis indicated mean latencies ranging from 798-2709 ms with standard 
deviations ranging from 908-2281 ms; see Cameron et al., 2012, pp. 342-343). Granted, 
a very small minority of evaluative priming studies have attempted to actively minimize 
participants’ ability to deliberate while responding to trial targets. However all did so in 
such an extreme manner that they obscured the relevant evaluative processes even more 
than conventional evaluative priming effects. Specifically, the time given participants to 
respond to the targets was designed to become adaptively briefer and briefer (e.g. 300-
500 ms) until it heavily interfered with each participant’s ability to ‘correctly’ evaluate 
targets as positive versus negative (i.e. the researcher judged correctness in terms of 
his/her opinion about people’s normal evaluations of the relevant target). The basic 
assumption here is that very brief response deadlines will cause evaluative priming 
effects to emerge primarily from automatic cognitive processes in terms of response 
‘accuracy’ (i.e. at very brief response latencies participants should be more versus less 
able to ‘correctly’ classify targets depending respectively upon whether the preceding 
prime prompts them to respond in ways that agree versus disagree with the relevant 
‘correct’ evaluation; see Wentura & Degner, 2010, pp. 103, 107-108). However, the key 
problem in setting out to interfere with the participant’s ability to evaluate prime and/or 
target stimuli as instructed is that it is tantamount to encouraging evaluating in other, 
unspecified terms when responding to the relevant trial (as is tacitly acknowledged by 
the common practice of excluding extremely brief evaluations when scoring priming 
effects; see Wentura & Degner, 2010, pp. 109-110). Thus, as compared to conventional 
evaluative priming effects that allow participants enough time to evaluate trial stimuli 
according to the researcher’s expectations of normal, by definition priming effects based 
upon decrements in response ‘accuracy’ make it less clear to the researcher what 
cognitions they involve (i.e. because these decrements indicate that participants have 
evaluated the relevant targets with unusual connotations that the researcher neither 
anticipated nor recorded). 
 
Note 2 
Admittedly, most evaluative priming procedures do make some attempt to 
control for extraneous influences when scoring latency-based evaluative priming 
effects. Specifically, researchers typically exclude any target evaluation post hoc that 
contradicts the researcher’s beliefs about how that target is normally evaluated by most 
people (e.g. if a participant evaluated the target ‘fabulous’ negatively that self-report 
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would usually be excluded from scoring; see Wentura & Degner, 2010, pp. 109-110; 
Wittenbrink, 2007, p. 29). However, aside from the fact that these exclusion criteria are 
not possible with one major variant of evaluative priming (i.e. the AMP; see Payne et 
al., 2007, p. 404), even when they are possible they are not a solution to the original 
problem of cognitive indeterminacy but rather merely a compromise. Such practices not 
only tacitly acknowledge that participants might perceive their task in many different 
but unrecorded ways (i.e. even when they appear to evaluate targets as ‘normal’ and are 
therefore not excluded), but they also diminish the size of each priming effect’s dataset 
and therefore, in principle, that effect’s reliability (see Wentura & Degner, 2010, pp. 
106, 111; Wittenbrink, 2007, p. 29). 
 
Note 3 
Although Degner (2009) prevented participants from strategically distorting 
evaluative priming effects, this was achieved only by using response deadlines that were 
specifically designed to interfere with participants’ ability to evaluate target stimuli 
consistently. Thus, Degner (2009) exchanged one methodological ambiguity for another 
(i.e. as per Notes 1 and 2, Appendix 1, above). Moreover, Teige-Mocigemba and Klauer 
(2013) recently demonstrated that participants can strategically distort their evaluative 
priming effects even under similar response deadline conditions as those that Degner 
(2009) claimed prevented this. Likewise, although there is some evidence that 
procedures designed to mask participants’ awareness of primes can reduce participants’ 
ability to strategically control evaluative priming effects, in such cases the resulting 
priming effects were smaller and/or more unstable than unmasked evaluative priming 
effects (see Van den Bussche et al, 2009; Wentura & Degner, 2010, pp. 99-100). This is 
unsurprising given that evaluative priming was originally inspired by theoretical 
traditions that are generally unconcerned with participants’ awareness of stimuli and 
much more interested in intentionality, efficiency and/or speed as facets of implicitness 
(see Payne & Gawronski, 2010, pp. 2-10).  
 
Note 4 
One recent variant of evaluative priming, the AMP, has been widely promoted 
in terms of its exemplary internal reliability (e.g. .70 ≤ αs ≤ .90 Payne et al., 2005; 
Wentura & Degner, 2010). However, when considered across a broad range of 
psychometric criteria AMP scores perform rather disappointingly (see Bar-Anan & 
Nosek, 2014b). Although the AMP improves upon other evaluative priming methods in 
that participants tend to respond more consistently across its trials, nevertheless its tasks 
cannot identify the particular evaluating they induce for each participant (see Bar-Anan 
& Nosek, 2014a; Deutsch & Gawronski, 2009; Loersch & Payne, 2011; Oikawa, Aarts, 
& Oikawa, 2011; Ruys, Aarts, Papies, Oikawa & Oikawa, 2012; Spruyt et al., 2014). In 
other words, even if AMP scores are internally consistent the specific evaluating they 
measure remains undetermined and thus free to vary in an unrecorded, confounded 
fashion from participant to participant and from occasion to occasion.  
Furthermore, AMP scores are very susceptible to strategic distortion (see Bar-
Anan & Nosek, 2012, 2014b; Blaison et al., 2012; De Houwer & Smith, 2013). In 
response to such findings, some authors have attempted to defend the implicitness of 
AMP scores by claiming that so-called strategic distortions of AMP scores operate 
indirectly via non-deliberative, implicit processes; however, none have yet tested the 
relevant processes directly (see Gawronski & Ye, 2014; Payne, Brown-Iannuzzi, 
Burkley, Arbuckle, et al., 2013; Payne et al., 2005; Payne, Govorun & Arbuckle, 2008). 
In fact, to the contrary, the latest evidence suggests that participants must be 
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consciously aware of prime stimuli in order for AMP effects to emerge (i.e. AMP 
effects usually only emerge when participants correctly detected and/or recognized its 
primes as being relevant to their completion of AMP trials; see Cameron et al., 2011, 
pp. 341-344; Gast, De Houwer & De Schryver, 2012; Oikawa et al., 2011; Rohr, 
Degner & Wentura, 2015, pp. 13-15; Ruys et al., 2012).  
 In any case, whether or not the AMP is deemed implicit, the key point is that it 
does not determine the specific type(s) of evaluating involved. Indeed, even the 
reliability of all but the strongest of AMP scores is questionable as per the recent 
finding that AMP scores rapidly lose internal reliability as their magnitude reduces (see 
Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014b; De Houwer & Smith, 2013, pp. 300-301). This finding 
makes sense from the point of view that the misattributions upon which AMP scores are 
based are likely to become more unstable whenever AMP tasks lose relevance for 
participants (see Notes 1 and 2 above about how ambiguous tasks promote unstable 
evaluating; also see Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014b; Loersch & Payne, 2011; Oikawa et al., 
2011; Ruys et al., 2012). Crucially, whatever the reason for the diminishing reliability 
of AMP scores’ as they become weaker, it means that such scores are bound to be 
limited in their ability to measure individual differences. And indeed, this is confirmed 
in practice by the limited ability of AMP scores to detect many known-groups type 
behavioral criteria despite initial claims that AMP scores achieved average criterion 
effects of r = .53 (see Payne et al., 2005, p. 290; Payne, Govorun, & Arbuckle, 2008).  
For example, Bar-Anan and Nosek’s (2014b) large scale comparison of implicit 
measures involving 23,413 participants revealed that AMP scores bore erratic and 
relatively weak relationships with corresponding validity criteria across the three 
domains tested. Specifically, AMP scores correlated with validity criteria in the range -
.13 ≤ r ≤ .37, with the respective weighted average criterion correlations for race, 
political orientation and self-esteem being r = .09, r = .36, and r = .07 (i.e. we calculated 
these and the following r effects by first converting all relevant criterion statistical 
effects in terms of r before then using degrees of freedom to weight the relevant 
averages; see Rosnow, Rosenthal & Rubin, 2000). Indeed, these criterion correlations 
diminished even more when disregarding extreme AMP scores and/or when AMP 
scores were derived from one topic at a time (i.e. an average r = .09 across the three 
domains tested between the middle 90% of AMP scores and corresponding criterion 
variables; and an average r = .11 between single category AMP scores and 
corresponding criterion variables; see Bar-Anan and Nosek, 2014b; see also Bar-Anan 
& Nosek, 2012, 2014a; Cameron et al., 2012, p. 342; Herring et al., 2013, p. 1074; 
Rooke et al., 2008). 
 
Note 5 
Just as precise measures of implicit evaluating are prerequisite to examine how 
contextual cues moderate evaluating, a very similar point applies to the core methods 
employed by the research literature examining the neurobiology and/or 
psychopharmacology of addiction (see Berridge & Robinson, 2006; Everitt & Robins, 
2005; Greenberg & Altman, 1976; Koob & Le Moal, 2008; Perkins et al, 1997; 
Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2003, 2008). The various cued conditioning techniques 
(i.e. operant, respondent, habituation, etc.) that form the backbone of this literature are 
generally used to measure how motivating a given object of addiction is in terms of how 
effectively it can condition overt behaviours to occur more or less often with particular 
contextual cues (i.e. in contrast to the cue-reactivity paradigm which measures how pre-
existing behavioural cues function). The key problem with such research is that it 
cannot determine or therefore measure how the behavioural contingencies it sets up are 
being motivationally transformed on an ongoing basis by evaluating (see Barnes-
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Holmes et al., 2010; Berridge & Robinson, 2006, 2011; Field & Duka, 2001; Hayes & 
Brownstein, 1986; Heyman, 2011, 2013; Moore, 2013; Perkins, 2009; Perkins et al., 
1997; Rose et al., 2013; Skinner, 1945, 1989; Steele & Hayes, 1991). Therefore, to the 
extent that researchers wish to determine how neurobiological and/or pharmacological 
variables interact with motivational processes in humans capable of evaluating, they 
will need to incorporate precise measures of implicit evaluating within their analyses. 
Indeed, this point has important implications for psychological research in general. To 
understand how contextual variables influence the motivational processes governing the 
behaviour of people capable of evaluating it follows that we must account precisely for 
implicit evaluating. Otherwise, researchers will lack the practical ability to replicate any 
particular neurobiological and/or psychopharmacological findings about the impact of 
context upon motivational processes (for a review of how this has already occurred in 
the literature on social- and goal-priming see Cesario, 2014; Kahneman, 2012; Loersch 
& Payne, 2011; Yong, 2012).  
 
Note 6 
The creators of the unipolar ST-IAT and the FAST each argued from the outset 
that they had effectively achieved a non-relative measure by targeting implicit 
associations between an attitude object and some attribute relative to neutrality for both 
associates (i.e. neutrality as the intersection of both the scale for the attitude object and 
for the attribute of interest). And indeed, such arguments have some face validity 
insofar as comparing a category with its notional zero point constitutes a non-relative, 
albeit hypothetical, scale by definition. Crucially, however, it is highly questionable 
whether the ‘neutral’ stimuli employed by either measure actually function as such for 
either the attitude object and attribute of interest.  
The unipolar ST-IAT and the FAST (and incidentally, the unipolar IAT and the 
Brief IAT) are all designed to make relative comparisons with stimuli that were chosen 
to be universally neutral, in the sense of irrelevant, to the topic and attribute category of 
interest. Crucially, the unipolar ST-IAT and the FAST (and indeed the unipolar IAT and 
the Brief IAT) are specifically designed to incorporate particular neutral stimuli on the 
basis of irrelevance to the attitude object and attribute of interest. Thus, rather than 
operationalising neutrality in terms of stimuli that are neutral with respect to the 
relevant attitude object and attribute, all such measures make the tacit compromise of 
equating irrelevancy with neutrality. Given that it is a contradiction in terms to speak of 
comparing things that are irrelevant to each other, therefore, by inadvertent design, such 
measures make comparisons that are an even less interpretable than a standard IAT 
effect. 
To illustrate, the unipolar ST-IAT (Thush & Wiers, 2007) was designed as a 
hybrid of the unipolar IAT and the ST-IAT. Admittedly, this hybrid does avoid 
comparisons between an attitude object of interest and some contrasting topic. 
Specifically, the only difference between a unipolar ST-IAT and an ST-IAT is that the 
former replaces one of the latter’s attribute categories with a group of stimuli that were 
each chosen to be universally neutral, in the sense of irrelevant, to its accompanying 
IAT stimulus categories. Thus, for example, Thush and Wiers (2007) employed words 
such as flat, daily, usual, wide and steep as ‘neutral’ stimuli when attempting to measure 
implicit associations between alcohol-related words and positive attribute words such as 
likeable or pleasant. The key point here is that there are many unintended and 
unrecorded ways in which participants might have associated alcohol-related words 
with the ‘neutral’ words employed by Thush and Wiers (2007). Participants might have 
associated the supposedly neutral word ‘flat’ in negative terms with one of the beers 
named among the alcohol-related stimuli, but in contrast have also associated the 
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supposedly neutral word ‘daily’ in positive terms with alcohol (e.g. that daily alcohol 
consumption is benign and/or customary). 
Taking a somewhat different approach to achieving comparisons with neutrality, 
the FAST uses nonsense words as neutral comparison stimuli. In broad terms, the FAST 
compares how quickly participants learn to classify a target attitude object’s exemplars 
with a target attribute’s exemplars together, versus with nonsense stimuli, while under 
time pressure (i.e. < 3000ms per trial). The basic idea here is that participants should 
require less learning trials to correctly match exemplars from an attitude object with 
exemplars from attribute and neutral categories (and vice-versa) to the extent that 
participants have a behavioural history of similarly relating the attitude object and 
attribute categories together. However, like the unipolar ST-IAT the core, albeit tacit, 
assumption here is that participants will always respond neutrally to nonsense stimuli 
because they are fundamentally irrelevant to all topics and attributes.  
Therefore, the FAST is tacitly based on the untenable dual assumption that 
participants will only ever respond to trials involving neutral/nonsense stimuli in terms 
of (a) the categories about which those stimuli were specifically designed to be 
irrelevant (i.e. this is needed to achieve a scale in terms of the attitude object and 
attribute of interest), and yet (b) without associating those neutral/nonsense stimuli in 
any way with those categories (i.e. this is needed to achieve a true zero point on the 
relevant scale object-attribute associative scale). In other words, it seems very 
contradictory to expect a participant to respond to neutral/nonsense stimuli in terms of 
an attitude object and attribute of interest during tasks that specifically legislate against 
this (e.g. as in a unipolar IAT when neutral stimuli must be classified as distinct from 
the attribute of interest, or as when nonsense stimuli must be paired with nonsense 
stimuli during a FAST). By incorporating comparisons with stimuli that are designed to 
be irrelevant to the topic of interest, therefore as we have already argued with respect to 
unipolar (ST-)IATs, the FAST is a relative measure of implicit evaluating and moreover 
it is one that is even less interpretable than the original format IAT (i.e. especially given 
that when faced with ambigious stimuli people usually respond to those stimuli in 
ideographic terms; cf. apophonia; see also Bordieri, Kellum, & Wilson, 2013; Bordieri, 
Kellum, Wilson, Whiteman, in press). 
Incidentally, similar criticisms also apply to the Brief IAT. The Brief IAT 
instructs participants to classify contrasting attribute stimuli by ignoring their category 
label, and instead responding relative to the category label for the attribute of interest. 
Thus, in addition to measuring one attitude object relative to another, Brief IATs also 
compare responses to some attribute category of interest with responses to an irrelevant 
attribute category (i.e. in order to achieve a neutral comparison for the implicit 
evaluative association of interest; see Sririam & Greenwald, 2009; Teige-Mocigemba et 
al., 2010, p. 134). Therefore, much like the unipolar IAT, the unipolar ST-IAT, and the 
FAST, the Brief IAT also fails to disambiguate one attribute category from another 
despite its aspirations to the contrary.  
Granted, there is an IAT variant that can disambiguate one attribute category 
from another without resorting to comparisons with irrelevant stimuli. However, that 
variant, the so-called single attribute IAT, has only been used once in the literature 
(Penke, Eichsteadt, & Asendorpf, 2006), and it is still a relative measure with respect to 
attitude objects (i.e. it is designed to measure the implicit association between a given 
attitude object and a given attribute relative to some contrasting attitude object). 
Overall, therefore, neither the original format IAT nor any of its variants succeed in 
providing non-relative measures of implicit evaluating.  
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Note 7 
Wittekind et al. (2015) recently reported evidence that a zAAT designed to train 
avoidance of smoking-related cues (and approach to smoking-neutral cues) brought 
about significant reductions in a number of indicators for tobacco addiction four weeks 
later. However, Wittekind et al. did not implement a measurement version of the 
relevant zAAT to test whether the relevant response biases had been successfully 
trained, and thus it is speculative whether or not any such changes brought about 
changes in tobacco addiction at follow-up. Moreover, even ignoring this issue, smokers 
receiving a ‘slight variant’ of the relevant zAAT training unexpectedly exhibited no 
such changes in tobacco addiction at follow-up. This raises important questions about 
whether the relevant changes in smoking-related behaviour, which were relatively 
minor, were merely an instance of regression to the mean among the heavy smokers 
included in this study. On average the relevant smokers who received the standard 
zAAT training had been smoking for 22-25 years, smoking an average of 20 CPD at the 
outset of the study and reported reductions in their cigarette consumption that was of a 
similarly small magnitude as the accompanying reductions in CPD observed among 
those receiving the variant zAAT or those in the control group (i.e. respective average 
reductions of 1.85, 0.75 and 0.40 CPD from an average of 20 CPD).  
Granted, two studies that are commonly cited as having treated alcohol addiction 
using AATs did employ alcohol-related zAATs as measures (i.e. Wiers et al., 2011; 
Wiers, Rinck, Kordts, Houben, & Strack, 2010). And yet, neither study succeeded in 
demonstrating that the small changes in alcohol-related zAAT scores they obtained 
mediated the relatively minor changes in alcohol-related behaviour they also obtained 
(i.e. despite third party claims to the contrary; e.g. Earp et al., 2013, p. 2159; Watson et 
al., 2012, p. 6-7; Woud, Becker & Rinck, 2011, pp. 1331-1332). Indeed, even putting 
aside the question of whether zAAT training impacts addiction-related behaviour, 
follow-up research now suggests that any such changes in behaviour might not occur 
via changes in implicit evaluating but rather as a deliberative artefact of the zAAT 
instructions involved (see Vandenbosch and De Houwer, 2011; Van Dessel, De 
Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2014; Van Dessel, De Houwer, Roets, & Gast, 2015; Wiers, 
Gladwin, et al., 2013). 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
The Demographic and Behavioural History Questionnaire (DBHQ) 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
The DIAT-algorithm 
The DIAT-algorithm was computed as follows: (i) latencies above 10,000 ms 
from the dataset were eliminated; (ii) all data for a participant were removed if he or she 
produced more than 10% of trials with latencies less than 300 ms; (iii) means were 
computed for trials in each of the four blocks, 3, 4, 6, and 7; (iv) one standard deviation 
was calculated for all trials in blocks 3 and 6, and another for blocks 4 and 7; (v) 
difference scores were computed between blocks 3 and 6, and between blocks 4 and 7, 
taking the pro-smoking from the anti-smoking blocks; (vi) each mean difference score 
was divided by its associated standard deviation; and (v) these two scores were added 
together and divided by two. Accordingly, the only difference between the DIAT score 
and Cohen’s d is that whereas DIAT is computed using the common standard deviation 
computed from all of the trials across both treatment conditions being compared, d uses 
a pooled standard deviation (i.e. the square root of a weighted average, according to 
relative sample size, of the sample variances from each individual condition being 
compared).  
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APPENDIX 4 
 
The DIRAP-algorithm 
The IRAP response latencies were transformed into DIRAP scores using an 
adaptation of the DIAT-algorithm called the DIRAP-algorithm. The details of the DIRAP-
algorithm are as follows: (i) only response-latency data from test blocks are used (unlike 
the DIAT-algorithm which incorporates IAT practise blocks 3 and 6); (ii) latencies above 
10 000 ms are eliminated from the dataset; (iii) the data are eliminated for a participant 
for whom more than 10% of test-block trials have latencies less than 300 ms; (iv) twelve 
standard deviations are computed, one for the response latencies belonging to each trial-
type in each of the three pairs of test blocks (i.e. four common standard deviations for 
the response-latencies from test blocks 1 and 2, four from the latencies from test-blocks 
3 and 4, and a further four from test-blocks 5 and 6); (v) 24 mean response latencies are 
calculated, one for each of the four trial-types in each test block; (vi) 12 difference 
scores are computed for each trial-type in each pair of test blocks, by subtracting the 
mean latency of each trial-type’s trials in a pro-smoking test-block from the mean 
latency of that trial-type’s trials in its corresponding anti-smoking test-block; (vii) each 
difference score is then divided by its corresponding standard deviation from step iv, 
yielding 12 block-pair DIRAP scores; one score for each trial-type for each pair of test 
blocks (viii) finally, four overall trial-type DIRAP scores are computed by averaging each 
trial-type’s three block-pair DIRAPs from step vii.  
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APPENDIX 5 
 
The Accuracy, Speed and Synchronicity Characteristics of the Trial Responses 
Underlying DIATs versus DIRAPs 
 Although the average accuracy of participant responding on the IAT data trials 
was less than that on the IRAP test trials, t(85) = 2.64, p = .01, 2 = .08, this difference 
likely lacks practical significance. In both cases the participants responded with an 
average accuracy of at least 80%: 91.6% of the IAT data trials were accurate, standard 
deviation (SD) = 6.4%, inter-quartile range (IQR) = 7.5%, and similarly, the average 
percentage accuracy for the IRAP test trials was 94%, SD = 3.9%, IQR = 4.67%.  
In contrast, there was a substantial difference between the average speed with 
which participants completed the IAT test trials versus the IRAP test trials, t(85) = 
16.93, p < .0001, such that on average, participants completed the IAT trials 1254 ms 
faster than the IRAP trials. Specifically, although participants completed IAT data trials 
with a mean latency of just 1134 ms, SD = 355 ms, IQR = 434 ms, on average 
participants took 2388 ms to complete each IRAP test trial, SD = 410 ms, IQR = 595 ms. 
 Crucially, however, the critical response property underlying the IAT effect, the 
relative (a) synchrony of pro- versus anti-smoking trials, did not differ from those 
underlying the trial-type DIRAPs, t(85) = .24, p = .81, 
2 = .0007. The average pro- 
versus anti-smoking response latency difference underpinning each IAT effect was just 
18 ms, SD = 424 ms, IQR = 530 ms, and similarly the average pro- versus anti-smoking 
response latency difference underpinning each trial-type effect from the IRAP was just 
36 ms, SD = 237 ms, IQR = 182 ms.  
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APPENDIX 6 
 
Major Rationales for Analysing IRAP data in terms of its Nested Stimulus 
Variables 
All IRAP research to date has analysed the four trial-type DIRAPs as a single 
four-level ‘trial-type’ variable. By minimizing the complexity among the four trial-type 
DIRAPs to one ‘trial-type’ dimension, this approach maximises one’s statistical power to 
detect any experimental main or interaction effects that affect all four trial-type DIRAPs 
collectively in the same way. This is a legitimate strategy if we are convinced that the 
four trial-type DIRAPs do not meaningfully differ from each other in a given analytic 
context (i.e. if we are convinced they will not interact with any of the other 
experimental variables involved). However, many IRAPs are specifically designed to 
permit drawing clear functional distinctions among all four trial-types and thus it seems 
likely, as in the present case, that the forgoing assumptions will often be untenable. 
Under such circumstances, if one is to avoid confounding an IRAP’s four trial-types, 
one must at least begin by analysing all four trial-types DIRAPs collectively in terms of 
the two nested IRAP variables which ultimately distinguish them (i.e. in the present 
study these variables are called Concept Label versus Attribute Target Stimulus Class; 
see Method section). To do otherwise, would not just neglect important information 
about how an IRAP’s four trial-type DIRAPs interact with each other, but also about how 
they interact with external experimental variables. For example, it would mean that we 
would not be able to statistically test whether smokers differed from non-smokers more 
on the smoking-related trial-type DIRAPs versus on the smoking-ban-related trial-type 
DIRAPs. Admittedly, one could compute all of the eight simple effect comparisons 
between smokers versus non-smokers on each of the four trial-type DIRAPs, and then 
informally interpret trend(s) about which trial-type DIRAPs were most sensitive to 
smoking-status. However, that is all it would be; a subjective interpretation vulnerable 
to illusions about how the two neglected trial-type variables interacted with each other. 
Therefore, to exclude subjective illusions about the many meaningful interactions that 
are possible among an IRAP’s four trial-type DIRAPs (i.e. they grow exponentially when 
we use the IRAP to examine an increasing number of experimental manipulations), it 
requires an omnibus statistical test incorporating smoking-status with the two ‘internal’ 
IRAP variables which distinguished those four trial-types from each other. Finally, 
given that in the present case the concept label variable defines the topic to which each 
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attribute target stimulus class applies, we therefore nested the attribute target stimulus 
class variable within the concept label variable throughout all proceeding analyses. 
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APPENDIX 7 
 
The Technical Rationale of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve 
Statistics 
A ROC curve describes the dynamic trade-off between the true positive rate (i.e. 
sensitivity) versus the false positive rate (i.e. 1 – specificity = 1 – true negative rate) with 
which a given measure classifies cases into two diagnostic categories. Thus, the area 
bounded by the receiver operating characteristic curve, quantified in the Area Under the 
Curve (AUC) statistic, is a direct indicator of a measure’s ability to dichotomise cases in 
the relevant way. When the AUC has a value of .5, corresponding to a positively sloped 
diagonal ROC curve, it indicates that the measure in question cannot distinguish 
between the two classifications being considered beyond chance; but when the AUC of 
a curve is 1 it indicates that the measure in questions achieves a perfect separation of the 
two classifications being considered (i.e. the closer the trajectory of the ROC curve to 
the top of the sensitivity axis throughout the false positive axis the more effective the 
relevant measure is at discriminating between the two relevant classifications). Once an 
AUC has been calculated for a given dichotomous classification problem its statistical 
significance is usually calculated in comparison to the asymptotically normal population 
distribution of AUC about 0.5 (i.e. where the two classification groups have equal 
sampling likelihoods; IBM Corp., 2012, pp. 839-844).  
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APPENDIX 8 
 
On the Distribution of DIATs versus trial-type DIRAPs about Zero 
Figure A8.1 reveals that unlike the smokers’ DIATs which appear to have 
polarized on either side of the neighbourhood of zero, the smokers’ four trial-type 
DIRAPs were continuously and (approximately) normally distributed across that 
neighbourhood. Indeed, not one smoker scored within -.1 < DIAT < .1, even though 
almost a third of IAT smokers had a DIAT < -.1, with the other two thirds scoring DIAT 
>.1. What is more, only three smokers scored within the relatively large interval -.3 < 
DIAT < .3 (i.e. corresponding to -.59 < d < .59 in the present sample), and all three scores 
were decidedly non-zero: one smoker scored DIAT = -.23; another scored DIAT = .13; and 
the third scored DIAT = .20.  
 
 
Figure A8.1. Histograms of smokers’ four trial-type DIRAPs juxtaposed with histogram of matched 
smokers’ DIATs. Most notably, smokers’ trial-type DIRAPs appear to be continuously and approximately 
normally distributed across the region of zero, but there is a clear discontinuity in smokers’ DIATs around 
zero.  
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Figure A8.2. A Yates-corrected chi-gram illustrating the dramatic polarization of the smokers’ DIAT 
scores. In essence, the chi-gram displays the differences between the observed patterns with which 
smokers’ DIAT scores occurred in four intervals of DIAT, versus the expected patterns with which they 
would have occurred in these intervals if they were sampled from a normal population distribution. The 
vertical axis graduates chi (), which for each interval of DIAT on the horizontal axis is the observed DIAT 
count minus the expected DIAT count divided by the square root of the expected DIAT count. Thus a zero  
score indicates that the number of smokers scoring within the relevant interval of DIAT conforms to the 
standard normal model; and in contrast, a positive versus negative  score respectively indicates that the 
smokers collectively produced more versus less DiATs in the relevant interval than is predicted by the 
standard normal model.  
 
Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure A8.2, we conducted a chi-square goodness-
of-fit test on four adjacent intervals of smokers’ DIATs to quantify the extent to which the 
respective frequencies observed in each interval was different from what would be 
expected if it were normally distributed. The four intervals of DIAT, -.6 < DIAT < -.2, -.2 < 
DIAT < +.2, .2 < DIAT < .6, .6 < DIAT < 1.0, were chosen based upon three criteria: (a) the 
inclusion of all observed DIATs in terms of one-decimal of D (b) adjacency to each other; 
(c) and thirdly, being of sufficient width to at least approximate the minimum expected 
count per cell of five needed to conduct a chi-squared goodness-of-fit test. Overall, the 
chi-squared test indicated that the smokers produced much fewer scores in the middle 
of their DIAT distribution (i.e. around DIAT = 0), and proportionately more at either end of 
their DIAT distribution, than would be expected if these scores were in fact sampled from 
a homogenous normal population of DIATs, 
2(3, 22) = 9.98, p = .019, Cramer’s V = .38 
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(i.e. a Cramer’s V of .29 with df = 3 conventionally qualifies as large; Cohen, 1988). 
Using the appropriate Z-transformations with M = .275 and SD = .51, -.6 < DIAT < -.2 
would be expected to contain 13.4% of the sample (i.e. 2.9 smokers) versus the 27% 
observed (i.e. 6 smokers); -.2 < DIAT < +.2 would be expected to contain 26.4% of the 
sample (i.e. 5.8 smokers) versus the 9% observed (i.e. 2 smokers); .2 < DIAT < .6 would 
be expected to contain 29.9% of the sample (i.e.  6.6 smokers) versus the 23% observed 
(i.e. 5 smokers); .6 < DIAT < 1.0 would be expected to contain 18.3% (i.e. 4 smokers) 
versus the 36% observed (i.e. 8 smokers).88  
 
 
Figure A8.3. Histograms of non-smokers’ four trial-type DIRAPs juxtaposed with histogram of matched 
non-smokers’ DIATs. Both non-smokers’ trial-type DIRAPs and matched non-smokers’ DIATs appear to be 
continuously and approximately normally distributed across the region of zero.  
 
In contrast, Figure A8.3 suggests that non-smokers’ DIATs were continuously and 
normally distributed across the neighbourhood of zero much as non-smokers’ trial-type 
DIRAPs. Indeed, normal Q-Q plots and Shapiro-Wilks tests confirmed that all of the 
smokers’ and non-smokers’ trial-type DIRAPs were approximately normally distributed, 
Ws  .95, ps  .36; as were the IAT non-smokers’ DIATs, W(21) = .97, p = .69; but that 
                                                 
88 On balance, the expected frequencies observed here are sufficiently high particularly given that there 
are no discrepancies among them (see Cochran, 1954; Hogg & Tanis, 1996; Howell, 2012b; Kirkman, 
1996; Yarnold, 1970). 
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in contrast the IAT smokers’ DIATs did somewhat violate normality due to its narrow 
and polarized tails, W(22) = .90, p = .03. In summary, therefore, the smokers’ DIATs 
were unique among the other samples of Ds obtained in the present study, insofar as 
they were bimodally distributed into sub-varieties on either side of zero.  
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APPENDIX 9 
 
Plots of Smoking-status Sensitivity versus Specificity for Smoking-Pos DIRAP and 
Ban-Neg DIRAP 
 
 
 
Figure A9.1. The sensitivity versus specificity of the Smoking-Pos DIRAP to smoking-status across relevant 
ROC curve coordinates. The intersection between the dashed vertical line and the two dashed horizontal 
lines at Smoking-Pos DIRAP = .196 represents the point at which Smoking-Pos DIRAP has maximal 
combined sensitivity and specificity for identifying smokers from the present sample (i.e. 91% sensitivity, 
and 62% specificity).  
 
 
 
Figure A9.2. The sensitivity versus specificity of the Ban-Neg DIRAP to smoking-status across relevant 
ROC curve coordinates. The intersection between the dashed vertical line and the two dashed horizontal 
lines at Ban-Neg DIRAP = .11 represents the point at which Ban-Neg DIRAP has maximal combined 
sensitivity and specificity for identifying smokers from the present sample (i.e. 77% sensitivity, and 62% 
specificity).  
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APPENDIX 10 
 
Statistical Details for the Bootstrapped Models of the Various Ds in Terms of 
Years Smoking and Trait Smoking Compulsion Intensity 
We used the Hayes (2012) ‘PROCESS’ software for casual path analysis to 
individually model the causal provenance of each of the various Ds in terms of years 
smoking (YS) and trait smoking compulsion intensity (i.e. CPD, mFTQ or HONC). 
Essentially, the PROCESS software uses SPSS macros to implement an innovative 
bootstrapping procedure which is designed to estimate the sampling distribution of the 
indirect causal path (i.e. between the independent variable and the relevant dependent 
variable via its purported mediator), thereby providing a non-parametric estimate of the 
indirect effect 95% Confidence Interval (CI); and if the CI excludes zero this means that 
the indirect path is statistically significant and otherwise not (see also Preacher & 
Hayes, 2004; 2008; Hayes, 2009). CPD, mFTQ and HONC were tested separately as 
candidate mediators between YS and each of the Ds because of the high degree of 
collinearity and conceptual reciprocity among them (i.e. both here and in the literature 
they constitute indeterminately overlapping aspects of the trait intensity of smoking 
compulsions; see DiFranza, Ursprung, & Biller, 2012; O’Loughlin et al., 2002, p. 359; 
Wellman et al., 2006).  
Modelling Some Causes of DIAT  
Our three mediation models respectively indicated that the relationship between 
YS and DIAT was dominantly mediated by CPD and mFTQ, 
2s = .34, .26 (i.e. ps  .05 
for both 2s and the corresponding mediation paths), and less so by HONC, 2 = .13, p 
> .05. In particular, as illustrated in Figure A10.1 below, the mediation path (ab) from 
YS to DIAT via CPD was a very large proportion of the total effect (path c’) of YS on 
DIAT (i.e. 
2 = .34 means that path ab was 34% of the maximum mediation effect 
possible given the observed patterns of variation between YS and DIAT). Overall, YS 
and the respective smoking-compulsion intensity traits accounted for approximately 10-
19% of the observed variation in DIAT, of which the indirect path ab constituted 
approximately 1.7% of DIAT via CPD, 0.6% of DIAT via mFTQ, and 0.2% of DIAT via 
HONC (i.e. the latter three percentages were obtained by multiplying the R2 for path c 
between YS and DIAT with each corresponding 
2 in Figure A10.1 and Table A10.1). 
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Figure A10.1. Path diagrams of the total effects model from years smoking (YS) to DIAT versus the 
corresponding mediation model via CPD. A tilde (~) indicates that the relevant mediation statistic was 
found to be significant at p < .05 using 5000 bias corrected (BC) bootstrapped resamples of n = 42 with 
replacement. SEB signifies the standard error of a path’s unstandardised OLS regression coefficients, B; 
the s are the standardized versions of these Bs.  * p  .05, ** p  .01, *** p   .001, **** p  .0001. 
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Table A10.1 
Statistical details of the total effects model from YS to DIAT, along with the statistical details of the 
bootstrapped mediation models from YS to DIAT via CPD, HONC or mFTQ.  
 
 Point 
Estimate 
SE p 
 
95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
Lower CI         Upper CI 
Models w/out CPD or HONC      
  Intercept -.04 .09 .69 -.19 .12 
  YS  DIAT (path c) .02 .02 .33 -.01 .05 
  R
2
,XY (path c) .05 .05 .33 -.05 .15 
Model with CPD      
  Intercept -.13 .09 .14 -.28 .02 
  YS  CPD (path a) 1.37 .23 < .0001 .99 1.75 
  CPD  DIAT (path b) .04 .02 .02 .01 .07 
  YS  DIAT (path c’) -.04 .04 .68 -.09 .03 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .06 .03 --a .02 .10 
  R
2
,XM  (path a) .72 .07 < .0001 .61 .83 
  R
2
,MXY  (paths b and c’) .19 .07 .006 .03 .35 
  2 .34 .13 --a .11 .54 
Model with HONC      
  Intercept -.09 .10 .70 -.25 .07 
  YS  mFTQ (path a) .47 .07 < .0001 .33 .61 
  mFTQ  DIAT (path b) .04 .04 .33 -.03 .10 
  YS  DIAT (path c’) .003 .02 .93 -.05 .06 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .02 .02 --a -.01 .05 
  R
2
,XM  (path a) .53 .12 < .0001 .33 .73 
  R
2
,MXY  (paths b and c’) .08 .16 .27 -.04 .20 
  2 .13 .11 --a .01 .34 
Model w/out mFTQ      
  Intercept -.02 .09 .85 -.17 .14 
  YS  DIAT (path c) .01 .02 .54 -.03 .04 
  R
2
,XY (path c) .01 .03 .54 -.04 .06 
Model with mFTQ      
  Intercept -.10 .09 .56 -.26 .05 
  YS  mFTQ (path a) .34 .05 < .0001 .26 .42 
  mFTQ  DIAT (path b) .12 .08 .13 -.01 .26 
  YS  DIAT (path c’) -.03 .03 .72 -.09 .03 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .04 .03 --b .01 .09 
  R
2
,XM  (path a) .65 .09 < .0001 .51 .79 
  R
2
,MXY  (paths b and c’) .11 .20 .25 -.21 .43 
  2 .26 .13 --b .05 .48 
Note. All 95% CIs are one-tailed as per Steiger (2004, p. 174) and all were bootstrapped except those for 
the  R2 estimates which weren’t provided for in the PROCESS software.  
a 20,000 bias corrected (BC) bootstrap resamples with replacement of n = 42; one multivariate outlier was 
found using the Mahalanobis distance method and removed from both the CPD and HONC models.  
b 20,000 BC bootstrap resamples with replacement of n = 41; two multivariate outliers were found using 
the Mahalanobis distance method and removed.  
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Modelling Some Causes of the four trial-type DIRAPs  
The Smoking-Pos DIRAP. As illustrated in Figure A10.2 below CPD, mFTQ and 
HONC all dominated the relationship between YS and Smoking-Pos DIRAP as very 
strong mediators (i.e. .17  2s  .30, ps  .05). Specifically, as per Hayes (2013, pp. 
158-164), although path c was large in all cases, s = .44, in contradiction path c’ was 
relatively small in each of the three mediation models,  = -.03. Thus, for example, 
approximately (2 =) 30% of the 20% shared total effects variance between YS and 
Smoking-Pos DIRAP could, in principle, have developed in tandem with HONC; which 
approximately amounts to a moderate 6% of Smoking-Pos DIRAP overall (or an r ≈ .24). 
And likewise, a small-to-moderate 4.4% and 3.4% of Smoking-Pos DIRAP (or rs ≈ .21, 
.18) could in principle have developed in tandem with CPD and mFTQ, respectively. In 
addition, our analysis indicated that between 5%-10% of Smoking-Pos DIRAP was likely 
to have resulted collaterally from each of the three smoking-compulsion intensity traits 
(i.e. as compared to the 5% of Smoking-Pos DIRAP which on average could have 
developed in tandem with tobacco addiction). Specifically, CPD, mFTQ and HONC all 
accounted for Smoking-Pos DIRAP even while controlling for YS, respective R
2-changes 
= .09, .05, .10, F(1, 41)s = 5.30, 2.91, 6.08, ps = .03, .10, .02 (see Table A10.2 for 
model details). 
 
 
Figure A10.2. Path diagram on top of the total effects model from years smoking (YS) to Smoking-Pos 
DIRAP, followed underneath by the corresponding path diagrams for mediation models via CPD, mFTQ or 
HONC. A tilde (~) indicates that the relevant mediation statistic was significant at p < .05 using 5000 BC 
bootstrapped resamples of n = 44 with replacement; and otherwise not. SEB signifies the standard error of 
a path’s unstandardised OLS regression coefficients (i.e. B); the s are the standardized versions of these 
Bs. * p  .05, ** p  .01, *** p   .001, **** p  .0001, with all ps one-tailed. 
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Table A10.2 
Statistical details of the bootstrapped mediation and total effects models from YS to Smoking-Pos DIRAP 
via CPD, mFTQ or HONC.  
 
 Point 
Estimate 
SE P 
 
95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
Lower CI         Upper CI 
 
Model w/out CPD, mFTQ 
or HONC 
     
  Intercept .06 .08 .45 -.08 .20 
  YS  DIRAP (path c) .03 .01 .03 .01 .05 
  R 2 ,XY (path c) .20 .08 .03 .02 .38 
 Model with CPD      
  Intercept -.004 .09 .97 -.15 .15 
  YS  CPD (path a) .92 .19 < .0001 .61 1.23 
  CPD  DIRAP (path b) .02 .01 .001 .01 .03 
  YS   DIRAP (path c’) .01 .01 .17 -.01 .04 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .02 .01 --a .01 .03 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .41 .11 < .0001 .23 .59 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .29 .10 .0007 .12 .46 
  2 .22 .07 --a .09 .32 
 Model with mFTQ       
  Intercept -.004 .09 .97 -.16 .15 
  YS  mFTQ (path a) .20 .02 < .0001 .13 .27 
  mFTQ  DIRAP (path b) .07 .04 .04 .04 .14 
  YS   DIRAP (path c’) .02 .02 .30 -.01 .04 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .01 .01 --a .003 .03 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .44 .10 < .0001 .27 .61 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .25 .10 .006 .09 .41 
  2 .17 .09 --a .04 .32 
 Model with HONC      
  Intercept -.02 09 .87 -.17 .14 
  YS  HONC (path a) .52 .06 < .0001 .42 .62 
  HONC  DIRAP (path b) .06 .02 .004 .03 .10 
  YS  DIRAP (path c’) -.002 .02 .55 -.03 .03 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .03 .01 --a .02 .05 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .68 .07 < .0001 .56 .80 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .30 .10 .0009 .13 .47 
  2 .30 .09 --a .16 .44 
Note. All 95% CIs are one-tailed as per Steiger (2004, p. 174) and all were bootstrapped except those for 
the  R2 estimates which weren’t provided for in the PROCESS software. 
a 20,000 BC bootstrap resamples of n = 44 with replacement; we found one multivariate outlier using the 
Mahalanobis distance method (in the CPD model) but did not exclude it because upon closer examination 
it was an extension of the predicted effect. 
 
The Ban-Neg DIRAP. The relationship between YS and Ban-Neg DIRAP appeared 
to be dominantly mediated by CPD, mFTQ and HONC, respectively, 2s = .19, .19, .19 
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(for relevant model Figure A10.3 and Table A10.3). However, given that the 
relationship between YS and Ban-Neg DIRAP was only moderate to begin with, F(1, 42) 
= 5.23, R2 = .11, p = .03, therefore only a null 2% of Ban-Neg DIRAP could have 
developed in tandem with CPD, mFTQ or HONC across YS (i.e. r = .14). In contrast, a 
further 5-8% of Ban-Neg DIRAP appeared to be an artefact of the three smoking-
compulsion intensity traits, R2-changes = .08, .07, .05, F(1, 41)s = 3.92, 3.52, 2.34, ps = 
.05, .07, .13.   
 
 
Figure A10.3. Path diagrams for the total effect model from years smoking (YS) to Ban-Neg DIRAP, for the 
corresponding mediation models via cigarettes smoked per day (CPD), mFTQ and HONC. All models 
involved n = 44. A tilde (~) indicates that the relevant mediation statistic was significant at p < .05 using 
5000 BC bootstrapped resamples of n with replacement; and otherwise not. SEB signifies the standard 
error of a path’s unstandardised OLS regression coefficients (i.e. B); the s are the standardized versions 
of these Bs. 
#
 p  .10, * p  .05, ** p  .01, *** p   .001, **** p  .0001, with all ps one-tailed. 
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Table A10.3 
Statistical details of the bootstrapped mediation and total effects models from YS to Ban-Neg DIRAP via 
CPD, mFTQ or HONC.  
 
 Point 
Estimate 
SE p 
 
95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
Lower CI        Upper CI 
 Model w/out CPD, mFTQ or 
HONC 
     
  Intercept .07 .08 .36 -.06 .20 
  YS  DIRAP (path c) .02 .01 .12 -.001 .04 
  
R
2
,XY (path c) .11 .08 .12 -.03 .25 
 Model with CPD      
  Intercept .01 .08 .87 -.12 .15 
  YS  CPD (path a) .92 .19 < .0001 .61 1.23 
  CPD  DIRAP (path b) .02 .01 .02 .005 .03 
  YS   DIRAP (path c’) .01 .02 .68 -.02 .04 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .01 .01 --a .01 .03 
  
R
2
,XM  (path a) .41 .11 < .0001 .23 .59 
  
R
2
,MXY  (paths b and c’) .19 .10 .02 .03 .35 
  2 .19 .07 --a .07 .30 
 Model with mFTQ       
  Intercept -.002 .08 .99 -.14 .14 
  YS  mFTQ (path a) .20 .04 < .0001 .13 .27 
  mFTQ  DIRAP (path b) .08 .04 .07 .01 .14 
  YS   DIRAP (path c’) .01 .02 .75 -.03 .04 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .02 .01 --a .0004 .09 
  
R
2
,XM  (path a) .44 .05 < .0001 .27 .61 
  
R
2
,MXY  (paths b and c’) .18 .10 .02 .01 .35 
  2 .19 .10 --a .03 .35 
 Model with HONC      
  Intercept .02 .08 .80 -.12 .16 
  YS  HONC (path a) .52 .06 < .0001 .42 .62 
  HONC  DIRAP (path b) .04 .03 .16 -.01 .09 
  YS  DIRAP (path c’) .0001 .03 .98 -.04 .04 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .02 .01 --a -.002 .04 
  
R
2
,XM  (path a) .68 .07 < .0001 .56 .80 
  
R
2
,MXY  (paths b and c’) .16 .06 .04 .07 .25 
  2 .19 .11 --a .02 .38 
Note. All 95% CIs are one-tailed as per Steiger (2004, p. 174) and all were bootstrapped except those for 
the  R2 estimates which weren’t provided for in the PROCESS software.  
a 20,000 BC bootstrap resamples of n = 44 with replacement; we found one multivariate outlier using the 
Mahalanobis distance method (in the CPD model) but did not exclude it because upon closer examination 
it was an extension of the predicted effect. 
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APPENDIX 11 
 
Compensation Algorithm for Comparisons of trial-type DIRAP rsbs with DIAT rsbs 
 
The Spearman-Brown’s generalized prediction formula is: 
 
  xx
xx



1k1
k'
xx

   
 
where xx  is the internal reliability of the current test, and where
'
xx  is the predicted 
internal reliability of current test if all things being equal it had k times as many test 
items as the current test (i.e. this can include numbers between zero and one if we wish 
to hypothetically shorten the current test; Brown, 1910; Spearman, 1910; Wainer & 
Thissen, 2001; Webb et al., 2007, p. 87). 
 
 
Thus,  
 
  r
r
r
r
rsb




1
2
121
2
     
 
where rsb is the Spearman-Brown corrected split-half reliability of a given test, and 
where r is the split-half reliability of that test. 
 
Thus, the formula for the ‘compensated rsbs’ which predict the internal reliability of a 
given trial-type DIRAPs with four times as many of the same trials as they have (i.e. as 
many as the DIAT), 
 
Compensated 
  sb
sb
sb
sb
sb
r
r
r
r
r
31
4
141
4



   
 
where rsb is the Spearman-Brown corrected split-half correlation of the original trial-
type DIRAP in question. 
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APPENDIX 12 
 
The Demographic and Behavioural History Questionnaire Version 2 (DBHQ-2) 
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APPENDIX 13 
 
The Avoidance and Inflexibility Scale (AIS) 
 
 
 
 
 
381 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
382 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
383 
 
APPENDIX 14 
 
Bootstrapped Mediaton Models of the four IRAP trial-type effects in Terms of 
Trait Tobacco Addiction Intensity across Years Smoking 
Table A14.1 
Statistical details of the bootstrapped mediation and total effects models from YS to Enjoy-Pos DIRAP via 
CPD, mFTQ, HONC or AIS.  
 
 Point 
Estimate 
SE p 
 
95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
Lower CI         Upper CI 
 Model w/out CPDa      
  Intercept .24 .08 .01 .10 .37 
  YS  DIRAP (path c) .05 .03 .05 .01 .10 
  R 2 ,XY (path c) .11 .08 .05 -.05 .27 
 Model w/out mFTQ or 
HONCb 
     
  Intercept .22 .08 .01 .08 .36 
  YS  DIRAP (path c) .06 .03 .08 .004 .11 
  R 2 ,XY (path c) .12 .08 .06 -.04 .28 
 Model w/out AISc      
  Intercept .22 .08 .01 .08 .36 
  YS  DIRAP (path c) .05 .04 .14 -.01 .11 
  R 2 ,XY (path c) .09 .08 .14 -.06 .24 
 Model with CPDa      
  Intercept .24 .08 .01 .10 .38 
  YS  CPD (path a) 2.78 .14 < .0001 2.54 3.02 
  CPD  DIRAP (path b) -.03 .04 .53 -.10 .04 
  YS  DIRAP (path c’) .12 .11 .28 -.07 .32 
  Indirect effect (path ab) -.07 .13 --a -.24 .15 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .95 .02 < .0001 .92 .98 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .12 .08 .10 -.04 .28 
  2 .11 .11 --a .005 .29 
 Model with mFTQb       
  Intercept .22 .08 .01 .08 .35 
  YS  mFTQ (path a) 2.80 .22 < .0001 2.43 3.17 
  mFTQ  DIRAP (path b) .005 .04 .90 -.06 .07 
  YS  DIRAP (path c’) .04 .11 .71 -.15 .23 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .01 .10 --b -.17 .14 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .89 .03 < .0001 .83 .95 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .11 .08 .18 -.05 .26 
  2 .03 .11 --b .00 .06 
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Table A14.1 (continued) 
Statistical details of the bootstrapped mediation and total effects models from YS to Enjoy-Pos DIRAP via 
CPD, mFTQ, HONC or AIS.  
 
 
 
Point 
Estimate 
SE p 
 
95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
Lower CI         Upper CI 
 Model with HONCb      
  Intercept .22 08 .01 .08 .35 
  YS  HONC (path a) .68 .13 < .0001 .46 .90 
  HONC  DIRAP (path b) .06 .06 .32 -.04 .16 
  YS  DIRAP (path c’) .02 .05 .76 -.07 .10 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .04 .04 --b -.02 .10 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .56 .09 < .0001 .38 .74 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .16 .09 .08 -.01 . 33 
  2 .17 .11 --b .01 .36 
 Model with AISc      
  Intercept .16 .19 .41 -.16 .48 
  YS  AIS (path a) 5.51 .79 < .0001 4.16 6.86 
  AIS  DIRAP (path b) .004 .01 .76 -.02 .03 
  YS  DIRAP (path c’) .03 .09 .73 -.12 .18 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .02 .07 --c -.10 .13 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .74 .06 < .0001 .62 .86 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .10 .08 .22 -.05 . 25 
  2 .07 .13 --c .0003 .19 
Note. All 95% CIs are one-tailed as per Steiger (2004, p. 174) and all were bootstrapped except those for 
the  R2 estimates which weren’t provided for in the PROCESS software.  
a 20,000 BC bootstrap resamples of n = 30 with replacement (i.e. two multivariate outliers were found 
using the Mahalanobis distance method). b 20,000 BC bootstrap resamples of n = 32 with replacement 
(i.e. no multivariate outliers). c 20,000 BC bootstrap resamples of n = 31 (i.e. one multivariate outlier).  
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Table A14.2 
Statistical details of the bootstrapped mediation and total effects models from YS to Enjoy-Neg DIRAP via 
CPD, mFTQ, HONC or AIS.  
 
 Point 
Estimate 
SE p 
 
95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
Lower CI         Upper CI 
 Model w/out CPDa      
  Intercept .17 .08 .04 .04 .31 
  YS  DIRAP (path c) .05 .02 .02 .02 .09 
  R 2 ,XY (path c) .14 .09 .02 -.04 .32 
 Model w/out mFTQ or 
HONCb 
     
  Intercept .16 .08 .05 .03 .30 
  YS  DIRAP (path c) .05 .02 .03 .01 .10 
  R 2 ,XY (path c) .15 .09 .03 -.03 .31 
 Model w/out AISc      
  Intercept .16 .08 .06 .02 .29 
  YS  DIRAP (path c) .06 .03 .03 .02 .11 
  R 2 ,XY (path c) .15 .09 .03 -.03 .33 
 Model with CPDa      
  Intercept .17 .08 .04 .03 .31 
  YS  CPD (path a) 2.78 .14 < .0001 2.54 3.02 
  CPD  DIRAP (path b) .03 .03 .36 -.02 .08 
  YS   DIRAP (path c’) -.03 .09 .75 -.18 .12 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .08 .12 --a -.05 .29 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .95 .02 < .0001 .92 .98 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .15 .09 .07 -.03 .33 
  2 .13 .11 --a .01 .34 
 Model with mFTQb       
  Intercept .16 .08 .07 .02 .29 
  YS  mFTQ (path a) 2.80 .22 < .0001 2.43 3.17 
  mFTQ  DIRAP (path b) .01 .03 .68 -.03 .06 
  YS   DIRAP (path c’) .02 .08 .78 -.11 .16 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .03 .08 --b -.11 .15 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .89 .03 < .0001 .83 .95 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .14 .09 .12 -.03 .31 
  2 .08 .11 --b .001 .21 
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Table A14.2 (continued) 
Statistical details of the bootstrapped mediation and total effects models from YS to Enjoy-Neg DIRAP via 
CPD, mFTQ, HONC or AIS.  
 
 
 
Point 
Estimate 
SE p 
 
95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
Lower CI         Upper CI 
 Model with HONCb      
  Intercept .16 .08 .06 .02 .29 
  YS  HONC (path a) .68 .13 < .0001 .46 .90 
  HONC  DIRAP (path b) .07 .03 .04 .02 .13 
  YS  DIRAP (path c’) .004 .03 .91 -.05 .06 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .05 .02 --b .02 .09 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .56 .06 < .0001 .38 .74 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .23 .10 .009 .04 .42 
  2 .24 .10 --b .07 .40 
 Model with AISc      
  Intercept .07 .16 .69 -.21 .34 
  YS  AIS (path a) 5.51 .79 < .0001 4.16 6.86 
  AIS  DIRAP (path b) .01 .01 .54 -.01 .02 
  YS  DIRAP (path c’) .03 .06 .67 -.08 .14 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .03 .07 --c -.07 .13 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .74 .06 < .0001 .62 .86 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .17 .09 .13 -.01 .35 
  2 .12 .13 --c .003 .31 
Note. All 95% CIs are one-tailed as per Steiger (2004, p. 174) and all were bootstrapped except those for 
the  R2 estimates which weren’t provided for in the PROCESS software.  
a 20,000 BC bootstrap resamples of n = 30 with replacement (i.e. two multivariate outliers were found 
using the Mahalanobis distance method). b 20,000 BC bootstrap resamples of n = 32 with replacement 
(i.e. no multivariate outliers). c 20,000 BC bootstrap resamples of n = 31 (i.e. one multivariate outlier). 
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Table A14.3 
Statistical details of the bootstrapped mediation and total effects models from YS to Need-Pos DIRAP via 
CPD, mFTQ, HONC or AIS. 
 
 
 Point 
Estimate 
SE P 
 
95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
Lower CI         Upper CI 
 Model w/out CPDa      
  Intercept .16 .12 .18 -.04 .36 
  YS  DIRAP (path c) .07 .04 .049 .01 .13 
  R 2 ,XY (path c) .15 .09 .049 -.03 .33 
 Model w/out mFTQ or 
HONCb
      
  Intercept .16 .12 .19 -.04 .35 
  YS  DIRAP (path c) .06 .03 .07 -.007 .12 
  R 2 ,XY (path c) .12 .08 .07 -.04 .28 
 Model w/out AISc      
  Intercept .17 .12 .15 -.02 .37 
  YS  DIRAP (path c) .05 .03 .16 -.01 .10 
  R 2 ,XY (path c) .07 .07 .16 -.06 .20 
 Model with CPDa      
  Intercept .16 .12 .18 -.04 .36 
  YS  CPD (path a) 2.78 .14 < .0001 2.54 3.02 
  CPD  DIRAP (path b) .009 .05 .86 -.07 .09 
  YS   DIRAP (path c’) .05 .13 .71 -.18 .28 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .02 .10 --a -.19 .20 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .95 .02 < .0001 .92 .98 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .15 .09 .16 -.03 .33 
  2 .03 .14 --a .00 .07 
 Model with mFTQb       
  Intercept .14 .12 .26 -.07 .34 
  YS  mFTQ (path a) 2.80 .22 < .0001 2.43 3.17 
  mFTQ  DIRAP (path b) .02 .02 .27 -.01 .06 
  YS   DIRAP (path c’) -.0003 .07 .97 -.12 .11 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .07 .07 --b -.06 .16 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .89 .03 < .0001 .83 .95 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .14 .09 .12 -.03 .31 
  2 .13 .10 --b .009 .30 
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Table A14.3 (continued) 
Statistical details of the bootstrapped mediation and total effects models from YS to Need-Pos DIRAP via 
CPD, mFTQ, HONC or AIS. 
 
 
 
Point 
Estimate 
SE p 
 
95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
Lower CI         Upper CI 
 Model with HONCb      
  Intercept .15 .12 .20 -.05 .35 
  YS  HONC (path a) .68 .13 < .0001 .46 .90 
  HONC  DIRAP (path b) .06 .05 .25 -.03 .15 
  YS  DIRAP (path c’) .02 .06 .72 -.09 .13 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .04 .04 --b -.01 .11 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .56 .09 < .0001 .38 .74 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .16 .09 .08 -.01 . 33 
  2 .16 .11 --b .02 .35 
 Model with AISc      
  Intercept .01 .17 .93 -.27 .30 
  YS  AIS (path a) 5.51 .79 < .0001 4.16 6.86 
  AIS  DIRAP (path b) .01 .01 .15 -.002 .02 
  YS  DIRAP (path c’) -.01 .05 .85 -.09 .08 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .06 .05 --c -.01 .14 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .74 .06 < .0001 .62 .86 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .10 .08 .18 -.05 . 25 
  2 .17 .10 --c .02 .33 
Note. All 95% CIs are one-tailed as per Steiger (2004, p. 174) and all were bootstrapped except those for 
the  R2 estimates which weren’t provided for in the PROCESS software.  
a 20,000 BC bootstrap resamples of n = 30 with replacement (i.e. two multivariate outliers were found 
using the Mahalanobis distance method). b 20,000 BC bootstrap resamples of n = 32 with replacement 
(i.e. no multivariate outliers). c 20,000 BC bootstrap resamples of n = 31 (i.e. one multivariate outlier). 
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Table A14.4 
Statistical details of the bootstrapped mediation and total effects models from YS to Need-Neg DIRAP via 
CPD, mFTQ, HONC or AIS.  
 
 Point 
Estimate 
SE p 
 
95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
Lower CI         Upper CI 
 Model w/out CPDa      
  Intercept .09 .09 .33 -.06 .24 
  YS  DIRAP (path c) .10 .03 .002 .05 .16 
  R 2 ,XY (path c) .29 .11 .002 .08 .50 
 Model w/out mFTQ or  
HONCb 
     
  Intercept .07 .09 .40 -.07 .22 
  YS  DIRAP (path c) .11 .03 .0001 .06 .16 
  R 2 ,XY (path c) .35 .11 .0001 .14 .56 
 Model w/out AISc      
  Intercept .07 .09 .43 -.08 .22 
  YS  DIRAP (path c) .12 .03 .001 .06 .18 
  R 2 ,XY (path c) .34 .11 .001 .13 .55 
 Model with CPDa      
  Intercept .08 .09 .37 -.07 .23 
  YS  CPD (path a) 2.78 .14 < .0001 2.54 3.02 
  CPD  DIRAP (path b) .09 .05 .10 -.0001 .18 
  YS   DIRAP (path c’) -.15 .16 .35 -.43 .12 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .26 .15 --a .06 .50 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .95 .02 < .0001 .92 .98 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .38 .10 .001 .18 .58 
  2 .35 .15 --a .08 .58 
 Model with mFTQb      
  Intercept .03 .08 .73 -.11 .17 
  YS  mFTQ (path a) 2.80 .22 < .0001 2.43 3.17 
  mFTQ  DIRAP (path b) .06 .03 .08 .003 .11 
  YS   DIRAP (path c’) -.05 .10 .62 -.22 .12 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .16 .09 --b -.02 .27 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .89 .03 < .0001 .83 .95 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .44 .10 .0009 .25 .63 
  2 .36 .17 --b .05 .60 
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Table A14.4 (continued) 
Statistical details of the bootstrapped mediation and total effects models from YS to Need-Neg DIRAP via 
CPD, mFTQ, HONC or AIS.  
 
 
 
Point 
Estimate 
SE p 
 
95% Confidence Intervals (CI) 
Lower CI         Upper CI 
 Model with HONCb      
  Intercept .07 .09 .43 -.08 .22 
  YS  HONC (path a) .68 .13 < .0001 .46 .90 
  HONC  DIRAP (path b) .07 .05 .19 -.02 .15 
  YS   DIRAP (path c’) .07 .04 .13 -.01 .14 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .04 .03 --b -.02 .09 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .56 .09 < .0001 .38 .74 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .39 .12 .003 .15 .63 
  2 .19 .11 --b .02 .36 
 Model with AISc      
  Intercept -.20 .18 .26 -.50 .10 
  YS  AIS (path a) 5.51 .79 < .0001 4.16 6.86 
  AIS  DIRAP (path b) .02 .01 .13 -.002 .04 
  YS  DIRAP (path c’) .02 .08 .81 -.12 .16 
  Indirect effect (path ab) .10 .06 --c -.01 .19 
  R 2 ,XM  (path a) .74 .06 < .0001 .62 .86 
  R 2 ,MXY  (paths b and c’) .43 .10 .001 .24 .62 
  2 .31 .15 --c .03 .54 
Note. All 95% CIs are one-tailed as per Steiger (2004, p. 174) and all were bootstrapped except those for 
the  R2 estimates which weren’t provided for in the PROCESS software.  
a 20,000 BC bootstrap resamples of n = 30 with replacement; two multivariate outliers were found using 
the Mahalanobis distance method. b 20,000 BC bootstrap resamples of n = 32 with replacement (i.e. no 
multivariate outliers). c 20,000 BC bootstrap resamples of n = 31 (i.e. one multivariate outlier). 
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APPENDIX 15 
 
The ‘Extended’ DIRAP-algorithm 
The details of the extended DIRAP-algorithm are as follows: (i) only response-
latency data from the three pairs of test blocks and the preceeding pair of practise blocks 
(i.e. the criterion practise blocks) are used; (ii) latencies above 10 000 ms are eliminated 
from the dataset; (iii) the entire IRAP dataset is eliminated for any participant for whom 
more than 10% of test-block trials have latencies less than 300ms; (iv) sixteen standard 
deviations are computed, one for the response latencies belonging to each trial-type 
across the two criterion practise blocks, and one for the response latencies belonging to 
each trial-type in each of the three pairs of test blocks; (v) 32 mean response latencies 
are calculated, one for each of the four trial-types in each criterion practise block and 
test block; (vi) 16 difference scores are computed, one per trial-type per pair of 
qualifying trial blocks, by subtracting the mean latency of each trial-type’s trials in each 
pro-smoking block from the mean latency of that trial-type’s trials in the paired anti-
smoking block; (vii) each difference score is then divided by its corresponding standard 
deviation from step iv, yielding 16 block-pair DIRAP scores; one score for each trial-type 
across the criterion practise blocks and one score for each trial-type across each pair of 
test blocks; (viii) four standard trial-type DIRAP scores are computed by averaging each 
trial-type’s three block-pair DIRAPs from step vii relating to test blocks; (ix) and finally, 
four extended trial-type DIRAP scores may optionally be computed by averaging all four 
of each trial-type’s block-pair DIRAPs from step vii. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
392 
 
APPENDIX 16 
 
The Instructions for IRAP-based Perspective Switching Task in Study 3 
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APPENDIX 17 
 
Instructions for the Questionnaire-based Perspective Switching Task in Study 3 
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APPENDIX 18 
 
The Manipulation Check Questionnaires for IRAP-based Perspective Swtiching 
Task in Study 3 
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APPENDIX 19 
 
The Manipulation Check Questionnaires for Questionnaire-based Perspective 
Swtiching Task in Study 3 
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APPENDIX 20 
 
Response Latency by Thought Suppression Analyses for Study 3 
The Smoking-Pos DIRAP and Ban-Neg DIRAP were the only two (standard) trial-type 
DIRAPs in Study 3a to be impacted by the thought suppression instructions. This might 
have occured either by the relevant instructions leading to a speeding up of anti-
smoking IRAP responses relative to pro-smoking IRAP responses; and/or by the 
relevant instructions leading to a slowing down of pro-smoking IRAP responses relative 
to anti-smoking IRAP responses. Crucially, the former eventuality would have implied 
that the Smoking-Pos DIRAP and Ban-Neg DIRAP became less pro-smoking as a result of 
the thought suppression instructions facilitating anti-smoking responding (i.e. 
facilitating smokers’ pre-existing anti-smoking implicit evaluating perspectives). And 
the latter eventuality would imply that these trial-type effects became less pro-smoking 
as a result of the thought suppression instructions interfering with pro-smoking 
responding (i.e. with smokers’ pre-existing implicit evaluating perspectives). Therefore, 
in order to determine the extent to which the thought suppresion instructions impacted 
Smoking-Pos DIRAP and Ban-Neg DIRAP via pro- versus anti-smoking IRAP response 
latencies we conducted two corresponding 2x2 mixed ANOVAs. Specifically, these 
ANOVAs respectively examined Smoking-Pos DIRAP and Ban-Neg DIRAP in terms of 
crossing the IRAP effect variable (i.e. pro- versus anti-smoking IRAP response 
latencies) with a contrast between the control group and both perspective switching 
groups considered collectively. 
The first ANOVA indicated that there was a moderate-to-small interaction effect 
between thought suppression and the IRAP effect variable on Smoking-Pos response 
latency, F(1, 54) = 3.33, p = .07, p
2 = .06 (i.e. r ≈ .24), which qualified a main effect 
for IRAP effect F(1, 54) = 26.98, p = .0001, p
2 = .33, r ≈.58, and a null main effect for 
the thought suppression contrast, F(1, 54) = 1.19, p = .28, p
2 = .02, r ≈ .15. Crucially, 
planned comparisons indicated that the thought suppressors’ Smoking-Pos affirmation 
response latencies were a moderate degree slower than the control group’s Smoking-Pos 
affirmation response latencies (i.e. t(54) = -1.82, p = .07, 2 = .06, r ≈ .24); and that by 
contrast, there was no such difference for the Smoking-Pos denial response latencies 
(i.e. t(54) = -.13, p = .90, 2 = .0003, r ≈ .02). 
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The second ANOVA indicated that there was a moderate-to-small interaction effect 
between the control versus thought suppression contrast and the IRAP effect variable on 
Ban-Neg response latency, F(1, 54) = 1.91, p = .17, p
2 = .04 (i.e. r ≈ .19), which 
qualified main effects for both variables (i.e. respectively, Fs = 2.89, 30.93; ps = .09, 
.0001; p
2s = .05, .36; rs ≈ .23, .60). Crucially, planned comparisons indicated that the 
thought suppressors’ Ban-Neg affirmation response latencies were a moderate degree 
slower than the control group’s Ban-Neg affirmation response latencies (i.e. t(54) = -
2.33, p = .02, 2 = .09, r ≈ .30); and that by contrast, there was no such  difference for 
the Ban-Neg denial response latencies (i.e. t(54) = -1.01, p = .32, 2 = .02, r ≈ .14). 
Overall, therefore, it appeared as though the thought suppression instructions made 
smokers’ Smoking-Pos DIRAP and Ban-Neg DIRAP less pro-smoking only by interfering 
with their pro-smoking responding on these trial-types (i.e. with smokers’ pre-existing 
implicit evaluating perspectives), rather than by facilitating their anti-smoking 
responding to these trial-types (e.g. by stimulating smokers’ pre-existing anti-smoking 
implicit evaluating perspectives). 
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APPENDIX 21 
 
Response Latency by Thought Suppression and Block Order Analyses for Study 3 
The IRAP block order variable interacted with the pre-practise thought 
suppression instructions but not with the post-practise thought suppression instructions. 
We therefore analysed only the pre-practise group as a means of determining how their 
thought suppression instructions interacted with IRAP block order in terms of 
facilitating versus interfering with pro- versus anti-smoking responses across the four 
IRAP trial-types. Applying the appropriate ANOVA contrasts revealed that there was a 
moderately-sized interaction effect between the pre-practise thought suppression 
instructions and the IRAP effect variable, F(1, 14) = .92, p = .35, p
2 = .06 (i.e. r ≈ .25), 
which qualified a large main effect for IRAP effect, F(1, 14) = 3.69, p = .07, p
2 = .21, r 
≈ .46, and a moderately-sized main effect for the thought suppression contrast, F(1, 14) 
= 1.50, p = .24, p
2 = .10, r ≈ .31. Crucially, planned comparisons indicated that the pre-
practise group’s anti-smoking response latencies were a moderate-to-large degree faster 
in the pro-smoking-first block order than the anti-smoking-first block order (i.e. t(14) = 
-1.52, p = .15, 2 = .14, r ≈ .38). Indeed, the pre-practise group’s pro-smoking response 
latencies were also moderately faster in the pro-smoking-first block order than the anti-
smoking-first block order (i.e. t(14) = -.90, p = .38, 2 = .05, r ≈ .23). As such, given 
that the latter effect was actually contrary to the thought suppression instructions (i.e. 
and more importantly, the block order effect), it implies that the pre-practise block order 
effect across four IRAP trial-types was exclusively due to the pro-smoking-first block 
order facilitating anti-smoking IRAP responses relative to the anti-smoking-first block 
order. 
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APPENDIX 22 
 
Response Latency by Thought Suppression and Block Order Analyses for Study 4 
When the thought suppression instructions reduced the current trial-type DIRAPs, 
in each case it might have occured by the relevant instructions leading to a speeding up 
of anti-smoking IRAP responses relative to pro-smoking IRAP responses; and/or by the 
relevant instructions leading to a slowing down of pro-smoking IRAP resposnes relative 
to anti-smoking IRAP responses. Crucially, the former eventuality would imply that the 
affected trial-type DIRAPs became less mood-consistent as a result of the thought 
suppression instructions facilitating mood-inconsistent responding (i.e. facilitating 
smokers’ pre-existing mood-inconsistent implicit evaluating perspectives). And the 
latter eventuality would imply that these trial-type effects became less mood-consistent 
as a result of the thought suppression instructions interfering with mood-consistent 
responding (i.e. with smokers’ pre-existing implicit evaluating perspectives). Therefore, 
in order to determine whether the perspective switching instructions most impacted the 
relevant trial-type DIRAPs via mood-consistent versus -inconsistent IRAP response 
latencies we conducted the following ANOVAs, accounting for block order wherever it 
made a difference. 
The first ANOVA indicated that there was a moderate-to-small interaction effect 
between perspective switching and the IRAP effect variable on Need-Neg response 
latency, F(1, 46) = 2.65, p = .11, p
2 = .05 (i.e. r ≈ .23), which qualified a large main 
effect for IRAP effect, F(1, 46) = 18.37, p < .0001, p
2 = .29, r ≈ .53, and also a large 
main effect for the perspective switching contrast, F(1, 46) = 24.10, p < .0001, p
2 = .34, 
r ≈ .59. Crucially, planned comparisons indicated that the perspective switchers’ 
consistent Need-Neg response latencies were a moderate degree slower than the control 
group’s Need-Neg response latencies (i.e. t(46) = -4.70, p < .0001, 2 = .32, r ≈ .57); 
and that by contrast, the relevant difference was smaller for the inconsistent Need-Neg 
response latencies (i.e. t(46) = -3.22, p = .002, 2 = .18, r ≈ .43). 
The second ANOVA indicated that there was a moderate-to-large three-way 
interaction on Need-Pos response latencies among IRAP effect, perspective switching, 
and block order, F(2, 42) = 3.45, p = .04, p
2 = .14 (i.e. r ≈ .38). This interaction 
qualified a large main effect of perspective switching, F(2, 42) = 9.08, p = .0001, p
2 = 
.30 (i.e. r ≈ .55), and a two-way interaction between IRAP effect and perspective 
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switching, F(2, 42) = 4.32, p = .02, p
2 = .17 (i.e. r ≈ .41), but all other omnibus effects 
were null, Fs ≤ .84, ps ≥ .36, p
2s ≤ .02 (i.e. rs ≤ .14). Crucially, planned comparisons 
indicated that the pre- and post-practise groups’ consistent Need-Pos response latencies 
were a large degree slower than the control group’s Need-Pos response latencies in both 
block order conditions (i.e. respectively, t(15)s = -3.70, -2.60, -2.60, -5.40; ps = .002, 
.02, .02, .0001; 2s = .48, .31, .31, .66; rs ≈ .69, .56, .56, .81); and that by contrast, the 
corresponding pre- and post-practise differences were typically moderately-sized for the 
inconsistent Need-Neg response latencies in both block orders (i.e. respectively, t(15)s = 
-.92, -2.15, -.81, -1.15; ps = .37, .05, .44, .27; 2s = .05, .24, .04, .08; rs ≈ .23, .49, .20, 
.28). In other words, the perspective switching instructions appeared to impact Need-
Pos DIRAP by slowing mood-consistent (i.e. ‘False’) Need-Pos responses more than 
mood-inconsistent (i.e. ‘True’) Need-Pos responses (i.e. even when this impact was 
moderated by block order). 
By contrast, the mood-consistent-first block order helped make the pre-practise 
group’s Need-Pos DIRAP less mood-consistent (and more pro-smoking) mainly by 
speeding up their mood-inconsistent IRAP responding, t(14) = -.88, p = .39; 2 = .05, r 
≈ .22, rather than by interfering with their mood-consistent IRAP responding, t(14) = 
.57, p = .58; 2 = .02, r ≈ .15 (i.e. the relevant interaction was moderately-sized, F(1, 
14) = 2.02, p = .18, p
2 = .13, r = .36). However, conversely, the mood-inconsistent-first 
block order helped make the post-practise group’s Need-Pos DIRAP less mood-consistent 
(and more pro-smoking) mainly by interfering with their mood-consistent IRAP 
responding, t(14) = -1.78, p = .10; 2 = .18, r ≈ .43, rather than by speeding up their 
mood-inconsistent IRAP responding, t(14) = .62, p = .54; 2 = .03, r ≈ .16 (i.e. the 
relevant interaction was moderately-sized, F(1, 14) = 4.00, p = .07, p
2 = .22, r = .47). 
The third and final ANOVA indicated that there was a moderate two-way 
interaction on Enjoy-Neg response latencies both between IRAP effect and perspective 
switching, F(2, 42) = 2.08, p = .14, p
2 = .09 (i.e. r ≈ .30); and also between perspective 
switching and block order, F(2, 42) = 1.68, p = .20, p
2 = .07 (i.e. r ≈ .27). These 
interactions qualified a main effect of perspective switching, F(2, 42) = 14.09, p < 
.0001, p
2 = .40 (i.e. r ≈ .63), but all other main and interaction effects were null, Fs 
≤.64, ps ≥ .43, p
2s ≤ .01 (i.e. rs ≤ .12). Crucially, planned comparisons indicated that 
the pre- and post-practise groups’ consistent Enjoy-Neg response latencies tended to be 
slower than than the control group’s Enjoy-Neg response latencies, (i.e. respectively, 
t(15)s = -2.66, -5.23, -.87, -4.62; ps = .02, .0001, .40, .0003; 2s = .32, .65, .04, .58; rs ≈ 
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.57, .80, .20, .77), to a consistently greater degree than the consistent Enjoy-Neg 
response latencies were (i.e. respectively, t(15)s = -2.83, -3.04, -.05, -2.53; ps = .01, .01, 
.96, .02; 2s = .35, .38, .0002, .30; rs ≈ .59, .62, .01, .55). In other words, crucially, the 
perspective switching instructions appeared to impact Enjoy-Neg DIRAP by slowing 
mood-consistent Enjoy-Neg responses more than mood-inconsistent Enjoy-Neg 
responses (i.e. even when this impact was moderated by block order). 
Indeed, likewise (and much like the post-practise mood-inconsistent-first block 
order for Need-Pos DIRAP), the post-practise mood-consistent-first block order helped 
make Enjoy-Neg DIRAP less mood-consistent (and more pro-smoking) mainly by 
interfering with their mood-consistent IRAP responding, t(14) = -2.01, p = .06; 2 = .22, 
r ≈ .47, rather than by speeding up their mood-inconsistent IRAP responding which 
were actually moderately slower than the mood-consistent-first pre-practise group, t(14) 
= .93, p = .37; 2 = .06, r ≈ .24 (i.e. the relevant interaction was moderately-sized, F(1, 
14) = 1.34, p = .27, p
2 = .25, r = .50). Overall, therefore, it appeared as though the 
perspective switching instructions made their impact on the current trial-type DIRAPs by 
interfering with mood-consistent responding (i.e. with smokers’ pre-existing implicit 
evaluating perspectives), rather than by facilitating mood-inconsistent responding. And 
that, block order operated differently depending upon not just perspective switching, but 
also the particular trial-type DIRAP involved. Namely, whereas the pre-practise block 
order effect on Need-Pos DIRAP occurred by facilitating mood-inconsistent IRAP 
responding, both post-practise block order effects (i.e. on Need-Pos DIRAP and Enjoy-
Neg DIRAP) occurred by interfering with mood-consistent IRAP responding. 
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APPENDIX 23 
 
A Thought-listing Questionnaire for Musical Induction of Sad Moods 
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APPENDIX 24 
 
PASAT-C Mood Induction Manipulation Check Rating Scales 
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APPENDIX 25 
 
The Demographic and Behavioural History Questionnaire Version 3 (DBHQ-3) 
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